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In this thesis, a particular class of agent is singled out for examination. In order to provide
a guiding metaphor, we speak of control room agents. Our focus is on rational decision-
making by such agents, where the circumstances obtaining are such that rationality is
bounded. Control room agents, whether human or non-human, need to reason and act
in a changing environment with only limited information available to them. Determining
the current state of the environment is a central concern for control room agents if they
are to reason and act sensibly. A control room agent cannot plan its actions without
having an internal representation (epistemic state) of its environment, and cannot make
rational decisions unless this representation, to some level of accuracy, reects the state
of its environment. The focus of this thesis is on three aspects regarding the epistemic
functioning of a control room agent:
1. How should the epistemic state of a control room agent be represented in order to
facilitate logical analysis?
2. How should a control room agent change its epistemic state upon receiving new
information?
3. How should a control room agent combine available information from di¤erent
sources?
i
In describing the class of control room agents as rst-order intentional systems hav-
ing both informational and motivational attitudes, an agent-oriented view is adopted.
The central construct used in the information-theoretic approach, which is qualitative in
nature, is the concept of a templated ordering.
Representing the epistemic state of a control room agent by a (special form of) tem-
plated ordering signals a departure from the many approaches in which only the beliefs
of an agent are represented. Templated orderings allow for the representation of both
knowledge and belief.
A control room agent changes its epistemic state according to a proposed epistemic
change algorithm, which allows the agent to select between two well-established forms of
belief change operations, namely, belief revision and belief update.
The combination of (possibly conicting) information from di¤erent sources has re-
ceived a lot of attention in recent years. Using templated orderings for the semantic
representation of information, a new family of purely qualitative merging operations is
developed.
Keywords: control room agents, semantic information theory, nonmonotonic logic,
templated orderings, epistemic logic, epistemic entrenchment, epistemic states, AGM
postulates, iterated revision, templated revision, templated update, social choice theory,
information fusion, content-based merging.
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This Is the Title of This Story
Which Is Also Found Several Times in the Story Itself.
David Mosers story in Metamagical Themas (Douglas Hofstadter)
1.1 Motivation and overview
The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, that
took place in March 1979 nearly caused a catastrophe. In the subsequent investigation
into the accident, the operators (agents) were blamed for errors that were actually
sensible defeasible conjectures based on default rules provided by their training. They
were acting to avoid the risks associated with a loss of coolantsystem state, unaware that
the system was already in that state. This example is illustrative of the more general
scenario in which control room agents, whether human or non-human, need to reason
and act in a changing environment with only limited information available to them. It
highlights the importance of determining the current state of the environment and the
importance of having an internal representation (called an epistemic state) which reects
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the state of the environment.
The environmentsof control room agents form what we shall call the class of dia-
grammable systems, which, broadly speaking, are systems that are directly representable
(in a sense to be made precise) with nitely many components. The key features of
diagrammable systems are that they are dynamic and discrete. Control room agents
themselves may be summarised as rst-order intentional systems having specic infor-
mational and motivational attitudes, about which more will be said later. Control room
agents are further characterised by a set of principles which may be viewed as a spe-
cialisation of more general principles for rational (ideal) agents. A key specialisation is
the principle of Qualitativeness, which, motivated from cognitive science, advocates a
qualitative approach, as opposed to the quantitative approaches underlying probabilistic
or fuzzy methods. The quantitative approaches represent a large and important body of
work but they violate our insistence on qualitativeness and therefore are not included in
our comparisons.
The information-theoretic approach that is developed to address the questions raised
in this thesis is purely qualitative in nature. The central construct used in the information-
theoretic approach is the concept of a templated ordering, or t-ordering for short. T-
orderings have their origins in the dichotomous partitions associated with semantic
information theory (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952) and in the strict modular partial or-
ders associated with the approach of Lehmann and Magidor (1992) to nonmonotonic
logic. Unlike the weaker semantic representations of information a¤orded by these ap-
proaches, t-orderings provide a unied semantic framework for the combination of both
denite information (or knowledge) and indenite information (or belief). T-orderings
are closely related to the ordinal conditional functions of Spohn (1988) but, unlike ordi-
nal conditional functions which rely on the arithmetic of ordinals, t-orderings are purely
qualitative.
2
1.1. Motivation and overview
Finding appropriate representations of the epistemic states of agents is an important
issue in the area of knowledge representation and reasoning. Representing the epistemic
state of a control room agent by a (regular) t-ordering signals a departure from the
many approaches in which only the beliefs of an agent are represented. T-orderings
allow for the representation of both knowledge and belief, as advocated by the proposed
principle of Duality. The distinction between knowledge and belief is not based on the
traditional Platonic view of true justied beliefbut instead related to a psychological
notion of entrenchment of beliefin which knowledge arises as a special case when some
threshold of entrenchment is surpassed. The triangular connection that is shown to
exist between the information-theoretic semantics for epistemic logic of Labuschagne
and Ferguson (2002), epistemic entrenchment (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1988), and t-
orderings, provides an information-theoretic justication for representing the epistemic
state of a control room agent by a (regular) t-ordering.
The area of belief change, which has been an active research area for at least two
decades, has as its focus the issue of how an agent changes its epistemic state upon
receiving new information. The classical approaches of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and
Makinson (1985) and Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) continue to serve as the compara-
tive benchmarks for belief revision and belief update respectively. The problem of iterated
revision has received a lot of attention in recent years (in stark contrast to the problem of
iterated update which has largely been ignored) and the approach of Darwiche and Pearl
(1997) has proved to be very inuential, despite continued criticism. In the context of
control room agents, the notions of templated revision and templated update represent an
information-theoretic approach to iterated epistemic change in which an epistemic change
operation may be followed by a di¤erent epistemic change operation on the basis of a
clear selection between the epistemic change operations. A proposed epistemic change
algorithm provides the mechanism for control room agents to select between templated
3
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revision and templated update. The selection stems from the (agent-oriented) distinc-
tion between knowledge and belief: broadly speaking, templated revision is selected when
newly received information is consistent with the control room agents knowledge (though
not necessarily consistent with the agents beliefs), templated update otherwise. Under
the principle of Trustworthiness, information received is trustworthy, and inconsistency
with the control room agents knowledge therefore indicates that a change of state has
occurred in the system, which may be radically di¤erent from the previous state because
of the discreteness of diagrammable systems. In contrast to the standard approach to
belief update in which the underlying system is (implicitly) assumed to be continuous,
templated update makes no such assumption, leading to unexpected results. From the
(agent-oriented) distinction between knowledge and belief an alternative but comparable
distinction between revision and update emerges of revision as an epistemic change op-
eration in which the agents knowledge grows monotonically while its beliefs may change
non-monotonically and of update as an epistemic change operation in which the agents
knowledge changes non-monotonically and consequently, its beliefs too.
In recent times, research in the area of belief change has tended to shift more towards
belief merging (Delgrande et al., 2005) and the eld of information fusion (Grégoire and
Konieczny, 2006) where the focus has been on the combination (merging) of possibly
conicting information (epistemic states). The notion of templated merging is strongly
inuenced by the proposal of Meyer (2001a) for merging epistemic states and takes into
account results from social choice theory (Arrow, 1963; Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura, 2002).
Unlike other approaches that focus on the technical similarities between merging epis-
temic states and aggregating preferences in social choice theory, the notion of templated
merging is guided by an evaluation of the applicability of the results from social choice
theory for control room agents. Templated merging is an m-ary operation on regular
t-orderings that combines (possibly conicting) information from multiple sources. It is
4
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shown to be exible enough to capture the existing families of merging operations for
both knowledge base merging and epistemic state merging. However, some of these con-
structions do not satisfy the principle of Qualitativeness. The importance of the principle
of Qualitativeness for control room agents prompted the development of a new family of
purely qualitative merging operations.
Overall, the thesis is motivated by the hope that by formalising the epistemic func-
tioning of control room agents one may provide a way to show whether or not agents
act sensibly in terms of the available information. This might help to catch errors earlier
and to prevent agents from being blamed for errorswhen in fact they were reasoning
sensibly given the available information.
1.2 A readers guide
Chapter 1 gives an overview of this thesis. It also denes the class of nitely generated
transparent propositional languages that serve as knowledge representation languages for
control room agents.
In chapter 2, the notion of a diagrammable system is introduced in the form of
an illustrative example before dening it formally and showing that nitely generated
transparent propositional languages are suitable knowledge representation languages for
diagrammable systems. The notion of an agent-oriented view is outlined by reviewing
some of the literature on agent theory before characterising the class of control room
agents by a set of principles which guide their epistemic functioning.
The focus of chapter 3 is on the semantic representation of information. The theory
of semantic information (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952) is formally described, highlight-
ing the representation of denite information in the context of diagrammable systems.
Similarly, the representation of indenite information is highlighted in the formal de-
5
1. Introduction
scription of the KLM approach to nonmonotonic logic (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor,
1990; Lehmann and Magidor, 1992). T-orderings are formally dened as instances of
an abstract datatype and it is shown that every t-ordering can be transformed into a
t-ordering in normal form that is order equivalent to the original t-ordering. Subclasses
of t-orderings for the exclusive representation of denite and of indenite information
are dened too. The information represented by (di¤erent subclasses of) t-orderings is
shown to be expressible (as di¤erent normal forms) in the knowledge representation lan-
guage and, more importantly, it is shown that from every such syntactic expression, the
original t-ordering may be recovered. The notion of (semantic) information content for t-
orderings is dened and compared with similar notions from semantic information theory.
A preferential model semantics based on t-orderings is dened and, using the concepts of
plausibility and distrust of a sentence with respect to a t-ordering (Labuschagne et al.,
2002), it is shown that the defeasible consequence relations induced by this semantics
satisfy several restricted forms of transitivity. As a practical example to reasoning with
t-orderings, the lottery paradox is considered.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the informational attitudes of knowledge and belief. The
Kripke semantics of epistemic logic (Hintikka, 1962) is formally described before recalling
the information-theoretic semantics of Labuschagne and Ferguson (2002) in the context
of diagrammable systems. The information-theoretic semantics is a generalisation of the
Kripke semantics in which the accessibility relation is replaced by an accessibility function
that assigns a t-ordering to each state of the system. The information-theoretic semantics
allows for a wide range of counterparts to the axiom schemas familiar from the Kripke
semantics. Other approaches in the literature that allow knowledge and belief to be mod-
elled in the same semantics, of which there are few, are reviewed and contrasted to the
information-theoretic model. The original notion of epistemic entrenchment (Gärdenfors
and Makinson,1988) is formally described and the link between epistemic entrenchment
6
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and the modal operators for belief under the information-theoretic semantics recalled.
A plausibility ordering on sentences of the knowledge representation language is dened
in terms of the notion of plausibility (of a sentence with respect to a t-ordering) and a
direct link established between plausibility orderings and epistemic entrenchment order-
ings. These connections provide an information-theoretic justication for representing
the epistemic state of a control room agent by a regular t-ordering plus an associated
belief set and knowledge set. Finally, the representation of epistemic states by regular
t-orderings is contrasted to the representation of epistemic states by ordinal conditional
functions.
In chapter 5, the focus is on two kinds of epistemic change, namely, revision and
update. The AGM approach to belief revision (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson,
1985) is described with the focus on di¤erent semantic constructions of belief revision
operations and followed by a description of the KM approach (Katsuno and Mendelzon,
1992) to knowledge base (belief) update. Iterated revision, the problem of dealing with a
succession of revisions to the epistemic state of an agent, is described by focussing on the
approach of Darwiche and Pearl (1997) and highlighting some of the more recent trends
in the literature. The notion of templated revision (as an information-theoretic approach
to iterated revision) is dened by proposing a set of rationality postulates, providing a
representation theorem, and constructing a concrete templated revision operation. The
di¤erences between templated revision and some of the more recent proposals around
iterated revision in the literature are teased out. An epistemic change algorithm is
provided to distinguish between templated revision and the notion of templated update,
which is dened (as an information-theoretic approach to iterated update) by proposing
a set of rationality postulates, providing a representation theorem, and constructing a
concrete templated update operation. Other frameworks in the literature which allow
an agent to perform iterated revision and iterated update in the same system, of which
7
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there are few, are reviewed and contrasted to the templated framework. Finally, some
connections between templated revision and nonmonotonic logic are explored.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the merging of (possibly conicting) information from
multiple sources. Several proposals for knowledge base (belief) merging that have been
presented in the literature, based on di¤erent intuitions, are reviewed with the focus on
the logical properties of merging; followed by a comparison of these proposals in terms
of three families of knowledge base merging operations. At the level of epistemic states,
where fewer proposals have been presented in the literature, belief merging is formally
described by focussing on the proposal of Meyer (2001a) and highlighting some of the
others. Technically, the problem of merging epistemic states may be viewed as similar
to the problem of aggregating preferences in social choice theory (Maynard-Zhang and
Lehmann, 2003). With this in mind, the conditions imposed by Arrow (1951, 1963) on
the process for aggregating individual preferences into a social preference (social welfare
functions) are evaluated to determine their applicability for control room agents. The
notion of templated merging (as the combination of possibly conicting information rep-
resented by regular t-orderings) is dened by proposing a set of rationality postulates
and by constructing several concrete instances of abstractly dened templated merging
operations. Lastly, a proposal for content-based merging is provided.
The nal chapter, chapter 7, summarises the contribution of the thesis and points to
areas of further research.
1.3 Finitely generated transparent propositional lan-
guages
Control room agents are assumed to express their knowledge and beliefs in transparent
propositional languages that are nitely generated. As the focus is on developing new
8
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semantic concepts, the languages themselves will be kept as simple as possible. The
advantage of using a transparent (rather than an opaque) language is that the atomic
sentences have structure provided by predicates and constants rather than being merely
propositional symbols, which allows for ner-grained expression. A nitely generated
transparent propositional language is composed of the following symbols: a nite set
Cons of constants, a nite set Pred of predicate symbol-arity pairs, the Boolean connec-
tives :, ^, _, !, and $, and the punctuation symbols ( and ).
An atom of L is a string of the form P (c1; c2; : : : ; ck) where (P; k) 2 Pred and each
c1; c2; : : : ; ck 2 Cons. The set of atoms of L is denoted by Atom. Every atom is a
sentence of L. If  and  are sentences of L then so too are :, ( ^ ), ( _ ),
(! ), and ($ ). L is the smallest set of sentences generated from the atoms using
the connectives a nite number of times as described above.
A literal is a sentence of L that is either an atom or the negation of an atom. A
set of literals in which every atom appears exactly once, either negated or unnegated, is
a diagram of L1. Thus for the languages of interest, diagrams are nite sets. Suppose
L is generated by Atom = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. A sentence  of L is a state description i¤
 = 1 ^2 ^ : : :^ n where for each j either j = j or j = :j. A state description
may be constructed by forming a conjunction using all the literals appearing in a diagram.
A sentence  of L is in state description normal form (SDNF) i¤  = 1 _ 2 _ : : :_ n
where each j is a distinct state description. As metavariables, lowercase Greek letters
(with or without subscripts) will be used to denote sentences of L, while uppercase Greek
letters will denote sets of sentences of L. Parentheses will be omitted when writing
sentences of L provided no ambiguity arises.
Associated with each language L is the traditional truth-value semantics consisting
of interpretations. An interpretation I consists of a non-empty set D (the domain of I)
1See Chang and Keisler (1990) for a more formal denition.
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and a denotation function den that assigns to each constant of L an element of D and
to each predicate symbol of L a set of n-tuples of D where n is the arity of the predicate
symbol. A term interpretation is an interpretation I = (D; den) where D = Cons and
where the denotation function den associates with every constant of L the constant itself.
The set of all term interpretations is denoted by UT .
Every interpretation I = (D; den) determines a unique valuation. A valuation is
a function v : Atom ! f1; 0g; thus a valuation assigns a truth value to every atom.
The set of all valuations of L is denoted by V . The valuation determined by an in-
terpretation I = (D; den) is denoted by vI and obtained as follows: for every atom
P (c1; c2; : : : ; ck) 2 Atom, vI(P (c1; c2; : : : ; ck)) = 1 i¤ hden(c1); den(c2); : : : ; den(ck)i 2
den(P; k). There is a bijective correspondence between the set V of valuations and the
set UT of term interpretations. Suppose that the set of atoms is Atom = f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
It will often be convenient to abbreviate a valuation v by writing the sequence of values
v(1)v(2) : : : v(n).
A possible worlds interpretation of L is a pair M = hS; li such that
 S is a non-empty set (the elements of which are called states) and
 l is a function from S to UT (referred to as the labelling function).
If A  Atom, then l(s) and l(s0) are said to agree on A, denoted by l(s) A l(s0), i¤
l(s) and l(s0) assign the same truth value to every atom of A. Given a possible worlds
interpretation M = hS; li, a state s 2 S satises a sentence  of L in M , denoted by
M; s  , i¤ one of the following is the case:
  2 Atom and vI() = 1 where I = l(s)
  = : and M; s 1 
  = ( ^ ) and M; s   and M; s  
10
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  = ( _ ) and M; s   or M; s   or both
  = ( ! ) and M; s 1  or M; s  
  = ( $ ) and M; s   and M; s  , or M; s 1  and M; s 1 
In general, the states of a possible worlds interpretation M = hS; li may be inten-
sional, by which is meant that two di¤erent states s and s0 may, under l, correspond to
the same valuation. In cases where the labelling function l is injective, the states of M
are extensional in the sense that the only thing that matters is what atoms hold at that
state. An extensional interpretation is a possible worlds interpretation M = hS; li such
that l is injective. There is historical precedent for singling out extensional interpreta-
tions for special attention. According to Ben-Naim (2005), such preferential structures
without copieswere rst singled out for attention by Hanson (1969) in the context of
deontic logics. Subsequently, and of great interest to us, Shoham (1987, 1988) used them
to give a semantics for nonmonotonic logics. The extensional interpretation M0 = hS; li
for S = UT and l the identity function, which corresponds to the traditional truth-value
semantics of propositional logic, will be referred to as the classical interpretation.
If a sentence  2 L is satised at a state s in a possible worlds interpretation M =
hS; li of L, then s is called a (local) model of  and  is said to be (locally) satisable.
Given M , the set of models of  is denoted by ModM(). For a set of sentences    L,
ModM( ) = fs 2 S j 8 2  , s 2 ModM()g. The nonmodels of  form the set
S  ModM(), denoted by NModM(). Any sentence  such that ModM() 6= ? is M-
satisable and ifModM() = S, then  isM-valid. In particular, tautologies areM -valid
for every M , where by a tautology is understood any sentence > that is M0-valid where
M0 = hS; li is the classical interpretation. Any sentence  such that ModM() = ? is
M-unsatisable. In particular, contradictions are M -unsatisable for every M , where by
a contradiction is understood any sentence ? that is M0-unsatisable.
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Given a possible worlds interpretationM = hS; li, sentences  and  are semantically
equivalent (under M), denoted by  M , i¤ModM() = ModM(). By a proposition
is understood an equivalence class of sentences relative to M . For any sentence , the
equivalence class to which it belongs is [] = f 2 L j  M g.
The entailment relation (or semantic consequence relation) induced by a possible
worlds interpretationM = hS; li is the relation j=M on L given by  j=M  i¤ModM() 
ModM(). If  j=M  then  is said to entail  (under M) and  is said to be a
semantic consequence of  (under M). The entailment relation j=M is associated with a
(unary) semantic consequence operation CnM on L which is dened in terms of j=M as
CnM() = f 2 L j  j=M g. The entailment relation j=M can also be dened in terms
of CnM by taking  j=M  i¤  2 CnM(). For a set of sentences  , CnM( ) = f 2 L j
ModM( )  ModM()g. If a set of sentences   is M -unsatisable, then CnM( ) = L.
A sentence  is M -inconsistent with a set of sentences   i¤   [ fg is M -unsatisable.
Every semantic consequence operation CnM induced by a possible worlds interpreta-
tion M = hS; li satises, for every sentence ;  2 L, the properties of reexivity (i.e.
 2 CnM()), idempotence (i.e. CnM(CnM())  CnM()), and monotonicity (i.e. if
 j=M  then CnM()  CnM()). Compactness (i.e.  2 CnM( ) i¤  2 CnM( 0)
for some nite subset  0   ) follows from the niteness of L. Every semantic con-
sequence operation CnM satises the deduction theorem (i.e.  2 CnM(  [ fg) i¤
(! ) 2 CnM( )). Lastly, every semantic consequence operation CnM is supraclassi-
cal in the sense that CnM0()  CnM() whereM0 = hS; li is the classical interpretation.
A theory is a set of sentences   closed under entailment (underM), i.e.   = CnM( ).
For everyX  S, the theory determined byX, denoted by ThM(X), is the set ThM(X) =
f 2 L j X  ModM()g. Suppose that M = hS; li is a possible worlds interpretation
of L and that X  S. If there exists a set of sentences   of L such that ModM( ) = X,
then   is called an axiomatisation of X. In an extensional interpretation of a nitely
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generated language, the theory determined by X is an axiomatisation of X since X =
ModM(ThM(X)). If there exists a sentence  of L such that ModM() = X, then  is
called a nite axiomatisation of X.
In contexts where the classical interpretationM0 = hS; li is used, the semantic notions
dened above will usually be given without any form of subscripting.
Proposition 1.1 Suppose L is generated by Atom = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. Let M = hS; li be
an extensional interpretation of L. Then for every state s 2 S, the set fsg has a nite
axiomatisation in the form of a unique state description.
Proof. Pick any state s 2 S. Let I = l(s). A state description  = 1 ^2 ^ : : :^n
is constructed by taking i = i if vI(i) = 1 and i = :i if vI(i) = 0 for each i  n.
Clearly, fsg =ModM(). Conversely, suppose s0 2ModM(). Let J = l(s0). So for each
i  n, s0 satises i, i.e. if i = i then vJ(i) = 1 and if i = :i then vJ(i) = 0.
But then vJ = vI and so l(s0) = l(s). Since l is injective it follows that s0 = s. Hence
ModM()  fsg. But then state description  is a nite axiomatisation of fsg. Suppose
there is another state description 0 = 1 ^ 2 ^ : : : ^ n such that ModM(0) = fsg. So
for each i  n, if vI(i) = 1 then i = i and if vI(i) = 0 then i = :i. But then
0 = . Thus fsg has a nite axiomatisation in the form of a unique state description.
Note that the converse of proposition 1.1 does not hold, i.e. it is not the case that for
every state description  there exists a unique state s 2 S such that ModM() = fsg.
The following example illustrates.
Example 1.1 Suppose L is generated by Atom = fP (a); P 0(a)g and M = hS; li is an
extensional interpretation such that S = fs1; s2; s3g and l = f(s1; I); (s2; J); (s3; K)g with
vI = 11, vJ = 10, and vK = 01 (where the atoms are considered in the given order, so
that 10 corresponds to the valuation rendering P (a) true but P 0(a) false). Then state
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descriptions P (a) ^ P 0(a), P (a) ^ :P 0(a), and :P (a) ^ P 0(a) correspond to states s1,
s2, and s3 respectively. However, state description :P (a)^:P 0(a) has no corresponding
state, i.e. there is no state si 2 S such that ModM(:P (a) ^ :P 0(a)) = fsig.
Denition 1.1 A sentence  = 1 _ 2 _ : : :_ n of L in SDNF is extensional i¤ for
every state description j in , there exists a corresponding state sj 2 S such that
ModM(j) = fsjg.
Proposition 1.2 Suppose L is generated by Atom = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. Let M = hS; li
be an extensional interpretation of L. Then every X  S has a nite axiomatisation,
and in fact, if X 6= ? then X has a nite axiomatisation in the form of a sentence  in
extensional SDNF.
Proof. IfX = ? then? is a nite axiomatisation ofX. SupposeX = fs1; s2; : : : ; skg.
By proposition 1.1, for every sj 2 X, the set fsjg has a nite axiomatisation in the
form of a state description. For each sj 2 X, let j be the state description such that
ModM(j) = fsjg. Take  = 1_2_ : : :_k. So  is in extensional SDNF. Every state
in X satises one of the disjuncts and thus satises . So X  ModM(). Conversely,
suppose s0 2 ModM(). So s0 must satisfy one of the disjuncts, say i. Thus, by
proposition 1.1, fs0g = ModM(i). But then s0 2 X and so ModM()  X. Thus the
sentence  in extensional SDNF is a nite axiomatisation of X.
Propositional languages comprising innitely many atoms have subsets of states that
have no axiomatisation (Brink and Heidema, 1989). It is possible to establish this by
a general cardinality argument. A more direct proof, using a transparent propositional
language generated by an innite set of atoms, is given below.
Proposition 1.3 Suppose L is generated by Atom = f1; 2; : : :g. Let M0 = hS; li be the
classical interpretation. Then there exists a set X  S such that X has no axiomatisation.
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Proof. Pick any state s 2 S and let I = l(s). Let X = S   fsg. Suppose there
is some sentence  of L such that Mod() = X. So s =2 Mod(). Let f1; 2; : : : ; kg
be such that every atom occurring in  is among 1; 2; : : : ; k. Let s
0 2 S be the state
such that vJ(i) = vI(i) for all i  k and vJ(i) 6= vI(i) for all i > k where J = l(s0).
Then s0 2 Mod() i¤ s 2 Mod(). But s =2 Mod() and so it must be the case that
s0 =2 Mod(). But this contradicts the assumption that every state in X = S   fsg is a
model of . Thus there is no sentence such that Mod() = X. But then there can be no






Science is a system of statements based on direct experience,
and controlled by experimental verication.
The Unity of Science (Rudolf Carnap, translation by M. Black)
2.1 An illustrative example
As an illustrative example, the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania in the USA and the sequence of events that took place during the accident
of March 28, 1979 are considered. In the following brief account of the sequence of events
that took place during the TMI accident, it is illustrated how the system changed state
dynamically and discretely from normalto turbine trip, to reactor scram, to LOCA,
to core melting, to cooling restored, to hydrogen explosion. Also indicated is how
the operators (agents) reasoned from their own internal conceptual model of the system
based on incomplete information about the state of the system. For a more detailed
account, see Perrow (1984).
The accident in the TMI Unit 2 reactor started in the secondary cooling system when
17
2. Systems and agents
moisture entered the instrument air system of the plant causing two feedwater pumps
to stop and the circulation of the secondary cooling system to halt, so that heat was
no longer removed from the primary coolant. Automatically, at precisely 4:00 AM, the
turbine tripped and the emergency feedwater pumps came on. However, two emergency
feedwater block valves (EF-V12A and EF-V12B) that were supposed to be open had been
left in a closed position after maintenance some days before, which meant that there was
still no heat being removed from the core by the primary coolant, causing a rise in core
temperature and pressure. The operators were unaware of any problems with emergency
feedwater and, never expecting valves EF-V12A and EF-V12B to be closed, because they
were always open during operation, did not immediately check the indicators on the TMI
control panel which showed that the valves were closed. Besides, one of the indicators
was obscured by a repair tag attached to a nearby switch.
Since no heat was being removed from the core, the reactor scrammed and graphite
control rods dropped into the core to stop the chain reaction, but the residual decay
heat of the reactor continued to build up temperature and pressure. Within seconds of
the scram, the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) automatically opened to relieve the
pressure in the core. It failed to reseat, allowing the coolant in the core, which was
under high pressure, to escape from the pressuriser through the stuck valve down into a
drain tank. This was thirteen seconds into the accident. The operators believed that the
PORV had reseated because the indicator on the control panel showed no warning to the
contrary. It turned out that the indicator merely reected that the PORV had received
the signal to reseat.
With the loss of coolant, the pressure in the reactor went down and the temperature
up, a dangerous situation that prompted the reactor coolant pumps to start up auto-
matically followed shortly by the high-pressure injection (HPI) device which forces water
into the core at a rapid rate. This was two minutes into the accident. On the control
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panel, one dial subsequently showed that the pressure in the reactor was still falling while
another dial showed that the pressure in the pressuriser was rising. Normally, these di-
als move together and their readings were seen as contradictory. Believing the reactor
dial would have meant that the core was being uncovered, something unheard of, while
believing the pressuriser dial would have meant that the pressuriser was being ooded,
called going solid. Still unaware of any problem with emergency feedwater and having
been diligently trained to avoid going solid, the operators decided to throttle back the
HPI because if too much water is forced into the core it may cause the pressuriser to ood
risking a loss of coolant accident, or LOCA. They were unaware that they were already
in a LOCA. Shortly after throttling back the HPI, the reactor coolant pumps started to
cavitate and were shut down by the operators thereby e¤ectively ending forced cooling
of the core.
With the arrival of a new shift at approximately 6:20 AM, the stuck PORV was
discovered and operators closed a blocked valve to shut o¤ the ow to the PORV. At
that stage, incredible damage had been done and substantial parts of the core were
uncovered and melting. In the control room, alarms were sounding, indicator lights
were on or blinking, and radiation monitoring alarms were coming on. So many alarms
were registered that the computer fell far behind schedule printing them; in fact, it took
several hours before the message that something might be wrong with the PORV was
nally printed. Fortunately, with the ow to the PORV shut o¤and valves EF-V12A and
EF-V12B that had been blocking the emergency feedwater opened some time earlier, the
operators were able over the next couple of hours to restore forced cooling of the reactor
core.
Thirty-three hours into the accident, a mu­ ed bang was heard in the control room
registering a pressure spike in the containment building. The bang was caused by the
explosion of a hydrogen bubble, which formed after the zirconium lining of the fuel rods
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became too hot and reacted with the surrounding water to free hydrogen by binding
with oxygen. The operators could not explain the spike and wrote it o¤ as an instrument
malfunction of some sort. At the time, nuclear physicists disagreed whether hydrogen
could be formed in this way. Prior to the accident, a paper mentioning the danger had
been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (Gulbransen, 1975) but the nuclear
physicist who served as adviser to the company running the reactor at TMI had written
a rebuttal (Palladino, 1976) denying these claims.
In the subsequent investigation into the accident, the operators were blamed for er-
rorsthat were actually sensible defeasible conjectures based on default rules provided by
their training, as pointed out by Perrow (1984). For example, the Kemeny Commission
indicated in their report (Kemeny, 1979) that the operators should have known that the
PORV was open and the manufacturers of the reactor, Babcock and Wilson, agreed;
this was the sole cause of the accident. One of the indicators that might have alerted
operators to the fact that the PORV was open was the drain tank temperature indicator
(Perrow, 1984):
Another indicator showed the temperature of the drain tank; with hun-
dreds of gallons of hot coolant spewing out and going to the drain tank, that
temperature reading should be way up. It was indeed up. But they had been
having trouble with a leaky PORV for some weeks, meaning that there was
always some coolant going through it, so it was usual for it to be higher than
normal. It did shoot up at one point, they noted, but that was shortly after
the PORV opened, and when it didnt come down fast that was comprehen-
sible, because the pipe heats up and stays hot. That hot? a commissioner
interrogating an operator asked, in e¤ect. The operator replied, in e¤ect,
Yes, if it were a LOCA I would expect it to be much higher. It was not the
LOCA they were trained for on the simulators that are used for training ses-
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sions, since it had some coolant coming in through an emergency system, and
some coming in through HPI, which was only throttled back, not stopped.
Their training never imagined a multiple accident with a stuck PORV, and
blocked valves.
2.2 Diagrammable systems
Consider the collection of all raptors in Southern Africa. This collection of birds is
unstable in the sense that birds come and go over a relatively short period of time due to
the natural occurrence of birth and death and due to the seasonal migration of species
such as the Black Kite and the Booted Eagle. The collection is anonymous in the sense
that it is impossible to name or ring each individual bird in the collection. As a system,
this collection of birds is undiagrammable. One consequence of this is that if one were to
attempt to describe a state of the system, it would be di¢ cult to decide where to draw
the line, since so much could arguably inuence the state: weather, the use of poisons,
automobiles, the growth of the human population.
Consider, in contrast, a museum collection of raptors in Southern Africa, say, for
example, the collection in the Albany Museum in Grahamstown, South Africa. This
collection of birds is stable over a relatively long period of time and it is possible to
distinguish and label each individual bird in the collection. As a result it is easier to
demarcate relevance: the fact that specimen #113 is a Lammergeier (or Bearded Vulture)
shot on the farm Moddervlei on June 6, 1946 is relevant and contributes to determining
the state of the collection; facts such as that farmers have recently begun using a new
pesticide, or even facts closer to home such as that the Albany museum was founded
on September 11, 1855 are irrelevant as far as the state of the collection of raptors is
concerned. The museum collection of raptors is an example of a diagrammable system,
21
2. Systems and agents
and the states of such a system are determined by the properties of and relationships
between components of the system, rather than by external factors.
Denition 2.1 A system is directly representable if
 each component is su¢ ciently stable and distinctive to be representable by a constant
symbol of the knowledge representation language, and
 a state of the system is su¢ ciently determined by the properties of and relationships
between components to be representable by the atoms of the knowledge representation
language that hold in that state.
Denition 2.2 A diagrammable system is a directly representable system in which
there are nitely many components.
A nuclear power plant is a diagrammable system in the sense of having a stable
conguration of nitely many components that are typically identied and named in a
collection of complex drawings and diagrams. Diagrammable systems may be partially
observable or fully observable, dynamic or static, discrete or continuous, nondeterministic
or deterministic, sequential or episodic, multi-agent or single-agent, and cooperative or
competitive1. Following Russell and Norvig (2003) a system is said to be
 partially observable if the agents sensory apparatus provides incomplete informa-
tion about the state of the system, and fully observable if it provides complete
information about the state of the system;
 dynamic relative to the agent if the system can change state independently of the
agents actions, and static otherwise;
1In the rst edition (Russel and Norvig, 1995), the terms inaccessible and accessible are used
instead of partially observableand fully observable, and nonepisodicinstead of sequential.
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 discrete if a change of state can result in a state of the system that di¤ers radically
from its predecessor, and continuous if changes in state are gradual;
 nondeterministic2 to the agent if the next state of the system is not completely
determined by the current state and the action of the agent, and deterministic
otherwise;
 sequential if the agents current decision and action could a¤ect all future decisions,
and episodic if it a¤ects only the current episode of perception, decision, and action;
 multi-agent if more than one agent can interact with the system, and single-agent
otherwise; and
 cooperative if the nature of the system demands cooperation between agents, and
competitive if it encourages competition between agents.
Our focus will be on the class of diagrammable systems in which every system is par-
tially observable, dynamic, discrete, sequential, multi-agent, and cooperative. A nuclear
power plant is a positive example of such a diagrammable system.
In a diagrammable system, states of the system can be mapped injectively to valua-
tions of the knowledge representation language. Hence the importance, for our purposes,
of extensional interpretations. However, the mapping may not be direct and obvious.
Consider a device containing n balls, with each ball painted one of k colours, which op-
erates by changing the colouring of the balls in a random fashion. Consider the scenario
in which the balls are distinguishable, say by virtue of a number painted on them in an
invariant colour di¤erent from the k colours. An intuitive conceptualisation would have
each state of the system represented by an n-tuple whose coordinates may have any of
the k colour values. This natural representation provides a total of kn states. However,
2The term stochasticis preferred over nondeterministicin Russel and Norvig (2003).
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an (obvious) knowledge representation language for this system should allow one to say
things like Ball j has colour mand so there must be nk atoms and thus 2nk valuations.
Not only are the number of states and the number of valuations di¤erent, but it may
take a little thought to decide which valuation corresponds to a particular state. For
example, a state hred, bluei corresponds to the valuation which makes the atom Ball 1
is redtrue, all other atoms talking about ball 1 false, the atom Ball 2 is bluetrue, and
all other atoms involving ball 2 false.
Finitely generated transparent propositional languages are suitable knowledge rep-
resentation languages for diagrammable systems. The stability and distinctiveness of
components mean that the systems lend themselves to the denitions of the sets Cons
and Pred and that term interpretations su¢ ce. To make explicit the correspondence
between states of the system and valuations of the knowledge representation language,
possible worlds interpretations are used. And since a state of a diagrammable system is
determined by the elementary facts about the components, the possible worlds interpre-
tations may be restricted to extensional interpretations.
Proposition 2.1 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Every state of a diagrammable system is axiomatisable by a unique (nite) diagram.
Proof. Pick any state s 2 S. By proposition 1.1, the set fsg is nitely axiomatisable
by a unique state description, say  = 1^2^: : :^n. Thus fsg =ModM(). A (nite)
diagram is constructed by taking   = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. But ModM() = ModM( ) and
so fsg is nitely axiomatisable by a unique (nite) diagram.
While a diagram has been dened to be a certain kind of set of sentences, ordinary
language uses diagramfor a kind of stylised picture, in some contexts called a blue-
print. The picture and the sentential diagram are closely related. Whether sentential
or pictorial, the purpose of a diagram is to display at least some of the relevant facts
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that determine states of the system. From the pictorial version one can extract a set of
invariant facts or constraints, limiting the realisable states of the system.
By way of example, consider a full adder, that is, an adder circuit of a digital computer
that can handle a carry signal as well as the binary elements that are to be added. One
possible conguration of a full adder is depicted by the circuit diagram in gure 2-1.
Figure 2-1: Full adder
The circuit diagram serves as the blueprint of the full adder: it identies components
X1 and X2 as XOR-gates, components A1 and A2 as AND-gates, and component O1 as
an OR-gate, and it shows how these components t together, for example, it shows that
the rst input to component A2 is the same as the second input to component X2. From
the circuit diagram it is clear that certain states, for example, states in which the output
from component X1 di¤ers from either the rst input to component X2 or the second
input to component A2, are not realisable.
In focussing on a subset of invariant facts or constraints, a system diagram (or blue-
print) typically provides an agent with information about those states of the system that
are unrealisable.
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2.3 Agents in context
An agent is an entity capable of interacting with its environment and changing it. Pollock
(1995) memorably contrasts agents and rocks. Each is a stable entity in a dynamically
changing environment. But whereas a rock achieves its stability passively, by virtue of
being hard to destroy, an agent achieves its stability by interacting with its surroundings
and changing these. An agent may be human or non-human, with non-human agents
typically being hardware agents (robots) or software agents.
Software agents, as dened by Genesereth and Ketchpel (1994), are software com-
ponents that communicate with one another by exchanging messages in a standardised
agent communication language (ACL). The components of an ACL were originally de-
ned as part of the DARPA Knowledge Sharing E¤ort (Neches et al., 1991) as consisting
of a vocabulary, a Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) language, and a Knowledge
Query and Manipulation Language (KQML). KIF is based on rst-order predicate logic
and allows for the expression of simple information (Genesereth and Fikes, 1992) while
KQML, which is based on speech acts, provides a linguistic layer for dialogue between
sender and receiver (Finin et al., 1994, 1997). A critique of KQML may be found in
Cohen and Levesque (1995, 1997). The e¤ort of standardising agent communication lan-
guages has subsequently been taken over by FIPA, the Foundation of Intelligent Physical
Agents, which is a standards body concerned with the interoperation of heterogeneous
software agents. For a more recent collection of papers on software agents, see Bradshaw
(1997) or Huhns and Singh (1998).
The concept of a software agent can be traced back to the Actor formalism of Hewitt
(1977). Based on Hewitts Actor model, Shoham (1990, 1993) introduced the compu-
tational framework of agent-oriented programming (AOP) as a specialisation of object-
oriented programming (OOP). The basic units of computation in OOP are modules
(objects) that communicate with one another by passing messages and that respond
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to incoming messages by using individual methods. In AOP, objects are specialised to
agents that have mental states, which in turn consist of components such as beliefs, ca-
pabilities, choices, and commitments. (The tradition in AI of ascribing mental qualities
to computer programs dates back to McCarthy (1979).) Agents communicate with each
other by performing communicative acts such as informing, requesting, o¤ering, accept-
ing, and rejecting as opposed to passing unconstrained messages. These communicative
acts are based on the theory of speech acts which, based on earlier work by Grice (1957),
was introduced by Austin (1962) and further developed by Searle (1969, 1979). In AOP,
agents no longer merely respond to incoming messages as in OOP but, with greater in-
dependence, are able to plan and act autonomously by using their mental components
according to individual constraints. A more recent survey of agent-oriented programming
may be found in Shoham (1997) or Thomas (1999).
A computer program endowed with mental attitudes may be seen as an intentional
system in the sense of Dennett (1987). Dennett distinguishes between rst-order and
second-order intentional systems. A rst-order intentional system has, for example, be-
liefs and desires but no beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires while a second-order
intentional system has, in addition to, say, beliefs and desires, also beliefs and desires
about beliefs and desires. Mental attitudes may be partitioned into four broad categories
of which informational and motivational attitudes are, for the applications envisaged for
agent-oriented programming, the most important, with social and emotional attitudes
less so (Shoham and Cousins, 1994).
Informational attitudes relate to the information that an agent has about its environ-
ment and consists of knowledge and belief. The standard philosophical literature attaches
more importance to knowledge than belief (Hintikka, 1962; Halpern, 1986, 1995) as is
compatible with a true justied beliefaccount of knowledge (Schmitt, 1992) in which
belief is merely the germ from which knowledge may spring. Until recently, very few for-
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malisations in logic allowed the coexistence of knowledge and belief in the same language
and semantics. A notable exception is the account given by Moses and Shoham (1993)
in which belief is viewed as defeasibleknowledge.
Goals, desires, plans, intentions, and commitments are examples of motivational atti-
tudes that relate to the way in which an agent makes decisions. In an inuential paper,
Cohen and Levesque (1990) formalised the interrelationship between beliefs, goals, and
intentions by adopting Bratmans philosophical theory of intention (Bratman, 1987). Rao
and George¤ (1991) provided an alternative formalisation in which intention is dened,
not implicitly as a commitment to goals, but explicitly as consistent with an agents
goals (or desires). This formalisation was further developed over a series of papers and
culminated in their paper (Rao and George¤, 1998) on systems of belief-desire-intention
(BDI) logics.
Social attitudes relate to the social and moral reasons (or obligations) for agents to
behave in a certain way. Although the notions of obligation and permission have been
formalised in philosophy in the context of deontic logic (von Wright, 1951, 1963; Åqvist,
1984, 2002; Makinson, 1999), the formalisation of social attitudes within the context of
agent theory is still emerging (Castelfranchi, 1998; van der Torre, 2003).
The formalisation of the emotional attitudes of an agent, which relate to the inuence
of emotional analogs on the behaviour of the agent in achieving its goals, has received even
less attention. Reilly and Bates (1992) were among the rst to informally investigate the
notion of emotional agents, largely based on the cognitive model of emotion of Ortony,
Clore, and Collins (1988). The work of Picard (1997) on a¤ective computing, inuenced
by research in neuroscience (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996) and cognitive science (Simon,
1967; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987), has sparked renewed interest in the formalisation
of emotional attitudes within the context of agent theory.
Most of the work in agent theory is concerned with giving a good account of the inter-
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relationships between various mental attitudes and an early survey of di¤erent approaches
may be found in Wooldridge and Jennings (1995). More recent investigations into the
theory of rational agents may be found inWooldridge and Rao (1999), Wooldridge (2000),
and van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2003). It should be noted that a desire to render
tractable the notion of accountability of agents has led to FIPA-sponsored attempts to
devise useful models of agents that dispense with the epistemic components, namely,
knowledge and belief. The motivation for doing so is set out in Singh (1998). Since our
concern is with the epistemic functioning of agents, we remain true to the AOP tradition
as conceived by Shoham.
2.4 Control room agents
Control room agents are agents whose environments are the class of diagrammable sys-
tems in which every system is partially observable, dynamic, discrete, sequential, multi-
agent, and cooperative. They may be human agents or software agents. Whether human
or non-human, the class of control room agents may be described as rst-order inten-
tional systems having both informational attitudes and motivational attitudes, with the
focus of this thesis exclusively on the informational attitudes of knowledge and belief. To
provide a broader framework for describing the informational attitudes of control room
agents, we briey consider one specic mental model, namely, the Decision Ladder as
proposed by Rasmussen (1986) in the context of cognitive engineering. It is a mental
model applicable for process control operators and therefore suitable for investigating
control room agents.
The Decision Ladder focuses on the mental processing performed by control operators
without making any assumptions as to the nature of the underlying information processes
themselves. Eight information processes are identied. The rst three processes relate
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to the sensing, observation, and identication of the current state of the system. The
next two processes concern the interpretation and evaluation of goals to determine the
desired state of the system. The last three processes bear on the selection, planning, and
execution of tasks to e¤ect the necessary change in the state of the system.
Figure 2-2: Rasmussens Decision Ladder
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The outcome of an information process is a state of knowledge, which may di¤er
depending on the experience of the operator and the uncertainty of the situation, re-
sulting in di¤erent sequences of mental processing. The unlabelled arcs in gure 2-2
show the sequence typically associated with decision making in unfamiliar situations. In
more familiar situations, solutions from previous experiences are used resulting in various
shortcut sequences as indicated by the labelled arcs.
Within the broader framework provided by the Decision Ladder, the focus on the
informational attitudes of knowledge and belief may be viewed as concentrating on the
states of knowledgeand on the information processes related to the identication of
the current state of the system. In other words, the focus is on the representation of
a control room agents epistemic state and on the processes of changing the agents
epistemic state based on new information.
Control room agents are further characterised by a set of principles which guide their
epistemic functioning. This characterisation may be viewed as a specialisation of more
general principles for rational (ideal) agents. A distinction is made between principles
guiding the representation of a control room agents epistemic state, still to be dened,
and principles guiding the manner in which a control room agent changes its epistemic
state upon receiving new information.
As specic principles for guiding the representation of a control room agents epistemic
state, the principle of Duality is proposed as a specialisation for control room agents while
the general principle of Logical Closure is adopted.
 Principle of Duality
The principle of Duality says that the epistemic state of a control room agent should
allow for the representation of both knowledge and belief and that knowledge should
constitute more than mere tautologies. It is strongly motivated by the argument of Girle
31
2. Systems and agents
(1998) that philosophico-logical systems (agents) should distinguish between knowledge
and belief and, moreover, in a way that ensures it is not only logical and mathematical
propositions (tautologies) that can be known.
 Principle of Logical Closure
The principle of Logical Closure says that if a sentence is expressing the current
knowledge and beliefs of an agent in an epistemic state, then the logical consequences
of the sentence should also be an expression of the current knowledge and beliefs of the
agent in the epistemic state. Formulated as a rationality criterion (Gärdenfors, 1988), it
is generally viewed as a minimal requirement on representations of epistemic states.
The general principle of Consistency is applicable to both epistemic state represen-
tations and changes, and is adopted for control room agents. The proposed principle of
Qualitativeness is a key specialisation for control room agents and advocates a qualitative
approach. It, too, is applicable to both epistemic state representations and changes.
 Principle of Consistency
The principle of Consistency says that the set of sentences expressing an agents
current knowledge and beliefs in an epistemic state should be consistent (where we may
take consistentto be a synonym for satisable). This is the other rationality criterion
that has been proposed as a minimal requirement on representations of epistemic states
(Gärdenfors, 1988). In the context of epistemic change, it says that if an epistemic
state is consistent before an epistemic change has taken place, then, provided the new
information is satisable, the epistemic state after the change has taken place should be
consistent too.
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 Principle of Qualitativeness
The principle of Qualitativeness says that the representation of a control room agents
epistemic state should not depend on arithmetic and neither should any changes to its
epistemic state depend thereon. It is motivated by results from cognitive science (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974, 1983; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) where it has been
shown that ordinary reasoning often violates the principles of probability theory and
instead employs heuristics such as representativeness (stereotypes), availability of sce-
narios, and anchoring. Arguments against the use of numbers (Piattelli-Palmarini,1994;
Gigerenzer, 2002) provide additional support for a qualitative model of thinking.
The fundamental problem underlying any quantitative model of thinking is Where
do the numbers come from? In the case of a large, complex, and very expensive system
(e.g. a nuclear powerplant), it is simply not possible to experiment with various scenarios
and set up the relative frequency tables that are required if a probability measure is
to be based on anything more than intuition. (We do not include simulations under
the term experiment, for simulations must generally assume the probabilities that the
experiments would be intended to reveal.) In the absence of reliable statistics, we may
as well accept that intuition is the best we can do, and proceed to model it. Given that
intuition provides not numerically precise values such as 17.835% but softer indenite
indications such as the qualitative classication rather unlikely, it follows that a non-
numerical model is su¢ cient.
To drive the point home, consider the hydrogen explosion that occurred during the
Three Mile Island disaster. Potentially, such an explosion could breach containment
and lead to a spread of contamination. What did the control room operators know
about the likelihood of such explosions? At the time, nuclear physicists had formed
no consensus as to whether the hydrogen formation could occur. There was complete
ignorance of any probability for the event. Being ignorant of the probability is not the
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same as assuming the probability to be 50%, and the event therefore had no numerical
probability that could justiably be associated with it. Nevertheless, the operators were
faced with data to which they needed to respond. Any analysis seeking to account for
the fact that the operators wrote the explosion o¤ as an instrument malfunction of
some sortmust take into account their (non-statistical) predisposition to regard such
an explosion as impossible or very unlikely. This predisposition can be explained by
recalling that it reected the opinion of the scientist who served as o¢ cial adviser to the
company employing the operators.
Such informed opinions are a common source of predispositions forming the basis
for action in many everyday situations. Generally, such opinions are in the nature of a
categorisation, and the category contains members that are either more or less typical
(Rosch et al., 1976). The principle of Qualitativeness may therefore be regarded as
an undertaking to provide models of reasoning that make no assumptions beyond the
assumption that control room agents are willing and capable of categorisation.
Adhering to the principles of Duality, Logical Closure, and Consistency imply that
control room agents will be capable of distinguishing between knowledge and belief, capa-
ble of knowing all the consequences of their knowledge and believing all the consequences
of their beliefs, and incapable of believing (or knowing) anything which is false. Adhering
to the principle of Qualitativeness implies that the formation and change of control room
agents knowledge and beliefs will be modelled by non-arithmetic mechanisms rather
than assuming the availability of numerical measures as in probability theory or fuzzy
sets theory.
The manner in which a control room agent changes its epistemic state upon receiving
new information will, likewise, be guided by a number of specic principles. The following
general principles are adopted:
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 Principle of Minimal Change
The principle of Minimal Change says that an epistemic change operation should
change an epistemic state as little as necessary to accommodate the new information.
 Principle of Informational Economy
The principle of Informational Economy is related to the principle of Minimal Change.
It says that an epistemic change operation should, in the process of ensuring that an
epistemic state remains consistent, remove as little information as possible from the
epistemic state.
 Principle of Irrelevance of Syntax
The principle of Irrelevance of Syntax says that an epistemic change operation should
be independent of the syntactic form of an epistemic state and of the new information.
The principle was rst formulated by Dalal (1988).
 Principle of Success
The principle of Success says that an epistemic state should contain the new infor-
mation after an epistemic change has taken place.
 Principle of Categorical Matching
The principle of Categorical Matching says that the representation of an epistemic
state after an epistemic change has taken place should be of the same format as the
representation of the epistemic state before the change. The principle is sometimes
referred to as the principle of Adequacy of Representation (Dalal, 1988) but in the present
formulation, it is generally attributed to Gärdenfors and Rott (1995). While almost too
obvious, it is particularly relevant when iterations of epistemic change are at stake.
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The principles of Consistency, Minimal Change, Irrelevance of Syntax, and Success
are often adopted as basicprinciples (Dubois and Prade, 1998). However, none of these
principles constrain the new information in any way and should the new information be
a contradiction, the agent would be obliged by the principle of Success to accept the
contradiction, making its epistemic state inconsistent. While this may be appropriate in
some domains, in the context of diagrammable systems and control room agents it is not.
The principle of Trustworthiness is proposed as a specialisation for control room
agents to guide epistemic state changes and supports Friedman and Halperns (1999)
argument against accepting ? as new information.
 Principle of Trustworthiness
The principle of Trustworthiness says that the information received by a control room
agent is trustworthy.
Under the principle of Trustworthiness a control room agent would neither observe
? nor receive the communication ? from another agent. But the principle makes an
even stronger assumption. Firstly, it assumes that the control room agent would not
hear from another agent that a component of the system is, say on, when in fact it is
(believed by the other agent to be) o¤. Given the cooperative nature of diagrammable
systems, this is realistic. Secondly, the principle makes the assumption that the control
room agent would not observe that a component of the system is, say on, when in fact it
is o¤. Whilst certainly possible for human senses (or articial sensors) to fail at times,
these are ordinarily reliable, and it does not seem unreasonable to adopt as a convenient
simplication the assumption that a control room agent can trust its senses (or sensors).
Having established the notion of a control room agent, it will be convenient henceforth




If theres no meaning in it,said the King, that saves a world of trouble,
you know, as we neednt try to nd any. . . . 
Alices Evidence in Alices Adventures in Wonderland (Lewis Carroll)
3.1 Semantic information theory
The basic intuition underlying semantic information theory is that the more information
an agent has about a system the more states the agent is able to exclude, an intuition that
dates back to Poppers idea that the more a statement forbids, the more it says about
the world of experience (Popper, 1934 - see the opening sentence of Section 35). In this
chapter we shall outline formalisations that rest on the intuition that a state may be ruled
out of consideration either denitely or tentatively. The former case is that of denite
information (or knowledge), while the latter brings us to indenite information and the
use of default rules to form (defeasible) beliefs. By focussing on semantic formalisations,
we shall pull together apparently disparate strands from semantic information theory




The theory of semantic information was formulated by Carnap and Bar-Hillel over
a series of papers (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952; Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1953; and Bar-
Hillel, 1955) in an attempt to address the semantic aspects of information, which were not
taken into account in the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 1949). In
its original form, the theory of semantic information applies to transparent propositional
languages1 generated by a nite number of atoms. In this convenient form, semantic
information theory thus applies to diagrammable systems where the states of the system
are of course determined by a nite number of elementary facts about the components
that may or may not hold. In semantic information theory, it is assumed that states which
are excluded, are ruled out denitely rather than tentatively. In this sense, semantic
information theory deals with information which is denite.
Denite information is information that is hardor certain, and from which con-
clusions may be drawn which are undisputable. It can be expressed by sentences of the
knowledge representation language and is provided by xed information, typically in the
form of a system diagram (or blueprint), and evidential information, typically in the form
of both observations and communications from trusted agents. Whereas xed informa-
tion is state-independent, evidential information is state-dependent. As an example of
denite information, the following extract from the Three Mile Island account, provided
earlier, is considered:
On the control panel, one dial subsequently showed that the pressure in
the reactor was still falling while another dial showed that the pressure in the
pressuriser was rising. Normally, these dials move together and their readings
were seen as contradictory.
1The theory of semantic information also applies to predicate logic in an extended form developed
by Hintikka (see, for example, Hintikka (1970)).
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In this example, the denite information, in the form of an (indirect) observation, is
rstly, that the pressure in the reactor was falling and secondly, that the pressure in the
pressuriser was rising.
A semantic representation of denite information may be accomplished by a division
of the nite set of states (each of which corresponds to a valuation of the language) into a
set of included or positive states and a complementary set of excluded or negative states,
providing a kind of dichotomous partitionon the set of states. (Visually, this semantic
representation may be pictured by two boxes one of which is positioned on top of the
other, the lower box containing the set of included states and the upper box the set of
excluded states.) In keeping with the intuition behind semantic information theory, a lack
of information is indicated by the exclusion of no state and too much (or contradictory)
information by the exclusion of every state. An agent has complete information about
the system when it is able to rule out all but one state of the system. Under the principle
of Trustworthiness of information, the remaining non-excluded state would have to be
the actual state of the system. (We are considering only the denite ruling out of states
at this point.) However, for most of the time an agent has to deal with information that
is incomplete.
Example 3.1 Consider an agent observing a simple Light-Fan system where each com-
ponent may be on or o¤. As a diagrammable system, the Light-Fan system may be
represented by a transparent propositional language L generated by Atom = fP (a); P (b)g
where P is the predicate representing the property that a component is on and a and b are
the constants representing the components the light and the fan respectively. The states
of the system, represented by S = f11; 10; 01; 00g, correspond directly to the valuations
of L, with 10 corresponding to the valuation making P (a) true and P (b) false, and so
on. Suppose the agent can see only the light and observes that it is on. This example of
denite information may be represented visually as shown in gure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: Denite information
A syntactic expression of denite information may be extracted from the semantic
division in either of two ways, since specifying either the set of included states or the set
of excluded states su¢ ces to determine the remaining set. Inclusion of a state may be
expressed by a state description since, by proposition 1.1, for every state s 2 S, there
exists a unique state description  2 L such thatModM() = fsg whereM = hS; li is an
extensional interpretation of L. Exclusion of a state may be indicated by a corresponding
content element: a sentence that is the negation of a state description and, by application
of De Morgans identities, a disjunction of atoms in which every atom appears exactly
once, either negated or unnegated. It will subsequently be shown that for every state
s 2 S, there exists a unique content element " 2 L such that NModM(") = fsg where
M = hS; li is an extensional interpretation of L.
Denition 3.1 Suppose L is a transparent propositional language generated by Atom =
f1; 2; : : : ; ng. A sentence " 2 L is a content element i¤ " = 1_2_ : : :_n where
for each j either j = j or j = :j. A sentence  2 L is in semantic content
normal form (SCNF) i¤  = "1 ^ "2 ^ : : : ^ "m where each "j is a distinct content
element.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose L is a transparent propositional language generated by Atom =
f1; 2; : : : ; ng. Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L. Then for every
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state s 2 S, there exists a unique content element " 2 L such that NModM(") = fsg.
Proof. Pick any state s 2 S. Let I = l(s). A content element " = 1 _ 2 _ : : : _ n
is constructed by taking i = i if vI(i) = 0 and i = :i if vI(i) = 1 for each i  n.
Clearly, fsg  NModM("). Conversely, suppose s0 2 NModM("). Let J = l(s0). So for
each i  n, s0 fails to satisfy i, i.e. if i = i then vJ(i) = 0 and if i = :i then
vJ(i) = 1. But then vJ = vI and so l(s0) = l(s). Since l is injective, it follows that
s0 = s. Hence NModM(")  fsg. But then NModM(") = fsg. Suppose there is another
content element "0 = 1_ 2_ : : :_ n such that NModM("0) = fsg. So if vI(i) = 0 then
i = i and if vI(i) = 1 then i = :i for each i  n. But then "0 = ". So for every state
s 2 S, there exists a unique content element " 2 L such that NModM(") = fsg.
Note that the converse of proposition 3.1 does not hold, i.e. it is not necessarily the
case that for every content element " 2 L there exists a unique state s 2 S such that
NModM(") = fsg. The following example illustrates.
Example 3.2 Suppose L is generated by Atom = fP (a); P 0(a)g and M = hS; li is an
extensional interpretation such that S = fs1; s2; s3g and l = f(s1; I); (s2; J); (s3; K)g with
vI = 11, vJ = 10, and vK = 01 (where the atoms are considered in the given order, so
that 10 corresponds to the valuation rendering P (a) true but P 0(a) false). Then content
elements :P (a)_:P 0(a), :P (a)_P 0(a), and P (a)_:P 0(a) correspond to states s1, s2,
and s3 respectively. However, content element P (a) _ P 0(a) has no corresponding state,
i.e. there is no state si 2 S such that NModM(P (a) _ P 0(a)) = fsig.
Denition 3.2 A sentence  = "1 ^ "2 ^ : : :^ "m of L in SCNF is extensional i¤ for




Proposition 3.2 Suppose L is generated by Atom = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. Let M = hS; li be
an extensional interpretation of L. Then every X  S has a nite axiomatisation in the
form of a sentence  in extensional SCNF.
Proof. Let Y = S X. So Y 6= ?. Suppose Y = fs1; s2; : : : ; skg. By proposition 3.1,
for every sj 2 Y , there exists a unique content element " such that NModM(") = fsjg.
For each sj 2 Y , let "j be the content element such that NModM("j) = fsjg. Take
 = "1 ^ "2 ^ : : : ^ "k. So  is in extensional SCNF. But now every state in Y fails to
satisfy one of the conjuncts and thus fails to satisfy . So Y  NModM(). Conversely,
suppose s0 2 NModM(). So s0 must fail to satisfy one of the conjuncts, say "i. Thus,
by proposition 3.1, fs0g = NModM("i). But then s0 2 Y and so NModM()  Y . Thus
NModM() = Y from which it follows that ModM() = X. But then , which is a
sentence in extensional SCNF, is a nite axiomatisation of X.
For a sentence to be an accurate expression of the semantic representation of denite
information it must axiomatise the set of included states. Let C be the set of included
states and C the set of excluded states. By taking the state descriptions corresponding
to C, a sentence in extensional SDNF may be formed which axiomatises C as shown in
proposition 1.2 (provided C is non-empty). Similarly, by taking the content elements
corresponding to C, a sentence in extensional SCNF may be constructed which axioma-
tises C as illustrated in proposition 3.2 (provided C is non-empty). So for every semantic
representation of denite information as a division of the nite set of states into a set
of included states and a complementary set of excluded states there exists a syntactic
expression in the form of a sentence in extensional SDNF or SCNF or both. Conversely,
every sentence  2 L induces a semantic representation of denite information by divid-
ing the nite set of states into a set of states included by  (the models of ) and a set
of states excluded by  (the nonmodels of ).
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Proposition 3.3 Suppose L is a transparent propositional language generated by Atom =
f1; 2; : : : ; ng. Let M0 = hS; li be the classical interpretation. Then for every content
element " 2 L, if " j=M , then either  M > or  M " (but not both).
Proof. Pick any content element " = 1_2_ : : :_n 2 L and suppose that " j=M .
It must be shown that either Mod() = S or else Mod() = Mod(") but Mod(") 6= S.
The proof relies on the result that under the classical interpretation, for every content
element " 2 L there exists a unique state s 2 S such that NMod(") = fsg. To see this,
we construct a valuation vI , where I = l(s), by taking vI(i) = 0 if i = i and vI(i) = 1
if i = :i for each i  n. So for each i  n, s fails to satisfy i and thus s fails to satisfy
", i.e. s 2 NMod("). Suppose there is another state s0 2 NMod("). Let J = l(s0). So
for each i  n, s0 fails to satisfy i, i.e. if i = i then vJ(i) = 0 and if i = :i then
vJ(i) = 1. But then vJ = vI and so l(s0) = l(s). But under the classical interpretation,
S = UT and l is the identity function. So s0 = s and thus NMod(") = fsg. But then
Mod(") = S   fsg. Thus Mod(") 6= S. Since, by assumption, Mod(")  Mod(), it
then follows that either Mod() = S or Mod() = S   fsg.
Under the traditional truth-value semantics of nitely generated propositional lan-
guages, a content element is the weakest sentence that conveys information or, alterna-
tively, the smallest syntactic unit of information, as suggested by proposition 3.3. Using
this property, Carnap and Bar-Hillel (syntactically) dened the information carried by a
sentence to be the set of content elements entailed by the sentence. However, under the
more general possible worlds semantics, a content element need not convey any informa-
tion at all, as illustrated by example 3.2 (on page 41) where NModM(P (a)_P 0(a)) = ?.
This is because the natural correspondence between excluded states and content elements
that holds under the traditional truth-value semantics of nitely generated propositional
languages, namely, that the set of content elements entailed by a sentence corresponds
to the set of states excluded by the sentence, does not hold in general under the possible
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worlds semantics. Within the framework provided by the possible worlds semantics, the
concept of information content is a semantic one rather than a syntactic one.
Denition 3.3 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and  2 L. The information carried by , or the content of , is dened as ContM() =
NModM().
Proposition 3.4 (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952) Let M = hS; li be an extensional
interpretation of L with card(S) = n and ;  2 L. Then the following holds:
1. ?  ContM()  S
2. ContM() = ? i¤  is M-valid
3. ContM() = S i¤  is M-unsatisable
4.  j=M  i¤ ContM()  ContM()
5.  M  i¤ ContM() = ContM()
6. ContM( ^ ) = ContM() [ ContM()
7. ContM( _ ) = ContM() \ ContM()
8. ContM(:) = S   ContM()
The notion of information content is closely linked to the notion of entailment: when-
ever a sentence  entails a sentence ,  asserts all that is asserted by  (and possibly
more), which means that the information carried by  includes the information carried by
. And since an M -valid sentence is entailed by every sentence and an M -unsatisable
sentence entails every sentence, it is not unexpected that the former carries no infor-
mation beyond that already provided by M while the latter carries all of the available
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information. On the other hand, sentences which are semantically equivalent entail each
other and must therefore carry the same information.
In developing the theory of semantic information, Carnap and Bar-Hillel proceeded to
develop numerical measures largely because they wanted to nd a connection between the
probabilistic foundation for inductive logic (Carnap, 1950) and the notions of semantic
information. We mention the numerical aspects merely so that the overview of semantic
information theory remains true to the spirit of the original work.
Carnap and Bar-Hillel (syntactically) dened the amount of information carried by a
sentence using content elements, not directly, but indirectly via state descriptions2. Un-
der the traditional truth-value semantics of nitely generated propositional languages,
the amount of information carried by a sentence may be formulated using content el-
ements by dening a measure for the smallest syntactic unit of information, i.e. the
content element, and then taking the sum of the measures attributed to the elements
of the information content of a sentence, i.e. the content elements entailed by the sen-
tence, as the amount of information carried by the sentence. However, under the possible
worlds semantics, the amount of information carried by a sentence will be formulated se-
mantically by dening a measure for the smallest semantic unit of information, i.e. the
state.
Denition 3.4 The content measure of a state s 2 S is dened as cont(s) = 1=card(S).
Denition 3.5 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and  2 L. The amount of information carried by , or the content measure of , is
dened as contM() =
Pm
i=1(cont(si) j si 2 ContM()) where m = card(ContM()).
2In an alternative explicatum of content measure, Carnap and Bar-Hillel dened the content measure
of a sentence  as inf() = Log(1=(1   cont())). This alternative explicatum was motivated directly
by a desire to show that it was possible to use a numerical measure for semantic content that was




Proposition 3.5 (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952) Let M = hS; li be an extensional
interpretation of L with card(S) = n and ;  2 L. Then the following holds:
1. 0  contM()  1
2. contM() = 0 i¤  is M-valid
3. contM() = 1 i¤  is M-unsatisable
4. if  j=M  then contM()  contM()
5. if  M  then contM() = contM()
6. contM( ^ ) = contM() + contM()  contM( _ )
7. contM( _ ) = contM() + contM()  contM( ^ )
8. contM(:) = 1  contM()
The content measures of sentences range between 0 and 1 with 0 reserved for M -
valid sentences (those having no content in the context of M) and 1 reserved for M -
unsatisable sentences (those having contradictory content in the context of M). As
expected, whenever the content of a sentence  includes the content of a sentence , the
content measure of  is never less that the content measure of  and whenever  and 
have the same content, their content measures are the same.
Proposition 3.6 (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952) Suppose L is a transparent propo-
sitional language generated by n atoms. Let M0 = hS; li be the classical interpretation.
Then the following holds:
1. cont() = 1=2 for  a literal
2. cont() = 1=2n for  a content element
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3. cont() = 1  1=2n for  a state description
4. cont() = m=2n for  a sentence in SCNF with m conjuncts
5. cont() = 1 m=2n for  a sentence in SDNF with m disjuncts
Under the more general possible worlds semantics, proposition 3.6 need not hold as
illustrated by example 3.2 (on page 41) where ContM(P (a) _ P 0(a)) = ? for content
element P (a) _ P 0(a) so that contM(P (a) _ P 0(a)) = 0 thus violating properties 2 and
4. For state description P (a) ^ P 0(a) where ContM(P (a) ^ P 0(a)) = fs1; s2; s3g, prop-
erties 3 and 5 are violated since contM(P (a) ^ P 0(a)) = 1 (rather than 2=3). Lastly,
property 1 is violated by literal P (a), for example, since ContM(P (a)) = fs3g resulting
in contM(P (a)) = 1=3 (and not 1=2).
In summary, semantic information theory is concerned with denite information, the
semantic representation of which as a dichotomous partition on the set of states is
expressible as a sentence in either extensional SDNF or SCNF, and the syntactic rep-
resentation of which as a sentence of the knowledge representation language induces a
set of included states (the models of the sentence) and a complementary set of excluded
states (the content of the sentence). The semantic representation of denite informa-
tion provides a mechanism for the formation of semantic consequences. The formation
may be viewed as a movement from a hypothesis to the set of states included by the
hypothesis and from there to a semantic consequence that is true at each of the included
states, or alternatively, as a movement from a hypothesis to the set of states excluded by
the hypothesis and from there to a semantic consequence, the content of which is found
among the set of excluded states.
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3.2 KLM nonmonotonic reasoning
In defeasible reasoning, an agent may draw conclusions that are plausible but not in-
disputable. Traditional truth-value semantics of propositional logic and its associated
semantic consequence relation do not permit such defeasible conjectures to be drawn.
Nonmonotonic logics attempt to formalise defeasible reasoning. To dene nonmonotonic
consequence relations suitable for diagrammable systems, a form of the preferential model
semantics of Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor will be used. This inuential approach,
often referred to as the KLM approach, evolved, on the one hand, from earlier work
by McCarthy on circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) and by Shoham on preferred mod-
els (Shoham, 1987, 1988), and, on the other hand, from the study of nonmonotonic
consequence relations, pioneered by Gabbay (1985). It resulted in the development of
preferential models to dene preferential consequence relations (Kraus, Lehmann, and
Magidor, 1990) and ranked models to dene rational consequence relations (Lehmann
and Magidor, 1992). In the context of diagrammable systems, nonmonotonic logic deals
with information which is indenite.
Indenite information is information that is softor uncertainand from which con-
clusions may be drawn that are plausible but not indisputable. Indenite information is
provided by default rules. Default rules arise naturally in the presence of incomplete in-
formation and are a common occurrence in daily life (Davis, 1990). In natural language,
a default rule may be expressed in various ways, for example, by a sentence including
the word normally, by a sentence including the word typically, by a sentence including
the word probably, or by a sentence indicating a subjective preference. Unlike denite
information, indenite information can (in general) not be expressed by sentences of a for-
mal knowledge representation language. For example, attempts to introduce generalised
quantiers like few, many, and mosthave been shown to be subject to paradoxes. By
way of illustration, suppose we introduce a quantier Q that stands for normallyand
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tackle the semantics in the manner of Mostowski (1957). Then we might take QxP (x)
to be true in a term interpretation (D; den) if P (d) were satised for more than half of
the constants d in D. Now we can construct the paradox. Suppose P is a predicate
symbol expressing the property of being a cat, and that P 0 is a predicate symbol ex-
pressing the property of having only three legs. The standard way to formalise the idea
that Normally, cats have only three legswould be Qx(P (x) ! P 0(x)), in other words
Normally, if x is a cat then x has only three legs. Consider an interpretation in which
there are, say, ten member of the domain D, and let den be such that four objects are
four-legged cats and the remaining six objects are three-legged stools. Thus more than
half of the objects satisfy the unquantied formula P (x) ! P 0(x), and so the original
quantied formula is true in term interpretation (D; den). But this makes no sense, since
D contains no 3-legged cats at all!
As an example of indenite information, the extract from the Three Mile Island
account, provided earlier, is considered again:
On the control panel, one dial subsequently showed that the pressure in
the reactor was still falling while another dial showed that the pressure in the
pressuriser was rising. Normally, these dials move together and their readings
were seen as contradictory.
In this example, the indenite information, in the form of a default rule, states that
rstly, if the pressure in the reactor falls, then the pressure in the pressuriser typically
falls as well (and vice versa), and secondly, that if the pressure in the reactor rises, then,
normally, the pressure in the pressuriser rises as well (and vice versa). In a transparent
propositional language, a default rule cannot be expressed by sentences of the language
in any obvious way. In formalising the indenite information available to an agent, it will
thus be necessary to nd an alternative representation of indenite information; either
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a syntactic representation via inference rules, as in Reiters default logic (Reiter, 1980),
or, as we shall instead prefer, a semantic representation.
Whereas denite information is represented semantically by a division of the nite set
of states into at most two complementary subsets, thus permitting subsets of states to
be matched up with sentences via the notion of a model, indenite information is given
by a division of the nite set of states into more than two subsets. This division may
very naturally be represented by a strict linearly ordered partition where the subset of
states lowest down in the ordering is regarded as most preferred (i.e. most normal, likely,
or typical) and the subsets of states higher up as progressively less preferred (i.e. less
normal, likely, or typical). A strict linear order R on a set X is a binary relation on
X that is irreexive, antisymmetric, transitive, and connected, where by connected it is
understood that for all elements x; y 2 X, either (x; y) 2 R or (y; x) 2 R or x = y.
Visually, this semantic representation may be pictured as a stack of boxes one on
top of another, with a bottom box that has nothing under it and a top box that has
nothing above it, and the set of states contained in each box corresponding to an element
of the partition and the position of each box in the picture corresponding to that of its
associated element in the ordering.
Example 3.3 Consider again the Light-Fan system introduced in example 3.1 (on page
39). Suppose the agent has through experience observed that the light is normally on,
and if the light is on then normally the fan is on as well. This example of indenite
information may be represented visually as shown in gure 3-2.
A strict linearly ordered partition of states may be produced from a total preorder
on the set of states as shown by the following (more general) proposition. A preorder
R on a set X is a reexive and transitive relation on X and is total i¤ for all elements
x; y 2 X, either (x; y) 2 R or (y; x) 2 R or both.
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Figure 3-2: Indenite information
Proposition 3.7 Let X be a set and let R be a total preorder on X. Then R produces
a strict linearly ordered partition of X.
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.1.
For every preorder R on a set X, there is a corresponding strict order on X which
is given by RS = R   f(x; y) j (y; x) 2 Rg. An order relation is strict if it is irreexive
instead of reexive. Preorders R and Q on X are order-equivalent i¤ RS = QS. For a
total preorder, the corresponding strict order is a (strict) modular partial order, as will
be shown subsequently. A partial order R on a set X is a preorder that is antisymmetric.
Denition 3.6 (Lehmann and Magidor, 1992) A partial order R on X ismodular
i¤ for every x; y; and z 2 X one of the following holds:
 if (x; y) =2 R, (y; x) =2 R, and (z; x) 2 R then (z; y) 2 R
 if (x; y) 2 R then either (z; y) 2 R or (x; z) 2 R
 there is a totally ordered set 
 and function r : X ! 
 such that (x; y) 2 R i¤
r(x) < r(y)
Proposition 3.8 Let X be a set. For every total preorder R on X there is a strict
modular partial order Q on X such that R and Q are order-equivalent, and conversely,
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for every strict modular partial order Q on X there is a total preorder R on X such that
Q and R are order-equivalent.
Proof. Let R be a total preorder on X and let Q = RS. But then Q is order-
equivalent to R. By construction, Q is irreexive on X and antisymmetric. To see that
Q is transitive, suppose that (x; y) 2 Q and (y; z) 2 Q. So (x; y) 2 R and (y; z) 2 R
and (by transitivity of R) (x; z) 2 R. But (z; x) =2 R since otherwise (y; x) 2 R (by
transitivity of R) and then (x; y) =2 Q. So (x; z) 2 Q. Thus Q is a strict partial order on
X. To see that Q is modular suppose that (x; y) =2 Q, (y; x) =2 Q, and (z; x) 2 Q. Since
R is total it must be the case that either (x; y) 2 R or (y; x) 2 R. Since neither belongs
to Q, it follows that both (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) 2 R. But since (z; x) 2 Q it must hold
that (z; x) 2 R and (x; z) =2 R. So (z; y) 2 R by transitivity of R but (y; z) =2 R. Thus
(z; y) 2 Q, i.e. Q is modular.
Conversely, let Q be a strict modular partial order on X and let R = Q [ f(x; y) j
(x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Qg. Clearly RS = Q and hence R order-equivalent to Q. For
every x 2 X; (x; x) =2 Q. But then (x; x) 2 R for every x 2 X, i.e. R is reexive.
Transitivity of R follows directly from transitivity of Q. Thus R is a preorder. To see
that R is total, pick any x; y 2 X. If (x; y) 2 Q then (x; y) 2 R. Similarly, if (y; x) 2 Q,
then (y; x) 2 R. If (x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q then, by construction, (x; y) 2 R and
(y; x) 2 R. Thus R is total.
Proposition 3.8 suggests that a strict linearly ordered partition of states may also be
produced from a strict modular partial order on the set of states. Furthermore, since
a total preorder and its corresponding strict modular partial order are order-equivalent,
one would expect them to produce the same linearly ordered partition of states.
Proposition 3.9 Let X be a set and let Q be a strict modular partial order on X. Then
Q produces a strict linearly ordered partition of X.
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Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.1.
Proposition 3.10 Let X be a set, R a total preorder on X, and Q the corresponding
strict modular partial order on X. Then R and Q produce the same strict linearly ordered
partition of X.
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.1.
Semantically, indenite information may be represented by either a total preorder
or a strict modular partial order since the e¤ect of both is to produce a strict linearly
ordered partition of states as shown by proposition 3.10. For illustrative purposes, an
example is provided below of a total preorder, its corresponding strict modular partial
order, and the strict linearly ordered partition that they produce.
Example 3.4 Suppose S = f11; 10; 01; 00g is a set of states . The relation R = f(11; 11);
(10; 10); (01; 01); (00; 00); (11; 10); (10; 00); (11; 00); (11; 01); (01; 00); (10; 01); (01; 10)g is a
total preorder on S, and the relation RS = f(11; 10); (10; 00); (11; 00); (11; 01); (01; 00)g
the corresponding strict modular partial order on S. Then P = hf11g; f10; 01g; f00gi is
the strict linearly ordered partition produced by R (and also by RS). See the illustration
in gure 3-3.
The KLM approach was formulated in terms of strict modular partial orders. Nonethe-
less, the visual representation of an ordered partition by boxes positioned on top of one
another highlights the di¤erence between indenite information and denite information
in a way not as apparent with either preorders or partial orders.
Visually, a dichotomous ordered partition on the set of states depicted by a box
of least normal states positioned on top of a box of most normal states has the same
appearance as the dichotomy associated with denite information and depicted by a




meaning. In the case of indenite information and default rules, we may view the less
normal states as being tentatively, rather than denitely, excluded. Should we wish to
treat both indenite information and denite information, a visualisation will have to be
developed that makes this distinction clear.
Strict modular partial orders (or total preorders) play an important role in the pref-
erential model semantics of Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor. Such a relation provides an
ordering on the set of states from which the notion of a minimal element in a subset of
states, and hence, the notion of a model of a sentence that is most preferred with respect
to the ordering, may be dened.
Denition 3.7 Let R be a total preorder on a set X.
 For every Y  X, an element y 2 Y is minimal in Y with respect to R i¤ there
is no x 2 Y such that (x; y) 2 R, unless (y; x) 2 R. The set of minimal elements
in Y with respect to R is denoted by MinR(Y ).
 For every Y  X, the preorder R is Y -smooth i¤ for every element y 2 Y there
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is some x 2 Y such that (x; y) 2 R and x is minimal in Y 3.
In the context of diagrammable systems, the denition of a ranked model (or inter-
pretation) may be simplied and adapted in the obvious way to a (nitely generated)
propositional language that is transparent rather than opaque.
Denition 3.8 A ranked interpretation of L is a triple P = hS;R; li such that
 S is a non-empty set of states,
 l : S ! UT is a labelling function, and
 R is a total preorder on S4.
The notion of satisfaction and of a model are dened in exactly the same way for
ranked interpretations as for possible worlds interpretations. The notion of a minimal
model is, however, only applicable to ranked interpretations. Given a ranked inter-
pretation P = hS;R; li, a state s 2 S is called a minimal model of a sentence  i¤
s 2MinR(ModP ()). Given P , the set of minimal models of  is denoted by MinR().
The essential di¤erence between ranked interpretations and possible worlds interpreta-
tions is that, through the use of minimal models, every ranked interpretation P induces a
defeasible consequence relation on L. A defeasible consequence relation is a consequence
relation js on L that cannot be counted on to always satisfy monotonicity. Monotonicity
in the case of a consequence relation, as opposed to a consequence operation, translates
into saying that if  js  then  ^  js  for all ; ;  2 L.
Denition 3.9 Let P = hS;R; li be a ranked interpretation of L. The defeasible con-
sequence relation induced by P is the relation jsP on L given by  jsP  i¤ MinR() 
3The smoothness condition is essentially the same as the limit assumption in Lewis (1973).
4Lehmann and Magidor also require R to be X-smooth for every sentence  2 L where X =ModM ()
and M = hS; li. However, this condition holds true since L is nite.
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ModP (). If  jsP  then  is said to defeasibly entail  (under P ) and  is said to
be a defeasible consequence of  (under P ).
The defeasible consequence relation jsP induced by a ranked interpretation P =
hS;R; li does not necessarily satisfy Monotonicity, as expected. However, in the limit,
for the ranked interpretation P = hS;R; li with R = S  S, the defeasible consequence
relation jsP induced by P is exactly the semantic consequence relation j=P and thus
monotonic. The more general relationship between semantic consequence, semantic
equivalence, and defeasible consequence is provided by the following proposition, the
proof of which is routine. Note that Supraclassicality is dened in the version appropri-
ate for consequence relations rather than for consequence operations.
Proposition 3.11 Let P = hS;R; li be a ranked interpretation of L and let jsP be
the defeasible consequence relation on L induced by P . Then jsP satises the following
properties:
 if  j=P  then  jsP  (Supraclassicality)
 if  P 0,  P  0, and  jsP  then 0 jsP  0 (Well-behavedness)
The KLM approach focusses on the properties of defeasible consequence relations,
based on the general assumption that all reasonable logical systems draw only sensible
conclusions. Of particular interest are the family of preferential consequence relations
and the family of rational consequence relations.
Denition 3.10 A preferential consequence relation is a binary relation js on L that
satises the following properties for all , , and  2 L:
 for every  2 L,  js  (Reexivity)
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 if  js  and    then  js  (Left Logical Equivalence)
 if  js  and  j=  then  js  (Right Weakening)
 if  js  and  js  then  js  ^  (And)
 if  js  and  js  then  _  js  (Or)
 if  js  and  js  then  ^  js  (Cautious Monotonicity)
Reexivity (in the case of a consequence relation) states that a hypothesis is a defeasi-
ble consequence of itself. Left Logical Equivalence stipulates that semantically equivalent
hypotheses have the same defeasible consequences while Right Weakening stipulates that
the defeasible consequences of a hypothesis include logically weaker sentences. The con-
junction of two defeasible consequences of the same hypothesis is itself a defeasible con-
sequence (by And) while a (common) defeasible consequence of two di¤erent hypotheses
is also a defeasible consequence of the disjunction of the hypotheses (by Or). Cautious
Monotonicity states that a hypothesis may be expanded without invalidating previous
defeasible consequences by adding to it one of its defeasible consequences.
Denition 3.11 A rational consequence relation is a preferential consequence relation
js on L that satises the following property for all , , and  2 L:
 if  js  and  j6s : then  ^  js  (Rational Monotonicity)
Rational Monotonicity is stronger than Cautious Monotonicity in the sense that a
hypothesis may be expanded without invalidating previous defeasible consequences by
adding any sentence to the hypothesis, provided the negation of the added sentence is not
already a defeasible consequence of the hypothesis. Rational consequence relations may
be characterised in terms of ranked interpretations as shown by Lehmann and Magidor
(1992) in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.1 (Lehmann and Magidor, 1992) If P = hS;R; li is a ranked interpre-
tation of L, then the defeasible consequence relation jsP on L induced by P is rational.
Conversely, if a binary relation js on L is a rational consequence relation, then it can be
dened by some ranked interpretation of L.
As mentioned earlier, the rational consequence relation induced by a ranked inter-
pretation di¤ers from the semantic consequence relation induced by a possible worlds
interpretation primarily in not always satisfying monotonicity. However, a number of
other important properties which are satised by semantic consequence relations, are not
(in general) satised by rational consequence relations.
Proposition 3.12 Let P = hS;R; li be a ranked interpretation of L and let jsP be the
rational consequence relation on L induced by P . Then jsP does not always satisfy the
following properties (which are satised by j=P ):
 if  j=P  and  j=P  then  P  (Antisymmetry)
 if  j=P  and  j=P  then  j=P  (Transitivity)
 if  j=P  then : j=P : (Contraposition)
In summary, nonmonotonic reasoning is concerned with indenite information, the
semantic representation of which by some form of ordering is utilised in providing a
mechanism for the formation of defeasible conjectures. The mechanism is essentially a
movement from a hypothesis to those models that are minimal with respect to the or-
dering representing the indenite information and from there to a defeasible consequence
that is true at each of the minimal models. In cases where every model is minimal, the




Templated orderings have their origins in the strict modular partial orderings associated
with nonmonotonic logic. Recall from the previous section that the e¤ect of both a
strict modular partial order and a total preorder is to produce a strict linearly ordered
partition on a set of states. The visual representation of such an ordered partition by
boxes stacked on top of one another, one box for each element of the partition, provides a
useful analogue for introducing the concept of a templated ordering. Loosely speaking, a
templated ordering may be seen as the distribution of a set of states over an arrangement
of boxes stacked on top of one another with one box specially designated as the top box.
This xed construct of stacked boxes is what is referred to as the template. A template is
determined by the size of the set of states in the sense that it contains, apart from the top
box, a box for each element of the largest possible partition on the set of states. Thus if
there are n states, the template consists of n+1 boxes. The top box in a template fulls
the same role as the top box encountered in semantic information theory: it is reserved
for those states that are denitely excluded.
In the context of diagrammable systems, where the states of the system correspond to
a subset of the valuations of some nitely generated propositional language, a template
is of course inuenced by the language itself. In the case where there is a bijective
correspondence between states and valuations, a propositional language generated by n
atoms will result in a template consisting of exactly 2n+1 boxes, since the language has
2n valuations.
A templated ordering may be regarded as an instance of an abstract data type, or ADT
for short. An ADT is a collection of objects together with a collection of operations that
may be performed on the objects and a collection of laws describing the behaviour of
the objects. (See, for example, Aho and Ullman (1992). Alternatively, for a more formal
treatment, see Guttag (1986) or Loeckx, Ehrich, and Wolf (1996).) In a templated
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ordering ADT, the objects are the templated orderings themselves, i.e. the distributions
of a set of states across, or over, a template.
Denition 3.12 Let S be a nite non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. The tem-
plate for S is the set B = f0; 1; : : : ; ng (of box-labels) together with the usual linear order
 on B. A templated ordering or, t-ordering for short, is a function t : S ! B. The
class of all t-orderings having the same set S of states and template B for S is denoted
by TS.
Choosing the set f0; 1; : : : ; ng as the template B for S is a matter of convenience.
The important characteristic of a template is that it permits the nest possible partition
of a nite set of states and that a linear order is dened on the template. The basic
idea underlying templates is qualitative in nature although, admittedly, choosing the set
f0; 1; : : : ; ng opens up the possibility of using t-orderings in a more quantitative manner.
This temptation will be resisted.
Denition 3.13 The collection of basic operations for a class TS of t-orderings is dened
as follows:
 get : TS B B ! }S by get(t; i; j) = fs 2 S j i  t(s)  j and i  jg
 top : TS ! }S by top(t) = fs 2 S j t(s) = ng
 bottom : TS ! }S by bottom(t) = fs 2 S j t(s) = 0g
 push : TS  S B ! TS by
push(t; s; j) =
8<: t f(s; j)g if j > t(s),t otherwise
 pull : TS  S B ! TS by
pull(t; s; j) =
8<: t f(s; j)g if j < t(s),t otherwise.
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where the overriding operation  on functions is given by f  g = f(x; y) j if x is
in the domain of g then y = g(x), else y = f(x)g
Operation getretrieves the sets of states between (and at) two specied box-labels
while operation top simply retrieves the set of states at the top box and operation
bottomthe set of states at the bottom box. Operation pushmodies the position of a
state by pushing it up to a specied box-label while operation pullmodies the position
of a state by pulling it down to a specied box-label.
Denition 3.14 Specialisations of operation get : TS  B  B ! }S for a class TS of
t-orderings are dened as follows:
 get! : TS B ! }S by get!(t; j) = get(t; j; j)
 get" : TS B ! }S by get"(t; j) = get(t; 0; j)
 get# : TS B ! }S by get#(t; j) = get(t; j; n)
Operation get!retrieves the set of states at a specied box-label. Operation get"
retrieves the sets of states starting from the bottom box up to (and including) a specied
box-label while operation get#retrieves the sets of states starting from the top box down
to (and including) a specied box-label.
Denition 3.15 Two auxiliary operations for a class TS of t-orderings will prove useful
and are dened as follows:
 first" : TS ! B by first"(t) = j where get"(t; j   1) = ? and get!(t; j) 6= ?
 first# : TS ! B by first#(t) = j where get#(t; j + 1) = ? and get!(t; j) 6= ?
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Operation first" retrieves the rst box-label that is occupied by a set of states,
starting from the bottom box going up while operation first#retrieves the rst box-
label that is occupied by a set of states, starting from the top box going down.
Proposition 3.13 Let t 2 TS, i; j 2 B, and s 2 S. Then the following constraints hold:
1. bottom(t)  get"(t; j) and top(t)  get#(t; j)
2. get!(t; i)  get"(t; j) if i  j and get!(t; i)  get#(t; j) if i  j
3. get"(t; j) [ get#(t; j) = S and get"(t; j) \ get#(t; j) = get!(t; j)
4. pull(push(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t
5. push(pull(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.2.
Denition 3.16 The templated ordering ADT is the class which is the union of all
the classes TS of t-orderings.
Denition 3.17 A t-ordering t 2 TS is strongly contradictory i¤ get"(t; n   1) = ?
and weakly contradictory i¤ get!(t; 0) = ? but get"(t; n 1) 6= ?. A t-ordering t 2 TS
is tautological i¤ get!(t; 0) = S.
Every t-ordering induces a strict modular partial order or, alternatively, a total pre-
order on the set of states.
Proposition 3.14 Let t 2 TS. Then t induces a total preorder and a strict modular
partial order on S.
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Proof. Let Rt be the relation on S induced by t-ordering t 2 TS such that (s; s0) 2 Rt
i¤ t(s)  t(s0). Clearly, the relation Rt is reexive, transitive, and total. Alternatively, let
Qt be the relation on S induced by t-ordering t 2 TS such that (s; s0) 2 Qt i¤ t(s) < t(s0).
It is easy to see that Qt is irreexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. To see that Qt is
modular note that B is a linearly ordered set and t a function from S to B such that
(s; s0) 2 Qt i¤ t(s) < t(s0).
The total preorder induced by a t-ordering and the strict modular partial order in-
duced by the same t-ordering are order-equivalent since the corresponding strict order of
the total preorder is precisely the strict modular partial order. If a t-ordering is strongly
contradictory then the total preorder induced by the t-ordering is the relation R = SS
while the strict modular partial order induced by the same t-ordering is the relation
Q = ?. Note that the same relations are induced by a t-ordering that is tautological
(and by every t-ordering where t(s) = i for every s 2 S). Thus a t-ordering is more than
a total preorder or strict modular partial order.
Denition 3.18 Let t; t0 2 TS. Then t and t0 are order-equivalent i¤ the total pre-
orders induced by t and t0 are order-equivalent.
Each equivalence class of order-equivalent t-orderings has a member which is minimal
in the sense that every state, except for the denitely excluded states in the top box, is
as low as possible.
Denition 3.19 A t-ordering t 2 TS is in normal form i¤ for each (box-label) i 2 B,
if i < n and get!(t; i) = ? then get(t; i; n   1) = ?. The subclass of all t-orderings
t 2 TS in normal form is denoted by TN .
Included in the subclass of t-orderings in normal form are t-orderings which are tauto-
logical and t-orderings which are strongly contradictory, but t-orderings which are weakly
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contradictory are excluded. The subclass of t-orderings in normal form e¤ectively de-
nes a purely qualitative subclass of t-orderings because the notion of relative distance,
which can be expressed by unrestricted t-orderings, is removed. T-orderings in normal
form are an important subclass of t-orderings and, as will be shown, every t-ordering can
be transformed into a t-ordering in normal form that is order equivalent to the original
t-ordering. Such a transformation, which is called normalisation, is reliant on the fact
that template B is a well-ordered set. An ordering is a well-ordering on a set X if every
nonempty subset of X has a least element under the ordering. If X is nite and R is a
linear order on X, then R is automatically a well-ordering on X. The initial segment of
an element x 2 X is given by seg(x) = fy 2 X j (y; x) 2 Rg. In a well-ordered set X,
the elements in seg(x) are followed by element x in the ordering in the sense that x is
the least member of the complement of seg(x). Given a well-ordered set X, x is referred
to as the successor of seg(x).
Denition 3.20 Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B. The normalise
function for A is the function g : A! B given by
 g(x) =
8<: card(seg(x)) if x 6= nn otherwise
where seg(x) is the initial segment of x.
Denition 3.21 The normalisation of t-ordering t 2 TS is the t-ordering of TS given
by the composition g  t where g is the normalise function for ran(t).
To prove that the normalisation of a t-ordering produces a t-ordering in normal form
that is order-equivalent to the original, several lemmas are subsequently introduced.
Lemma 3.1 Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B and let g be the normalise
function for A. Then g(x) < n for every x 2 A such that x 6= n.
64
3.3. Templated orderings
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.2.
Lemma 3.2 Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B and let g be the normalise
function for A. Then g is injective.
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.2.
Lemma 3.3 Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B and let g be the normalise
function for A. If j < n and j 2 ran(g), then k 2 ran(g) for every 0  k < j.
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.2.
Proposition 3.15 Let t 2 TS. Then g  t is in normal form where g is the normalise
function for ran(t).
Proof. Assume there is some i 2 B such that i < n and get!(g  t; i) = ?. It must
be shown that get(g  t; i; n   1) = ?. Suppose it is not the case. So there must be at
least one s 2 S such that (g  t)(s) = g(t(s)) = j for i < j  n   1. So j < n and
j 2 ran(g). But then k 2 ran(g) for every 0  k < j by lemma 3.3. Since i < j it follows
that i 2 ran(g). But then there must be some s0 2 dom(t) such that g(t(s0)) = i. But
then s0 2 get!(g  t; i), i.e. get!(g  t; i) 6= ?. Contradiction. So get(g  t; i; n  1) = ?.
Thus g  t is in normal form.
Proposition 3.16 Let t 2 TS. Then gt is order-equivalent to t where g is the normalise
function for ran(t).
Proof. Let Qt be the strict modular partial order induced by t-ordering t and let
Qgt be the strict modular partial order induced by t-ordering g  t. Pick any element
(si; sj) 2 Qt. So t(si) < t(sj). Suppose t(sj) 6= n. Then g(t(si)) = card(seg(t(si)))
and g(t(sj)) = card(seg(t(sj))). But t(si) 2 seg(t(sj)) and so g(t(si)) < g(t(sj)). Thus
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(si; sj) 2 Qgt. Suppose t(sj) = n. Then g(t(si)) = card(seg(t(si))) and g(t(sj)) = n.
But t(si) 6= n and so (by lemma 3.1) g(t(si)) < n. Hence, g(t(si)) < g(t(sj)) and so
(si; sj) 2 Qgt. Since (si; sj) was chosen arbitrarily, Qt  Qgt.
Conversely, suppose (si; sj) 2 Qgt. So g(t(si)) < g(t(sj)). Suppose t(sj) 6= n. Then
card(seg(t(si))) < card(seg(t(sj))), i.e. seg(t(si))  seg(t(sj)). But ran(t) is well-
ordered and so t(si) = succ(seg(t(si))) and t(sj) = succ(seg(t(sj))). But then t(si) <
t(sj). Thus (si; sj) 2 Qt. Suppose t(sj) = n. Then t(si) < n otherwise g(t(si)) = g(t(sj)).
So t(si) < t(sj) and thus (si; sj) 2 Qt. Since (si; sj) was chosen arbitrarily, Qgt  Qt.
So Qt = Qgt, i.e. t-orderings t and g  t are order-equivalent.
Proposition 3.16 shows that for every t-ordering in a class of t-orderings having the
same set of states and template, there exists a t-ordering in normal form that is order-
equivalent to the original. T-orderings in normal form provide the basis for representing
denite and indenite information semantically, and for expressing these semantic repre-
sentations syntactically.
Denite t-orderings provide a means for representing denite information in an easily
visualisable way. Recall from semantic information theory that denite information was
represented semantically by a division of the nite set of states into a set of included states
and a complementary set of excluded states. In a denite t-ordering, the set of included
states is distributed below the top box (over the bottom box) and the complementary
set of excluded states over the top box.
Example 3.5 Consider the Light-Fan system of example 3.1 (on page 39). Using a
denite t-ordering, the observation that the light is on may be represented semantically
as shown in gure 3-4.
Denition 3.22 A t-ordering t 2 TS is denite i¤ t is in normal form and top(t) [
bottom(t) = S. The subclass of all denite t-orderings t 2 TS is denoted by TD.
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Figure 3-4: Denite t-ordering
When a denite t-ordering is tautological, it corresponds to the case in semantic in-
formation theory where the set of excluded states is empty, thus representing the instance
of no information. In contrast, when a denite t-ordering is strongly contradictory, every
state belongs to the set of excluded states thus representing the instance of too much (or
contradictory) information.
Indenite t-orderings provide a means for representing indenite information in a
visualisable way that is compatible with our visualisation of denite information. Recall
from nonmonotonic logic that a default rule was represented semantically by a division
of the nite set of states into a strict linearly ordered partition where the subset of states
lowest down in the ordering was considered most typical (or normal) and the subsets of
states higher up as progressively less typical (or normal). In an indenite t-ordering, the
subset of states considered most typical are distributed over the bottom box, the subset
of states considered less typical over the next box, and so on, until the subset of states
considered least typical has been distributed over a box. The set of maximally preferred
states is taken to be the subset of most typical states, i.e. the set of states distributed
over the bottom box. Note that the top box will remain empty. This is consistent with
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the idea that indenite information warrants only the tentative ruling out of states, not
denite exclusion.
Example 3.6 Consider the Light-Fan system of example 3.1 (on page 39). Using an
indenite t-ordering, the default rule Normally the light is on, and if the light is on, then
normally the fan is on as wellmay be represented semantically as shown in gure 3-5.
Figure 3-5: Indenite t-ordering
Denition 3.23 A t-ordering t 2 TS is indenite i¤ t is in normal form and top(t) = ?
and bottom(t) 6= S. The subclass of all indenite t-orderings t 2 TS is denoted by TI .
In dening an indenite t-ordering as a t-ordering in normal form, indenite infor-
mation has been restricted to the kind of default rules encountered in nonmonotonic
reasoning approaches such as the KLM approach. In section 3.7, an example of a default
rule that cannot be represented by a t-ordering in normal form will be encountered, and
it will be shown that such a representation leads to a kind of weakparadox.
Denite and indenite t-orderings are two specialisations of t-orderings in normal
form in which either denite or indenite information is represented, but not both. In
contrast, regular t-orderings, which is another specialisation of t-orderings in normal
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form, provide a means for representing the combination of (non-contradictory) denite
information and indenite information.
Example 3.7 Consider the Light-Fan system of example 3.1 (on page 39). Suppose the
agent has available denite information in the form of an observation that the light is on
(with ignorance about the fan) and indenite information in the form of a default rule
that says Normally the light is on, and if the light is on, then normally the fan is on as
well. Using a regular t-ordering, the combination of denite and indenite information
may be represented semantically as shown in gure 3-6.
Figure 3-6: Regular t-ordering
Denition 3.24 A t-ordering t 2 TS is regular i¤ t is in normal form and t is not
strongly contradictory. A regular t-ordering is said to be pure i¤ t =2 TD and t =2 TI . The
subclass of all regular t-orderings t 2 TS is denoted by TE.
The subclass of regular t-orderings di¤ers from the subclass of t-orderings in normal
form only in the exclusion of t-orderings that are strongly contradictory. An important
property of regular t-orderings is that if two regular t-orderings are order-equivalent,
then they are identical. The same does not hold true (in general) for t-orderings in
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normal form. To see why, consider t-orderings t = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 0); (00; 0)g and t0
= f(11; 4); (10; 4); (01; 4); (00; 4)g. The total preorders induced by both t-orderings are
the relation R = S  S. So we have a case in which two t-orderings in normal form are
order-equivalent but, clearly, not identical.
Proposition 3.17 Let t; t0 2 TE. If t and t0 are order-equivalent then t = t0.
Proof. Suppose that t and t0 are order-equivalent. So t(s)  t(s0) i¤ t0(s)  t0(s0) for
every s; s0 2 S. It must be shown that t(s) = t0(s) for every s 2 S, i.e. it must be shown
that get!(t; i) = get!(t0; i) for every i 2 B. The proof is by induction.
Suppose i = 0. Choose any s 2 get!(t; 0). So t(s) = 0. But then t(s)  t(s0) for every
s0 2 S. But t and t0 are order-equivalent and thus t0(s)  t0(s0) for every s0 2 S. Since
t0 is regular, it follows that t0(s) = 0, i.e. s 2 get!(t0; 0). But s was chosen arbitrarily
and thus get!(t; 0)  get!(t0; 0). Similarly for the converse. So get!(t; i) = get!(t0; i)
for i = 0.
Suppose that get!(t; j) = get!(t0; j) for some 0 < j < n (induction hypothesis).
It must be shown that get!(t; j+1) = get!(t0; j+1). Choose any s 2 get!(t; j+1).
So t(s) = j + 1. Suppose that t0(s) < j + 1, say t0(s) = i where i  j. So s 2 get!(t0; i).
Then, by the induction hypothesis, s 2 get!(t; i), i.e. t(s) = i. Contradiction. Suppose
that t0(s) > j + 1, say t0(s) = j + 1 + i where i > 0. Since t0 is regular, it follows that
get!(t0; j + 1) 6= ?. So there must be some s0 2 get!(t0; j + 1) such that t0(s0) < t0(s).
But t and t0 are order-equivalent and thus t(s0) < t(s). Since t(s) = j +1, it follows that
t(s0) < j + 1. Suppose t(s0) = j, i.e. s0 2 get!(t; j). Then, by the induction hypothesis,
s0 2 get!(t0; j), i.e. t0(s) = j. Contradiction. So t0(s) 6> j + 1. But then t0(s) = j + 1.
So s 2 get!(t0; j + 1). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that get!(t; j + 1) 
get!(t0; j + 1). Similarly for the converse. So get!(t; j + 1) = get!(t0; j + 1).
The visualisations that were developed for the semantic representations of information
assisted us in pulling together apparently disparate strands from semantic information
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theory and (the KLM approach to) nonmonotonic logic. Unlike the semantic representa-
tions of information a¤orded by these approaches, t-orderings provide a unied semantic
framework for the combination of both denite information and indenite information.
Henceforth, we shall refrain from speaking in terms of the visualisation of a t-ordering
and shall simply speak of the levels (boxes) of a t-ordering and of the level (box-label)
of a state in a t-ordering.
3.4 Syntactic expressions
In semantic information theory, every semantic representation of denite information is
expressible as a sentence in either extensional SDNF or extensional SCNF, and from
every such syntactic representation in the knowledge representation language, a seman-
tic representation may be recovered. In the KLM approach to nonmonotonic reasoning,
the semantic representation of indenite information is (in general) not expressible as
sentences of the knowledge representation language. Developing normal forms to syntac-
tically express the representation of (semantic) information by t-orderings and recovering
t-orderings from such normal forms, is the focus of this section.
The rst step in developing normal forms is to decide what set of states the normal
form should axiomatise. We could choose to axiomatise absolutely any subset of states,
but four possibilities stand out as less arbitrary reference points than the rest: the set of
all states, the empty set of states, the set of maximally preferred states at the bottom
level, and the set of all included states. While it is tempting to axiomatise the set of all
states by ensuring that the normal form is a tautology relative to the set S of states,
thereby perturbing the landscape of tautologies in a potentially interesting way, we have
chosen instead an alternative more compatible with an agent-oriented approach. The
agents beliefs, determined by the states at the bottom level as will be shown in the
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next chapter, encompass all the elements that have a bearing on decisions and actions,
from the most daring defeasible beliefs to the most conservative and entrenched items of
knowledge. Therefore we choose to axiomatise the states at the bottom level, in e¤ect
casting the agents beliefs into a normal form.
Denition 3.25 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
A t-ordering t 2 TS is expressible as a sentence  2 L i¤  is a nite axiomatisation of
bottom(t), the set of maximally preferred states. A t-ordering t 2 TS is recoverable from
a syntactic expression  2 L i¤ t can be reconstructed from  in the manner illustrated
below. A t-ordering t 2 TS that is recovered from a syntactic expression  2 L of t is
denoted by t.
The denite information from the observation that the light is on, as represented by
the denite t-ordering t = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 4)g in gure 3-4 (on page 67), is
expressible as the sentences
 = (P (a) ^ P (b)) _ (P (a) ^ :P (b)) in extensional SDNF, and
 = (P (a) _ :P (b)) ^ (P (a) _ P (b)) in extensional SCNF.
This much is evident. The trick is to cope with states that are tentatively excluded.
We shall rst formally establish that denite t-orderings are easily expressible and re-
coverable, and then move on to the more complex question of t-orderings representing
indenite information (i.e. default rules) and t-orderings representing the combination
of denite and indenite information.
Proposition 3.18 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Then every denite t-ordering is expressible as a sentence in extensional SDNF or
extensional SCNF (or both).
Proof. Pick any denite t-ordering t 2 TD. It must be shown that there exists
a sentence in extensional SDNF or extensional SCNF that is a nite axiomatisation of
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bottom(t), the set of maximally preferred states. If t is not strongly contradictory then, by
proposition 1.2, bottom(t) has an axiomatisation in the form of a sentence  in extensional
SDNF. If t is not tautological then, by proposition 3.2, bottom(t) has an axiomatisation
in the form of a sentence  in extensional SCNF. Since t was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that every denite t-ordering is expressible as a sentence  2 L in extensional SDNF or
extensional SCNF (or both).
Proposition 3.19 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n and let t 2 TD be a denite t-ordering. Then t is recoverable from every syntactic
expression of t in extensional SDNF or extensional SCNF.
Proof. It must be shown that from every syntactic expression of t in extensional
SDNF or extensional SCNF, a denite t-ordering t0 can be constructed such that t0 = t.
Pick any nite axiomatisation  2 L of t in extensional SDNF or extensional SCNF.
Thus, by proposition 3.18, bottom(t) = ModM() (and top(t) = NModM()). Let t00 be
a t-ordering that is strongly contradictory. For every s 2ModM() let t0 = pull(t00; s; 0).
So bottom(t0) =ModM() and top(t0) = NModM(). But then t0 = t.
In general, since every sentence is semantically equivalent to a sentence in extensional
SDNF or extensional SCNF (or both), it follows that under an extensional interpretation
of L every denite t-ordering t is expressible as a sentence  and recoverable from ,
and conversely, that from every sentence  2 L a denite t-ordering t may be recovered
that is expressible as a sentence  in extensional SDNF or extensional SCNF, where 
is semantically equivalent to . Note that under an intensional interpretation, this need
not be true, i.e. it is not necessarily the case that every denite t-ordering t is expressible
as a sentence . The following example illustrates.
Example 3.8 Suppose L is generated by Atom = fP (a); P 0(a)g and M = hS; li is an
intensional interpretation such that S = fs1; s2; s3g and l = f(s1; I); (s2; J); (s3; J)g
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with vI = 11 and vJ = 01 (where the atoms are considered in the given order, so
that 01 corresponds to the valuation rendering P (a) false but P 0(a) true). Let t =
f(s1; 0); (s2; 0); (s3; 3)g be a denite t-ordering. Then there exists no sentence  such that
ModM() = bottom(t) where bottom(t) = fs1; s2g. This is because if s2 2ModM() then
it must be the case that s3 2ModM() since l(s2) = l(s3) and thus ModM() 6= fs1; s2g.
Moving on to the more complex question of t-orderings representing indenite infor-
mation, we turn our attention to indenite t-orderings and a new normal form, called
state description cumulative form, or SDCF for short.
Denition 3.26 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
A sentence  2 L is in state description cumulative form (SDCF) i¤  = Vni=0 i
where
 each i is a sentence in extensional SDNF,
 for each state description j occurring in i, j occurs in every k where k > i,
and
 n contains all the state descriptions corresponding to S.
From an indenite t-ordering t, the i components of a sentence in SDCF are con-
structed so that each i axiomatises, starting from level 0, the cumulative subsets of
states get"(t; i). Consider the default rule Normally the light is on, and if the light is
on, then normally the fan is on as well, as represented by the indenite t-ordering t
= f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 2)g in gure 3-5 (on page 68). Then
 0 = (P (a) ^ P (b)) with Mod(0) = f11g,
 1 = 0 _ (P (a) ^ :P (b)) with Mod(1) = f11; 10g,
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 2 = 1 _ (:P (a) ^ P (b)) _ (:P (a) ^ :P (b)) with Mod(2) = S,
 3 = 2 with Mod(3) = S, and
 4 = 3 with Mod(4) = S.
The fact that there are no change after 2 shows that above the third level, the
remaining levels are empty. Taking the conjunction of the i components yields the
sentence  = 0^1^2^3^4 in SDCF. It is not hard to see thatMod() =Mod(0).
Lemma 3.4 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Then for every sentence  =
Vn
i=0 i of L in SDCF, ModM() =ModM(0).
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.3.
As a dual to state description cumulative form, which is based on extensional SDNF,
we introduce semantic content cumulative form, or SCCF for short, which is a normal
form based on extensional SCNF.
Denition 3.27 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
A sentence  2 L is in semantic content cumulative form (SCCF) i¤  = Vmi=0 i
for m < n where
 each i is a sentence in extensional SCNF, and
 for each content element "j occurring in i, "j occurs in every k where k < i.
In the case of SCCF, the i components of a sentence in SCCF are semantically
equivalent to the negation of state descriptions and may therefore be read as recording
which states are excluded from each cumulative subset get"(t; i). Consider the same




 0 = 1 ^ (:P (a) _ P (b)) with NMod(0) = f01; 00; 10g and
 1 = (P (a) _ :P (b)) ^ (P (a) _ P (b)) with NMod(1) = f01; 00g.
The fact that there are only two i components indicates that by the third level, there
are no more states to be excluded, i.e. get"(t; 2) = S. Note that each i still axiomatises
the cumulative subsets of states get"(t; i) sinceMod(0) = f11g andMod(1) = f11; 10g.
Taking the conjunction of the i components yields the sentence  = 0 ^ 1 in SCCF.
It is not hard to see that Mod() =Mod(0).
Lemma 3.5 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Then for every sentence  =
Vm
i=0 i of L in SCCF, ModM() =ModM(0).
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.3.
Lemma 3.5 is key in showing that every indenite t-ordering is expressible as a sen-
tence in SCCF and, similarly, lemma 3.4 in showing the expressibility of every indenite
t-ordering as a sentence in SDCF.
Proposition 3.20 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Then every indenite t-ordering is expressible as a sentence in SDCF and in SCCF.
Proof. Pick any indenite t-ordering t 2 TI . It must be shown that there exists a
sentence in SDCF and in SCCF that is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t), the set of
maximally preferred states.
Case 1 (SDCF): Let Xi = get"(t; i) for i = 0; 1; : : : ; n. Since t is indenite, it follows
that each Xi is non-empty. Thus, by proposition 1.2, there is a nite axiomatisation in
the form of a sentence i in extensional SDNF for each Xi, i.e. ModM(i) = Xi. Let
 =
Vn
i=0 i. But then  is a sentence of L in SDCF. (To see that, pick any state
description j occurring in i. So there must be some s 2 Xi satisfying j, say sj: But,
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by construction, Xi  Xk for every k > i. So sj 2 Xk for every k > i. But then j occurs
in every k where k > i.) By lemma 3.4, ModM() =ModM(0). But ModM(0) = X0
and X0 = get"(t; 0) = bottom(t). So  is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t).
Case 2 (SCCF): By denition, bottom(t) 6= S. Let m = first#(t)   1 and let
Xi = get"(t; i) for i = 0; 1; : : : ;m. So each Xi  S. Thus, by proposition 3.2, there is a
nite axiomatisation in the form of a sentence i in extensional SCNF for each Xi such
that ModM(i) = Xi. Let  =
Vm
i=0 i. But then  is a sentence of L in SCCF. (To see
that, pick any content element "j occurring in i. So there must be some s 2 S   Xi
that fails to satisfy "j, say sj: But, by construction, Xi  Xk for every k > i, i.e.
S   Xi  S   Xk for every k < i. So sj 2 Xk for every k < i. But then "j occurs in
every k where k < i.) By lemma 3.5, ModM() = ModM(0). But ModM(0) = X0
and X0 = get"(t; 0) = bottom(t). So  is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t).
Although an indenite t-ordering is expressible by every sentence that axiomatises
the set of maximally preferred states (and not just by a sentence in SDCF or SCCF), it is
not the case that the t-ordering can be recovered from every such sentence. However, an
indenite t-ordering t 2 TI is recoverable from every syntactic expression of t in SDCF
or SCCF as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.21 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and let t 2 TI be an indenite t-ordering. Then t is recoverable from every syntactic
expression of t in SDCF or SCCF.
Proof. It must be shown that from every syntactic expression of t in SDCF or SCCF,
an indenite t-ordering t0 can be constructed such that t0 = t.
Case 1 (SDCF): Pick any syntactic expression  2 L of t in SDCF. By denition of
SDCF,  =
Vn
i=0 i where each i is a sentence in extensional SDNF. LetXi =ModM(i).
Since  is in SDCF, it follows that for each state description j occurring in i, j
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occurs in every k where k > i. Thus Xi  Xk for every k > i. Let Y0 = X0 and
Yi = Xi  Xi 1 for i = 1; : : : ; n. Let t0 be a t-ordering that is tautological. For each Yi,
let t0 = push(t0; sj; i) for every sj 2 Yi. It is claimed that t0 = t. To see this, pick any
s 2 S. By construction of , each i axiomatises get"(t; i). So Xi = get"(t; i). Suppose
t0(s) = 0. So s 2 Y0 = X0. But then s 2 get"(t; 0), i.e. t(s) = 0. Suppose t0(s) = i
for i > 0. So s 2 Yi = Xi   Xi 1. But then s 2 get"(t; i) and s =2 get"(t; i   1). So
s 2 get !(t; i), i.e. t(s) = i. Hence t0 = t.
Case 2 (SCCF): Pick any syntactic expression  2 L of t in SCCF. By denition of
SCCF,  =
Vm
i=0 i where each i is a sentence in extensional SCNF. LetXi =ModM(i).
Since  is in SCCF, it follows that for each content element "j occurring in i, "j occurs
in every k where k < i, whence it follows that S   Xi  S   Xk for every k < i,
i.e. Xk  Xi for every k < i. Let Y0 = X0 and Yi = Xi   Xi 1 for i = 1; 2; : : : ;m
and let Ym+1 = S   Xm. Let t0 be a t-ordering that is tautological. For each Yi, let
t0 = push(t0; sj; i) for every sj 2 Yi. It is claimed that t0 = t. To see this, pick any
s 2 S. By construction of , each i axiomatises get"(t; i). So Xi = get"(t; i). Suppose
t0(s) = 0. So s 2 Y0 = X0. But then s 2 get"(t; 0), i.e. t(s) = 0. Suppose t0(s) = i for
0 < i  m. So s 2 Yi = Xi   Xi 1. But then s 2 get"(t; i) and s =2 get"(t; i   1). So
s 2 get !(t; i), i.e. t(s) = i. Suppose t0(s) = m + 1. So s 2 S   Xm. By construction
of , m = first#(t)   1. But then s 2 get !(t;m + 1) otherwise s 2 get !(t; j) for
some j  m in which case s 2 Xi for every j < i  m so that t0(s) 6= m + 1 or else
s 2 get !(t; j) for some j > m + 1 in which case first#(t) 6= m + 1: Both cases lead to
contradictions. Thus t(s) = m+ 1. Hence t0 = t.
Having established that indenite t-orderings are expressible and recoverable, we turn
our attention to regular t-orderings representing the combination of denite and indenite
information and in particular, pure regular t-orderings. We shall again introduce new
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normal forms, the rst of which is called state description templated form, or SDTF for
short.
Denition 3.28 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
A sentence  of L is in state description templated form (SDTF) i¤
 = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn
i=0 i) where
 each i is a sentence in extensional SDNF,
 for each state description j occurring in i, j occurs in every k where k > i,
and
 n contains all the state descriptions corresponding to S.
The i components of a sentence in SDTF are constructed in exactly the same manner
as the i components of a sentence in SDCF. Consider the pure regular t-ordering t
= f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 4); (00; 4)g in gure 3-6 (on page 69). Then
 0 = (P (a) ^ P (b)) with Mod(0) = f11g,
 1 = 0 _ (P (a) ^ :P (b)) with Mod(1) = f11; 10g,
 2 = 1 with Mod(2) = f11; 10g,
 3 = 2 with Mod(3) = f11; 10g, and
 4 = 3 _ (:P (a) ^ P (b)) _ (:P (a) ^ :P (b)) with Mod(4) = S,
Taking the conjunction of all the i components yields the sentence 
0 = 0 ^ 1 ^
2^3^4, which is in SDCF and thus axiomatises the set of maximally preferred states,
i.e. Mod(0) = f11g. Taking the disjunction of components 0 to 3 yields the sentence
00 = 0 _ 1 _ 2 _ 3. It is not hard to see that Mod(00) = f11; 10g. The sentence
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 = 00^ 0 is in SDTF and since Mod() = f11g, it follows that  axiomatises the set of
maximally preferred states. Note that the disjunctive part 00 of the sentence  in SDTF
determines the set of excluded states (since it axiomatises the set of included states) and
thus records the denite information represented by t.
Lemma 3.6 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Then for every sentence  = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn




Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.3.
The second normal form is called semantic content templated form, or SCTF for
short. In contrast to SDTF, which is based on extensional SDNF, SCTF is based on
extensional SCNF.
Denition 3.29 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.






 each i is a sentence in extensional SCNF, and
 for each content element "j occurring in i, "j occurs in every k where k < i.
As was the case with SDTF, the i components of a sentence in SCTF are constructed
in exactly the same manner as the i components of a sentence in SCCF. Consider again
the pure regular t-ordering t = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 4); (00; 4)g in gure 3-6 (on page 69).
Then
 0 = 1 ^ (:P (a) _ P (b)) with NMod(0) = f01; 00; 10g,
 1 = 2 with NMod(1) = f00; 10g,
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 2 = 3 with NMod(2) = f00; 10g, and
 3 = (P (a) _ :P (b)) ^ (P (a) _ P (b)) with NMod(1) = f01; 00g.
The fact that there are four i components indicates that by the fth level, which is
the top level, there are no more states to be excluded, i.e. get"(t; 4) = S. Taking the
conjunction of components 0 to 3 yields the sentence 
0 = 0 ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 3, which
is in SCCF (with m = n   1) and axiomatises the set of maximally preferred states,
i.e. Mod(0) = f11g. Taking the disjunction of components 0 to 3 yields the sentence
00 = 0 _ 1 _ 2 _ 3. It is not hard to see that Mod(00) = f11; 10g. The sentence
 = 00 ^ 0 is in SCTF and since Mod() = f11g, it follows that  axiomatises the set of
maximally preferred states. As was the case with SDTF, the disjunctive part 00 of the
sentence  in SCTF determines the set of excluded states (since it axiomatises the set of
included states) and thus records the denite information represented by t.
Lemma 3.7 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Then for every sentence  = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn 1




Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.3.
Proposition 3.22 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Then every pure regular t-ordering is expressible as a sentence in SDTF and in SCTF.
Proof. Pick any pure regular t-ordering t 2 TE. It must be shown that there exists
a sentence in SDTF and in SCTF that is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t), the set of
maximally preferred states.
Case 1 (SDTF): Let Xi = get"(t; i) for i = 0; 1; : : : ; n. Since t is pure regular, it
follows that each Xi is non-empty. Thus, by proposition 1.2, there is a nite axiomatisa-





i=0 i. But then 
0 is a sentence of L in SDCF (as shown in proposition 3.20,
case 1). But then, by proposition 3.20, 0 is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t), i.e.
ModM(
0) = bottom(t). Let 00 =
Wn 1
i=0 i. By lemma 3.6, ModM(
00) = ModM(n 1),
i.e. ModM(00) = get"(t; n  1). SoModM(00)\ModM(0) = bottom(t). Let  = 00^ 0.
But then  is in SDTF and ModM() = bottom(t). So  is a nite axiomatisation of
bottom(t).
Case 2 (SCTF): Since t is pure regular, it follows that t is not tautological and
first#(t0) = n. Let Xi = get"(t; i) for i = 0; 1; : : : ; n   1. So each Xi  S. Thus, by
proposition 3.2, there is a nite axiomatisation in the form of a sentence i in extensional
SCNF for each Xi such that ModM(i) = Xi. Let 
0 =
Vn 1
i=0 i. But then 
0 is a
sentence of L in SCCF (as shown in proposition 3.20, case 2) with m = first#(t)  1 =
n   1. But then, by proposition 3.20, 0 is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t), i.e.
ModM(
0) = bottom(t). Let 00 =
Wn 1
i=0 i. By lemma 3.7, ModM(
00) = ModM(n 1),
i.e. ModM(00) = get"(t; n  1). SoModM(00)\ModM(0) = bottom(t). Let  = 00^ 0.
But then  is in SCTF and ModM() = bottom(t). So  is a nite axiomatisation of
bottom(t).
Although a pure regular t-ordering is expressible by every sentence that axiomatises
the set of maximally preferred states (and not just by a sentence in SDTF or SCTF), it
is not the case that the t-ordering can be recovered from every such sentence. However,
a pure regular t-ordering t 2 TE is recoverable from every syntactic expression of t in
SDTF or SCTF as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.23 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and let t 2 TE be a pure regular t-ordering. Then t is recoverable from every syntactic
expression of t in SDTF or SCTF.
Proof. It must be shown that from every syntactic expression of t in SDTF or SCTF,
a t-ordering t0 can be constructed such that t0 = t.
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Case 1 (SDTF): Pick any syntactic expression  2 L of t in SDTF. By denition
 = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn
i=0 i) where each i is a sentence in extensional SDNF. Let Xi =
ModM(i). Now let  = 
00^0 where 00 =Wn 1i=0 i and 0 =Vni=0 i. Since 0 is in SDCF,
it follows that for each state description j occurring in i, j occurs in every k where
k > i. Thus Xi  Xk for every k > i. Let Y0 = X0 and Yi = Xi Xi 1 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Let t0 be a t-ordering that is tautological. For each Yi, let t0 = push(t0; sj; i) for every
sj 2 Yi. It is claimed that t0 = t. To see this, pick any s 2 S. By construction of 0, each
i axiomatises get"(t; i). So Xi = get"(t; i). Suppose t
0(s) = 0. So s 2 Y0 = X0. But
then s 2 get"(t; 0), i.e. t(s) = 0. Suppose t0(s) = i for i > 0. So s 2 Yi = Xi Xi 1. But
then s 2 get"(t; i) and s =2 get"(t; i  1). So s 2 get !(t; i), i.e. t(s) = i. Hence t0 = t.
Case 2 (SCTF): Pick any syntactic expression  2 L of t in SCTF. By denition
 = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn 1
i=0 i) where each i is a sentence in extensional SCNF. Let Xi =
ModM(i). Now let  = 
00 ^ 0 where 00 = Wn 1i=0 i and 0 = Vn 1i=0 i. Since 0 is
in SCCF with m = first#(t)   1 = n   1, it follows that for each content element "j
occurring in i, "j occurs in every k where k < i, whence it follows that S Xi  S Xk
for every k < i, i.e. that Xk  Xi for every k < i. Let Y0 = X0 and Yi = Xi  Xi 1 for
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n  1 and let Yn = S  Xn 1. Let t0 be a t-ordering that is tautological. For
each Yi, let t0 = push(t0; sj; i) for every sj 2 Yi. It is claimed that t0 = t. To see this,
pick any s 2 S. By construction of 0, each i axiomatises get"(t; i). So Xi = get"(t; i).
Suppose t0(s) = 0. So s 2 Y0 = X0. But then s 2 get"(t; 0), i.e. t(s) = 0. Suppose
t0(s) = i for 0 < i  n   1. So s 2 Yi = Xi   Xi 1. But then s 2 get"(t; i) and
s =2 get"(t; i   1). So s 2 get !(t; i), i.e. t(s) = i. Suppose t0(s) = n. So s 2 S  Xn 1.
But then s 2 get !(t; n) otherwise s 2 get !(t; j) for some j  n   1 in which case
s 2 Xi for every j < i  n   1 so that t0(s) 6= n, leading to a contradiction. Thus
t(s) = n. Hence t0 = t.
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The normal forms that were developed to syntactically express the semantic represen-
tation of information by t-orderings and from which t-orderings are recoverable, illustrate
that the semantic representations of information a¤orded by semantic information the-
ory and (the KLM approach to) nonmonotonic logic are weaker than that of t-orderings.
Denite t-orderings are expressible and recoverable through extensional SDNF (exten-
sional SCNF) in a way similar to the dichotomous partitionsassociated with semantic
information theory. Indenite t-orderings, which are expressible and recoverable through
SDCF (SCCF), represent the strict modular partial orders associated with (the KLM
approach to) nonmonotonic logic. In addition, pure regular t-orderings, which are ex-
pressible through SDTF (SCTF), have no counterpart as a semantic representation of
information in either of these approaches. In the next section we return to one of the
cornerstones of t-orderings, namely, semantic information theory.
3.5 Semantic information content
The concept of the information carried by a sentence (as the set of states excluded by
the sentence) and the concept of the amount of information carried by a sentence (as
a numerical measure of its information content) were introduced in section 3.1. In this
section, the notion of (semantic) information content for t-orderings will be dened. For
completeness, numerical measures for the notion of information content will be dened
too, but, because our approach is qualitative in nature, will not be developed any further.
The information content of a t-ordering may be formulated in terms of the exclusion of
states, either denitely or tentatively.
Denition 3.30 Let t 2 TS. The denite information represented by t, or the denite
content of t, is dened as ContD(t) = top(t).
Denition 3.31 Let t 2 TS. The amount of denite information represented by t, or the
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denite measure of t; is dened as contD(t) =
Pm
i=1(cont(si) j si 2 ContD(t)) where
m = card(ContD(t)).
Proposition 3.24 Let t 2 TS. Then the following holds for 0  i < n:
1. ?  ContD(t)  S
2. if t is indenite, then ContD(t) = ?
3. ContD(t) = S i¤ t is strongly contradictory
Proof. The results follow directly from the denitions.
Having dened the notion of denite content, we are now in a position to compare
the notion of the information carried by the syntactic expression of a t-ordering with
the notion of the denite content of the t-ordering recovered from such a sentence. As
mentioned in section 3.4, under an extensional interpretation of L every denite t-ordering
is expressible as and recoverable from every sentence  2 L and not merely sentences in
extensional SDNF or extensional SCNF.
Proposition 3.25 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let t 2 TD be the denite t-ordering recovered from a sentence  2 L. Then
ContM() = ContD(t).
Proof. Pick any s 2 ContM(). By denition of ContM , s 2 NModM(). But  is a
syntactic expression of t and thusModM() = bottom(t). Since t is denite it follows
that s 2 top(t). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that ContM()  ContD(t).
Conversely, pick any s 2 ContD(t). By denition of ContD, s 2 top(t). But  is a
syntactic expression of t and so ModM() = bottom(t). Since t is denite it follows
that s 2 NModM(), i.e. s 2 ContM(). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that
ContD(t)  ContM(). Hence ContM() = ContD(t).
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When restricting ourselves to denite t-orderings, the basic results from semantic
information theory apply as illustrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.26 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let t; t 2 TD be the denite t-orderings recovered from ;  2 L respectively. Then
 j=M  i¤ ContD(t)  ContD(t).
Proof. Suppose  j=M . So ModM()  ModM(). But then NModM() 
NModM(), and, by denition of ContM , ContM()  ContM(). But t and t are the
denite t-orderings recovered from  and  respectively and, thus, by proposition 3.25,
it follows that ContD(t)  ContD(t). Conversely, suppose ContD(t)  ContD(t).
But t and t are the denite t-orderings recovered from  and  respectively and, thus,
by proposition 3.25, it follows that ContM()  ContM(). So, by denition of ContM ,
NModM()  NModM(). But then ModM() ModM(), i.e.  j=M .
The result shows that the information carried by a sentence coincides with the denite
content of the denite t-ordering recovered from that sentence. The other results from
semantic information theory (proposition 3.4) similarly apply under the restriction to
denite t-orderings.
We now turn our attention to pure regular t-orderings and formally show that the
disjunctive part of a sentence  = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn
i=0 i) in SDTF determines the set of
excluded states and thus records the denite information represented by t. It is done
by showing that the information carried by the sentence 00 =
Wn 1
i=0 i coincides with
the denite content of the pure regular t-ordering recovered from . Similarly, it will be




i=0 i) in SCTF records
the denite information represented by t.
Proposition 3.27 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
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(
Vn
i=0 i) in SDTF. Then ContM(
Wn 1
i=0 i) = ContD(t).
Proof. Let 00 =
Wn 1
i=0 i. By denition of SDTF, each i is a sentence in extensional
SDNF and by construction of , each i axiomatises get"(t; i). So ModM(n 1) =
get"(t; n   1). But ModM(00) = ModM(n 1) by lemma 3.6 and thus ModM(00) =
get"(t; n   1). Pick any s 2 ContM(00). By denition s 2 NModM(00), i.e. s 2
S ModM(00) and thus s 2 S  get"(t; n  1). So s 2 top(t). But then s 2 ContD(t).
Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that ContM(00)  ContD(t). Conversely, pick
any s 2 ContD(t). By denition s 2 top(t), i.e. s =2 get"(t; n  1). So s =2 ModM(00)
and thus s 2 NModM(00). But then s 2 ContM(00). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it
follows that ContD(t)  ContM(00). But then ContM(
Wn 1
i=0 i) = ContD(t).
Proposition 3.28 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =





i=0 i) in SCTF. Then ContM(
Wn 1
i=0 i) = ContD(t).
Proof. Let 00 =
Wn 1
i=0 i. By denition of SCTF, each i is a sentence in extensional
SCNF and by construction of , each i axiomatises get"(t; i). So ModM(n 1) =
get"(t; n   1). But ModM(00) = ModM(n 1) by lemma 3.7 and thus ModM(00) =
get"(t; n   1). Pick any s 2 ContM(00). By denition s 2 NModM(00), i.e. s 2
S ModM(00) and thus s 2 S  get"(t; n  1). So s 2 top(t). But then s 2 ContD(t).
Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that ContM(00)  ContD(t). Conversely, pick
any s 2 ContD(t). By denition s 2 top(t), i.e. s =2 get"(t; n  1). So s =2 ModM(00)
and thus s 2 NModM(00). But then s 2 ContM(00). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it
follows that ContD(t)  ContM(00). But then ContM(
Wn 1
i=0 i) = ContD(t).
As is to be expected, the information carried by a sentence  in SDCF or SCCF does
not coincide with the denite content of the indenite t-ordering recovered from .
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Proposition 3.29 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let t 2 TI be the indenite t-ordering recovered from a sentence  in SDCF or SCCF.
Then ContM() 6= ContD(t).
Proof. Since t is indenite it follows that ContD(t) = ? and bottom(t) 6= S.
By proposition 3.20, ModM() = bottom(t). Since bottom(t) 6= S it follows that
ModM() 6= S, i.e. NModM() 6= ?, i.e. ContM() 6= ?. But then ContM() 6=
ContD(t).
This is because a sentence  in SDCF or SCCF determines the maximal set of ten-
tatively excluded states (since it axiomatises the set of maximally preferred states) and
thus records the indenite information represented by t. The indenite information
represented by a t-ordering is captured by the notion of indenite content. We allow
for varying degrees of tentative exclusion, the usefulness of which will be illustrated in
section 4.3 where the information-theoretic semantics for epistemic logic (Labuschagne
and Ferguson, 2002) is applied. The indenite content of a t-ordering t to degree 0 will
often be referred to simply as the indenite content of t.
Denition 3.32 Let t 2 TS. The indenite information represented by t, or the indef-
inite content of t, to degree i, is dened as Conti(t) = get(t; i+ 1; n) for 0  i < n.
Denition 3.33 Let t 2 TS. The amount of indenite information represented by t, or
the indenite measure of t, to degree i, is dened as conti(t) =
Pm
j=1(cont(sj) j sj 2
Conti(t)) where m = card(Conti(t)).
Proposition 3.30 Let t 2 TS. Then the following holds for 0  i < n:
1. ?  Conti(t)  S
2. Cont0(t) = ? i¤ t is tautological
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3. if t is weakly contradictory, then Cont0(t) = S
4. if t is denite, then Cont0(t) = ContD(t)
5. Conti(t)  Conti 1(t)
Proof. The results follow directly from the denitions.
Having dened the notion of indenite content, it can now be formally shown that
a sentence  in SDCF or SCCF determines the maximal set of tentatively excluded
states (since it axiomatises the set of maximally preferred states) and thus records the
indenite information represented by t. It is done by showing that the information
carried by  coincides with the indenite content of the indenite t-ordering recovered









i=0 i) in SCTF record
the indenite information represented by the pure regular t-ordering recovered from .
Proposition 3.31 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let t 2 TI be the indenite t-ordering recovered from a sentence  in SDCF or SCCF.
Then ContM() = Cont0(t).
Proof. A sentence  in SDCF or SCCF axiomatises bottom(t), by proposition 3.20.
So ModM() = bottom(t). But then NModM() = S   bottom(t) = get(t; 1; n). So
ContM() = get(t; 1; n). But Cont0(t) = get(t; 1; n) and thus ContM() = Cont0(t).
Proposition 3.32 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =





i=0 i) in SDTF. Then ContM(
Vn
i=0 i) = Cont0(t).
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Proof. Let 0 =
Vn
i=0 i. By denition of SDTF, each i is a sentence in ex-
tensional SDNF and by construction of , each i axiomatises get"(t; i). Since 
0
is a sentence in SDCF, it follows by lemma 3.4 that ModM(0) = ModM(0). But
ModM(0) = get"(t; 0) and thus ModM(
0) = bottom(t). But then NModM(0) =
S bottom(t) = get(t; 1; n). So ContM(0) = get(t; 1; n). But Cont0(t) = get(t; 1; n)
and thus ContM(0) = Cont0(t). Hence ContM(
Vn
i=0 i) = Cont0(t).
Proposition 3.33 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =





i=0 i) in SCTF. Then ContM(
Vn 1
i=0 i) = Cont0(t).
Proof. Let 0 =
Vn 1
i=0 i. By denition of SCTF, each i is a sentence in ex-
tensional SCNF and by construction of , each i axiomatises get"(t; i). Since 
0 is
a sentence in SCCF with m = first#(t)   1 = n   1, it follows by lemma 3.5 that
ModM(
0) =ModM(0). ButModM(0) = get"(t; 0) and thusModM(
0) = bottom(t).
But thenNModM(0) = S bottom(t) = get(t; 1; n). So ContM(0) = get(t; 1; n). But




The notion of indenite content has no counterpart in semantic information theory,
one of the cornerstones of t-orderings. On the other hand, the notion of denite content
is closely connected with semantic information theory in the sense that the information
carried by a sentence coincides with the denite content of the denite t-ordering re-
covered from that sentence. In the next section we return to the other cornerstone of
t-orderings, namely, nonmonotonic logic.
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3.6 Reasoning with t-orderings
As mentioned earlier, nonmonotonic reasoning is concerned with indenite information,
the semantic representation of which by some form of ordering is utilised in providing
a mechanism for the formation of defeasible conjectures. In the KLM approach to non-
monotonic reasoning, the semantic representation of indenite information is by means
of a total preorder or its corresponding strict modular partial order. Both orderings
produce a strict linearly ordered partition on the set of states. T-orderings may be seen
as a distribution of the elements of such a partition of states over a template that main-
tains the strict linear order on the partition of states (but keeping the top-most position
for states that are denitely excluded). The mechanism involved in nonmonotonic rea-
soning is essentially a movement from a hypothesis to those models that are minimal
with respect to the ordering representing the indenite information and from there to a
defeasible consequence that is true at each of the minimal models.
Denition 3.34 Let t 2 TS. For every Y  S, an element s 2 Y is minimal in Y with
respect to t i¤ there is no s0 2 Y such that t(s0)  t(s), unless t(s)  t(s0). The set of
minimal elements in Y with respect to t is denoted by Mint(Y ).
Denition 3.35 A templated interpretation of L is a triple T = hS; t; li such that
 S is a nite non-empty set of states with card(S) = n,
 l : S ! UT is a labelling function, and
 t 2 TS is a t-ordering.
As before, the notions of satisfaction and of a model are dened in exactly the same
way for templated interpretations as for possible worlds interpretations. The notion
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of a minimal model is dened as for ranked interpretations, but using t-orderings in-
stead of strict modular partial orders (or total preorders). Thus, given a templated
interpretation T = hS; t; li, a state s 2 S is called a minimal model of a sentence  i¤
s 2Mint(ModT ()). Given T , the set of minimal models of  is denoted byMint() and
the defeasible consequence relation induced by T on L dened in exactly the same way
as for ranked interpretations, i.e.  jsT  i¤Mint() ModT (). When the t-ordering
t is denite, the defeasible consequence relation jsT induced by a templated interpreta-
tion T = hS; t; li is exactly the semantic consequence relation j=T . More importantly,
defeasible consequence relations induced by templated interpretations are rational.
Proposition 3.34 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let P =
hS;R; li be the corresponding (nite) ranked interpretation of L where R is the total
preorder induced by t. Then  jsT  i¤  jsP  for every ;  2 L.
Proof. It must be shown that Mint() = MinR(). Choose any s 2 Mint(), i.e.
s 2 Mint(ModT ()). So s 2 ModT () and there is no s0 2 ModT () such that t(s0) 
t(s), unless t(s)  t(s0). But then, by proposition 3.14, there can be no s0 2 ModT ()
such that (s0; s) 2 R, unless (s; s0) 2 R. Since ModT () = ModP (), it follows that
s 2 MinR(ModP ()), i.e. s 2 MinR(). So Mint()  MinR(). Similarly, it can be
shown that MinR() Mint(). Hence Mint() =MinR().
Proposition 3.35 If T = hS; t; li is a templated interpretation of L, then the defeasible
consequence relation jsT on L induced by T is rational. Conversely, if a binary relation
js on L is a rational consequence relation, then it can be dened by some templated
interpretation of L.
Proof. Suppose that T = hS; t; li is a templated interpretation of L. Then, by
proposition 3.34, a corresponding (nite) ranked interpretation P = hS;R; li of L may
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be dened such that jsT= jsP . But jsP is rational by theorem 3.1 and hence, it follows
that jsT is rational.
Conversely, suppose that js is a rational consequence relation on L. Then, by theorem
3.1, it can be dened by some ranked interpretation P = hS;R; li. Since L is nitely
generated, P = hS;R; li can be dened such that S is nite. A templated interpretation
T = hS; t; li can now be dened from P = hS;R; li by taking t(s)  t(s0) i¤ (s; s0) 2 R.
Given a t-ordering and a sentence, the concepts of plausibility and distrust (of the
sentence with respect to the t-ordering) can be dened. These concepts were originally
dened within the context of epistemic doxastic logic as the entrenchment of a sentence
and the disbelief in a sentence (Labuschagne et al., 2002). With the plausibility of a
sentence with respect to a t-ordering is meant the degree of condence with which the
agent whose epistemic state is given by the t-ordering may regard the sentence to be
true and adopt it as a basis for further action. A high degree of plausibility suggests
that the sentence may be adopted with a high degree of condence that it is true in the
current state of the system. In essence, if the plausibility of a sentence with respect to
a t-ordering has the highest possible level, the agent would consider the sentence to be
irrefutable with respect to the t-ordering. A T -valid sentence is irrefutable with respect
to every t-ordering.
The distrust in a sentence with respect to a t-ordering refers to the degree to which
the agent may lack condence that the sentence is satisable given the t-ordering. The
higher the degree of distrust, the lower the degree of condence in the satisability of
a sentence, with the highest degree of distrust indicating a judgment of unsatisability.
A T -unsatisable sentence is (as would be expected) unsatisable with respect to every
t-ordering. A formalisation of these concepts is subsequently presented.
Denition 3.36 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let  2 L. Then
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the plausibility of  with respect to t, is the function pl : TS L! f 1; 0; : : : ; ng given
by
 pl(t; ) =
8<: the greatest j such that get"(t; j) ModT () 1 if there is no such j
The plausibility of a sentence with respect to a t-ordering is dened as the greatest
level in the t-ordering such that the sentence is satised at every state (in the templated
interpretation) lying at or below that level. From the denition it is clear that every T -
valid sentence has a plausibility of n with respect to every t-ordering, sinceModT () = S
for every T -valid sentence . A sentence that cannot be adopted with any degree of
condence has a plausibility of  1.
Denition 3.37 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let  2 L. Then
the distrust in  with respect to t, is the function dt : TS  L! f0; : : : ; ng given by
 dt(t; ) =
8<: the least j such that get"(t; j) \ModT () 6= ?n if there is no such j
The distrust in a sentence with respect to a t-ordering is dened as the least level
in the t-ordering such that the sentence is satised at some state (in the templated
interpretation) lying at or below that level. From the denition, it is clear that the
distrust in every T -unsatisable sentence is n with respect to every t-ordering, since
ModT () = ? for every T -unsatisable sentence .
Proposition 3.36 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let ;  2 L.
Then the following hold:
1. If t is tautological, then pl(t; ) =  1 for every  2 L that is not T -valid and
dt(t; ) = 0 for every  2 L that is not T -unsatisable
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2. If t is strongly contradictory, then pl(t; ) = n   1 for every  2 L that is not
T -valid and dt(t; ) = n for every  2 L
3. If t is weakly contradictory, then pl(t; ) >  1 for every  2 L
4. If t is in normal form and pl(t; ) >  1, then dt(t; ) = 0
5. If dt(t; ) < dt(t; ) then pl(t; )  pl(t; )
Proof. 1. Let t be tautological. So get!(t; 0) = S. Suppose  is not T -valid,
i.e. ModT () 6= S. Then there can be no j < n such that get"(t; j)  ModT () and
thus pl(t; ) =  1. Suppose  is not T -unsatisable, i.e. ModT () 6= ?. Then, since
get!(t; 0) = S it follows that get"(t; 0) \ModT () 6= ?, i.e. dt(t; ) = 0.
2. Let t be strongly contradictory. So get"(t; n   1) = ?. But then get"(t; n   1) 
ModT () for every  2 L and there can be no greater j < n such that get"(t; j) 
ModT () unless  is T -valid. Hence pl(t; ) = n  1 for every  2 L that is not T -valid.
Since get"(t; n 1) = ? it follows that get"(t; n) = S and thus, for every  2 L that is not
T -unsatisable, the least j such that get"(t; j)\ModT () 6= ? is n. If  is unsatisable,
then dt(t; ) = n by denition. Hence dt(t; ) = n for every  2 L.
3. Let t be weakly contradictory. So get!(t; 0) = ?. But then get!(t; 0) ModT ()
for every  2 L and hence pl(t; ) >  1.
4. Let t be in normal form. Suppose pl(t; ) >  1. But then get"(t; 0) 6= ? and so
there must be some j > 0 such that get"(t; j) ModT (). So get"(t; 0) \ModT () 6= ?
and hence dt(t; ) = 0.
5. Let dt(t; ) < dt(t; ). If dt(t; ) = n then there is no j such that get"(t; j) \
ModT () 6= ?. But then there can be no j such that get"(t; j) ModT (), i.e. pl(t; ) =
 1. So pl(t; )  pl(t; ). Let dt(t; ) = i and dt(t; ) = j. So i is the least level such
that get"(t; i)\ModT () 6= ? and j is the least level such that get"(t; j)\ModT () 6= ?.
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Since i < j it follows that get"(t; i) \ModT () = ?. But then get"(t; i) 6ModT (), i.e.
pl(t; ) =  1. So pl(t; )  pl(t; ).
When restricted to t-orderings in normal form, a sentence which is plausible with
respect to a t-ordering, i.e. a sentence that the agent feels able to adopt with some
degree of condence as a basis for action, has the least possible distrust with respect to
the t-ordering, as shown by case (4) of the previous proposition. However, for sentences
that are not plausible, the level of distrust may vary with respect to the t-ordering.
Example 3.9 Consider a transparent propositional language L generated by Atom =
fP (a); P (b)g and where the states of the system, represented by S = f11; 10; 01; 00g, cor-
respond directly to the valuations of L, with 10 corresponding to the valuation making
P (a) true and P (b) false, and so on. Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of
L where t = f(11; 1); (10; 0); (01; 2); (00; 4)g is a t-ordering in normal form and visually
depicted in gure 3-7.
Figure 3-7: T-ordering t
The following sentences are not plausible with respect to t:
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Plausibility Sentences
 1 :P (a) _ P (b), :P (a), P (a)$ P (b), P (b), :P (a) ^ :P (b),
:P (a) ^ P (b), P (a) ^ P (b), P (a) ^ :P (a)
However, the distrust in these sentences di¤ers with respect to t:
Distrust Sentences
1 :P (a) _ P (b), P (a)$ P (b), P (b), P (a) ^ P (b)
2 :P (a), :P (a) _ P (b)
4 :P (a) ^ :P (b), P (a) ^ :P (a)
The notion of the distrust in a sentence with respect to a t-ordering is used to dene
a restricted form of transitivity, called Rational Transitivity (Labuschagne et al., 2002),
which is subsequently shown to be satised by every defeasible consequence relation
induced by a templated interpretation.
Lemma 3.8 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let  2 L. Then
Mint() = fs 2ModT () j t(s) = dt(t; )g.
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.4.
Lemma 3.9 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let  2 L and s 2 S.
If s 2ModT ( ^ ) and s 2Mint(), then s 2Mint( ^ ).
Proof. See proof in appendix A, section A.4.
Proposition 3.37 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let ; ;  2 L.
Then jsT satises the following property:
 if  jsT  and  jsT , and dt(t; ) 6> dt(t; ), then  jsT  (Rational Transitivity)
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Proof. Let  jsT  and  jsT . So Mint() ModT () and Mint() ModT ().
Let dt(t; ) 6> dt(t; ). Choose any s 2 Mint(). By lemma 3.8, s 2 ModT () and
t(s) = dt(t; ). But dt(t; ) 6> dt(t; ). So either t(s) < dt(t; ) or t(s) = dt(t; ). But
s 2 ModT () and thus t(s) 6< dt(t; ). So t(s) = dt(t; ). But then, by lemma 3.8,
s 2 Mint(). But Mint()  ModT () and thus s 2 ModT (). Since s was chosen
arbitrarily it follows that Mint() ModT (). But then  jsT .
Other restricted forms of transitivity were studied by Freund, Lehmann, and Morris
(1991). They showed that for preferential consequence relations, Rational Monotonicity
is equivalent to several restricted forms of transitivity, in particular, Weak Transitivity,
which says that transitivity for , , and  holds provided  is compatible with ,
i.e. provided  does not defeasibly entail . A restricted form of contraposition, called
Weak Contraposition, was also dened which says that contraposition between  and ,
given  as background information, holds provided that  does not defeasibly entail .
Weak Contraposition was shown to be strictly weaker than Rational Monotonicity, again
for preferential consequence relations. However, for (nite) preferential interpretations,
which are ranked interpretations in which the ordering on the set of states is not a strict
partial order but a strict modular partial order (or a total preorder),Weak Contraposition
is equivalent to Rational Monotonicity when the labelling function is injective. The
defeasible consequence relations induced by templated interpretations (which have been
shown to be rational) satisfy both Weak Transitivity and Weak Contraposition.
Proposition 3.38 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let ; ;  2 L.
Then jsT satises the following properties:
1. if  jsT  and  jsT , and  j6sT :, then  jsT  (Weak Transitivity)
2. if  ^  jsT  and  j6sT , then : ^  jsT : (Weak Contraposition)
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Proof. 1. Let  jsT  and  jsT . So Mint()  ModT () and Mint() 
ModT (). Let  j6sT :. So Mint() 6 ModT (:). Choose any s 2 Mint(). By
lemma 3.8, s 2 ModT () and t(s) = dt(t; ). Since s 2 ModT () it follows that either
dt(t; ) = t(s) or dt(t; ) < t(s). If dt(t; ) < t(s) then, by lemma 3.8, there must be some
s0 2 Mint() such that dt(t; ) = t(s0). So s0 2 Mint() and s0 =2 ModT (:). But then
s0 2 ModT () from which it follows that t(s0)  t(s). Contradiction. So dt(t; ) = t(s).
But then, by lemma 3.8, s 2 Mint(). But Mint() ModT () and thus s 2ModT ().
Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that Mint() ModT (). But then  jsT .
2. Let  ^  jsT  and  j6sT . So Mint( ^ )  ModT () and Mint() 6
ModT (). Choose any s 2 Mint(: ^ ). By lemma 3.8, s 2 ModT (: ^ ) and
t(s) = dt(t;: ^ ). So s 2ModT (:) and s 2ModT (). But Mint() 6ModT (). So
dt(t; ) dt(t;:^) otherwise there may be some s0 2Mint() such that s0 2ModT ().
Hence t(s)  dt(t; ). Suppose s =2 ModT (:). Then s 2 ModT (). But s 2 ModT ()
and thus s 2 ModT ( ^ ). However, since t(s)  dt(t; ), it follows that s 2 Mint().
But then, by lemma 3.9, s 2 Mint( ^ ). But Mint( ^ )  ModT () and thus
s 2 ModT (). Contradiction. So s 2 ModT (:). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it
follows that Mint(: ^ ) ModT (:). But then : ^  jsT :.
These results illustrate the role that the notions of plausibility and, in particular,
distrust play in reasoning with t-orderings. As a practical example to reasoning with
t-orderings, the lottery paradox is consider in the next section.
3.7 The lottery paradox
The lottery paradox is a famous problem (Kyburg, 1961) which arises when the conjunc-
tion of a number of likely propositions becomes very unlikely or even impossible. Poole
(1989, 1991) has shown that the lottery paradox arises naturally in default reasoning
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systems, presenting di¢ culties for most.
The idea behind the lottery paradox is that there are a number of tickets, say m,
and only one ticket that wins. The chance of any specic ticket, say ticket 117, winning
is so small that :Win(ticket117) is a likely proposition. The same applies for every
other ticket. So it is possible to (defeasibly) infer that the conjunction :Win(ticket1) ^
:Win(ticket2)^: : :^ :Win(ticketm) is true. But one ticket must win, in other words, the
disjunctionWin(ticket1)_Win(ticket2)_ : : :_Win(ticketm) must be true. The paradox
is clear, it is possible to infer both the conjunction of a number of (likely) propositions
and the negation thereof.
T-orderings o¤er a solution to the lottery paradox. In the example mentioned above,
the denite information of one ticket winning, may be represented by assigning all states
in which no ticket wins or more than one ticket wins to the top level of the t-ordering,
i.e. by denitely excluding those states. The indenite information of it being likely for a
ticket not to win (but not most likely because some ticket has to win), may be represented
by accommodating those states in which one ticket wins above the bottom level of the
t-ordering, i.e. by tentatively excluding those states. How far above the bottom level
is a matter of choice; a larger number of tickets warrants stronger exclusion, a smaller
number of tickets weaker exclusion. For illustration purposes, assume that the states are
assigned to level 1.
It is immediately apparent that the resulting t-ordering is weakly contradictory. So it
is not unexpected that both :Win(ticketi) and Win(ticketi) may be inferred defeasibly.
However, both are inferred with the lowest degree of condence, both having a plausi-
bility of 0 with respect to the t-ordering. Similarly, the conjunction :Win(ticket1) ^
:Win(ticket2)^ : : :^ :Win(ticketm) may only be inferred tentatively, as its plausibility
is 0 too. However, the plausibility of the disjunction Win(ticket1)_Win(ticket2)_ : : :_
Win(ticketm) with respect to the t-ordering is n 1; where n is the cardinality of the set
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of states, which implies that Win(ticket1) _Win(ticket2) _ : : :_ Win(ticketm) may be
inferred with the highest degree of condence. It is interesting to note that the distrust
in :Win(ticket1) ^ :Win(ticket2) ^ : : :^ :Win(ticketm) with respect to the t-ordering
is n (as would be expected) but that the distrust in Win(ticket1)_Win(ticket2)_ : : :_
Win(ticketm) is 1, and not the lowest possible level of distrust. In essence, using t-
orderings, it is possible to infer condently that some ticket will win but only tentatively
that no ticket will win. This resolves the paradox.
The lottery paradox provides an example of where a default rule cannot be represented
by a t-ordering in normal form. It suggests a distinction between two di¤erent categories
of default rules, those that can be represented by t-orderings in normal form and those
that cannot. The latter leads to the kind of paradox encountered in the lottery example.
In the context of control room agents, this is undesirable and hence the focus will be on






IS THERE ANY KNOWLEDGE in the world which is so certain
that no reasonable man could doubt it?
The Problems of Philosophy (Bertrand Russel)
4.1 Kripke semantics
Hintikka (1962) originally formalised the informational attitudes of knowledge and belief
using a modal logic (Hughes and Cresswell, 1968, 1996; Fitting, 1993) and a possible
worlds semantics. This branch of modal logic is called epistemic logic after the Greek
word episteme, meaning knowledge(Fagin et al., 1995). The basic idea is that besides
the actual world, there are a number of possible worlds and some of these worlds may be
indistinguishable to the agent. Or, in other words, besides the actual state of the system,
there are a number of states that, from the perspectives of the agent, are indistinguishable
and equally good candidates for being the actual state. An agent is said to know a fact
if the fact is true in all the states the agent considers possible candidates for being the
actual state.
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A modal language L for knowledge is constructed from the transparent propositional
language L by adding a modal operator  to the connectives of L. The intention is that
 will be read The agent knows that. Every sentence of L is a sentence of L. If  is
a sentence of L then so too is . L is the smallest set generated from Atom using the
connectives as described.
Denition 4.1 A Kripke model of L is a tripleM = hS;R; li such that
 S is a non-empty set of states,
 l : S ! UT is a labelling function, and
 R is a binary relation on S (called an accessibility relation).
If (s; s0) 2 R then state s0 2 S is said to be accessible from state s 2 S. The set of all
states accessible from a state s 2 S is dened as R(s) = fs0 2 S j (s; s0) 2 Rg. A frame
hS;Ri is the class of all Kripke models sharing the same set S of states and the same
accessibility relation R. A Kripke modelM = hS;R; li is said to be based on the frame
hS;Ri. Given a Kripke modelM = hS;R; li, the notion of a state s 2 S inM satisfying
a sentence  of L may be extended from the possible worlds semantics of L to include
the following case: M; s   i¤
  =  andM; s0   for every state s0 2 R(s).
A sentence  2 L is satised at a state s 2 S inM i¤  is satised at every state
that is accessible from s. The notion of a (local) model is dened in exactly the same
way as before. A Kripke modelM = hS;R; li is a (global) model of a sentence  of L
i¤  isM-valid. A frame hS;Ri is a frame-model of a sentence  of L i¤ every Kripke
model based on hS;Ri is a model of .
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To capture the intuition behind an agent knowing a fact if the fact is true in all the
states the agent considers possible candidates for being the actual state, the accessibility
relation on the set of states is taken to be an equivalence relation so that the set of
candidate states constitutes an equivalence class. The class of Kripke models such that
R is an equivalence relation on S can be characterised as the class of models of a set of
sentences, which is called KT45. The set KT45 of sentences comprises all instances of
the following schemas:
 K : (! )! (! )
 T : ! 
 4 : ! 
 5 : :! :
Schema K, which may equivalently be written as ((! )^)! , says that
if an agent knows  !  and the agent also knows , then the agent will know . It is
named in honour of Saul Kripke for his contribution to the development of the possible
worlds semantics for modal logic (Kripke, 1963). Schema K suggests that agents are
ideal reasoners in the sense of knowing all the consequences of their knowledge. Every
sentence which is an instance of schema K has as its models all Kripke models.
Schema T is sometimes referred to as the knowledge schema because it provides a
distinction between knowledge and belief under the traditional philosophical assumption
of knowledge as true justied belief. Schema T says that if an agent knows , then 
is true. This schema characterises frames whose accessibility relations are reexive, in
other words, every sentence which is an instance of schema T has as its frame-models
those frames whose accessibility relations are reexive and, conversely, every frame whose
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accessibility relation is reexive is a frame-model for every sentence which is an instance
of schema T .
Schema 4 says that if an agent knows  then the agent knows that it knows .
Intuitively, it means that agents are capable of positive introspection. The positive intro-
spection may be iterated without limit, suggesting that agents are ideal reasoners in the
sense of having unlimited resources1. Schema 4 characterises frames whose accessibility
relations are transitive.
Negative introspection is captured by schema 5, which says that if an agent does not
know  then it knows that it does not know . Again, negative introspection may be
iterated without limit. This schema, when taken in conjunction with schemas T and
4, characterises frames whose accessibility relations are not only reexive and transitive
but also symmetric, and thus equivalence relations. Note that on its own, schema 5
characterises frames whose accessibility relations are euclidean, where by an euclidean
relation R on X it is understood that for all elements x; y; z 2 X, if (x; y) 2 R and
(x; z) 2 R, then (y; z) 2 R. Frames whose accessibility relations are symmetric can be
characterised as the class of models of a set of sentences that are the instances of a schema
B, also called the Brouwerian schema, which is stated as
 B : ! ::.
Positive and negative introspection taken together lead to the Plato principle, stated
as : ! :, which says that the mere falsity of a sentence is enough for the agent
to know that it does not know the sentence. The Plato principle is often regarded as an
idealistic and unrealistic feature (Girle, 1998). However, despite philosophical debate,
it has become customary to regard schemas K, T , 4, and 5 as an appropriate set of
1One approach that considers resource boundedness is that of Konolige (1986), in which accessibility
relations are replaced by pairs ( ;) where   is an initial set of beliefs and  is a deduction algorithm
which may be rendered incomplete by constraints on time and memory.
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properties of knowledge. Collectively, schemas K, T , 4, and 5 are referred to as the
S5 properties. These properties have also proved useful in domains such as distributed
systems (Halpern, 1987) and economics and game theory (Aumann, 1976; Parikh, 1985;
van Benthem, 2001).
The modal language L dened earlier may be taken as a language of belief when  is
read as The agent believes that. Assuming that an agent may hold a belief that is false,
schema T would be excluded as a property of belief. A popular approach is to regard
schemas K, D, 4, and 5 as the properties of belief, collectively referred to as the KD45
properties. Schema D is
 D : ! ::.
Schema D, which may equivalently be written as :( ^ :), says that if an agent
believes , then the agent does not believe the negation of . Intuitively, it means that
the agents beliefs are satisable. Schema D characterises frames whose accessibility
relations are serial, where by a serial relation R on X it is understood that for every
x 2 X, there is some y 2 X such that (x; y) 2 R.
The Kripke semantics of epistemic logic allows one to model either the knowledge or
the beliefs of an agent. To model both knowledge and belief in the Kripke semantics,
one would have to introduce two modal operators and an accessibility relation for each
of the operators. In the absence of further provisions, the accessibility relations would
be independent and thus counter intuitive to the notion that knowledge and belief are
closely related.
4.2 Information-theoretic semantics
As a generalisation of the Kripke semantics of epistemic logic, Labuschagne and Ferguson
(2002) dene an information-theoretic semantics that assigns a t-ordering to each state of
107
4. Knowledge and belief
the system. The information-theoretic semantics is recalled in this section in the context
of diagrammable systems with t-orderings dened as instances of a templated ordering
ADT. As mentioned earlier, in the context of diagrammable systems, the states of the
system correspond to a subset of the valuations of some nitely generated propositional
language. The modal language to be constructed from such a propositional language will
consist of a number of modal operators for belief, one for every element in the template
B associated with the set S of states.
A modal language L0 for belief is constructed from the transparent propositional
language L by adding modal operators [0] ; [1] ; : : : ; [n] to the connectives of L, where
n = card(S). The intention is that [i] will be read The agent believes to degree i that.
Every sentence of L is a sentence of L0. If  is a sentence of L0 then so too is [i]. L0 is
the smallest set generated from Atom using the connectives as described.
The intuition behind the di¤erent modal operators is that [0] reects the agents
most tentatively held defeasible beliefs. Modal operator [n] simply reects tautologies.
Each modal operator [i] in between reects the agents defeasible beliefs held to an
increasing level of strength with [n  1] reecting the agents most strongly held beliefs,
or its knowledge. This intuition will be motivated information-theoretically in section
4.5 when the notion of epistemic entrenchment is examined.
An information-theoretic semantics for L0 is dened by replacing the accessibility
relation of the Kripke semantics on a (nite) set of states S with an accessibility function
from S to TS (Labuschagne and Ferguson, 2002).
Denition 4.2 A templated interpretation of L0 is a triple T = hS; F; li such that
 S is a nite non-empty set of states with card(S) = n,
 l : S ! UT is a labelling function, and
 F : S ! TS is an accessibility function.
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The accessibility function of a templated interpretation of L0 associates with each
state of S a t-ordering of TS. The implication of using an accessibility function instead of
an accessibility relation is that the agent will have available at each state of the system,
not merely denite information, but indenite information as well, because, as has been
shown in the previous chapter, t-orderings allow for the combination of both denite
and indenite information in the same semantic structure. It is this capability to have
indenite information available at each state of the system that is the essential di¤erence
between accessibility functions and accessibility relations. The accessibility function in
e¤ect equips the agent, at every state, with a context-dependent default rule, in addition
to recording the denite information available to the agent.
When restricting to denite information (and thus to denite t-orderings), the division
of the nite set of states S into a set of included states C and a complementary set of
excluded states C is directly equivalent to the Kripke semantics. Given an accessibility
relation R and a state s 2 S, the set of states considered possible candidates for being the
actual state, may be formed by taking C = R(s), where R(s) = fs0 2 S j (s; s0) 2 Rg,
while the set of excluded states may be taken as the complement C = S   C. In
e¤ect, an accessibility relation may be seen as associating with each state an ordered pair
(C;C) which, as shown earlier, may be represented by a denite t-ordering t 2 TS where
bottom(t) = C and top(t) = C. Conversely, given an accessibility function F and a state
s 2 S, the set of states considered possible candidates for being the actual state may be
formed by taking C = get"(F (s); 0) while the set of excluded states may be taken as the
complement C = get!(F (s); n). The set of states accessible from s is thus, in the case
of a denite t-ordering, get"(F (s); 0).
If the restriction to denite information is removed, then the set of states consid-
ered possible candidates for being the actual state must be formed by taking C =
get"(F (s); n 1) so that the set of excluded states may still be taken as C = get!(F (s); n),
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given an accessibility function F and a state s 2 S. The set of states accessible from s
will now become get"(F (s); n   1). Having established the correlation between accessi-
bility relations and accessibility functions, it is now possible to dene a rened notion of
accessibility given an accessibility function.
Denition 4.3 Let T = hS; F; li be a templated interpretation of L0 and let s; s0 2 S.
Then state s0 is accessible from state s i¤ s0 2 get"(F (s); n 1). A state s0 is accessible
to degree i from state s i¤ s0 2 get"(F (s); i) for i < n.
The rened notion of accessibility given an accessibility function F : S ! TS suggests
that it is possible to recover not merely one accessibility relation R on S from an acces-
sibility function, but n, denoted by Ri where i = 0; 1; : : : ; n  1 and n = card(S). This is
one sense in which the information-theoretic semantics may be seen as a generalisation
of the Kripke semantics. Note that in the process of recovering an accessibility relation
from an accessibility function, some of the indenite information available to the agent at
each state of the system may be lost, although recovering all n relations simultaneously
preserves all information. Formally, therefore, the information-theoretic semantics can
be simulated by a multimodal version of epistemic logic in which one accessibility rela-
tion is designated the knowledge relation and the remainder are concerned with beliefs
of varying degrees. The facilitation of visualisation by the t-ordering ADT is sacriced
by such a simulation, however.
Proposition 4.1 Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. Then every
accessibility relation R on S induces an accessibility function F : S ! TS such that
R(s) = get"(F (s); 0) for every s 2 S and conversely, from every accessibility function
F : S ! TS an accessibility relation Ri on S may be recovered where i < n such that
get"(F (s); i) = Ri(s) for every s 2 S.
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Proof. Let R be an accessibility relation on S. An accessibility function F : S !
TS is constructed by taking F = f(s; t) j bottom(t) = R(s) and top(t) = S   R(s)g. It is
trivial to shown that for every state s 2 S, R(s) = get"(F (s); 0). Conversely, let F : S !
TS be an accessibility function. An accessibility relation Ri on S is constructed by taking
Ri = f(s; s0) j s0 2 get"(F (s); i)g for i < n. Again, it is trivial to shown that for every
state s 2 S, get"(F (s); i) = Ri(s).
A templated frame hS; F i is the class of all templated interpretations sharing the
same set S of states and the same accessibility function F . A templated interpretation
T = hS; F; li is said to be based on the templated frame hS; F i. Given a templated
interpretation T = hS; F; li, the notion of a state s 2 S in T satisfying a sentence  of L0
may be extended from the possible worlds semantics of L to include the following case:
T ; s   i¤
  = [i] and T ; s0   for every state s0 2 get"(F (s); i).
A sentence [i] 2 L0 is satised at a state s 2 S in T i¤  is satised at every state
that is accessible to degree i from s. At one extreme, [0] is satised at s i¤ is satised
at every state occurring in the bottom level of t-ordering F (s), in other words, at those
states considered most normal in t-ordering F (s). At the other extreme, [n] is satised
at s i¤  is T -valid. More importantly, [n  1] is satised at s i¤  is satised at every
state which is not denitely excluded in t-ordering F (s). The notions of a (local) model,
a model, and a frame-model of a sentence  of L0 are dened in exactly the same way as
for the Kripke semantics.
Proposition 4.2 Let T = hS; F; li be a templated interpretation of L0 and let M =
hS;Rn 1; li be the Kripke model of L where Rn 1 is the accessibility relation recovered
from F . Let s 2 S and  2 L. Let  be taken as the knowledge operator of L. Then
T ; s  [n  1] i¤ M; s  .
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Proof. Suppose s satises [n   1] in T . So s0 satises  in T for every s0 2
get"(F (s); n   1). But if s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1), then s0 2 Rn 1(s) by proposition 4.1.
Thus, since  2 L, it follows that s0 satises  in M for every s0 2 Rn 1(s). Hence, s
satises  inM.
Conversely, suppose s satises  inM. So s0 satises  inM for every s0 2 Rn 1(s).
But if s0 2 Rn 1(s), then s0 2 bottom(F (s)) by proposition 4.1. But F (s) is denite and
so s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1). Thus, since  2 L, it follows that s0 satises  in T for every
s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1). Hence, s satises [n  1] in T .
As shown in the previous result, modal operator [n   1] of L0 corresponds to modal
operator  of L, both representing the agents knowledge. The other modal operators
of L0 have no counterpart in L. However, if modal operator  of L is taken as the
belief operator, then modal operator [0] of L0, representing the agents most tentative
defeasible beliefs, corresponds to  given an appropriate accessibility relation. Again,
the other modal operators of L0 would now have no counterpart in L. This is another
sense in which the information-theoretic semantics may be seen as a generalisation of the
Kripke semantics.
Proposition 4.3 Let T = hS; F; li be a templated interpretation of L0 and let M =
hS;R0; li be the Kripke model of L where R0 is the accessibility relation recovered from
F . Let s 2 S and  2 L. Let  be taken as the belief operator of L. Then T ; s  [0] i¤
M; s  .
Proof. Suppose s satises [0] in T . So s0 satises  in T for every s0 2 get"(F (s); 0).
But if s0 2 get"(F (s); 0), then s0 2 R0(s) by proposition 4.1. Thus, since  2 L, it follows
that s0 satises  inM for every s0 2 R0(s). Hence, s satises  inM.
Conversely, suppose s satises  inM. So s0 satises  inM for every s0 2 R0(s).
But if s0 2 R0(s), then s0 2 bottom(F (s)) by proposition 4.1. But if s0 2 bottom(F (s))
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then s0 2 get"(F (s); 0). Thus, since  2 L, it follows that s0 satises  in T for every s0
2 get"(F (s); 0). Hence, s satises [0] in T .
However, the full extent of the generalisation of the Kripke semantics only becomes
apparent when the properties of knowledge and belief supported by the information-
theoretic semantics are revealed.
4.3 Properties of knowledge and belief
As mentioned earlier, it is customary to regard the schemas K, T , 4, and 5 as the prop-
erties of knowledge. Each of these schemas has a faithful counterpart (Labuschagne and
Ferguson, 2002) in the information-theoretic setting of epistemic logic by the correspon-
dence of modal operator [n  1] of L0 to modal operator  of L (assuming that  is read
as The agent knows that).
 Kn 1 : [n  1](! )! ([n  1]! [n  1])
 Tn 1 : [n  1]! 
 4n 1 : [n  1]! [n  1][n  1]
 5n 1 : :[n  1]! [n  1]:[n  1]
Note that the operator [n 1], like negation, governs the shortest well-formed sentence
following it, so that [n   1] !  should be read as ([n   1]) ! , and not as
[n  1](! ).
One would expect every sentence which is an instance of schema Kn 1 to have as its
models every templated interpretation of L0. Indeed, this will be shown to be the case.
However, in the information-theoretic setting, there exists a more general counterpart to
schema K with the property that if sentence  2 L0 is an instance of the schema, then
every templated interpretation of L0 is a model of .
113
4. Knowledge and belief
 Ki : [i](! )! ([i]! [i])
The generalisation is that the value of i need not be xed at n 1, but instead can be
xed at any value below n. Schema Ki says that if an agent defeasibly believes  ! 
to degree i and the agent also believes  to degree i, then the agent will believe  to the
same degree. When i is taken to be n  1, schema Ki is simply schema Kn 1.
Proposition 4.4 If  2 L0 is of the form [i]( ! ) ! ([i] ! [i]), then every
templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 is a model of .
Proof. Let  be any sentence of L0 of the form [i]( ! ) ! ([i] ! [i]). Choose
any templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 and any state s 2 S. Assume that  fails
to be satised at s. So [i]( ! ) is satised at s but ([i] ! [i]) is not satised at s,
from which it follows that [i] is satised at s but [i] not. Since [i] is not satised at
s, there must be some state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) such that  is not satised at s0. However,
since [i]( ! ) is satised at s and [i] is satised at s, it must be the case that both
 !  and  are satised at every state in get"(F (s); i), including state s0. But then
 must be satised at s0. Contradiction. Thus  is satised at the arbitrarily chosen s
and therefore at every state in T . But T itself was arbitrarily chosen and thus every
templated interpretation is a model of .
If an accessibility relation R on a set S of states is reexive, then for every state
s 2 S, s 2 R(s), i.e. s is accessible from itself. Frames whose accessibility relations are
reexive are, as mentioned earlier, characterised as the class of Kripke models of the set of
sentences which are the instances of schema T . In the information-theoretic setting, one
would expect schema Tn 1 to similarly characterise templated frames whose accessibility
functions ensure that every state s 2 S is accessible from itself.
114
4.3. Properties of knowledge and belief
Proposition 4.5 Let hS; F i be a templated frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model
of every sentence of L0 which is an instance of schema Tn 1 i¤ for every state s 2 S, s
is accessible from itself.
Proof. Suppose that hS; F i is a frame-model of every sentence which is an instance
of schema Tn 1. It must be shown that for every state s 2 S, s 2 get"(F (s); n   1).
Choose any s 2 S. Suppose s =2 get"(F (s); n  1). Then a templated interpretation can
be constructed based on hS; F i that is not a model of all the instances of schema Tn 1, in
particular the sentence [n  1]P (a)! P (a). Take T = hS; F; li such that vl(s)(P (a)) = 0
and vl(s0)(P (a)) = 1 for every state s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1). So P (a) is not satised at s
but is satised at every s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1). But then [n  1]P (a) is satised at s and
since P (a) is not satised at s it follows that [n   1]P (a) ! P (a) is not satised at s.
But then hS; F i cannot be a frame-model of [n  1]P (a)! P (a). Contradiction. Thus
s 2 get"(F (s); n   1) and since s was chosen arbitrarily, every state s 2 S is accessible
from itself.
Conversely, suppose that for every state s 2 S, s is accessible from itself. So s 2
get"(F (s); n  1). Choose any sentence  2 L0 of the form [n  1]! . Suppose hS; F i
is not a frame-model of . So there must be some templated interpretation T = hS; F; li
of L0 and some state s 2 S such that s fails to satisfy  in T . But then it must be the
case that [n 1] is satised at s and  is not satised at s. But if [n 1] is satised at
s then  is satised at every s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1). But s 2 get"(F (s); n  1) and hence
 must be satised at s. Contradiction. Hence, hS; F i is a frame-model of the arbitrarily
chosen sentence  and therefore of every instance of schema Tn 1.
In the Kripke semantics, schemas K, T , 4, and 5 collectively characterise frames
whose accessibility relations are equivalence relations. An equivalence relation captures
the intuition that besides the actual state of the system, there are a number of states
that, to the agent, are indistinguishable from the actual state and that this set of equally
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good candidates (for being the actual state) constitutes an equivalence class. In the
information-theoretic semantics, schemas Kn 1, Tn 1, 4n 1, and 5n 1 collectively charac-
terise templated frames whose accessibility functions ensure that every state is accessible
from itself (and thus a candidate for being the actual state, inasmuch as it has not been
denitely excluded), and that mutually accessible states have t-orderings with exactly
the same denite content.
Proposition 4.6 Let hS; F i be a templated frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model
of the set Kn 1Tn 14n 15n 1 of sentences of L0 that are instances of one of the schemas
Kn 1, Tn 1, 4n 1, or 5n 1 i¤ for every s; s0 2 S,
1. s is accessible from itself, and
2. if s0 is accessible from s, then ContD(F (s0)) = ContD(F (s)).
Proof. See proof in appendix B, section B.1.
The properties of belief are generally taken to be represented by the schemas K, D,
4, and 5, as mentioned earlier. Again, each of these schemas has a faithful counterpart
in the information-theoretic setting by the correspondence of modal operator [0] of L0 to
modal operator  of L (assuming this time that  is read as The agent believes that).
 K0 : [0](! )! ([0]! [0])
 D0 : [0]! :[0]:
 40 : [0]! [0][0]
 50 : :[0]! [0]:[0]
In the information-theoretic semantics, schemasK0, D0, 40, and 50 collectively charac-
terise templated frames whose accessibility functions ensure that every state is accessible
116
4.3. Properties of knowledge and belief
to degree 0 from some state and that states which are mutually accessible to degree 0
have t-orderings with exactly the same indenite content.
Proposition 4.7 Let hS; F i be a templated frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model
of the set K0D04050 of sentences of L0 that are instances of one of the schemas K0, D0,
40, or 50 i¤
1. for every s 2 S there exists some s0 2 S such that s is accessible to degree 0 from
s0 and
2. for every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is accessible to degree 0 from s, then Cont0(F (s0)) =
Cont0(F (s)).
Proof. See proof in appendix B, section B.1.
Thus far, the focus has been primarily on properties of knowledge and belief that have
faithful counterparts to the schemas familiar from the Kripke semantics of epistemic logic.
However, the information-theoretic semantics allows for a wide range of counterparts to
these properties (Ferguson and Labuschagne, 2001).
Schema T may be imposed over any of the defeasible belief operators [0] ; [1] ; : : : ; [n  1],
instead of only over the defeasible belief (or knowledge) operator [n  1], thereby placing
a stronger constraint on the capabilities of the agent.
 Ti : [i]! 
Schema Ti says that if an agent defeasibly believes  to degree i, then  is true. The
class of agents with schema Ti as a property of knowledge and belief would, if i is taken to
be less than n 1, have to have default rules that are infallible to degree i whereas, if i is
taken to be n  1, would have to have sensors that deliver infallible denite information.
The latter is the more feasible of the properties.
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Various counterparts to schema 4 are possible, each of which imposes di¤erent con-
straints on the positive introspective capabilities of the agent.
 4i : [i]! [i][i]
 4iK : [n  1]! [i][n  1]
 4Ki : [i]! [n  1][i]
Schema 4i says that if an agent defeasibly believes  to degree i, then the agent
defeasibly believes to degree i that it defeasibly believes  (again, to degree i). The class
of agents with schema 4i as a property of knowledge and belief would, if i is taken to be
n  1, be capable of knowing that they know whereas, if i is taken to be less than n  1,
would be capable of believing that they believe. However, this class of agents would not
be capable of believing that they know and would not be capable of knowing that they
believe.
Schema 4iK says that if an agent knows , then the agent defeasibly believes to
degree i that it knows . Schema 40K reects the weakest form of positive introspection
in which the agent is only weakly aware of its knowledge. The strongest form of positive
introspection is, of course, schema 4n 1. The class of agents with schema 4iK as a property
of knowledge and belief would be capable of believing (to degree i) that they know.
Schema 4Ki says that if an agent defeasibly believes  to degree i, then the agent
knows that it defeasibly believes  to degree i. The class of agents with schema 4Ki
as a property of knowledge and belief would be capable of knowing that they believe
(to degree i). In an approach such as ours, where knowledge is seen as a certain kind
of belief, schema 4Ki is intuitively more appealing than the other properties of positive
introspection.
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Proposition 4.8 Let hS; F i be a templated frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model
of every sentence of L0 which is an instance of schema 4Ki i¤ for every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is
accessible to degree i from s, then Conti(F (s))  Conti(F (s0)) and F (s0)(x)  F (s)(x)
for every x 2 get"(F (s0); i).
Proof. Suppose that hS; F i is a frame-model of every sentence which is an instance
of schema 4Ki. Suppose that there are s; s0 2 S such that s0 2 get"(F (s); i) but either
Conti(F (s)) * Conti(F (s0)) or F (s0)(x) < F (s)(x) for some x 2 get"(F (s0); i). Then,
in both cases, a templated interpretation based on hS; F i can be constructed that is
not a model of all the instances of schema 4Ki, in particular the sentence [i]P (a) !
[n   1][i]P (a). Assume Conti(F (s)) * Conti(F (s0)). Take T = hS; F; li such that
vl(s00)(P (a)) = 1 for every state s00 2 get"(F (s); i) including state s0, and vl(s000)(P (a)) = 0
for some s000 2 get"(F (s0); i). So P (a) is satised at every state s00 2 get"(F (s); i)
and hence [i]P (a) is satised at state s. However, P (a) is not satised at state s000 2
get"(F (s0); i) and thus [i]P (a) is not satised at state s0. But s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and hence
s0 2 get"(F (s); n 1). But then [n 1][i]P (a) is not satised at state s. But then s fails to
satisfy [i]P (a)! [n 1][i]P (a) at state s. So hS; F i cannot be a frame-model of [i]P (a)!
[n   1][i]P (a). Contradiction. Hence, if s0 is accessible from s, then Conti(F (s)) 
Conti(F (s
0)). Now assume F (s0)(x) < F (s)(x) for some x 2 get"(F (s0); i). Take
T = hS; F; li such that vl(s00)(P (a)) = 1 for every state s00 2 get"(F (s); i) including state
s0, and vl(s000)(P (a)) = 0 for some s000 2 get"(F (s0); i). Suppose F (s0)(s000) < F (s)(s000). So
P (a) is satised at every state s00 2 get"(F (s); i) and hence [i]P (a) is satised at state
s. However, P (a) is not satised at state s000 2 get"(F (s0); i) and thus [i]P (a) is not
satised at state s0. But s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and hence s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1). But then
[n   1][i]P (a) is not satised at state s. So s fails to satisfy [i]P (a) ! [n   1][i]P (a)
at state s. So hS; F i cannot be a frame-model of [i]P (a) ! [n   1][i]P (a). Contradic-
tion. Hence, if s0 is accessible from s, then F (s0)(x)  F (s)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s0); i).
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Conversely, suppose that for every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is accessible to degree i from s,
then Conti(F (s))  Conti(F (s0)) and F (s0)(x)  F (s)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s0); i).
To show that hS; F i is a a frame-model of every sentence that is an instance of schema
4Ki choose any sentence  2 L0 of the form [i] ! [n   1][i]. Suppose hS; F i is not a
frame-model of . So there must be some templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0
and some state s 2 S such that s fails to satisfy  in T . So it must be the case that
[i] is satised at s but [n   1][i] is not. If [i] is satised at s then  is satised at
every state s0 2 get"(F (s); i). If [n  1][i] is not satised at s then there must be some
state s00 2 get"(F (s); n   1) at which [i] is not satised. Hence there must be some
state s000 2 get"(F (s00); i) that fails to satisfy . But if s000 2 get"(F (s00); i) then s000 2
get"(F (s00); n   1): But get"(F (s00); n   1)  get"(F (s); n   1) with F (s00)(x)  F (s)(x)
for every x 2 get"(F (s00); n   1). Since s000 2 get"(F (s00); i) it follows that F (s00)(s000)  i
and hence s000 2 get"(F (s); i). But  is satised at every state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and
thus  must be satised at s00. Contradiction. Hence, hS; F i is a frame-model of the
arbitrarily chosen sentence  and therefore of every instance of schema 4Ki.
As with the properties of positive introspection, various counterparts to schema 5
are possible, each of which imposes di¤erent constraints on the negative introspective
capabilities of the agent.
 5i : :[i]! [i]:[i]
 5iK : :[n  1]! [i]:[n  1]
 5Ki : :[i]! [n  1]:[i]
Schema 5i says that if an agent does not defeasibly believe  to degree i, then the
agent defeasibly believes to degree i that it does not defeasibly believe  (again, to degree
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i). A weaker form of negative introspection is suggested by schema 5iK which says that
if an agent does not know , then the agent defeasibly believes to degree i that it does
not know . Schema 5Ki says that if an agent does not defeasibly believe  to degree i,
then the agent knows that it does not defeasibly believe  to degree i.
The class of agents with schema 5i as a property of knowledge and belief would, if i
is taken to be n  1, be capable of knowing that they do not know whereas, if i is taken
to be less than n  1, would be capable of believing that they do not believe. The class
of agents with schema 5iK as a property of knowledge and belief would be capable of
believing to degree i that they do not know while the class of agents with schema 5Ki as
a property of knowledge and belief would be capable of knowing that they do not believe
to degree i. Again, in the information-theoretic approach schema 5Ki is intuitively more
appealing than the other properties of negative introspection.
Proposition 4.9 Let hS; F i be a templated frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model
of every sentence of L0 which is an instance of schema 5Ki i¤ for every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is
accessible to degree i from s, then Conti(F (s0))  Conti(F (s)) and F (s)(x)  F (s0)(x)
for every x 2 get"(F (s); i).
Proof. Suppose that hS; F i is a frame-model of every sentence which is an instance
of schema 5Ki. Suppose that there are s; s0 2 S such that s0 2 get"(F (s); i) but either
Conti(F (s
0)) * Conti(F (s)) or F (s)(x) < F (s0)(x) for some x 2 get"(F (s); i). Then
a templated interpretation based on hS; F i can be constructed that is not a model of
all the instances of schema 5Ki, in particular the sentence :[i]P (a) ! [n   1]:[i]P (a).
Assume Conti(F (s0)) * Conti(F (s)). Take T = hS; F; li such that vl(s0)(P (a)) = 0 for
state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and vl(s00)(P (a)) = 1 for every s00 2 get"(F (s0); i). So P (a) is not
satised at state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and hence [i]P (a) is not satised at state s from which
it follows that :[i]P (a) is satised at state s. However, P (a) is satised at every state s00
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2 get"(F (s0); i) and thus [i]P (a) is satised at state s0 from which it follows that :[i]P (a)
is not satised at state s0. But s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1) and thus [n   1]:[i]P (a) is not
satised at state s. But then s fails to satisfy :[i]P (a)! [n  1]:[i]P (a) at state s. So
hS; F i cannot be a frame-model of :[i]P (a) ! [n   1]:[i]P (a). Contradiction. Hence,
if s0 is accessible from s, then Conti(F (s0))  Conti(F (s)). Now assume F (s)(x) <
F (s0)(x) for some x 2 get"(F (s); i). Take T = hS; F; li such that vl(s0)(P (a)) = 0 for
state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and vl(s00)(P (a)) = 1 for every s00 2 get"(F (s0); i). Suppose
F (s)(s0) < F (s0)(s0). So P (a) is not satised at state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) and hence [i]P (a)
is not satised at state s from which it follows that :[i]P (a) is satised at state s.
However, P (a) is satised at every state s00 2 get"(F (s0); i) and thus [i]P (a) is satised
at state s0, from which it follows that :[i]P (a) is not satised at state s0. But s0 2
get"(F (s); n   1) and thus [n   1]:[i]P (a) is not satised at state s. But then s fails
to satisfy :[i]P (a) ! [n   1]:[i]P (a) at state s. So hS; F i cannot be a frame-model
of :[i]P (a) ! [n   1]:[i]P (a). Contradiction. Hence, if s0 is accessible from s, then
F (s)(x)  F (s0)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s); i).
Conversely, suppose that for every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is accessible to degree i from s, then
Conti(F (s
0))  Conti(F (s)) and F (s)(x)  F (s0)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s); i). To show
that hS; F i is a a frame-model of every sentence that is an instance of schema 5Ki choose
any sentence  2 L0 of the form :[i]! [n 1]:[i]. Suppose hS; F i is not a frame-model
of . So there must be some templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 and some state
s 2 S such that s fails to satisfy  in T . So it must be the case that :[i] is satised at s
but [n 1]:[i] is not. If [n 1]:[i] is not satised at s then there must be some state s0 2
get"(F (s); n  1) at which :[i] is not satised, i.e. at which [i] is satised. So it must
be the case that  is satised at every s00 2 get"(F (s0); i). Recall that :[i] is satised at
s and thus [i] is not. So there must be some s000 2 get"(F (s); i) that fails to satisfy .
But since s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1) it follows that get"(F (s); n  1)  get"(F (s0); n  1) with
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F (s)(x)  F (s0)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s); n   1). Since s000 2 get"(F (s); i) it follows
that F (s)(s000)  i and hence that s000 2 get"(F (s0); i). But then  must be satised at
s000. Contradiction. Hence, hS; F i is a frame-model of the arbitrarily chosen sentence 
and therefore of every instance of schema 5Ki.
Collectively, schemas Ki, Tn 1, 4Ki, and 5Ki characterise templated frames whose
accessibility functions ensure that every state is accessible from itself and that states
which are mutually accessible to degree i have t-orderings which are identical up to level
i and have exactly the same indenite content (to degree i).
Proposition 4.10 Let hS; F i be a templated frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model
of the set KiTn 14Ki5Ki of sentences of L0 that are instances of one of the schemas Ki,
Tn 1, 4Ki, or 5Ki i¤ for every s; s0 2 S,
1. s is accessible from itself, and
2. if s0 is accessible to degree i from s, then Conti(F (s)) = Conti(F (s0)) and F (s0)(x) =
F (s)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s0); i).
Proof. See proof in appendix B, section B.1.
In the information-theoretic semantics, it becomes possible to model the knowledge
and beliefs of an agent as a hierarchy of defeasible beliefs, ranging from those held most
tentatively by the agent to those, its knowledge, which are held most strongly. To
capture this notion of a hierarchy of defeasible beliefs, a new schema, called schema H,
is introduced.
 H : [j]! [i] for j > i
Schema H says that if an agent believes  to degree j, then the agent believes  to
every lesser degree as well. In particular, it implies that [n  1]! [0], in other words,
if the agent knows , then the agent also believes .
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Proposition 4.11 If  2 L0 is of the form [j]! [i] where j > i, then every templated
interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 is a model of .
Proof. Let  be any sentence of L0 of the form [j] ! [i] where j > i. Choose
any templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 and any state s 2 S. Assume that
 fails to be satised at s. So [j] is satised at s but [i] is not. Since [i] is not
satised at s, there must be some state s0 2 get"(F (s); i) such that  is not satised at
s0. However, since [j] is satised at s, it must be the case that  is satised at every
state s00 2 get"(F (s); j). But since j > i, it follows that  is satised at every state s00
2 get"(F (s); i), including state s0. But then  must be satised at s0. Contradiction.
Thus  is satised at the arbitrarily chosen s and therefore at every state in T . But T
itself was arbitrarily chosen and thus every templated interpretation is a model of .
Of all the properties of knowledge and belief, the entailment property (that knowledge
entails belief as in schemaH) is typically viewed as the least controversial. However, in an
argument originally due to Lenzen (1978), it can be shown that if knowledge satises the
S5 properties, belief satises the KD45 properties, and both the entailment and positive
certainty2 properties hold, then it is possible for an agent to have false beliefs. In a re-
examination of the argument, Halpern (1996) shows that the entailment property can be
viewed as the culprit, and, more importantly, that the original argument fails when the
entailment property is weakened so that it applies only to objective (nonmodal) sentences,
rather than to arbitrary sentences. Objective beliefs form the basis of an epistemic model
for control room agents, as will be shown in sections 4.5 and 4.6.
The information-theoretic semantics allows for the modelling of both knowledge and
belief in the same semantics so that, apart from being an ideal reasoner with perfect
introspection who only has true knowledge and no false beliefs, an agent is capable of
2The positive certainty property says that if the agent believes , then the agent believes that it
knows .
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believing that it knows (and does not know) and of knowing that it believes (and does
not believe).
4.4 Other models of knowledge and belief
Kraus and Lehmann (1988) also model both knowledge and belief, but in a Kripke
semantics using two modal operators, one for knowledge and the other for belief, and
two accessibility relations, one for each of the modal operators3. The modal operator
for knowledge will be denoted by K and the modal operator for belief by B with the
accessibility relations denoted by RK and RB respectively.
The Kripke semantics of Kraus and Lehmann requires that the accessibility relations
RK and RB satisfy the following conditions:
(R1) RK is an equivalence relation on S
(R2) RB is a serial relation on S
(R3) RB is contained in RK (i.e. RB  RK)
(R4) for every s; s0; s00 2 S, if (s; s0) 2 RK and (s0; s00) 2 RB, then (s; s00) 2 RB
Conditions (R3) and (R4) describe the interrelationship between the two accessibility
relations. The intuition behind condition (R3) is that states which are indistinguishable
to an agent according to its beliefs will be indistinguishable according to its knowledge.
However, the agents beliefs may allow it to distinguish between states which are indis-
tinguishable according to its knowledge. The intuition behind condition (R4) is that if
states s and s0 are indistinguishable according to the agents knowledge and state s00 is
3The notion of common knowledge and common belief and their interrelationship are also considered
by Kraus and Lehmann (1988).
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considered possible according to the agents beliefs when the system is in state s0, then
state s00 will also be considered possible when the system is in state s (since the agent
cannot distinguish between states s and s0). Collectively, conditions (R3) and (R4)
ensure that the accessibility relation RB is euclidean and transitive.
In the approach of Kraus and Lehmann, schemas K, T , and 5 are selected as the
properties of knowledge while schemas K and D are selected as the properties of belief.
These properties are independent of each other. The interrelationship between knowledge
and belief are, however, described by the following two schemas:
 KL1 : B! KB
 KL2 : K! B
Schema KL1 says that if the agent believes , then the agent knows that it believes
 while schemas KL2 says that if the agent knows , then the agent also believes .
Note that from the collection of schemas, it is possible to derive schema 4 as a property
of knowledge and schemas 4 and 5 as properties of belief.
The approach of Kraus and Lehmann is comparable to the information-theoretic
approach when restricting to modal operators [n 1] (for knowledge) and [0] (for belief).
Their properties of knowledge are simply schemas Kn 1, Tn 1, and 5n 1 while their
properties of belief are schemas K0 and D0. The interrelationship between knowledge
and belief, as captured by their schemas KL1 and KL2, is captured by schemas 4K0 and
H (with j = n   1 and i = 0) respectively. In short, their schemas are a proper subset
of the information-theoretic approach. Although the approaches are comparable, the
underlying intuition di¤ers. In their approach, knowledge and belief are independent, but
interrelated. In the information-theoretic approach, knowledge and belief lie on opposite
ends of the same spectrum of defeasible beliefs, with knowledge arising as a special case.
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Turning to a very di¤erent approach, Moses and Shoham (1993) dene three belief
operators in terms of a standard knowledge operator. The basic idea is that an agent
believes a fact if the agent knows the fact to be true relative to an assumption. Belief can
thus be viewed as knowledge-relative-to-assumptions or, to use the terminology proposed
by Moses and Shoham, as defeasibleknowledge. In making explicit the assumptions, the
modal operators for belief become binary. The intuitive reading of B is that the agent
knows that, assuming  holds, so does . Given a modal operator K for knowledge, the
intuition is formally captured by the following denition:
 B def= K( ! )
In their approach, schemas K, T , 4, and 5 are taken as the properties of knowledge.
From the denition of the belief operator B and the properties of K , it follows that
schemas K, 4, and 5 are also properties of belief. However, schema D is not a property
of belief, in particular, when the agent knows the assumption to be false. The issue of
assumptions known to be falseis what prompted Moses and Shoham to formulate two
alternative denitions of belief. It is su¢ cient to note that the di¤erent formulations
of belief result in di¤erent connections between knowledge and belief. The following
connections result from the denition of belief stated earlier:
 MS1 : K! B
 MS2 : (B$ KB) ^ (:B$ K:B)
 MS3 : BK$ K _K:
 MS4 : B:K$ :K _K:
Schema MS1 says that the agents knowledge entails its beliefs. Schema MS2 is
concerned with the agents knowledge about its beliefs and suggests that the agent knows
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what it believes and knows what it does not believe. The agents beliefs about its
knowledge is reected by schemas MS3 and MS4. It suggests that if the agent believes
(assuming  holds) that it knows , then the agent either knows  or knows that the
assumption  is false, and vice versa. Similarly, when the agent believes (assuming 
holds) that it does not know , then the agent either does not know  or knows that the
assumption  is false, and vice versa.
The approach of Moses and Shoham (1993) is comparable to the information-theoretic
approach when restricting, as before, to modal operators [n  1] (for knowledge) and [0]
(for belief). Their properties of knowledge are simply schemas Kn 1, Tn 1, 4n 1, and
5n 1 while their properties of belief are intuitively reected by schemas K0, 40, and
50. However, modal operators [0] and B for belief are di¤erent as manifested in the
connections between knowledge and belief. In both approaches, knowledge entails belief,
as reected by schemas MS1 and H respectively. In terms of knowledge about belief,
their schema MS2 is stronger than schemas 4K0 and 5K0. But in terms of belief about
knowledge, there are no counterparts to their schemasMS3 andMS4 since both schemas
require explicit knowledge about the assumption .
We now turn to a third, and somewhat more quantitative, approach. Van der Hoek
and Meyer (1992) describe a system of graded modalities based on a Kripke semantics
consisting of modal operators 0;1; :::k (in the nite case) and a single accessibility
relation R, which is an equivalence relation. The basic intuition is that knowledge is
source dependent and that di¤erent sources may not necessarily agree on the truth of
a sentence, leading to a notion of graded knowledge that is based on the number of
disagreementsor exceptions amongst sources. The di¤erent sources are taken as the
elements of the set S of possible worlds, with card(S) = k. The intuitive reading of i
is that an agent reckons with at most i exceptions for  meaning that i is true at a
state s 2 S i¤  is false in at most i of the worlds accessible from s. Given a Kripke
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modelM = hS;R; li, the intuition may be captured by the following denition:
 M; s  i i¤ cardfs0 2 S j s0 2 R(s) andM; s0 6 g  i
The greater the number of exceptions an agent has to reckon with for , the less
condence expressed by . So i represents a form of uncertainknowledge and 0
a form of certainknowledge. As it turns out, 0 is the standard knowledge operator
since cardfs0 2 S j s0 2 R(s) and M; s0 6 g  0 i¤M; s0   for every s0 2 R(s).
The sentence i will be used as an abbreviation for :i: and i! as an abbreviation
for 0: if i = 0, and i 1 ^ :i if i > 0. The intuitive reading of i is that the
agent considers more than i alternatives possible in which  is true4 while the intuitive
reading of i! is that the agent considers exactly i alternatives possible in which  is
true. Van der Hoek and Meyer dened the following schemas for the graded modalities
of knowledge for each i  k:
 HM1 : 0(! )! (i! i)
 HM2 : i! i+1
 HM3 : 0:( ^ )! ((i! ^ j!)! i+j!( _ ))
 HM4 : :i! 0:i
 HM5 : 0! 
Schema HM1 is a generalisation of schema K. Schema HM5 is simply schema
T . Although positive introspection is not considered, negative introspection is captured
by schema HM4, which is a generalisation of schema 5. Schema HM3 captures the
4To see this note that :i: says that it is not the case that at most i worlds fail to satisfy :, i.e.
more than i worlds fail to satisfy :, i.e. fewer than k  i worlds satisfy :, and thus strictly more than
i worlds satisfy .
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notion that if the agent knows  and  to be mutually exclusive events, and considers i
alternatives in which  is true and, at the same time, j alternatives in which  is true, then
altogether the agent has to reckon with i+ j alternatives in which either  or  is true.
Schema HM2 says that if the agent foresees at most i exceptions to , then the agent
also does so with at most i + 1 exceptions. It suggests a hierarchy of graded knowledge
ranging from certainknowledge through decreasing levels of certainty to most uncertain
knowledge as depicted in the sequence 0! 1 ! 2! : : :! k.
In the information-theoretic approach, there is a hierarchy of defeasible beliefs ranging
from the most tentatively heldbeliefs through increasing levels of strength to the most
strongly heldbeliefs (or knowledge). Based on schema H, this hierarchy of defeasible
beliefs may be depicted in the sequence [n   1] ! [n   2] ! [n   3] ! : : : ! [0].
The approach of Van der Hoek and Meyer is comparable to the information-theoretic
approach when k is taken to be n  1 and the modal operators are treated according to
their relative position in the respective sequences so that, for example, modal operator
[n  1] corresponds to 0 and modal operator [n  2] corresponds to 1. Keeping this in
mind, it is clear to see that their schemas HM2, HM4, andHM5 are exactly schemas H,
5Ki, and Tn 1 respectively. If i is taken to be n  1, their schema HM1 is simply schema
Kn 1. However, there is no counterpart to their schema HM3. The di¤erence between
the approach of Van der Hoek and Meyer and the information-theoretic approach lies in
the motivation behind the modal operators. In their approach, the modal operators arise
from the number of exceptions that may exist amongst di¤erent sources from which the
agent may be getting input, in other words from the cardinalities of sets of worlds. In the
information-theoretic approach, the modal operators arise from the denite and indenite
information available to the agent when the system is in a specic state, in other words
from the set-theoretic inclusion of sets of states rather than from the cardinalities of these
sets.
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Finally, the approach of Friedman and Halpern (1997) models belief within a general
framework of knowledge and plausibility (to which a notion of time is added). The
approach extends the framework of Halpern and Fagin (1989) for modelling knowledge
in multi-agent systems and is probabilistic in origin (Fagin and Halpern, 1994). It uses a
standard modal operator for knowledge, denoted by K , and a standard modal operator
for conditionals, denoted by B. The intuitive reading of  B  is that according to the
agents plausibility measure,  typically implies . Belief is dened in terms of knowledge
and plausibility.
A plausibility space is a pair (S; P l) where Pl is a function, the plausibility measure,
that maps subsets of S to elements in some arbitrary partially ordered set D5. The set D
is assumed to contain the elements ?D and >D such that ?D  d  >D for every d 2 D
with Pl(S) = >D and Pl(?) = ?D. If A  B then Pl(A)  Pl(B). A plausibility space
is said to be qualitative if it satises the following two conditions:
 If A;B; and C are disjoint subsets of S, Pl(A[B) > Pl(C), and Pl(A[C) > Pl(B),
then Pl(A) > Pl(B [ C)
 If Pl(A) = Pl(B) = ?D, then Pl(A [B) = ?D
The notion of plausibility is captured by adding a plausibility assignment P , which
is a function that maps worlds to plausibility spaces, to a Kripke modelM = hS;RK ; li
for knowledge. The accessibility relation RK is an equivalence relation and RK(s) =
fs0 2 S j (s; s0) 2 RKg. Given a plausibility assignment P (s) = (Ss; P ls) and letting
ModM;Ss() denote the (local) models of  restricted to Ss, the semantics of  B  can
be dened as follows:
5This is the simplied denition of a plausibility space as used by Friedman and Halpern (1997).
Note that a plausibility space is a direct generalisation of a probability space in which the plausibility
measure replaces the probability measure.
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 M; s   B  if
8<: Pls(ModM;Ss()) = ?D orPls(ModM;Ss( ^ )) > Pls(ModM;Ss( ^ :))
An agent is said to believe , denoted by B, if the agent knows that  is more
plausible than : in all the worlds that the agent considers possible. Formally, this
notion of belief is dened as follows:
 B def= K(> B )
In the approach of Friedman and Halpern, the properties of knowledge are, as usual,
schemas K, T , 4, and 5. To reason about belief, the following conditions are imposed on
the Kripke modelM = hS;RK ; l; P i for knowledge and plausibility:
 QUAL : P (s) is qualitative for all s 2 S
 CONS : Ss  RK(s) for all s 2 S
 NORM : ?s > >s for all s 2 S
Condition QUAL ensures that schema K is a property of belief. Condition CONS
ensures that if the agent knows  it will also believe . This connection between knowl-
edge and belief is exactly schema KL2 of Kraus and Lehmann. (Schema KL1 follows
directly from the denition of B and schema 4 for knowledge.) Condition NORM en-
sures that the agent does not consider all sets to be completely implausible. Friedman
and Halpern show that by imposing conditions CONS and NORM , schemas D, 4, and
5 become properties of belief too.
The approach of Friedman and Halpern is very close to that of Kraus and Lehmann
in the sense that the properties of knowledge and belief are the same as is the inter-
relationship between knowledge and belief. Their schemas are therefore also a proper
subset of the information-theoretic approach. Although the approaches are comparable,
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the underlying intuition di¤ers. In their approach, belief is probabilistic in nature and
dened in terms of knowledge and plausibility. In the information-theoretic approach,
knowledge and belief lie on opposite ends of the same spectrum of defeasible beliefs, with
knowledge arising as a special case.
4.5 Epistemic entrenchment
The idea behind epistemic entrenchment is that some beliefs are more important than
others and if an agent is forced to give up some of its beliefs, it will give up those with
the lowest epistemic entrenchment. Recall that by language L we mean the nonmodal
transparent propositional language and by language L0 we mean the modal language
based on L but containing all the belief operators [i].
The formalisation of epistemic entrenchment as presented by Gärdenfors (1988) and
Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) applies to propositional languages under a traditional
truth-value semantics. In the setting of epistemic logic, epistemic entrenchment applies
to objective (nonmodal) beliefs as opposed to subjective (modal) beliefs. Objective beliefs
are sentences of L. In the context of the modal language L0, objective beliefs will always
be prefaced with a modal operator [i] but as bets sentences of the nonmodal language L
will contain no subsequent occurrences of modal operators. For example, in the sentence
[0]P (c), the atom P (c) is an objective belief. In the context of diagrammable systems,
an epistemic entrenchment ordering, or EE-ordering for short, is a certain kind of binary
relation on L, under the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li. If  and  are sentences of
L, then  v  will be taken as a shorthand for  is at least as epistemically entrenched
as . Note that an epistemic entrenchment ordering is dened only in relation to a
specic belief set (or theory) of L.
Denition 4.4 Let ;  2 L and   a theory of L. A binary relation v on L is an
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EE-ordering (with respect to  ) i¤ it satises the following postulates:
(EE1) v is transitive
(EE2) If  j=  then  v 
(EE3) For all ;  2  ,  v  ^  or  v  ^ 
(EE4) If   6= L then  =2   i¤  v  for all 
(EE5) If  v  for all  then j= 
Postulate (EE1) is a minimal requirement to impose on an ordering relation. If 
entails  and either  or  must be retracted from  , then giving up  and retaining
 is a smaller change than to give up , because then  has to given up as well if   is
to remain a theory. Hence the requirement by postulate (EE2) for  to be at least as
epistemically entrenched as . If the conjunction  ^  must be retracted from  , then
either  or  has to be given up as stated by postulate (EE3). As a consequence of
postulate (EE3) the ordering v has to be connected (and hence, a total preorder, since
reexivity follows from EE2). Postulate (EE4) requires that all sentences not contained
in   are minimal in the ordering while postulate (EE5) requires that tautologies are
maximal in the ordering.
An interesting result about the epistemic entrenchment orderings on sentences is that
they are closely related to total preorders on sets of possible worlds (Meyer, Labuschagne,
and Heidema, 2000a). The basic idea is to construct an EE-ordering from a faithful total
preorder on the set of states by a suitable power construction.
Denition 4.5 Let   be a theory of L. A total preorder  on S is faithful with respect
to   i¤
1. s  s0 for every s 2Mod( ) and s0 =2Mod( ), and
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2. s  s0 for every s; s0 2Mod( ).6
The power construction lifts a faithful total preorder on states to an ordering on sets of
states. Because every sentence is associated with a specic set of possible worlds - the set
of states at which the sentence is true, or its set of models - the power ordering constructed
on sets of states may be viewed as an ordering on sentences (or more accurately, as an
ordering on propositions).
Denition 4.6 Let   be a theory of L. Suppose  is a faithful total preorder on S with
respect to  . Then the power order v on L induced by  is dened, for all ;  2 L,
by  v  i¤ for every s0 2Mod(:) there is some s 2Mod(:) such that s  s0.
The power order v on L induced by  could have been dened information-theo-
retically as follows:  v  i¤ for every s0 2 Cont() there is an s 2 Cont() such
that s  s0. (This is because Cont() = NMod() and Mod(:) = S  Mod().) The
denition states that  is at least as epistemically entrenched as  i¤ for every state s0
there is some state s such that  excludes s0 more strongly than  excludes s. More
importantly however, is that every power order v on L induced by a faithful total
preorder  on S is an EE-ordering (and vice versa).
Theorem 4.1 (Meyer, Labuschagne, and Heidema, 2000a) Let   be a theory of
L. A binary relation v on L is an EE-ordering (with respect to  ) i¤ it is the power
order v on L induced by some faithful total preorder  on S (with respect to  ).
Turning our attention to t-orderings, recall that, by proposition 3.14, every t-ordering
t 2 TS induces a total preorder on the set of states, dened as the relation  on S such
6Due to the niteness of L, the smoothness condition is not required. If L were innite, then for
every sentence  2 L,  would need to be X-smooth, where X = ModM0() and M0 = hS; li is the
classical interpretation of L.
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that s  s0 i¤ t(s)  t(s0). As shown below, the total preorder  induced by t is faithful
with respect to the theory   = ThM(bottom(t)) under a (nite) extensional interpretation
M = hS; li.
Proposition 4.12 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let t 2 TS be a t-ordering and   = ThM(bottom(t)) a theory of L. Then the total
preorder  on S induced by t is faithful (with respect to  ).
Proof. Since L is nite and M an extensional interpetation of L, it holds that for
every X  S, X = ModM(ThM(X)). So ModM( ) = bottom(t). But then t(s) = 0
for every s 2 ModM( ) and t(s0) > 0 for every s0 =2 ModM( ). Hence s  s0 for every
s 2ModM( ) and s0 =2ModM( ) and secondly, s  s00 for every s; s00 2ModM( ).
The connection between t-orderings and EE-orderings is via the faithful total pre-
orders induced by t-orderings, from which the power orders are constructed. If  is the
faithful total preorder on S induced by t-ordering t (with respect to   = Th(bottom(t))),
then the power order v on L induced by  is an EE-ordering on L (with respect to  )
by theorem 4.1. However, the connection between t-orderings and EE-orderings can also
be dened directly via the notion of plausibility, which was introduced in section 3.6.
Recall that the plausibility of a sentence  (with respect to a t-ordering t) was dened as
the greatest level in the t-ordering such that  is satised at every state (in the templated
interpretation) lying at or below that level, or more succinctly, as the greatest j such
that get"(t; j)  ModT () (or  1 if there is no such j). A plausibility of  1 indicates
that the sentence  is not plausible with respect to the t-ordering t, in other words, that
get"(t; 0) 6 ModT (). The plausibility of a sentence (with respect to a t-ordering) is
thus relative to the states occupying the lowest level in the t-ordering.
Denition 4.7 Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let ;  2 L.
Then the plausibility ordering vP on L (with respect to t) is dened as  vP  i¤
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pl(t; )  pl(t; ).
Proposition 4.13 Let T0 = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L for S = UT and
l the identity function. Let   = ThT0(bottom(t)) be a theory of L. Then the plausibility
ordering vP on L (with respect to  ) is an EE-ordering on L (with respect to  ).
Proof. If a binary relation on L is the power order induced by some faithful total
preorder  on S (with respect to  ), then the binary relation is an EE-ordering on L
(with respect to  ), by theorem 4.1. Let  be the faithful total preorder on S (with
respect to  ) induced by t and let v be the power order induced by . If it can be
shown that vP= v, then vP will be an EE-ordering (with respect to  ). Choose any
 and  in vP . So pl(t; )  pl(t; ). Let j = pl(t; ). So j is the greatest level in t
such that get"(t; j)  ModT0(). But then for every every s0 2 ModT0(:), t(s0) > j.
Let i = pl(t; ). So i is the greatest level in t such that get"(t; i) ModT0(). But then
there must be some s 2 ModT0(:) such that t(s) > i. But i  j and thus t(s)  t(s0),
i.e. s  s0. Hence  v . Since  and  were chosen arbitrarily, it follows that vP is a
subset of v.
Choose any  and  in v. So for every s0 2ModT0(:) there is an s 2ModT0(:)
such that s  s0, i.e. such that t(s)  t(s0). Let i = t(s). So s 2 get"(t; i) and s fails
to satisfy . But then get"(t; i) 6 ModT0(), i.e. pl(t; ) < i. Let j = t(s0). So s0 2
get"(t; j) and s0 fails to satisfy . But then get"(t; j) 6 ModT0(), i.e. pl(t; ) < j. But
i  j and thus pl(t; )  pl(t; ). Hence  vP . Since  and  were chosen arbitrarily,
it follows that v is a subset of vP . But then vP = v, as required.
From the previous result it follows that if  and  are sentences of L, then  is at
least as epistemically entrenched as  i¤ the plausibility of  is less than or equal to the
plausibility of  (both with respect to t). The belief set in question is, of course, the set
  = ThT0(bottom(t)).
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Epistemic entrenchment is compatible with the modal operators of the language L0.
Let s 2 S. Now suppose t is taken to be the t-ordering such that t = F (s) where F
is the accessibility function of some templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0. Then
the plausibility of a sentence  2 L (with respect to F (s)) is the greatest j such that
for every state s0 2 get"(F (s); j), s0 satises  (under T ), in other words, the greatest j
such that s satises [j]. The entrenchment of a sentence  2 L (at a state s) can be
intuitively described as the greatest j in the t-ordering F (s) such that the agent believes
to degree j that  is true, which is nothing other than the plausibility of  with respect
to F (s). More formally, the connection between the epistemic entrenchment of sentences
of L and the modal operators of the encompassing modal language L0 is captured by the
following result, due to Labuschagne and Ferguson (2002).
Proposition 4.14 (Labuschagne and Ferguson, 2002) Let T0 = hS; F; li be a tem-
plated interpretation of L0 for S = UT and l the identity function . Let ;  2 L and
s 2 S. Let  be the faithful total preorder on S induced by t-ordering F (s) and let v be
the EE-ordering on L induced by . Then  v  (at s) i¤ s satises [i] ! [i] for all
i.
Proof. Suppose that  v . So for every x 2 Mod(:) there is an y 2 Mod(:)
such that y  x, i.e. F (s)(y)  F (s)(x). Suppose that [j]! [j] fails to be satised at
s. So [j] is satised at s but [j] is not. Since [j] is not satised at s, there must be
some state s0 2 get"(F (s); j) such that  is not satised at s0. But then s0 2ModT0(:)
and F (s)(s0)  j. However, since [j] is satised at s, it must be the case that 
is satised at every state s00 2 get"(F (s); j). So ModT0()  get"(F (s); j). But then
F (s)(s000) > j for every s000 2 ModT0(:). So F (s)(s0) < F (s)(s000) for s0 2 ModT0(:)
and s000 2ModT0(:). Contradiction. So s satises [i]! [i] for all i.
Conversely, suppose that s satises [i] ! [i] for all i. Assume it is not the case
that  v . So there must be some x 2ModT0(:) such that for every y 2ModT0(:),
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x  y, i.e. F (s)(x) < F (s)(y). Let j = F (s)(x). So x 2 get"(F (s); j). But then there is
some state s0 2 get"(F (s); j), namely x, such that  is not satised at s0. Hence [j] is
not satised at s. On the other hand, F (s)(y) > j for every y 2ModT0(:). But then 
must be satised at every state s00 2 get"(F (s); j). Hence [j] is satised at s. But then
[j]! [j] cannot be satised at s. Contradiction. So it must be case that  v .
In terms of epistemic entrenchment, the agents beliefs range from the least entrenched
beliefs at one end of the spectrum to the most deeply entrenched beliefs at the other end of
the spectrum. From an agent-oriented perspective to knowledge and belief (Labuschagne
and Heidema, 2001), it makes sense to think of knowledge as consisting of beliefs that
the agent is su¢ ciently reluctant to surrender, which, when modelled by an epistemic
entrenchment relation, would be those beliefs that are su¢ ciently entrenched.
The most deeply entrenched beliefs (at a state s) are those sentences  2 L with the
highest entrenchment value (or plausibility), in other words, those sentence  such that
s satises [n] - the tautologies. But, as suggested by Girle (1998), agents who know
only true sentences are unrealistic and, thus, we shall take as knowledge the next-to-
most deeply entrenched beliefs (which, of course, would include the tautologies). The
next-to-most deeply entrenched beliefs (at a state s) are those sentences  2 L with an
entrenchment value (or plausibility) of n 1. The agents knowledge at state s would thus
constitute those sentences  2 L such that s satises [n 1]. The least entrenched beliefs
(at a state s) are those sentences  2 L with an entrenchment value (or plausibility) of
0, and thus precisely the sentences  such that s satises [0].
As we have shown, the view that an agents defeasible beliefs form a hierarchy ranging
from its most strongly held beliefs (or knowledge) to its most tentatively held beliefs arises
naturally from the notion of epistemic entrenchment and its connection with t-orderings.
The use of a distinguished level in a t-ordering for denitely excluded states allows for a
qualitative notion of su¢ ciently entrenchedto characterise knowledge.
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4.6 T-orderings as epistemic states
In dening a model of epistemic states suitable for control room agents, who, as mentioned
before, may be summarised as rst-order intentional systems having specic informational
and motivational attitudes, it su¢ ces to consider only objective beliefs.
An epistemic state contains, in one form or another, the knowledge and beliefs of an
agent at a specic point in time, the formation of which is dependent on the information
available to the agent. At a specic point in time the system under consideration will be
in a specic state and it is therefore reasonable to view an epistemic state as relative to
a specic state (or possible world). The information-theoretic semantics of Labuschagne
and Ferguson (2002) that was recalled earlier assigns a t-ordering to each state of the
system. The connection between epistemic entrenchment and t-orderings has shown that
the agents knowledge at a state s 2 S comprises those sentences  2 L such that  is
satised at every state s0 2 get"(t; n  1) while the agents (most tentative) beliefs (at s)
consist of those sentences  2 L such that  is satised at every state s0 2 get"(t; 0), where
t is the t-ordering assigned to s. This provides an information-theoretic justication for
representing epistemic states by t-orderings.
Denition 4.8 Let L be a nitely generated transparent propositional language and let
S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. An epistemic state E is represented
by a regular t-ordering tE 2 TE.
In choosing to represent epistemic states by regular t-orderings, an information-
theoretic model of epistemic states is adopted, which may be seen as a generalisation
of the possible worlds model of epistemic states. Models of epistemic states based on
possible worlds have been used by many authors (Harper, 1977; Grove, 1988; Spohn,
1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991; Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) and in subsequent chap-
ters some of these, and other models, will be explored in more detail.
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Denition 4.9 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state. Then associated with tE are a belief set Bel(tE) 
L and a knowledge set Know(tE)  L dened as Bel(tE) = ThM(bottom(tE)) and
Know(tE) = ThM(get"(tE; n  1)).
The representation of epistemic states by regular t-orderings satises the principle of
Duality in the sense that both knowledge and belief are represented with knowledge not
restricted to tautologies. The belief set is the theory determined by the set of maximally
preferred states while the knowledge set is the theory determined by the set of included
states (= not denitely excluded). Given an extensional interpretation M = hS; li of L,
the belief set Bel(tE) is an axiomatisation of bottom(tE) and the knowledge setKnow(tE)
an axiomatisation of get"(tE; n   1), in other words, ModM(Bel(tE)) = bottom(tE) and
ModM(Know(tE)) = get"(tE; n 1). Since L is nite, there exist a nite axiomatisation of
bottom(tE) and of get"(tE; n 1) underM , denoted by bel(tE) and know(tE) respectively.
The sentence bel(tE) will be referred to as the belief assertion associated with epistemic
state tE (for reasons that will become clear in due course) while the sentence know(tE)
will be referred to as the knowledge assertion associated with tE.
By restricting the representation of epistemic states to regular t-orderings, the notion
of relative distance, which can be expressed by unrestricted t-orderings, is removed and
the approach becomes purely qualitative, thereby satisfying the principle of Qualitative-
ness. Since a regular t-ordering is a t-ordering in normal form that is not strongly con-
tradictory, it follows that the bottom level of the t-ordering is non-empty, which ensures
that the belief set and knowledge set associated with an epistemic state are satisable,
thus satisfying the principle of Consistency. The principle of Logical Closure is satised
by ensuring that both the belief set and knowledge set associated with an epistemic state
are theories.
A sentence  is said to be accepted in an epistemic state tE i¤ bottom(tE) ModM().
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In other words, a sentence is accepted in an epistemic state i¤ it is an element of the
belief set associated with the epistemic state. We think of acceptedas an abbreviation
of accepted as a basis for action. Some actions may entail greater risks for the agent
than others, and consequently one would want to have some actions requiring more
stringent preconditions than other actions may require. The notion of acceptance ought
therefore to be nuanced. Sentences can be accepted with varying degrees of rmness.
The degree of rmness with which a sentence is accepted in an epistemic state is dened
as the plausibility of the sentence with respect to the (regular t-ordering representing the)
epistemic state, thus reecting the entrenchment of the sentence with respect to the belief
set. The most strongly accepted sentences in an epistemic state (next to the tautologies)
are, of course, the elements of the knowledge set associated with the epistemic state.
A sentence  is said to be rejected in an epistemic state tE i¤ bottom(tE)\ModM() =
?. Rejected sentences are disbeliefs. Using the notion of distrust, which was introduced
in section 3.6, sentences can be rejected in an epistemic state with varying degrees of
rmness. Recall that the distrust of a sentence  (with respect to a t-ordering t) was
dened as the least level in the t-ordering such that  is satised at some state lying at
or below that level, or alternatively, as the least j such that get"(t; j) \ModM() 6= ?
(or n if there is no such j). The degree of rmness with which a sentence is rejected in
an epistemic state is dened as the distrust of the sentence with respect to the (regular
t-ordering representing the) epistemic state.
The information-theoretic model of epistemic states is, from a syntactic perspective,
based on the coherentist approach, which takes the view that sentences constituting
justications for beliefs need not be part of an epistemic model; instead, the focus is
on how coherent beliefs are with other beliefs that are accepted in the epistemic state.
This is in contrast with the foundationist approach, which takes the view that an agent
should keep track of the justications for its beliefs and that sentences that have no
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justication should not be accepted as beliefs in the epistemic state. The distinction
between the coherentist and foundationist approaches has resulted in ongoing debate
amongst researchers (Sosa, 1980; Harman, 1986; Gärdenfors, 1990; Hansson and Olsson,
1999, Hansson, 2006). From our semantic perspective, the debate is based on a false
dichotomy. Our own approach illustrates a third way, for, while technically coherentist,
our approach does include semantic (as opposed to syntactic) justication for beliefs in
the form of an epistemic state. (Recall that an epistemic state is a t-ordering, not merely
a set of sentences.)
One aspect that neither the coherentist nor the foundationist approach considers
seriously is how an agent arrives at an initial epistemic state. To arrive at an initial
epistemic state, an agent must have available some information about the system under
consideration. In the context of diagrammable systems this will take the form of xed
information, either given as a system diagram (or blueprint) or derived from perception.
Perception produces images, from which facts and constraints in the form of sentences are
produced by a psychological process of analog-to-discrete transformation (Harnad, 1990).
This xed information allows the agent to permanently rule out from consideration zero,
one, or more of those states of the system that are unrealisable. On the other hand,
observations, which provide state-dependent evidence, allow the agent to rule out some
states denitely though not permanently. Additionally, an agent will usually learn or be
given default rules about the system, which allow the agent to treat some of the realisable
states as more normal (or typical) than others. To form the initial epistemic state of the
agent, we shall single out the forms of information that might be more persistent than
observational evidence; the agents xed information rened by its default rules about
the system using a renement operation on t-orderings in normal form. The renement
operation relies on a lexicographical ordering that is induced by t-orderings in normal
form.
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Denition 4.10 Suppose X and Y are two sets on which there are order relations X
and Y respectively. If A is any subset of the Cartesian product X  Y , then the lexi-
cographic ordering on A is the relation  such that (x; y)  (x0; y0) i¤ x X x0 and if
x = x0 then y Y y0.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose X and Y are two nite sets on which there are linear orders X
and Y respectively. Then the lexicographic ordering  on any subset A of the Cartesian
product X  Y is a well-ordering on A.
Proof. See proof in appendix B, section B.2.
Denition 4.11 Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n and let B =
f0; 1; : : : ; ng be the template for S with the usual linear order  on B. Let t1; t2 2 TN .
Then the index set A  B  B induced by ht1; t2i is dened as A = f(x; y) j x = t1(s)
and y = t2(s) for some s 2 Sg.
From lemma 4.1 it follows that if t1 and t2 are t-orderings in normal form, then the
lexicographic ordering  on the index set A induced by ht1; t2i is a well-ordering on A.
Denition 4.12 Let t1; t2 2 TN and let A be the index set induced by ht1; t2i and well-
ordered by the lexicographic ordering . The renement operation  is a binary
operation on TN where t1  t2, which is the result of rening t1 by t2, is dened as
follows
 (t1  t2)(s) =
8<: card(seg(t1(s); t2(s))) if t1(s) < nn otherwise
where seg(t1(s); t2(s)) is the initial segment of (t1(s); t2(s)) 2 A.
The e¤ect of the renement operation is to push some of the states in the t-ordering
being rened up some level(s). However, in the renement of a t-ordering by another
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t-ordering, the ordering of the original t-ordering is respected in the sense that if some
state s 2 S was at a level below state s0 2 S, then s will be at a level below s0 in the
rened t-ordering too. In essence, the renement takes place on states (below the top
level) that occupy the same level. A renement operation has no e¤ect on the denite
content of the original t-ordering but may increase its indenite content.
Proposition 4.15 Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. Let t1; t2 2 TN
and let A be the index set induced by ht1; t2i and well-ordered by the lexicographic ordering
. Then the following holds for every s; s0 2 S:
1. t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s)
2. if t1(s) < t1(s0) then (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0)
3. if t1(s) = t1(s0) 6= n and t2(s) < t2(s0) then (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0)
4. bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1)
5. ContD(t1) = ContD(t1  t2)
6. Cont0(t1)  Cont0(t1  t2)
Proof. See proof in appendix B, section B.2.
The agents xed information reects what the agent knows about the system speci-
cation, in other words, what the agent knows about states of the system that will never
arise. The agents default rules about the system, on the other hand, reect what the
agent has learned about the system, in other words, what the agent believes to be the
most normal (or typical) states of the system. In the exceptional case where an agent has
no xed information and no default rules about the system, the initial epistemic state
tI 2 TE of the agent will be taken to be tautological. Otherwise it would be arrived at
in the manner dened below.
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Denition 4.13 Let tSD 2 TD (with tSD regular) represent the agents xed information
and let tSI 2 TI represent the agents default rules. Then the agents initial epistemic
state tI 2 TE is determined by taking tI(s) = (tSD  tSI)(s).
Collectively, the information available to an agent provides the epistemic framework
from which the agents epistemic state is formed, and changed. For now, our focus has
been on those components of the epistemic framework which allow the agent to arrive in
a natural way at an initial epistemic state. However, in the next chapter, the focus will
shift to those components of the epistemic framework which allow the agent to perform
certain types of changes to its epistemic state based on state-dependent information.
Strictly speaking, if the idea is accepted that epistemic states should contain all
the relevant information for determining how epistemic change operations should be
performed, then the components of the agents epistemic framework should form part of
the agents epistemic state. However, for notational convenience, the components of an
agents epistemic framework will be kept separate so that the agents epistemic state is
represented simply by a regular t-ordering (plus an associated belief set and knowledge
set).
4.7 Ordinal conditional functions
The representation of epistemic states by regular t-orderings is closely related to the
representation of epistemic states by the ordinal conditional functions (OCFs) of Spohn
(1988). The notion of a OCF is a generalisation of the concept of a well-ordered partition
(WOP) on the set of possible worlds S to the e¤ect that such a partition may contain
empty terms. In this sense, an OCF is very similar to the notion of a t-ordering as a
distribution of a strict linearly ordered partition on S over a xed construct of boxes
(or template) where some of the boxes may be empty. However, the role of the top box
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in a t-ordering has no counterpart in an OCF. In choosing to represent epistemic states
by OCFs, as opposed to WOPs, the notion of relative distance between possible worlds
becomes as important as the ordering between worlds. This notion of distance is the
key di¤erence between representing epistemic states by OCFs versus regular t-orderings:
OCFs are quantitative in nature whereas regular t-orderings are purely qualitative.
Formally, an ordinal conditional function (OCF) is a function k from a given set of
possible worlds S into the class of ordinals such that k(s) = 0 for at least one s 2 S.
Intuitively, the ordinals represent degrees of plausibility; the smaller the ordinal, the
more plausible the possible world. Spohn uses the traditional truth-value semantics of
propositional logic, which of course, corresponds to the classical interpretation M0 =
hS; li. The belief set associated with epistemic state k, denoted by Bel(k), is dened by
Mod(Bel(k)) = fs 2 S j k(s) = 0g. From the denition of an OCF it follows that every
belief set Bel(k) will be satisable.
Similarly to t-orderings, every OCF k induces a total preorder on the set of states,
dened as the relation  on S such that s  s0 i¤ k(s)  k(s0), which is faithful with
respect to the theory   = Th(fs 2 S j k(s) = 0g).
Proposition 4.16 Let k be an OCF and let   = Th(fs 2 S j k(s) = 0g) be a theory of
L. Then k induces a total preorder  on S that is faithful (with respect to  ).
Proof. Let  be the relation on S induced by OCF k such that s  s0 i¤k(s)  k(s0).
Clearly, the relation  is reexive, transitive, and total. To see that  is faithful (with
respect to  ) note that for every X  S, X = Mod(Th(X)) (since L is nite and the
underlying interpretation extensional). So Mod( ) = fs 2 S j k(s) = 0g. But then
k(s) = 0 for every s 2 Mod( ) and k(s0) > 0 for every s0 =2 Mod( ). Hence s  s0 for
every s 2Mod( ) and s0 =2Mod( ) and secondly, s  s00 for every s; s00 2Mod( ).
Spohn extends the denition of an OCF to sets of possible worlds, or sentences (be-
cause every sentence is associated with a specic set of possible worlds, its set of models),
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by associating every non-contradictory sentence with the smallest ordinal assigned to any
of its models. An OCF k : S ! Ord can be extended to a function k0 whose domain
includes all non-contradictory sentences by taking k0() = minfk(s) j s 2Mod()g.
A sentence  is said to be accepted in epistemic state k i¤ k0(:) > 0, rejected in
k i¤ k0() > 0, and indetermined with respect to k i¤ k0(:) = k0() = 0. The rich
structure of an OCF allows a notion of plausibility to be dened. The degree of rmness
with which a sentence  is accepted in k is measured by k0(:); the higher the value, the
more rmly believed, or the more plausible, the sentence is. The degree of rmness with
which a sentence  is rejected in k is measured by k0(); the higher the value, the more
rmly disbelieved, or the less plausible, the sentence is. If  and  are sentences of L,
then  @k , will be taken as a shorthand for  is more plausible than relative to k.
The plausibility ordering @k on L (relative to k) is dened as follows:
Denition 4.14 Let k be an OCF and let ;  2 L. Then the plausibility ordering
@k on L (relative to k) is dened as  @k  i¤ k0(:) > k0(:) or k0() < k0().
The plausibility ordering relative to an OCF is very similar to the plausibility ordering
relative to a t-ordering when the OCF and t-ordering are compatible. An OCF k and
a t-ordering t are compatible if the underlying ordered partitions are identical, in other
words, if the total preorder k induced by k and the total preorder t induced by t are
the same. But in that case, it follows that for every s; s0 2 S, k(s)  k(s0) i¤ t(s)  t(s0).
Proposition 4.17 Let t 2 TS be a t-ordering and k an OCF such that t and k are
compatible. Then for every ;  2 L, if  @P  then  @k  and if  @k  then  vP .
Proof. Suppose that  @P . So pl(t; ) < pl(t; ). Let i = pl(t; ). So i is the
greatest level in t such that get"(t; i)  Mod(). But then minft(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g =
i + 1. Let j = pl(t; ). So j is the greatest level in t such that get"(t; j)  Mod().
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But then minft(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g = j + 1. But i < j and thus minft(s) j s 2
Mod(:)g < minft(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g. Since t and k are compatible it follows that
minfk(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g < minfk(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g. But then k0(:) < k0(:), i.e.
 @k .
Conversely, suppose that  @k . So k0(:) > k0(:) or k0() < k0(). Suppose
that k0(:) > k0(:). So minfk(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g > minfk(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g.
Since t and k are compatible it follows that minft(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g > minft(s) j s 2
Mod(:)g. Let minft(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g = j and minft(s) j s 2 Mod(:)g = i. But
then get"(t; j   1)  Mod() and get"(t; i   1)  Mod(), i.e. pl(t; ) = j   1 and
pl(t; ) = i   1. Since j > i it follows that pl(t; ) > pl(t; ), i.e.  @P . Suppose
that k0() < k0(). So minfk(s) j s 2 Mod()g < minfk(s) j s 2 Mod()g. Since t
and k are compatible it follows that minft(s) j s 2Mod()g < minft(s) j s 2Mod()g.
Let minft(s) j s 2 Mod()g = i and minft(s) j s 2 Mod()g = j. So i is the least
level in t such that get"(t; i) \ Mod() 6= ? and j is the least level in t such that
get"(t; j)\Mod() 6= ?. But then, since i < j, it follows that dt(t; ) < dt(t; ). Hence,
by proposition 3.36(5), pl(t; )  pl(t; ), i.e.  vP .
The main advantage of using t-orderings as a representation of epistemic states is
that t-orderings are purely qualitative and allow for the representation of both knowledge
and belief. Ordinal conditional functions, on the other hand, rely on the arithmetic of
ordinals. This allows for more exibility in the representation of epistemic states but, at
the same time, violates the principle of Qualitativeness. The representation of knowledge
is not supported by OCFs, largely because the information-theoretic notion of denitely
excluded states is not an inherent part of OCFs.
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It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
Sherlock Holmes in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle)
5.1 AGM belief revision
The AGM approach to belief revision is one of the most inuential contributions to the
theory of belief change and has become a standard against which to compare belief change
operations. We shall begin this chapter by reviewing the AGM approach as well as several
families of closely related approaches. In the latter sections of the chapter we shall provide
a logical reconstruction of the ideas using t-orderings. The AGM approach is named after
its three authors, Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson after the
publication of their seminal paper (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, 1985). The
approach had its origins in the philosophy of science (Gärdenfors, 1978, 1982, 1984)
and the philosophy of law (Alchourrón and Makinson, 1981, 1982) and was strongly
inuenced by the earlier work of philosophers Harper (1976, 1977) and Levi (1977, 1980).
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A historical perspective on the AGM approach may be found in Makinson (2003a).
In the AGM approach, beliefs are objective and represented by sentences of a propo-
sitional language under a traditional truth-value semantics. The language is equipped
with an abstract (syntactic) consequence relation ` in terms of which a consequence op-
eration Cn is dened, which is assumed to be classical (i.e. reexive, idempotent, and
monotonic), to satisfy the deduction theorem and to be compact. In the context of dia-
grammable systems, the syntactic consequence relation ` is replaced by a corresponding
semantic consequence relation j=M0 on L under the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li.
The epistemic state of an agent is taken in the AGM approach to be a belief set, or
theory (Gärdenfors, 1988). In other words, the epistemic state of an agent is taken to
be a set K of sentences of L such that K = Cn(K). There is only one unsatisable
belief set, the set of all sentences, which is denoted by K?. If K is a satisable belief set,
then a sentence  is said to be accepted in K i¤  2 K, rejected in K i¤ : 2 K, and
indetermined with respect to K i¤  =2 K and : =2 K.
Three basic types of belief change operations are identied, namely, expansion, revi-
sion, and contraction.
 Expansion consists of adding new information, together with the logical conse-
quences of the information, to the belief set without retracting any of the existing
beliefs in the belief set. The resulting belief set may be unsatisable.
 Revision consists of adding new information, which is inconsistent with the belief
set, to the belief set in such a way that the resulting belief set is satisable (unless,
of course, the new information itself is unsatisable).
 Contraction consists of retracting information from the belief set, without adding
any new information.
Of the three belief change operations, only expansion is dened in a unique way.
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Denition 5.1 Let K be a belief set of L. An expansion operation + is an operation
such that for every sentence  2 L, the set K +, which is the result of expanding K by
, is dened as K +  = Cn(K [ fg).
For revision and contraction, a number of rationality postulates are dened that every
revision and contraction operation is expected to comply with. There are eight AGM
postulates dened for revision.
Denition 5.2 Let K be a belief set of L. A revision operation  is an operation
such that for every sentence  2 L, the set K , which is the result of revising K by ,
satises the following set of postulates:
(K  1) K   = Cn(K  )
(K  2)  2 K  
(K  3) K    K + 
(K  4) If : =2 K, then K +   K  
(K  5) K   = K? i¤  is a contradiction
(K  6) If   , then K   = K  
(K  7) K  ( ^ )  (K  ) + 
(K  8) If : =2 K  , then (K  ) +   K  ( ^ )
Postulate (K  1) requires the result of revision to be a belief set while postulate
(K  2) guarantees that the input sentence is accepted in the resulting belief set. Postu-
lates (K  3) and (K  4) describe the relationship between revision and expansion; the
belief set resulting from revision is a subset of the belief set resulting from expansion,
given the same input sentence, but if the input sentence is consistent with the belief
set, then revision coincides with expansion. Postulate (K  5) ensures that the belief
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set resulting from revision is satisable, unless the input sentence is a contradiction. To
ensure that the resulting belief set is satisable, some of the existing beliefs may have to
be given up. Postulate (K  6) says that revision by equivalent input sentences should
result in equivalent belief sets, implying that belief revision should be analysed at the
semantic level and not on the syntactic level. Postulates (K  7) and (K  8) together
state that if a revised belief set is to be changed by a further input sentence, it should be
done by expansion provided the additional input sentence is consistent with the already
revised belief set. From postulates (K  2) and (K  3), together with postulates (K  7)
and (K  8), the following property can be derived (Freund and Lehmann, 1994)
(K  9) (K  )   = K  ( ^ ) if : =2 K  .
Property (K  9) imposes some restrictions on iterated revision requiring that the
belief set resulting from a revision by (the conjunction of) two input sentences be the
same as the belief set resulting from a revision by one of the input sentences followed
by a second revision by the other input sentence (provided the second input sentence is
consistent with the already revised belief set). Iterated revision is considered in more
detail in section 5.3. The rst six postulates are referred to as the basic set of postulates
for revision and the last two postulates as the supplementary set of postulates.
For contraction, eight AGM postulates are dened.
Denition 5.3 Let K be a belief set of L. A contraction operation   is an operation
such that for every sentence  2 L, the set K   , which is the result of contracting K
with , satises the following set of postulates:
(K  1) K    = Cn(K   )
(K  2) K     K
(K  3) If  =2 K, then K    = K
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(K  4) If  is not a tautology, then  =2 K   
(K  5) If  2 K, then K  (K   ) + 
(K  6) If   , then K    = K   
(K  7) (K   ) \ (K   )  K   ( ^ )
(K  8) If  =2 K   ( ^ ), then K   ( ^ )  K   
Postulate (K  1) requires the result of contraction to be a belief set while postulate
(K  2) guarantees that contraction reduces the belief set. Postulate (K  3) ensures
that nothing is removed from the belief set unnecessarily while postulate (K  4) en-
sures that the input sentence is removed from the belief set, unless it is a tautology.
Postulate (K  5) is known as the Recovery postulate and is the most controversial pos-
tulate (Makinson, 1987, 1997b). It requires contraction to be recoverable, that is, the
original belief set should be recovered when the contracted belief set is expanded by the
initial input sentence. Postulate (K  6) requires input sentences which are semantically
equivalent to lead to identical contractions, implying that contraction, similarly to revi-
sion, should be analysed at the semantic level and not on the syntactic level. Postulates
(K  7) and (K  8) are less intuitive but may be interpreted as saying that contract-
ing with  ^  must not remove more beliefs than when contracting with  and with 
separately. Again, the rst six postulates are referred to as the basic set of postulates
(for contraction) and the last two postulates as the supplementary set of postulates.
Although the postulates for revision and contraction are independent in the sense
that neither refer to the other, revision and contraction can be dened in terms of each
via the Harper and Levi identities, as shown by Gärdenfors (1988).
 K   = (K   :) +  (Levi identity)
 K    = (K  :) \K (Harper identity)
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Theorem 5.1 (Gärdenfors, 1988) If a contraction operation   satises (K  1) to
(K  8), then the revision operation  dened via the Levi identity satises (K  1) to
(K  8).
Theorem 5.2 (Gärdenfors, 1988) If a revision operation  satises (K  1) to (K  8),
then the contraction operation   dened via the Harper identity satises (K  1) to
(K  8).
As mentioned earlier, the postulates for revision and contraction do not determine
unique revision and contraction operations. Partial meet contraction is a specic con-
struction method for contraction (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, 1985) that is
based on the intersection of a selected subfamily of the family of all maximal subsets of a
belief set K not entailing the sentence  to be contracted. The method of safe contrac-
tion, due to Alchourrón and Makinson (1985), is another way of constructing contraction
operations, based on the dual notion of minimal subsets of a belief set K that entail the
sentence  to be contracted. The concept of epistemic entrenchment, which was encoun-
tered in section 4.5, provides an alternative construction method for contraction. In all
of these classical syntactic methods, revision operations are obtained only indirectly via
the Levi identity. It is not quite clear how often pure contractions occur in real life (Rott,
2001, pp.107) and as a result, in the context of diagrammable systems, our focus will be
on revision.
The rst direct semantic method for constructing revision operations is due to Grove
(1988), who uses a system of spheresthat is similar to the sphere semantics for counter-
factuals proposed by Lewis (1973). Groves system of spheres is based on the notion of
maximal satisable subsets of an underlying propositional language. These subsets may
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be viewed as possible worlds. LetM denote the set of all maximal satisable subsets of L.
Every belief set K can be represented by the set [K] M of maximal satisable subsets
of K, given by [K] = f 2M j K  g. (The same denition may be used to construct
the set [] for any sentence  2 L.) When viewed as possible worlds, [K] = Mod(K)
(under the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li). Conversely, for every subset X  M,
the set of sentences th(X) = f 2 L j  2 \f 2 Xgg is a belief set. When viewed
as possible worlds, the set th(X) is the theory determined by the corresponding subset
X 0  S, i.e. th(X) = Th(X 0).
Denition 5.4 Let K be a belief set of L. A system of spheres, centered on [K], is a
collection S of subsets of M that satises the following conditions:
(S1) S is totally ordered by 
(S2) [K] is the -minimum of S
(S3) M 2 S
(S4) If any element of S intersects [], then there is a smallest element of S inter-
secting []
For any sentence  2 L, if [] intersects any element of S, then by condition (S4)
there is a smallest element of S intersecting [], say c(). If [] does not intersects any
element of S, then c() is taken to be M, since, by condition (S3), it must be the case
that [] = ?. The closestelements in M to [K] in which  is an element can now
be dened as the set [] \ c(). The key idea in Groves approach to belief revision is
that the revision of a belief set K by a sentence  can be represented by (the belief set
determined by) the subset [] \ c() M of worldsclosest to [K].
Theorem 5.3 (Grove, 1988) Let K be a belief set of L. A revision operation  satises
(K  1) to (K  8) i¤ there is some system of spheres S in M, which is centered on [K],
such that for all  2 L, K   = th([] \ c()).
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The result shows that revision can be characterised in terms of systems of spheres.
As an alternative, Grove provides a characterisation of revision operations in terms of an
ordering on the sentences of L (with respect to a belief set K) that satises a number of
conditions.
Denition 5.5 Let K be a belief set of L and let ;  2 L. A binary relation vG on L
is a G-ordering (with respect to K) i¤ it satises the following conditions:
(G1) vG is connected
(G2) vG is transitive
(G3) If j= !  _ , then either  vG  or  vG 
(G4)  is vG-minimal i¤ : =2 K
(G5)  is vG-maximal i¤  is a contradiction
The G-orderings can be induced by a system of spheres centered on [K] by taking,
for all ;  2 L,  vG  i¤ c()  c() and hence  @G  i¤ c()  c(). Groves
representation theorem for belief revision in terms of G-orderings is based on the idea
that the revision of a belief set K by a sentence  can be represented by the set of all
sentences  2 L such that ( ^ ) @G ( ^ :).
Theorem 5.4 (Grove, 1988) Let K be a belief set of L. A revision operation  satises
(K  1) to (K  8) i¤ there is some G-ordering vG on L with respect to K, such that for
all  2 L, K   = f 2 L j ( ^ ) @G ( ^ :)g.
G-orderings can be used to construct EE-orderings, and vice versa (Gärdenfors, 1988,
pp.95). The connection between the two orderings rests on the observation that an
EE-ordering is used to determine which sentences should be retained in K    whereas
a G-ordering is used to determine which sentences should be included in K  . The
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intuitive idea in constructing an EE-ordering from a G-ordering is that, if  2 K then,
to determine whether  should be in K , it su¢ ces to (apply the Harper identify and)
consider whether : is in K  , as characterised by some G-ordering (with respect to
K).
Theorem 5.5 (Gärdenfors, 1988) Let K be a belief set of L. A binary relation v on
L is an EE-ordering (with respect to K) i¤ it can be dened in terms of a G-ordering vG
on L (with respect to K) using the denition, for all ;  2 L,  v  i¤ : vG :.
However, from every EE-ordering on L (with respect to some belief set K), a faithful
total preorder on S (with respect to K) can be constructed as shown by theorem 4.1 in
section 4.5. From the relationship between EE-orderings and G-orderings, the relation-
ship between G-orderings and faithful total preorders on the set of states can be dened,
again, with the aid of a suitable power construction (Meyer, 1999).
Denition 5.6 Let K be a belief set of L. Suppose  is a faithful total preorder on S
(with respect to K). Then the power order vGP on L induced by  is dened, for all
;  2 L, by  vGP  i¤ for every s0 2 Mod() there is some s 2 Mod() such that
s  s0.
Theorem 5.6 (Meyer, 1999) Let K be a belief set of L. A binary relation vG on L
is a G-ordering (with respect to K) i¤ it is the power order vGP on L induced by some
faithful total preorder on S (with respect to K).
The rst semantic characterisation of revision operations in terms of faithful total
preorders if due to Katsuno and Mendelzon (1989, 1991). Their approach, which is con-
sidered in section 5.2, uses a nitely generated propositional language under a traditional
truth-value semantics, which allows a belief set K to be represented by a single sentence
 such that K = Cn(). The key idea in their approach is that the revision of a belief
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set K by a sentence  can be represented by (the theory determined by) the models of 
that are closestto the models of K, i.e. the models of  that are minimal with respect
to the faithful total preorder assigned to K. The following representation theorem is an
adaptation of the characterisation of Katsuno and Mendelzon in terms of belief sets.
Theorem 5.7 Let K be a belief set of L. A revision operation  satises (K  1) to
(K  8) i¤ there is some total preorder  on S, which is faithful with respect to K, such
that for all  2 L, K   = Th(Min()).
The representation theorems presented have shown that a revision operation can be
characterised in terms of a family of systems of spheres inM, one for each belief set K;
in terms of a family of G-orderings on L, one for each belief set K; and in terms of a
family of faithful total preorders on S, one for each belief set K. All of these approaches
describe how to produce, from a belief set and some kind of ordering a new belief set
for any sentence, but give no indication as to what the new ordering should be. As
pointed out by Friedman and Halpern (1999a), the epistemic state here is function not
only of a belief set, but of an ordering too, and it is the ordering that determines how
revision is performed and not the belief set, since there are many orderings for which the
associated belief set would be the same. Since the revision process results in a new belief
set only, and not a revised ordering as well, the representation does not fully support
iterated revision. Iterated revision, the problem of dealing with a succession of changes
to the epistemic state of an agent, is generally regarded as a fundamental limitation
of the AGM approach to belief revision. This matter will be addressed in section 5.3.
Another limitation of the AGM approach to belief revision is that it only deals with new
information about a staticworld, a matter that is taken up next.
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5.2 Knowledge base update
Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) make a fundamental distinction between the revision of a
knowledge base and the update of a knowledge base. Revision is deemed appropriate when
new information is obtained about a staticworld (a world which persists in the same
state) whereas update is deemed appropriate when the new information is about changes
in a dynamicworld (a world which changes its state). The distinction was originally
made by Keller and Winslett (1985) in the context of extended relational databases. The
following example, due to Winslett (1988), illustrates that revision is not appropriate in
cases involving a change of state.
Example 5.1 (Winslett, 1988) Suppose that all we know inK about a particular room
is that there is a table, a book and a magazine in it, and that either () the book is on the
table, or () the magazine is on the table, but not both, i.e. the belief set K is essentially
Cn(( ^ :) _ ( ^ :)). A robot is then ordered to put the book on the table, and as a
consequence, we learn that . If we change our beliefs by revision we should, according
to (K  4) end up with a belief set that contains ( ^ :) since  is consistent with K.
But why should we conclude that the magazine is not on the table?
In the context of belief change, revision is appropriate when the agent obtains new
information but the system has persisted in the same state whereas update is appropriate
when the system has changed state.
In the approach of Katsuno and Mendelzon, beliefs are objective and represented
by sentences of a nitely generated propositional language under a traditional truth-
value semantics. The niteness of the language allows the epistemic state of an agent
to be taken as a single sentence , referred to as a knowledge base. Note that the term
knowledge base is not interchangeable with the term belief base. A belief base, as
a model of epistemic states, uses an arbitrary set of sentences as opposed to a set of
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sentences closed under semantic consequence (i.e. a belief set). It is motivated by the
argument that some of the agents beliefs have no independent standing but arise merely
as inferences from the agents more basic beliefs (Fuhrmann, 1991; Hansson, 1992;
Nebel, 1989, 1992). A belief base B is taken to consist of such basic beliefs and is said
to be a base for a belief set K i¤ Cn(B) = K. Belief revision based on this model of
epistemic states is known as base revision (Gärdenfors and Rott, 1995; Hansson, 1998,
1999a; Nebel, 1998).
For every knowledge base , a belief set K can be constructed by taking K = Cn()
(under the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li). The knowledge base  is a nite ax-
iomatisation of the models of the belief set K. If  is a satisable knowledge base,
then a sentence  is said to be accepted in  i¤ Mod()  Mod(), rejected in  i¤
Mod() \Mod() = ?, and indetermined with respect to  i¤Mod() 6 Mod() but
Mod() \Mod() 6= ?.
Denition 5.7 Let  be a knowledge base of L. An expansion operation + is an
operation such that for every sentence  2 L, the knowledge base  + , which is the
result of expanding  by , is dened as +    ^ .
There are six KM postulates dened for revision.
Denition 5.8 Let  be a knowledge base of L. A revision operation  is an operation
such that for every sentence  2 L, the knowledge base , which is the result of revising
 by , satises the following set of postulates:
(KM  1)    j= 
(KM  2) If  ^  is satisable, then      ^ 
(KM  3) If  is satisable, then    is satisable
(KM  4) If   0 and   0 then     0  0
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(KM  5) (  ) ^  j=   ( ^ )
(KM  6) If (  ) ^  is satisable, then   ( ^ ) j= (  ) ^ 
The KM postulates for revision of knowledge bases correspond directly to the AGM
postulates for revision of belief sets when a belief set K is taken to be the set of conse-
quences of a knowledge base , i.e. K = Cn(). A belief set revision operation  satises
(K  1) to (K  6) i¤ the corresponding knowledge base revision operation  satises
(KM  1) to (KM  4), while (K  7) and (K  8) respectively correspond to (KM  5)
and (KM  6).
As mentioned earlier, Katsuno and Mendelzon were the rst to provide a semantic
characterisation of revision operations in terms of (faithful) total preorders. A faithful
assignment maps every knowledge base  to a total pre-order  on the set of worlds in
such a way that the following conditions hold:
  is faithful with respect to Cn(), and
 if   0, then = 0.
The faithful assignment ensures that the models of every knowledge base  are strictly
below its nonmodels in the total preorder assigned to .
Theorem 5.8 (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991) A revision operation  satises pos-
tulates (KM  1) to (KM  6) i¤ there exists a faithful assignment that maps each knowl-
edge base  to a total preorder  on S, such that for all  2 L, Mod() =Min().
Turning the attention to update, Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) provide two sets of
postulates for update; one characterising update operations in terms of partial orders
and the other characterising update operations in terms of total preorders. Our focus
will primarily be on the latter, for which seven postulates are dened.1
1In the alternative formulation, postulate (KM  6) is replaced by postulates (KM  8): If () j= 
and () j= , then ()  () and (KM  9): If  is complete, then ()^ () j=  (^).
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Denition 5.9 Let  be a knowledge base. An update operation  is an operation such
that for every sentence  2 L, the knowledge base   , which is the result of updating
 with , satises the following set of postulates:
(KM  1)    j= 
(KM  2) If  j= , then     
(KM  3) If both  and  are satisable, then    is satisable
(KM  4) If   0 and   0, then     0  0
(KM  5) (  ) ^  j=   ( ^ )
(KM  6) If (  ) ^  is satisable and  is complete2, then   ( ^ ) j= (  ) ^ 
(KM  7) ( _ 0)    (  ) _ (0  )
Postulates (KM  1), (KM  4), and (KM  5) for update correspond directly to
postulates (KM  1), (KM  4), and (KM  5) for revision respectively. Postulate
(KM  2) for update di¤ers from its counterpart, postulate (KM  2), for revision and
asserts merely that if the input sentence  is a semantic consequence of , then updating
by  does not inuence the knowledge base . From postulate (KM  3) it follows that
if the knowledge base is unsatisable, then updating it by a satisable input sentence
 does not necessarily result in a satisable knowledge base, in contrast to revising it
with , as stated by postulate (KM  3). Postulate (KM  6) corresponds to postulate
(KM  6) for revision but only applies to complete knowledge bases. Postulate (KM  7)
is referred to as the Disjunction Rule and requires that the result of updating the dis-
junction of two knowledge bases with an input sentence be equivalent to the disjunction
of updating each knowledge base with the input sentence.
2A sentence  is said to be complete if for any sentence ,  entails  or  entails : (Katsuno and
Mendelson, 1992).
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The characterisation of update operations (for knowledge bases) is based on the idea
that the update of a knowledge base  with a sentence  can be represented by selecting,
for each model s of , the models of  that are closestto s. (We shall have more to
say about this idea in due course.) The intuitive notion of closenessis captured by a
function that assigns a total preorder to each world s 2 S. Formally, a faithful update
assignment maps every world s 2 S to a total preorder s on S in such a way that the
following condition holds:
 for any s0 2 S, if s 6= s0 then s s s0.
Using the notion of a faithful update assignment, Katsuno and Mendelzon provide a
characterisation of update operations (for knowledge bases).
Theorem 5.9 (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992) An update operation  satises pos-
tulates (KM  1) to (KM  7) i¤ there exists a faithful update assignment that maps
each world s to a total preorder s on S, such that for all  2 L, Mod(  ) =S
s2Mod()Mins().
The class of update operations characterised in this way may be seen as a generali-
sation of the possible models approach of Winslett (1988, 1990). In the possible models
approach, or PMA for short, a partial order s is associated with every world s 2 S in
such a way that s0 s s00 i¤Dist(s; s0)  Dist(s; s00) where Dist(s; s0) is the set of atoms
that have di¤erent truth values under s and s03. Intuitively, s0 s s00 means that s0 must
be closerto s than s00, since s and s0 di¤er on fewer valuations than s and s00. The PMA
update operation selects for each model s in a xed knowledge base , the models of 
that are closestto s, in other words, the minimal models of  with respect to the partial
3If the new input sentence  is inconsistent with the knowledge base , then Winsletts PMA update
operation coincides with the update operation of Borgida (1985, 1988).
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order s on S. The models of the updated knowledge base are then the union of these
selected models. The PMA update operation satises postulates (KM  1) to (KM  5)
and postulates (KM  7) to (KM  9). As such, the PMA update operations constitute
a sub-class of the class of update operations characterised by Katsuno and Mendelzon in
terms of a family of partial orders, one for each world s 2 S.
The update operation of Forbus (1989), which is the update counterpart of the revision
operation of Dalal (1988), is based on total preorders. In the approach of Forbus, a
total preorder s is associated with every world s 2 S in such a way that s0 s s00
i¤ card(Dist(s; s0))  card(Dist(s; s00)) where Dist(s; s0) is, as before, the set of atoms
that have di¤erent truth values under s and s0. As with the PMA update operation, the
Forbus update operation selects for each model s in a xed knowledge base , the minimal
models of  with respect to the ordering s, which, in this case, is a total preorder on S.
The models of the updated knowledge base are again the union of these selected models.
In satisfying postulates (KM  1) to (KM  7), the Forbus update operations constitute
a sub-class of the class of update operations characterised by Katsuno and Mendelzon in
terms of a family of total preorders, again, one for each world s 2 S.
The update operations of Winslett and Forbus are examples of a family of update
operations, called minimisation-based updates, in which the distances between possible
worlds are minimised. Dependency-based updates are another family of update operations
in which the distances between possible worlds are constrained to be in some set Dep
of exceptions determined by the input sentence . In dependency-based updates, the
point-wide update s   of models of  can be dened as s   = fs0 2 Mod() j
Dist(s; s0)  Dep()g. The set Dep() can be dened in di¤erent ways. The basic idea
behind dependence (Herzig, 1996) is that some of the atoms appearing in  should be
exempted from change, specically, those atoms upon which  is not dependent.
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An alternative characterisation of dependency-based update operations, which is
based on the principle forget, then expand, is given by Doherty, Lukaszewicz, and
Madalin´ska-Bugaj (1998). The basic idea is that point-wide update s   of the models
of  proceeds by rst forgettingabout atoms in Dep() and then expandingthe result
with . The notion of independence is key. A sentence  is said to be independent
from A  Atom i¤ there exists a sentence 0   such that Atm(0) \ A = ?. The
sentence Forget(;A) is the strongest semantic consequence of  that is independent
from A. It can be obtained by transforming  into SDNF so that  = 1 _ 2 _ : : :_ n
and removing from each i all occurrences of i and :i for every i 2 A. Taking the
set Dep() to be the set of atoms in Atm() that  is dependent on, an alternative
characterisation of dependency-based updates through the notion of forgetting is given
as     Forget(;Dep()) ^ .
In an examination of ten concrete update operations, all of which are dened in terms
of the distance Dist between worlds, Herzig and Ri (1999) found, under a specied set
of hypotheses, that only the update operations of Winslett and of Forbus satisfy the KM
postulates for update. Based on the examination, they argue that postulates (KM  2),
(KM  5) and (KM  8) are undesirable and that postulate (KM  9) is without impor-
tance. The strongest argument is against postulates (KM  2) and (KM  5). According
to postulate (KM  2), an agent leaves unchanged its beliefs whenever the beliefs entail
the new information, and when interpreted as saying that the agent prefers to consider
the new information as noisy sensing in an unchanging world rather than correct sensing
in a changing world, the criticism seems fair. The criticism against postulate (KM  5)
derives from the result (Herzig and Ri, 1999, Lemma 38) that postulate (KM  5),
together with postulates (KM  1) and (KM  4), entail
(Exor) If bel(tE  ) j=M : and bel(tE  ) j=M : then bel(tE  ( _ ) j=M
( ^ :) _ (: ^ ).
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According to the condition (Exor), an update by an inclusive disjunction always leads
to exclusive disjunction, something which is deemed undesirable4. Given that postulates
(KM  1), (KM  4), and (KM  5) have identical counterparts in revision, the criticism
that disjunctive update should not be identied with exclusive disjunction could be raised
against postulate (KM  5) for revision too, but seldom is.
An important di¤erence between distance-based approaches to update and revision is
that in the case of update, an ordering is required for every model of the knowledge base
whereas, for revision, a single ordering is required for the knowledge base. Similarly to
belief revision, a knowledge base does not uniquely determine the outcome of an update
operation, rather, it is the orderings that determine how update is performed. The
problem of iterated revision thus applies to update as well.
5.3 Iterated revision
The approach of Darwiche and Pearl (1994, 1997) is arguably the most inuential ap-
proach to iterated belief revision with ideas initially proposed by Spohn (1988, 1990)
serving as the main inspiration. In distinguishing between epistemic states and belief
sets, they make the transition from revision as a function of belief sets to revision as a
function of epistemic states (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997).
In the approach of Darwiche and Pearl, beliefs are objective and represented by
sentences of a nitely generated propositional language under a traditional truth-value
semantics. Although they do not give an explicit denition (or representation) of epis-
temic states, an epistemic state is taken to comprise not only a belief set, but all of
the information needed for coherent reasoning and, in particular, the very strategyfor




revising the belief set. In terms of the approaches described earlier, a strategy may be
viewed as a kind of ordering, which may be a system of spheres in M, a G-ordering on
L, or a faithful total preorder on S, that determines how revision is performed.
Every epistemic state is assumed to have an associated belief set, but the belief set
does not uniquely characterise the epistemic state, in other words, di¤erent epistemic
states may have the same associated belief set. To accommodate the transition from
revision as a function of belief sets to revision as a function of epistemic states, a mod-
ication of the postulates for revision is required. Darwiche and Pearl propose a modi-
cation to the KM postulates for revision, thereby taking a belief set to be represented
by a knowledge base.5
Denition 5.10 Let E be an epistemic state and (E) the knowledge base associated
with E. A revision operation  is an operation such that for every sentence  2 L,
the epistemic state E  , which is the result of revising E by , satises the following
set of postulates:
(DP  1) (E  ) j= 
(DP  2) If (E) ^  is satisable, then (E  )  (E) ^ 
(DP  3) If  is satisable, then (E  ) is satisable
(DP  4) If E = E 0 and   0, then (E  )  (E 0  0)
(DP  5) (E  ) ^  j= (E  ( ^ ))
(DP  6) If (E  ) ^  is satisable, then (E  ( ^ )) j= (E  ) ^ 
The only di¤erence between these postulates and the KM postulates for revision is
the reformulation of postulate (KM  4) into (DP  4), which makes belief revision a
5A similar modication to the AGM postulates for revision had been proposed independently by
Friedman and Halpern (1996).
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function of epistemic states rather than belief sets. Postulate (KM  4) e¤ectively says
that if the knowledge bases associated with epistemic states E and E 0 are equivalent,
then revision by equivalent input sentences should result in equivalent knowledge bases.
Postulate (DP  4) requires epistemic states E and E 0 to be identical for this to be the
case. Note however, that postulate (DP  4) does not require the revised epistemic states
to be identical and can therefore not be seen as a formal expression of the principle
of Irrelevance of Syntax in the context of revision of epistemic states as is postulate
(KM  4) in the context of revision of knowledge bases. The rationale for reformulating
postulate (KM  4) into (DP  4) is clearly illustrated by the following example.
Example 5.2 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) Two jurors in a murder trail possess dif-
ferent biases; juror-1 believes A is the murderer, B is a remote but unbelievable possibility
while C is denitely innocent. Juror-2 believes A is the murderer, C is a remote but un-
believable possibility while B is denitely innocent. The two jurors share the same belief
set (E)  (E 0) = A is the only murderer. A surprising evidence now obtains:  =
A is not the murderer(A has produced a reliable alibi.) Clearly, any rational account
of belief revision should allow juror-1 to uphold a di¤erent belief set than juror-2. Yet
any approach based on a revision operator that satises postulate (KM  4) dictates that
(E  )  (E 0  ), which is an indefensible position.
Darwiche and Pearl provide a representation result in terms of (faithful) total pre-
orders, which parallels theorem 5.8. It requires a faithful assignment that maps every
epistemic state E to a total pre-order E on the set of worlds in such a way that the
following conditions hold:
 E is faithful with respect to Cn((E)), and
 if E = E 0, then E= E0.
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Theorem 5.10 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) A revision operation  satises (DP  1)
to (DP  6) i¤ there exists a faithful assignment that maps each epistemic state E to a
total preorder E on S, such that for all  2 L, Mod((E  )) =MinE().
Darwiche and Pearl provide a number of convincing examples showing that a revision
operation that satises the modied KM postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) can nonethe-
less lead to counterintuitive forms of iterated revision. This leads them to propose an
additional set of postulates, none of which is derivable from the modied KM postulates,
to augment the modied KM postulates for revision. The plausibility of these proposed
postulates for iterated revision is demonstrated by a number of concrete scenarios.
Denition 5.11 Let E be an epistemic state and (E) the knowledge base associated
with E. A revision operation  is an operation such that for every sentence  2 L,
the epistemic state E  , which is the result of revising E by , satises, in addition to
postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6), the following set of postulates:
(C1) If  j= , then ((E  )  )  (E  )
(C2) If  j= :, then ((E  )  )  (E  )
(C3) If (E  ) j= , then ((E  )  ) j= 
(C4) If (E  ) 6j= :, then ((E  )  ) 6j= :
Postulate (C1) says that if the second input sentence is more specic (i.e. logically
stronger) than the rst input sentence, then the rst input sentence is redundant. If the
second input sentence contradicts the rst input sentence, then postulate (C2) requires
the second (i.e. later) input sentence to prevail. Postulate (C3) requires the rst input
sentence to be retained after revision by a second input sentence if revising (the original
epistemic state) by the second input sentence would have entailed the rst input sentence.
Postulate (C4) says that no input sentence can contribute to its own demise. In other
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words, if the rst input sentence would not have been contradicted after revising (the
original epistemic state) by the second input sentence, then postulate (C4) requires the
rst input sentence not to be contradicted after a subsequent revision by the second input
sentence.
Each postulate for iterated revision represents a class of conditional beliefs. The
phrase conditional belief j is a shorthand for the phrase  will be accepted after
revising the current epistemic state by . A conditional belief j is accepted in an
epistemic state E precisely when (E  ) entails .6 Darwiche and Pearl show that E
accepts the conditional belief j precisely when there exists a state s 2 S such that
s satises  ^  and s E s0 for any state s0 that satises  ^ :. The conditional
beliefs accepted by an epistemic state E are therefore encoded by the total preorder E
associated with E and, similarly, the conditional beliefs accepted by E   are encoded
by the total preorder E. By making the total preorders E and E as similar as
(rationally) possible, the changes in conditional beliefs as a result of a revision can be
minimised, thus adhering to the principle of Minimal Change. Postulates (C1) to (C4)
constrain the relationship between E and E as shown by the following representation
theorem.
Theorem 5.11 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) Suppose that a revision operation  sat-
ises (DP  1) to (DP  6). Then  satises (C1) to (C4) i¤  and its corresponding
faithful assignment satisfy:
(CR1) If s; s0 2Mod(), then s E s0 i¤ s E s0
(CR2) If s; s0 2 NMod(), then s E s0 i¤ s E s0
(CR3) If s 2Mod() and s0 2 NMod(), then s E s0 only if s E s0




(CR4) If s 2Mod() and s0 2 NMod(), then s E s0 only if s E s0
The representation theorem indicates how each of postulates (C1) to (C4) respec-
tively ensures (through conditions (CR1) to (CR4)) that some part of E is preserved
into E after revising an epistemic state E by an input sentence . Condition (CR1)
ensures that the relative orderings of the models of  are preserved while condition
(CR2) ensures that the relative orderings of the nonmodels of  are preserved. Condi-
tions (CR3) and (CR4) together ensure that models of  that are below nonmodels of
 will remain so. The preservation of some part of E into E represents a form of
minimal change, and hence, an application of the principle of Minimal Change.
A more drastic form of minimal change obtains when postulate (CB) is added to the
AGM postulates for revision because it ensures that E is preserved as much as possible
into E.
(CB) If (E  ) entails :, then ((E  )  )  (E  )
Postulate (CB) says that accommodating a second input sentence should nullify the
rst input sentence if revision by the rst input sentence would contradict the second
input sentence. Note that postulate (CB) implies postulates (C1) to (C4) but that the
converse does not hold. The following representation theorem shows how postulate (CB)
ensures (through condition (CRB)) the maximum preservation of E into E.
Theorem 5.12 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) Suppose that a revision operation  sat-
ises (DP  1) to (DP  6). Then  satises (CB) i¤  and its corresponding faithful
assignment satisfy:
(CRB) If s; s0 2 NMod((E  )), then s E s0 i¤ s E s0
Condition (CRB) ensures that the relative orderings of the states in NMod((E 
)) are preserved, in other words, it ensures that the relative orderings of all states
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are preserved, except for the minimal models of  (with respect to E). However,
the faithfulness of E, which is required by the modied KM postulates (DP  1) to
(DP  6), determines the order imposed on the minimal models of  (with respect to
E) in E as follows:
 s =E s0 if both s and s0 are minimal models of  (with respect to E) and
 s E s0 if s is a minimal model of  (with respect to E) but s0 is not.
Condition (CRB) is e¤ectively Boutiliers denition of natural revision (Boutilier,
1993) and minimal conditional revision (Boutilier, 1996a). This form of iterated revision
ensures absolute minimisation of changes in conditional beliefs but, as shown by the
Red-Bird example, can lead to counterintuitive results.
Example 5.3 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) We encounter a strange new animal and
it appears to be a bird, so we believe the animal is a bird. As it comes closer to our
hiding place, we see clearly that the animal is red, so we believe that it is a red bird.
To remove further doubts about the animal birdness, we call in a bird expert who takes
it for examination and concludes that it is not really a bird but some sort of mammal.
The question now is whether we should still believe that the animal is red. Postulate
(CB) tells us that we should no longer believe that the animal is red. This can be seen
by substituting (E)  : = birdand  = red in postulate (CB), instructing us to
totally ignore the color observation  as if it never took place.
In this example, the original epistemic state reects the (tentative) belief that the
animal is a bird by taking (E) = bird. The rst observation that the animal is red is
reected by taking  = redwhile the subsequent (reliable) information that the animal
is in fact not a bird is reected by taking  = :bird. But then, by taking the set
of atoms to be fbird; redg, it follows that Mod((E)) = f11; 10g, Mod() = f11; 01g,
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and Mod() = f01; 00g. Since (E) ^  is satisable, it follows by postulate (KM  2)
that Mod((E  )) = f11g and thus (E  ) entails : whence satisfying the if-part
of postulate (CB). But then ((E  )  )  (E  ) (if postulate (CB) is to be
satised). Under the assumption (by Darwiche and Pearl) that (E  )  , which
satises postulate (KM  1), it then follows directly that ((E  )  )  , meaning
that we can no longer tell whether the animal is red or not. So, in satisfying postulate
(CB), a counterintuitive result is allowed. Darwiche and Pearl use the Red-Bird example
as a counterexample to including postulate (CB) as a postulate for iterated revision.
In providing a concrete revision operation that satises the modied KM postulates
(DP  1) to (DP  6) and the iterated revision postulates (C1) to (C4), Darwiche and
Pearl provide further justication for their approach. The revision operation is based
on Spohns ordinal conditional functions (see section 4.7). Spohn (1988) proposed a
construction for changing an OCF k that takes as input the pair (;m) where  is the
input sentence and m is the rmness with which  is to be accepted in the revised
epistemic state (i.e. OCF). The revised OCF k  (;m) is referred to as the (;m)-
conditionalisation of k.
Denition 5.12 Let k be an OCF and  2 L. The (;m)-conditionalisation of k is
dened as
 (k  (;m))(s) =
8<: k(s)  k0() if s 2Mod()k(s)  k0(:) +m otherwise
The (;m)-conditionalisation of k has the e¤ect of shifting the models of  down-
wards (whilst preserving their positions relative to one another) so that the minimal
models of  are assigned the number 0, and shifting the nonmodels of  upwards
(whilst preserving their positions relative to one another) so that the minimal models of
: are assigned the number m. Conditionalisation served as the inspiration for many
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other approaches, for example, the -rankings of Goldszmidt and Pearl (1992) and the
transmutations of Williams (1994).
Darwiche and Pearl relax the condition that k(s) = 0 for at least one s 2 S thus
permitting a knowledge base (E) to be unsatisable. They construct a concrete revision
operation, based on Spohns conditionalisation, in which m is e¤ectively k0(:)+1. This
ensures that the rmness with which an input sentence  is accepted in a revised epistemic
state is one degree higher than its current plausibility, thus strengthening the belief in .
Denition 5.13 Let E be an epistemic state represented by OCF k. The revision oper-
ation DP of Darwiche and Pearl is dened, for every sentence  2 L, as
 (k DP )(s) =
8<: k(s)  k0() if s 2Mod()k(s) + 1 otherwise
Note that if  is unsatisable, the knowledge base (k DP ) will be unsatisable too.
The revision operation DP of Darwiche and Pearl satises the modied KM postulates
for revision, in which belief revision is a function of epistemic states rather than belief
sets, as well as their postulates for iterated revision.
Theorem 5.13 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997) The revision operation DP of Darwiche
and Pearl satises postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) and postulates (C1) to (C4).
Another revision operation that satises the KM postulates for revision (reformulated
for epistemic states) and the DP postulates for iterated revision is the observation-based
revision operation B of Papini (2001), which uses polynomials on natural numbers to
assign to each epistemic state a weighting on the set of possible worlds. The revision
operation B modies the weighting by giving preference to the most recent observation
(in a sequence of observations) but takes into account the history of observations. Despite
the compatibility of Papinis approach providing strong support for postulates (C1) to
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(C4), attention must be drawn to postulate (C2), which has received some criticism in
the literature.
In the original formulation of postulate (C2) in terms of belief sets (Darwiche and
Pearl, 1994), it has been pointed out by Freund and Lehmann (1994) that postulate (C2)
is inconsistent with the original AGM postulates. The framework of Lehmann (1995), in
which an epistemic state is represented by a nite sequence of revisions, has been shown
to be incompatible with postulate (C2), but compatible with postulates (C1), (C3),
and (C4). Similarly, the choice-based revision functions of Rott (2001) satisfy postulates
(C3) and (C4) and, depending on the properties of the choice function involved, postulate
(C1) too, but not postulate (C2).
An interesting result by Cantwell (1999) shows that a certain variant of the contro-
versial recovery postulate for contraction is a derived property of any revision operation
satisfying the AGM postulates for revision together with postulate (C2). More recently,
it has been shown by Chopra, Meyer, and Wong (2006) that by weakening the (semantic
version) of postulate (C2) so that the minimal models of : retain their position after
revision (as opposed to all the nonmodels of  retaining their position), a number of
recovery-like postulates are satised allowing them to prove the result that if : 2 (E)
then ((E  )   )  (E   ) and thereby establishing an unexpected connection
between the recovery postulate and postulate (C2) for iterated revision.
Another criticism that has been raised against the Darwiche-Pearl approach is that
it is overly permissive and too limited in scope (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas, 2003).
Using the Singing-Bird example of (Nayak et al., 1996) they argue that the Darwiche-
Pearl account is too limited in that it does not guarantee seemingly reasonable behaviour.
Example 5.4 (Nayak et al., 1996) Our agent believes that Tweety is a singing bird.
However, since there is no strong correlation between singing and birdhood, the agent is
prepared to retain the belief that Tweety sings even after accepting the information that
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Tweety is not a bird, and conversely, if the agent were to be informed that Tweety does
not sing, she would still retain the belief that Tweety is a bird. Imagine that the agent
rst receives the information that Tweety is not a bird, then the information that Tweety
does not sing. On such an occasion, it is reasonable to assume that the agent should
believe that Tweety is a non-singing non-bird.
However, the postulates do not guarantee this. The reason, they claim, is that none
of the DP postulates are applicable when (E  ) 6j= . In a counterexample, Jin and
Thielscher (2007) argue that the behaviour which is claimed to be the reasonable one is
not generally justied. In the case where the agent initially believes rmly that Tweety
is a bird or sings, it would be reasonable, after the indicated successive revisions, for the
agent to believe that Tweety is a bird after all. On the other hand, Jin and Thielscher
agree with Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas that the DP postulates are too permissive. Both
parties use the Red-Bird example, which was used as an counterexample by Darwiche
and Pearl against natural revision, as a motivation for the claim and as a justication
for proposing new postulates. The basic argument is that because the DP postulates are
implied by postulate (CB), they do not block counterexamples against natural revision.
The Red-Bird example will be re-examined in the information-theoretic approach to
iterated revision, called templated revision.
5.4 Templated revision
Recall from section 4.6 that in the information-theoretic approach, the epistemic state of
an agent is represented by a regular t-ordering tE 2 TE and associated with every epis-
temic state tE are a belief assertion bel(tE) 2 L and a knowledge assertion know(tE) 2 L
both of which are satisable. The reason for choosing the terms belief assertionand
knowledge assertionwas to avoid confusion with the terms belief base and knowl-
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edge base introduced earlier in the present chapter. Under an extensional interpreta-
tion M = hS; li of L every sentence  2 L induces a denite t-ordering t such that
bottom(t) = ModM() and top(t) = NModM() and conversely, every denite t-
ordering t 2 TD has a syntactic expression in the form of a sentence  2 L that is
a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t). By using the semantic representation of input
sentences (that is, denite t-orderings) epistemic change operations e¤ectively become
operations on regular t-orderings.
Templated expansion is an expansion operation where the epistemic state of an agent
is represented by a regular t-ordering. So too are templated revision and templated up-
date7. An epistemic change operation under this scenario has to produce not only a new
regular t-ordering and an associated belief assertion but a new knowledge assertion too.
The knowledge assertion associated with an epistemic state together with the belief asser-
tion play an important role in determining which epistemic change operation should be
applied given a specic input sentence. Recall that in the information-theoretic model
of epistemic states, the knowledge of an agent is taken to be the next-to-most deeply
entrenched beliefs (which include the most deeply entrenched beliefs, namely, the tau-
tologies). Furthermore, it is assumed that the new information is obtained in a reliable
way such as making an observation or hearing from another agent who, by virtue of the
cooperative nature of diagrammable systems, may be regarded as reliable. This ensures
that the principle of Trustworthiness is satised. The new information should therefore
not be contradictory and, in fact, will be taken to be satisable. If the new information
is consistent with both the agents knowledge and its beliefs, then expansion is appro-
priate. If the new information is consistent with the agents knowledge but inconsistent
with its beliefs, then revision is required. If the new information is inconsistent with the
7Some of the results of this section on templated revision appear in van der Westhuizen, van der Poll,
and Labuschagne (2006).
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agents knowledge (and hence with the agents beliefs as well), then the system must
have changed state and hence update is called for.
Algorithm 5.1 Let E be an epistemic state with bel(E) the belief assertion and know(E)
the knowledge assertion associated with E. Let  2 L be a satisable new input sentence.
The basic epistemic change algorithm is provided below:
function epistemicChange(E : epistemic state; : L) : epistemic state;
begin
if  is consistent with know(E) then





The basic intuition underlying expansion is that the agents previous beliefs are re-
tained and expanded to include the given new information, even if it leads to inconsis-
tency. In templated expansion, the idea of expansion, which embodies the principle of
Success, is broadened to also include the agents knowledge but without compromising
the principle of Consistency. Templated expansion should therefore result in an epistemic
state where the agents knowledge and beliefs grow monotonically, in other words, tem-
plated expansion should result in a regular t-ordering tE +  where the denite content
and indenite content of tE +  are greater than or equal to the respective content of
the original t-ordering tE. The requirement for monotonic growth reects a strong ad-
herence to the principle of Informational Economy while the requirement for epistemic
state tE +  to be a regular t-ordering satises the principle of Categorical Matching.
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In support of the principle of Minimal Change, a requirement is stated insisting that
templated expansion should result in an epistemic state whereby the models of the input
sentence retain the relative ordering of the original epistemic state (provided templated
expansion is applied in accordance with the epistemic change algorithm). These ideas are
formulated in the following semantic characterisation of templated expansion operations.
Denition 5.14 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE. A templated expansion operation + is an
operation such that for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that is consistent with bel(tE),
the epistemic state tE +  2 TE, which is the result of expanding tE with , is dened as
follows:
1. ModM(bel(tE + )) =ModM(bel(tE) ^ )
2. ModM(know(tE + )) =ModM(know(tE) ^ )
3. For every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE + )(s)  (tE + )(s0)
Templated expansion operations support the principle of Qualitativeness in the sense
that the resulting epistemic states are regular t-orderings (in which the notion of rel-
ative distance is absent). As shown by the following proposition, templated expansion
operations also support the principle of Irrelevance of Syntax.
Proposition 5.1 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE; tE0 2 TE and let ; 0 2 L be consistent with bel(tE) and bel(tE0) respectively. Then
it holds that if tE = tE0 and  M 0 then tE +  = tE0 + 0.
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
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Proposition 5.2 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be consistent with bel(tE). Then the following holds:
1. ContD(tE)  ContD(tE + )
2. Cont0(tE)  Cont0(tE + )
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
Proposition 5.3 Let T = hS; tE; li and T 0 = hS; tE + ; li be templated interpretations
of L such that l is injective and card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be T -satisable
and consistent with bel(tE). Then the following holds:
1. pl(tE; )  pl(tE + ; )
2. dt(tE; ) = dt(tE + ; )
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
Templated expansion di¤ers from templated revision in the sense that the input sen-
tence triggering revision is not consistent with the agents beliefs, but has to be consistent
with the agents knowledge. Templated revision operates at the level of epistemic states,
the representation of which is by means of regular t-orderings. As was the case with tem-
plated expansion, a templated revision operation has to produce not only a new regular
t-ordering and an associated belief assertion but a new knowledge assertion too. In doing
so, the principles of Categorical Matching and Consistency are satised. The modied
KM postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) provide criteria that every belief assertion resulting
from the revision of an epistemic state should comply with. These postulates have to be
modied and augmented to also provide criteria that every knowledge assertion resulting
from the revision of an epistemic state should comply with. The following rationality
postulates are proposed for templated revision.
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Denition 5.15 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE)
the knowledge assertion associated with tE. A templated revision operation  is
an operation such that for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that is consistent with
know(tE), the epistemic state tE   2 TE, which is the result of revising tE by ,
satises the following set of postulates8:
(TR  1) bel(tE  ) j=M 
(TR  2) If bel(tE) ^  is M-satisable, then bel(tE  ) M bel(tE) ^ 
(TR  3) bel(tE  ) and know(tE  ) are M-satisable
(TR  4) If tE = tE0 and  M 0 then tE   = tE0  0
(TR  5) bel(tE  ) ^  j=M bel(tE  ( ^ ))
(TR  6) If bel(tE  ) ^  is M-satisable, then bel(tE  ( ^ )) j=M bel(tE  ) ^ 
(TR  7) know(tE  ) M know(tE) ^ 
(TR  8) If (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0) < n, then tE(s)  tE(s0)
Postulates (TR  1) to (TR  6) correspond to postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) with
postulates (TR  1), (TR  2), (TR  5), and (TR  6) being identical to postulates
(DP  1), (DP  2), (DP  5), and (DP  6) respectively. Note however that the mod-
ied KM postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) are formulated under the classical interpre-
tation M0 = hS; li whereas the postulates for templated revision are formulated under
an extensional interpretation. Postulate (TR  1) is a formal expression of the principle
of Success. Postulate (TR  3) is a strengthening of postulate (DP  3) and ensures
8In the spirit of the traditional denition of revision operations, this denition of templated revision
operations makes provision for the case where  is consistent with bel(tE), even though the epistemic
change algorithm would never allow it to be performed under those circumstances.
183
5. Revision and update
that both the agents knowledge and beliefs are satisable after performing a templated
revision, given that the new information must be consistent with the agents knowl-
edge for revision to be applicable. Postulate (TR  4) is a reformulation of postulate
(DP  4). It says that if two epistemic states are equivalent, then revision by equivalent
input sentences should result in equivalent revised epistemic states (and consequently, in
equivalent belief and knowledge assertions). In contrast to postulate (DP  4), postulate
(TR  4) is a formal expression of the principle of Irrelevance of Syntax in the context of
revision of epistemic states. Postulate (TR  7) guarantees that the agents knowledge is
expanded during a templated revision, thereby satisfying the principle of Informational
Economy. Postulate (TR  8) ensures that templated revision retains as much as possible
of the agents epistemic state, in accordance with the principle of Minimal Change. To
some extent, postulate (TR  8) reects a condition present in the construction of the
faithful total preorders of Darwiche and Pearl (and Katsuno and Mendelzon) whereby
s E s0 def= s 2 Mod((E)) or s 2 Mod((E  )) for  any nite axiomatisation of
fs; s0g.
This condition plays a key role in the representation theorem of Darwiche and Pearl,
where a faithful assignment is required that maps every epistemic state E to a faithful
total preorder E (with respect to Cn((E))) in such a way that equivalent epistemic
states are assigned the same preorder. The need for a faithful assignment is somewhat
unexpected given their view that an epistemic state should comprise not only a belief
set, but all of the information needed for changing the belief set. T-orderings alleviate
the need for such an assignment because, as shown by proposition 4.12, every t-ordering
t 2 TS induces a total preorder  on the set of states that is faithful with respect to
ThM(bottom(t)) under an extensional interpretation M = hS; li. In other words, every
epistemic state tE 2 TE induces a total preorder tE on S that is faithful with respect
to CnM(bel(tE)). Moreover, for t-orderings that are equal, the faithful total preorders
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induced by these t-orderings are equal, as shown by the following proposition. On the
other hand, di¤erent epistemic states may induce the same faithful total preorder.
Proposition 5.4 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let t; t0 2 TS be t-orderings and let t and t0 be the faithful total preorders (with respect
to ThM(bottom(t)) and ThM(bottom(t0))) induced by t and t0 respectively. If t = t0 then
t = t0.
Proof. Suppose t = t0. Choose any (s; s0) 2 t. So t(s)  t(s0). But t = t0 and thus
t0(s)  t0(s0), i.e. (s; s0) 2 t0. Since (s; s0) was chosen arbitrarily it follows that t 
t0. Similarly, it can be shown that t0  t. Hence t = t0.
In representing the epistemic states of agents by regular t-orderings, a semantic char-
acterisation of templated revision operations can be given without the need for the exis-
tence of some additional faithful assignment mapping epistemic states to (faithful) total
preorders. This is much closer to the idea that epistemic states should contain all the
relevant information for determining how epistemic change operations, revision in this
case, should be performed.
Theorem 5.14 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE. A templated revision operation  : TE  L! TE
satises postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8) i¤ for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that
is consistent with know(tE) the following holds:
1. ModM(bel(tE  )) =MintE(ModM())
2. ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM(know(tE) ^ )
3. For every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0)
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Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
From the denition of postulates (TR  1) to (TR  6) and theorem 5.14, it fol-
lows that every templated revision operation satises postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6).
However, as expected, not every revision operation that satises postulates (DP  1) to
(DP  6) is a templated revision operation, as will be shown by using a concrete revision
operation  that is dened as an operation on regular t-orderings.
Denition 5.16 Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion
and know(tE) the knowledge assertion associated with tE. The revision operation  is
dened, for every sentence  2 L, as tE   def= t  tE.
Proposition 5.5 Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and
know(tE) the knowledge assertion associated with tE. Then the revision operation 
satises postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) under the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li
of L.
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
Proposition 5.5 demonstrates that the revision of (the belief assertion associated with)
epistemic state tE by input sentence  can be accomplished through the renement of
t-ordering t by tE. This clearly illustrates the priority given to the new information in
(an AGM) revision, as required by postulate (DP  1), also called the Success postulate.
The class of revision operations that do not come with a guarantee of success is referred
to as non-prioritised revision. One approach to non-prioritised revision is to construct a
revision in two steps, the rst of which is to decide whether to accept or reject the new
input sentence and the second of which is to perform the revision if the new input sentence
is accepted. This is the basic idea behind screened revision (Makinson, 1997a) where the
decision to accept an input sentence is based on the existence of a set of potential core
beliefs that are immune to revision. For non-prioritised base revision, an alternative
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two-step approach involves as a rst step, the expansion of the belief base by the new
input sentence and as a second step, the consolidation of the belief base, an operation
that makes an unsatisable belief base satisable. This is the approach taken in semi-
revision (Hansson, 1997) where consolidation is dened as contraction by a contradiction.
A generalisation of non-prioritised base revision is the framework of Ghose and Goebel
(1998) which allows for disbeliefs as input and places a linear ordering of reliability on the
inputs (including both beliefs and disbeliefs) of the informationstate. The framework
is extended by Chopra, Ghose, and Meyer (2003) where the linear ordering is replaced
with a preference ranking. An early survey of non-prioritised revision may be found in
the special issue of Erkenntnis on non-prioritised revision (Hansson, 1999b).
In the context of diagrammable systems, the success postulate is desirable. However,
the epistemic change algorithm ensures that revision is not applied indiscriminately. It
is important to note that the revision operation  is not a templated revision operation
because it does not satisfy, in particular, postulate (TR  7), as shown by the following
counterexample.
Example 5.5 For simplicity, we use the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li. Let tE =
f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 4)g and let t = f(11; 4); (10; 0); (01; 0); (00; 0)g.
So Mod(know(tE)) = get"(tE; n   1) = f11; 10; 01g and Mod() = bottom(t) =
f10; 01; 00g. Hence Mod(know(tE) ^ ) = f11; 10; 01g \ f10; 01; 00g = f10; 01g. Ap-
plying the revision operation  yields t  tE = f(11; 4); (10; 0); (01; 1); (00; 2)g. So
Mod(know(tE)) = get"(ttE; n 1) = f10; 01; 00g. But thenMod(know(tE)) 6=
Mod(know(tE) ^ ). So  does not satisfy postulate (TR  7).
Postulate (TR  7) guarantees that the agents knowledge grow monotonically during
a templated revision operation, in other words, it guarantees that the denite content
of t-ordering tE   2 TE is greater than or equal to the denite content of the original
t-ordering tE 2 TE.
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Proposition 5.6 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be consistent with know(tE). Then ContD(tE)  ContD(tE).
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
In the construction of the renement operation t  tE, the denite content of tE
was not kept intact which meant that in the revised epistemic state tE  , the agents
knowledge was not kept intact. However, by dening a partial renement operation
t  tE that keeps the denite content of tE intact, a concrete revision operation  will
be dened that is templated.
Denition 5.17 Let t1 2 TD and t2 2 TN and let A be the index set induced by ht1; t2i
and well-ordered by the lexicographic ordering . The partial renement operation
 is a binary operation TD  TN ! TN where t1  t2, which is the result of partially
rening t1 by t2, is dened as follows:
 (t1  t2)(s) =
8<: card(seg(t1(s); t2(s))) if t1(s) < n and t2(s) < nn otherwise
where seg(t1(s); t2(s)) is the initial segment of (t1(s); t2(s)) 2 A.
Proposition 5.7 Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. Let t1 2 TD and
t2 2 TN and let A be the index set induced by ht1; t2i and well-ordered by the lexicographic
ordering . Then the following holds for every s; s0 2 S:
1. t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s)
2. if t1(s) < t1(s0) then (t1  t2)(s)  (t1  t2)(s0)
3. if t1(s) = t1(s0) 6= n and t2(s) < t2(s0) then (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0)
4. bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1)
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5. ContD(t1)  ContD(t1  t2)
6. Cont0(t1)  Cont0(t1  t2)
7. ContD(t2)  ContD(t1  t2)
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
In contrast to the renement operation that allows for the renement of any t-ordering
in normal form, the partial renement operation only allows for the renement of denite
t-orderings. The primary di¤erence between the two operations is reected in property
7 of proposition 5.7, which ensures that the denite content of the rening t-ordering
is kept intact. The addition of property 7 for partial renement operations required
adjustments to be made to properties 2 and 5 from the corresponding properties of
renement operations too.
Denition 5.18 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE. The templated revision operation  is dened,
for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that is consistent with know(tE), as tE   def=
t  tE.
Proposition 5.8 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE. Then the templated revision operation  satises
postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8).
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
In dening the templated revision operation  in terms of the partial renement
operation , the principle of Qualitativeness is satised for templated revision. To see
189
5. Revision and update
this, note, rstly, that the index set A induced by ht; tEi depends only on the linear
order  on B (and not on any arithmetic operation on f0; 1; : : : ; ng), and secondly, that
the same holds true for the construction of (t  tE)(s) for every s 2 S.
Returning to the Red-Bird example of Darwiche and Pearl (example 5.3 on page 174),
note that the example is essentially modelled at the level of belief sets as opposed to at
the level of epistemic states (since the total pre-order E associated with epistemic state
E plays no role in the example). By remodelling the example at the level of epistemic
states using t-orderings, it will be shown that it is possible to obtain an intuitively sensible
result.
Example 5.6 For simplicity, the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li is assumed. Sup-
pose L is generated by Atom = fP (a); P 0(a)g where P (a) represents the fact animal a is
a birdand P 0(a) represents the fact animal a is red. The original epistemic state reect-
ing the agents tentative belief that the strange new animal may be a bird is represented by
tE = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 1); (00; 1)g (where the atoms are considered in the given order,
so that 10 corresponds to the valuation rendering P (a) true but P 0(a) false). Observing
clearly that the animal is red is represented by t = f(11; 0); (10; 4); (01; 0); (00; 4)g where
 = P 0(a). Hearing the reliable information that the animal is in fact a mammal is repre-
sented by t = f(11; 4); (10; 4); (01; 0); (00; 0)g where  = :P (a). Revising epistemic state
tE by  yields the epistemic state t  tE = f(11; 0); (10; 4); (01; 1); (00; 4)g while subse-
quent revision of t  tE by  yields t  (t  tE) = f(11; 4); (10; 4); (01; 0); (00; 4)g. So
bottom(t(t tE)) = f01g and hence the agent believes :P (a)^P 0(a), that the animal
is not a bird but nonetheless red. Also note that ttE = f(11; 4); (10; 4); (01; 0); (00; 0)g.
The example shows, in contrast to example 5.3, that the templated revision oper-
ation  gives an intuitively sensible result when using exactly the same conditions
as Darwiche and Pearl (i.e. Mod(bel(tE)) = f11; 10g, Mod(bel(t)) = f11; 01g, and
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Mod(bel(t)) = f01; 00g) and under exactly the same assumption that (E)   (since
Mod(bel(tE)) = f01; 00g =Mod(bel(tE))). Furthermore, postulate (CB) is not satis-
ed sinceMod(bel(tE)) Mod(:) while it is not the case thatMod(bel((tE)
)) =Mod(bel(tE  )). (To see this, note that Mod(bel(tE  )) = bottom(t tE) =
f11g and Mod(:) = top(t) = f11; 10g with f11g  f11; 10g whereas Mod(bel((tE 
)  )) = bottom(t  (t  tE)) = f01g and Mod(bel(tE  )) = bottom(t  tE) =
f01; 00g with f01g 6= f01; 00g.) So, in e¤ect, the templated revision operation  blocks
natural revision.
The reason for the intuitively sensible result in which natural revision has been blocked
is that the Red-Bird example has been remodelled at the level of epistemic states using
t-orderings, which allows for a clear distinction between knowledge and belief. In the
example, the agents original epistemic state is represented by an indenite t-ordering,
which accurately reects the agents tentative belief that the strange new animal may be a
bird and, more importantly, the absence of any knowledge about the animal. If, however,
the agents original epistemic state were taken to be tE = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 4)g,
then it would be a completely di¤erent scenario because the agent would now know that
the animal is a bird, i.e. Mod(bel(tE)) =Mod(know(tE)) = f11; 10g. In this scenario, 
would be inconsistent with bel(tE  ) because t tE = f(11; 0); (10; 4); (01; 4); (00; 4)g
and, since t is denite, with know(tE) too. But in that case revision is not applicable,
rather, update is called for. So, while it would still be the case that Mod(bel(tE  )) 
Mod(:), the agents epistemic state after revision by  would not be subsequently
revised by  (since  is inconsistent with know(tE  )) and therefore natural revision
would be (indirectly) blocked in this scenario too.
It is subsequently shown that every templated revision operation satises DP pos-
tulates (C1), (C3), and (C4) for iterated revision but, with the templated revision
operation  serving as a counterexample, that it is not that case that every templated
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revision operation satises the controversial DP postulate (C2). Since the DP postulates
are implied by postulate (CB), this result is consistent with example 5.6 in which it has
been shown that the templated revision operation  does not satisfy postulate (CB).
Proposition 5.9 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Every templated revision operation  satises postulates (C1), (C3), and (C4), provided
 is dened for the input sentence.
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
Example 5.7 For simplicity, the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li is assumed.
Let tE = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 4)g and let t = f(11; 4); (10; 0); (01; 0); (00; 4)g.
Then t tE = f(11; 4); (10; 0); (01; 1); (00; 4)g. Let t = f(11; 0); (10; 4); (01; 4); (00; 4)g.
Since Mod() = bottom(t) = f11g and NMod() = top(t) = f11; 00g, it follows that
Mod()  NMod(). But t  tE = f(11; 0); (10; 4); (01; 4); (00; 4)g and t  (t tE) =
f(11; 4); (10; 4); (01; 4); (00; 4)g. So bottom(ttE) = f11g and bottom(t(ttE)) = ?.
But then bottom(ttE) 6= bottom(t(ttE)) and thus bel(tE) 6 bel(tE)).
Hence the templated revision operation  does not satisfy postulate (C2).
Recall that postulate (C2) states that if Mod()  NMod(), then Mod(bel((tE 
)  )) = Mod(bel(tE  )). But if Mod()  NMod() then  is inconsistent with
 and hence also inconsistent with know(tE) ^ . Since know(tE) ^   know(tE  )
it means that  would be inconsistent with know(tE  ) too. According to the basic
epistemic change algorithm, the agent should in this case update know(tE  ) with
 rather than attempt to revise know(tE  ) with . Applying revision would yield
a t-ordering in normal form that is strongly contradictory and hence both the belief
assertion and knowledge assertion would be unsatisable. Moreover, applying revision in
this instance would result in an increase of the distrust in , something which is contrary
to the normal behaviour of templated revision.
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Proposition 5.10 Let T = hS; tE; li and T 0 = hS; tE  ; li be templated interpretations
of L such that l is injective and card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be T -satisable
and consistent with know(tE). Then the following holds:
1. pl(tE; )  pl(tE  ; )
2. dt(tE  ; )  dt(tE; )
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.1.
The violation of postulate (C2) can be attributed to the lack of a clear criterion in
(C2) by which the agent may choose between revision and update. In the context of
diagrammable systems, the basic epistemic change algorithm suggests that if the new
information, which is obtained in a reliable manner and hence not unsatisable, is in-
consistent with the agents knowledge, then the system must have changed state and
therefore it would be more appropriate for the agent to choose update than to choose
revision.
5.5 Templated update
One of the di¢ culties with the update semantics of Katsuno and Mendelzon, as pointed
out by Boutilier (1998), lies in the interpretation of the orderings of closeness. Intu-
itively, the closer (or more similar) a possible world is to another, the smaller the
change required to transition from one to the other. The key assumption underlying
this interpretation is that the system changes smoothly and gradually, so that the worlds
most similar to the present state are the likeliest new states. We feel obliged to point out
that a discrete system doesnt have to work that way, and so, when dealing with discrete
systems, we will need to add to our semantic architecture an extra device, namely, the
epistemic transition function. But the case of a continuous system is not ignored - as
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will be shown, it is just the case in which the epistemic transition function may be taken
to be the accessibility function.
For diagrammable systems, which are discrete, a change of state can result in a state
of the system that di¤ers radically from its predecessor. As an example of an action that
radically changes the state, think about the Light-Fan system - or more elaborate versions
thereof in which many components have been added - and imagine that in addition to
each component having a switch to turn it on or o¤ there is also a mains switch that, if
it is turned o¤, will turn o¤ every component. Now consider that the simple action of
icking the mains switch can change the system from state 111:::1 to 000:::0, which in
terms of Hamming distance is the furthest state away from 111:::1 that one can get.
Templated update operates at the level of epistemic states, the representation of which
is by means of regular t-orderings. Operating at the level of epistemic states, a templated
update operation has to produce, similarly to templated revision, not only a new regular
t-ordering and an associated belief assertion but a new knowledge assertion too. This
ensures that the principles of Categorical Matching and Consistency are satised.
To allow for comparison with the KM postulates for update, a modication of the pos-
tulates is required to accommodate the transition from update as a function of knowledge
bases to update as a function of epistemic states.
Denition 5.19 Let E be an epistemic state and (E) the knowledge base associated
with E. An update operation  is an operation such that for every sentence  2 L, the
epistemic state E , which is the result of updating E with , satises the following set
of postulates:
(KM  10) (E  ) j= 
(KM  20) If (E) j= , then (E  )  (E)
(KM  30) If both (E) and  are satisable, then (E  ) is satisable
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(KM  40) If E = E 0 and   0, then (E  )  (E 0  0)
(KM  50) (E  ) ^  j= (E  ( ^ ))
(KM  60) If (E  ) ^  is satisable and (E) is complete, then (E  ( ^ )) j=
(E  ) ^ 
(KM  70) ((E 5 E 0)  )  (E  ) _ (E 0  )
Similarly to revision, postulate (KM  40) is a reformulation of postulate (KM  4).
The only other di¤erence between these postulates and the KM postulates for update is
that postulate (KM  70) requires an operation to be dened on epistemic states so that
the Disjunction Rule holds on the associated knowledge bases. For templated update,
where the epistemic state of an agent is represented by a regular t-ordering, the required
operation5 must ensure that the belief assertion associated with the resulting t-ordering
tE 5 tE0 is semantically equivalent to the disjunction of the belief assertions associated
with t-orderings tE and tE0 respectively.
Denition 5.20 Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. Let t1; t2; : : : ; tn 2
TN . The minimise operation 5 is a n-ary operation on TN dened as 5i=1:::nti =
g  _(ti) where _(ti)(s) = minft1(s); t2(s); : : : ; tn(s)g and g is the normalise function for
ran(_(ti)).
The e¤ect of the minimise operation is to create a t-ordering in normal form in which
the states are as low as possible given the input t-orderings. A minimise operation results
in a t-ordering t15 t25 : : :5 tn in normal form, the denite content of which is a subset
of the denite content of every ti and the indenite content of which is, similarly, a subset
of the indenite content of every ti.
Proposition 5.11 Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n and let t1; t2; t3 2
TN . Then the following holds:
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1. t15 t2 = t25 t1
2. t15 (t25 t3) = (t15 t2)5 t3
3. bottom(t15 t2) = bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2)
4. ContD(t15 t2) = ContD(t1) \ ContD(t2)
5. ContI(t15 t2) = ContI(t1) \ ContI(t2)
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.2.
From proposition 5.11(3) it follows that the minimise operation 5 satises the re-
quirement imposed by postulate (KM  70). Recall that Mod(bel(tE)) = bottom(tE)
under an extensional interpretation and hence also under the classical interpretation
M0 = hS; li. Then it is easy to see that the belief assertion associated with t-ordering
tE 5 tE0 is semantically equivalent to the disjunction of the belief assertions associated
with t-orderings tE and tE0 respectively.
An epistemic transition function is a function that reects the notion likelihood of
transitionby mapping every state to a regular t-ordering. Intuitively, it represents the
agents knowledge and beliefs about the most likely transitions of the system from one
state to the next. To ensure that the agent would not consider it likely for the system
to transition to a state that it knows will never arise, an epistemic transition function
would have to obey special restrictions with regards to the agents xed information.
Denition 5.21 Let tI 2 TE be the agents initial epistemic state with denite t-ordering
tSD 2 TE representing the agents xed information. An epistemic transition func-
tion is a function ~F : S ! TE such that for every s 2 S, ~F (s)(s0) = n if s0 2 top(tSD)
and ~F (s) = tI if s 2 top(tSD).
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In the case of a continuous system, the notion likelihood of transitionis proportional
to the notion similarity to the present actual state. Recall that the accessibility function
reects the agents ability to distinguish between the actual state and other states. If we
assume that the system changes continuously, then this agent-oriented kind of similarity
is a guide to likelihood, as far as the agent can tell, of being a transition target. In this
case, the epistemic transition function may be taken to be the accessibility function.
An epistemic transition function is a component of an agents epistemic framework
in the sense that it provides the agent with information about the behaviour of the
system. Recall that collectively, the information available to the agent provides the
epistemic framework from which the agents epistemic state is formed, and changed. As
a component of the agents epistemic framework, epistemic transition functions play an
important role in templated update. To illustrate, we shall use a concrete templated
update operation  that is dened as an operation on regular t-orderings. The formal
proof that  is a templated updated operation according to our (still to be dened)
postulates for templated update will be deferred until proposition 5.13.
Denition 5.22 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic transition function.
The templated update operation  is dened, for every M-satisable sentence  2 L
that is inconsistent with know(tE), as tE   def= 5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)).
The templated update operation  operates on each model of the belief assertion
associated with the agents epistemic state independently, by rening the (denite t-
ordering induced by the) input sentence with the regular t-ordering associated with each
model through the epistemic transition function. This pointwise renement satises
the principle of Qualitativeness. To see this, note, rstly, that the index set A induced
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by ht; tEi (according to denition 4.11) depends only on the linear order  on B, and
secondly, that the same holds true for the construction of t  ~F (s) for every s 2 S
(according to denition 4.12). The minimise operation 5 fulls, at the level of epistemic
states, the role fullled by set union at the level of belief sets. From denition 5.20 it is
clear to see that the minimise operation satises the principle of Qualitativeness. The
templated update operation  satises the modied KM postulates for update in which
belief update is a function of epistemic states rather than belief sets.
Proposition 5.12 Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion
and know(tE) the knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic tran-
sition function. Then the templated update operation  satises postulates (KM  10) to
(KM  70) for every satisable sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with know(tE), under
the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li of L.
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.2.
Since templated update is only dened for satisable sentences that are inconsistent
with the knowledge assertion (and hence with the belief assertion) associated with an
epistemic state, it follows that postulate (KM  20) is satised vacuously, in the sense
that the hypothesis is never satised. Nonetheless, if a templated update operation 
were applied to a sentence  that is entailed by bel(tE), then it would not always be
the case that Mod(bel(tE  )) = Mod(bel(tE)) and thus  would not satisfy postulate
(KM  20). This is because postulate (KM  20) relies on each model s of bel(tE) to be
minimal in ~F (s) with no other state s0 6= s minimal in ~F (s) for it to be satised and the
denition of an epistemic transition function ~F does not require that ~F (s)(s) = 0 and
that ~F (s)(s0) > 0 if s0 6= s, although it does not exclude such a possibility. Intuitively,
it means that postulate (KM  20) is appropriate under the assumption that it is more
normal for the system to persist in a state than to transition to another state. The event-
based model and generalized update (GU) model of Boutilier (1996b, 1998) are examples
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of other approaches that do not make this assumption. Nonetheless, both can model
scenarios under which the assumption is true (and postulate (KM  20) satised) through
the notion of a null event as the most plausible event in any situation. Scenarios under
which the assumption is true are still subject to the criticism of Herzig and Ri, provided
that the hypothesis that observations may be unreliable is accepted, a hypothesis that
we have rejected in the context of diagrammable systems.
The modied KM postulates for update provide criteria that every belief assertion
resulting from the update of an epistemic state should comply with. But for templated
update, it is not only the agents beliefs that are updated but its knowledge too and since
the new information is inconsistent with the agents knowledge, templated update relies
on input from the agents epistemic framework to update the agents current epistemic
state. The following postulates are proposed for templated update.
Denition 5.23 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic transition function.
A templated update operation  is an operation such that for every M-satisable
sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with know(tE), the epistemic state tE  2 TE, which
is the result of updating tE with , satises the following set of postulates:
(TU  1) bel(tE  ) j=M 
(TU  2) bel(tE  ) and know(tE  ) are M-satisable
(TU  3) If tE = tE0 and  M 0 then tE   = tE0  0
(TU  4) bel(tE  ) ^  j=M bel(tE  ( ^ ))
(TU  5) If bel(tE  ) ^  is M-satisable and bel(tE) is complete, then bel(tE  ( ^
)) j=M bel(tE  ) ^ 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(TU  6) bel((tE 5 tE0)  ) M bel(tE  ) _ bel(tE0  )
(TU  7) know(tE  ) M 
(TU  8) If (tE  )(s1)  (tE  )(s2) < n, then ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some s 2
ModM(bel(tE))
Postulates (TU  1), (TU  4), (TU  5), and (TU  6) are identical to postulates
(KM  10), (KM  50), (KM  60), and (KM  70) respectively. Postulate (TU  2) is a
strengthening of postulate (KM  30) and ensures that the agents knowledge and beliefs
are satisable after performing a templated update, given the constraints on the input
sentence. Postulate (TU  3) is a reformulation of postulate (KM  40). It says that if
two epistemic states are equivalent, then updating by equivalent input sentences should
result in equivalent updated epistemic states (and consequently, in equivalent belief and
knowledge assertions). In contrast to postulate (KM  40), postulate (TU  3) is a formal
expression of the principle of Irrelevance of Syntax in the context of update of epistemic
states. Postulate (TU  7) guarantees that the agents knowledge is replaced by the
input sentence. It represents the strongest possible formal expression of the principle of
Success. Postulate (TU  8) ensures that the agents epistemic state is updated based
on the most likely (or normal) transitions of the system from one state to the next. This
gives a di¤erent context for applying the principles of Minimal Change and Informational
Economy. It is reminiscent of a condition present in the construction of the faithful
update assignment of Katsuno and Mendelzon whereby a total preorder s is mapped
to each world s such that s1 s s2 def= s1 = s or s1 2Mod((Es  )) for (Es) any nite
axiomatisation of fsg and  any nite axiomatisation of fs1; s2g.
Albeit signicantly di¤erent from the faithful update assignment, the epistemic tran-
sition function plays, similarly to the faithful update assignment, a key role in the rep-
resentation theorem for templated update.
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Theorem 5.15 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n.
Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic transition function. A
templated update operation  : TE L! TE satises postulates (TU  1) to (TU  8) i¤
for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with know(tE), the following
holds:
1. ModM(bel(tE  )) =
S
s2Mod(bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM())
2. ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM()
3. For every s1; s2 2ModM(), if (tE )(s1)  (tE )(s2), then ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2)
for some s 2ModM(bel(tE))
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.2.
Using the representation theorem for templated update, it will now be formally shown
that the concrete templated update operation  introduced earlier is indeed a templated
update operation.
Proposition 5.13 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic transition function.
Then the templated update operation  satises postulates (TU  1) to (TU  8) for
every M-satisable sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with know(tE).
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.2.
Templated update operations behave like templated revision operations in the sense
that an update operation increases the plausibility of the input sentence with respect to
the updated epistemic state (as compared to the original epistemic state) and, likewise,
decreases the distrust in the input sentence.
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Proposition 5.14 Let T = hS; tE; li and T 0 = hS; tE  ; li be templated interpretations
of L such that l is injective and card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be T -satisable
and inconsistent with know(tE). Let ~F be an epistemic transition function. Then the
following holds:
1. pl(tE; )  pl(tE  ; )
2. dt(tE  ; )  dt(tE; )
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.2.
The essential di¤erence between templated update and templated revision is that
templated revision retains the agents knowledge from the original epistemic state (as
shown by proposition 5.6) whereas templated update does not.
Proposition 5.15 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be M-satisable and inconsistent with know(tE). Then
ContD(tE) 6 ContD(tE  ).
Proof. See proof in appendix C, section C.2.
The other important di¤erence is, of course, that whereas with templated revision the
ordering is embedded in the representation of an epistemic state as a regular t-ordering,
with templated update an epistemic transition function is required that maps each model
of the belief assertion associated with the epistemic state to a regular t-ordering.
Another way to compare templated revision and templated update is through the
respective links with nonmonotonic logic and counterfactuals. The connection between
KM update and counterfactuals that has been shown to exist (Grahne, 1991; Makinson,
1993; Ryan, Schobbens, and Rodrigues, 1996; Ryan and Schobbens, 1997) relies on a
notion of centeredness. An ordering s on S is weakly centered i¤ for any s0 2 S,
s0 6s s and fully centered i¤ for any s0 2 S, if s 6= s0 then s s s0. By denition, the
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faithful update assignments of KM update ensures that the orderings associated with
each state are fully centered. As discussed earlier, epistemic transition functions are
more general than the faithful update assignments of KM update. Epistemic transition
functions do not satisfy the constraint of either full centering or weak centering. The
implication is that the established connection between KM update and counterfactuals
will not be maintained between templated update and counterfactuals. Taking heed of the
cautionary remarks by Makinson (2003a) against an over-emphasis on formal translations
that may obscure underlying di¤erences of gestalt and intuition, the possible connections
between templated update and counterfactuals will not be explored. However, because of
the well-established relationship between revision and nonmonotonic logic (Makinson and
Gärdenfors, 1991) and the link between t-orderings and strict modular partial orderings,
some connections between templated revision and nonmonotonic logic will be explored
in section 5.7.
Notwithstanding the di¤erences and similarities between templated revision and tem-
plated update, the important feature is that both operations can be performed within
the same framework and that the agent has a means (the epistemic change algorithm) to
choose between these operations. As shown in the next section, this feature is generally
absent in related frameworks of revision and update.
5.6 Other frameworks of revision and update
A framework for revision and update would be closely related to the templated framework
if it allows an agent to select between revision and update in such a way that a revision of
the agents knowledge and beliefs may be followed by another revision or by an update,
and similarly, that an update of the agents knowledge and beliefs may be followed by
another update or by a revision. In the templated framework the notion of iterated belief
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revision is broadened in the sense that an epistemic change operation may be followed
by a di¤erent epistemic change operation and that an agent must be able to select the
appropriate epistemic change operation to perform. This notion of iterated epistemic
change is not prevalent in the literature. A notable exception is the recent investigation
by Nayak et al. (2005) where, instead of using revision operations, di¤erent iterations
of expansion and contraction operations (at the level of belief sets) are considered, in
particular, the iteration where an expansion is followed by a contraction and the iteration
where a contraction is followed by another contraction. However, the notion of iterated
update, which has received little attention in the literature, is not considered.
One approach that pays attention to both iterated revision and iterated update is
the run-based framework of Friedman and Halpern (1999b), which is the only approach
from those modelling both knowledge and belief (see section 4.4) to consider the question
of epistemic change. Their run-based framework, in which belief is modelled in terms
of knowledge and plausibility, and time is modelled explicitly using the standard modal
operators of temporal logic, captures both revision and update. The underlying system
is characterised by describing it in terms of a state that changes over time, in other
words, as sequences of state transitions over time, called runs. Formally, a run of the
system is a function r from time to pairs (se; sa), called global states, comprising the
environment state se and the agents local state sa with re(m) = se and ra(m) = sa.
A plausibility system is a possible worlds interpretation I = hS; l; P i where S is the
set of runs, or rather points (r;m), and P is the plausibility assignment (mapping each
point (r;m) to a plausibility space). The systems under consideration are assumed to be
synchronous with agents having perfect recall. This ensures that any runs that an agent
considers impossible at (r;m) are also considered impossible at (r;m+1). A plausibility
system is a belief change system (BCS) if it satises a number of conditions. Firstly,
the language includes a set of atoms for reasoning about the environment, whose truth
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depend only on the environment state (BCS1) and a disjoint set of atoms for reasoning
about observations (BCS3). Secondly, the agents local (or epistemic) state sa consists
of a sequence of observations (BCS2), which are assumed to be reliable (BCS4). The
belief set associated with the agents epistemic state sa is dened as follows:
 Bel(I; sa) = f j I; (r;m)  B for some (r;m) such that ra(m) = sag.
Lastly, the agent has a prior plausibility measure over runs describing the agents
initial assessment on the possible executions of the systems (BCS5). The prior is con-
strained (PRIOR) to ensure that the agents plausibility assessment at each point is
determined by its prior.
Revision is captured by further restricting belief change systems. Environmental
atoms do not change their truth value along a run (REV 1) capturing the intuition that
revision deals with staticworlds. The agents prior is ranked (REV 2), resulting in a
total preorder over points. If a sentence  is satisable, then the prior over runs in which
 is true at the initial state must be nontrivial (REV 3). Finally, the observation of  does
not provide any additional information (REV 4). In a belief change system that satises
conditions (REV 1) to (REV 4), the agent revises its epistemic state sa by conditioning
on its prior. The most plausible runs after revision by an observation  determine the
agents new epistemic state sa  . Friedman and Halpern show that, provided the belief
set is satisable, revision by conditioning satises the AGM postulates for revision.
Update is captured by restricting belief change systems by a di¤erent set of require-
ments. There is a bijective correspondence between the set of valuations, which is as-
sumed to be nite, and the states of the environment (UPD1). Similarly to (REV 2),
requirement (UPD2) puts constraints on the agents prior. The prior is essentially a
lexicographic ordering, based on a distance measure, that compares a set of runs shar-
ing a common prex of environment states. All sequences of satisable sentences have
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nontrivial plausibility (UPD3). As before, the agent obtains no additional information
from observing  beyond the fact that  is true (UPD4). In a belief change system
that satises conditions (UPD1) to (UPD4), the agent updates its epistemic state sa
by conditioning on its prior. Friedman and Halpern show that update by conditioning
satises the KM postulates for update (which characterise update operations in terms of
partial orders).
The important feature of the run-based framework is that both revision and update
use conditioning to perform belief change. The essential di¤erence lies in the allowable
sequences of runs and in the agents initial beliefs (as reected in its prior).
The run-based framework of Friedman and Halpern is very di¤erent from the tem-
plated framework and not directly comparable. The class of agents that they consider can
be viewed as second-order intentional systems, which focus exclusively on the informa-
tional attitudes of knowledge and belief; the templated framework, in contrast, regards
an agent as a rst-order intensional system, but with the same focus on informational
attitudes. The class of objective systems (i.e. agent environments) di¤ers too: in the run-
based framework, systems are continuous, as implied by the assumption of synchronicity
and requirement (UPD2), while, in the templated framework, systems are discrete. An-
other important di¤erence is that the dynamics of systems in the run-based framework
is modelled directly in the semantics of the underlying (modal) language whereas, in
the templated framework, it is modelled as a component of the agents epistemic frame-
work. An interesting correlation between the systems is that the belief change system
for update is essentially a diagrammable system, by virtue of requirement (UPD1). The
representation of an agents epistemic state as a sequence of (reliable) observations is not
comparable with the representation of an agents epistemic state as a regular t-ordering.
Although both iterated revision and iterated update can be captured in the run-based
framework, each requires a di¤erent belief change system and, in that sense, the notion
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of iterated epistemic change as described in the templated framework is not supported.
Since knowledge in the run-based framework is related to the agents capability to distin-
guish between states and not related to a notion of entrenchment, the need for revising
and updating knowledge does not arise in the run-based framework.
The transmutation approach of Lang, Marquis, and Williams (2001), which is an
extension of the transmutation approach of Williams (1994) for belief revision, focuses
on iterated update at the level of epistemic states. Lang, Marquis, and Williams use a
nitely generated propositional language under a traditional truth-value semantics, which
of course, corresponds to the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li. In their approach, the
epistemic state of an agent is taken to be an OCF that is induced by a stratied belief
base. A stratied belief base (SBB) B is a nite sequence h1; 2; : : : ; n; 1i of sentences
i of rank i. Fully certain beliefs are represented by 1 while n and 1 represent
respectively the most entrenched and the least entrenched of the uncertain beliefs. The
OCF kB induced by an SBB B is dened, for every s 2 S, as follows:
 kB(s) =
8<: maxfi j s 2Mod(:i)g if such an i exists0 otherwise
Note that the range of an OCF is taken to be the set N[f1g, as opposed to the class
of ordinals, and that the condition that k(s) = 0 for at least one s 2 S is not mandated
but instead used to dene a normalised OCF. A OCF k0 is said to be at least as specic
as an OCF k1, denoted by k1  k0, i¤ for every s 2 S, k1(s)  k0(s).
A transmutation is any operation ? that maps an OCF k and an input pair (;m)9,
comprising a satisable nontautological sentence  and a rank m, to a new OCF k ?
(;m) such that
9To be precise, Williams (1994) uses pairs (;m) comprising a nonempty set of consistent complete
theories  (possible worlds X where ?  X  S) and a degree of acceptance (or rank) m. However, for
a nitely generated propositional language under a traditional truth-value semantics, every such X has
a nite axiomatisation as a sentence  such that Mod() = X.
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1. (k ? (;m))(:) = m and
2. Mod(Bel(k ? (;m))) =
8>>><>>>:
fs 2Mod() j k(s) = k0()g if m > 0
fs 2 S j k(s) = 0 or
(s 2Mod(:) and k(s) = k0(:)g
otherwise
The OCF k ? (;m) is said to be a (;m)-transmutation of k. The e¤ect of a trans-
mutation, for m > 0, it to push the minimal nonmodels of  to level m and to pull the
minimal models of  to level 0. It ensures that the input sentence  is accepted in the
new OCF with rmness m. Spohns (;m)-conditionalisation of k for revision, as dened
by denition 5.12, is one example of a (;m)-transmutation of k. Another example of
a transmutation is an adjustment (Williams, 1994) in which the OCF k is disturbed as
little as necessary to accept  with rmness m. In the context of stratied belief bases,
adjustment can be seen as a strategy for resolving conict in stratied belief bases with
maxi-adjustment (Williams, 1996) and disjunctive-maxi-adjustment (Benferhat, Kaci, Le
Berre, and Williams, 2004) proposed as more rened conict resolution strategies, both
based on adjustment.
Lang, Marquis, andWilliams use the alternative characterisation of dependency-based
update operations to model an update operation. The principle of forget, then expand
is extended to OCFs in the following way10. An OCF k is said to be independent from
A  Atom i¤ for any nontautological sentence  such that Atm()  A, k0() = 0. The
set Dep(k) is dened as Dep(k) = fi 2 Atom j k depends on figg. The notion of
forgetting is dened by taking Forget(k;A)(s) = minfk(s0) j s0 2 S and l(s) Atom A
l(s0)g.
The U-transmutation of k by the pair (;m) with respect to Dep and a transmu-
tation operation ?U such that (k ?U (;m))() = m is dened by k U (;m) =
10Lang, Marquis, and Williams (2001) also provide an alternative formulation in terms of SBBs for
the case where an OCF is dened implicitely by a SBB.
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Forget(k;Dep()) ?U (;m). By taking ?U to be conditionalisation, the (;m)-U-
transmutation of k (with respect to Dep) becomes:
 (k U (;m))(s) =
8<: Forget(k;Dep())(s) if s 2Mod(:)Forget(k;Dep())(s) +m otherwise
The e¤ect of forgettingis reected by the OCF Forget(k;Dep()) in which selected
models of  (and :) are pulled down to level 0 while the e¤ect of expandingis reected
by the U-transmutation of Forget(k;Dep()) by (;m) in which the minimal models of
 are pushed up to levelm. This implies that the input sentence  is rejected (as opposed
to being accepted) in the new OCF with rmness m.
To model an update operation at the level of epistemic states, the OCFs k has to be
transmuted by (:;1) to ensure the acceptance of  in the updated OCF. An update
operation  on OCFs can be dened as k   def= Forget(k;Dep()) ?U (:;1). Although
both the update and revision operations on OCFs make use of transmutation operations,
the transmutation operations ?U and ? have almost the opposite e¤ect on the OCFs being
transmuted.
The transmutation framework of Lang, Marquis, and Williams is comparable with the
templated framework largely because of the close connection between OCFs and regular
t-orderings as representations of epistemic states. Recall from section 4.7 that the essen-
tial di¤erences between OCFs and regular t-orderings are that OCFs are quantitative in
nature whereas regular t-orderings are purely qualitative and that the representation of
knowledge is not supported by OCFs. An obvious di¤erence between the transmutation
update operations of Lang, Marquis, and Williams and templated update operations is
that the former is dependency-based while the latter is minimisation-based, and both
with di¤erent underlying semantic characterisations. The most important di¤erence,
however, is that their denition of dependence is based on a notion of closenessbetween
possible worlds, suggesting that the dynamics of the underlying system, which has been
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left undened, is continuous rather than discrete. Although the notion of iterated epis-
temic change as described in the templated framework is supported in the sense that an
epistemic change operation may be followed by a di¤erent epistemic change operation
(in the same framework), it is not fully supported as the agent has not been equipped
with a mechanism to select the appropriate epistemic change operation to perform.
5.7 Revision and nonmonotonic reasoning
Belief revision and nonmonotonic logic have a close relationship with each other. The key
idea underlying this relationship, due to Makinson and Gärdenfors (1991), is that a belief
set K  , the result of revising belief set K by input sentence , can be seen as the set
of defeasible consequences of  under the defeasible consequence relation determined by
the revision operation . Conversely, the set of defeasible consequences of  under some
defeasible consequence relation can be seen, by xing a belief set K in some appropriate
way, as the revised belief set K . Formally, this idea, which has become known as the
Makinson-Gardenfors translation, can be expressed as  js  i¤  2 K  for some xed
belief set K.
Using this translation scheme, Makinson and Gärdenfors (1991) shows that the AGM
postulates for revision can be translated into postulates for nonmonotonic reasoning, and
vice versa. The properties required to be satised by the rational consequence relations of
Lehmann and Magidor, which will be referred to as the LM postulates for nonmonotonic
logic, play an important role in these translations.11 From the LM postulates, the fol-
lowing postulates may be derived:
 If  js  for all  2   and   j=  then  js  (Closure)
11Using di¤erent sets of postulates, Rott (1998, 2001) shows that the theory of rational choice can be
used to dene nonmonotonic inferences which parallel semantic (and syntactic) constructions of belief
change based on choice functions.
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 If  ^  js  then  js  !  (Conditionalisation)
Closure follows fromRight Weakening andAnd using the compactness of the semantic
consequence relation j=. In the presence of Reexivity, Right Weakening, and Left Logi-
cal Equivalence, Or implies Conditionalisation12 (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990).
Weak Conditionalisation is a special case of Conditionalisation in which  = >. Simi-
larly, Weak Rational Monotonicity is the special case of Rational Monotonicity in which
 = >. It turns out that AGM postulates (K  1) to (K  4) correspond to Closure, Re-
exivity, Weak Conditionalisation, and Weak Rational Monotonicity respectively while
AGM postulates (K  6) to (K  8) correspond to Left Logical Equivalence, Condition-
alisation, and Rational Monotonicity respectively. AGM postulate (K  5) corresponds
to a postulate, called Consistency Preservation, which was introduced in Makinson and
Gärdenfors (1991):
 If  js ? then  j= ? (Consistency Preservation)
Consistency Preservation says that contradictions may only be defeasible conse-
quences of contradictions. It is not satised by all rational consequence relations, in
other words, given a ranked interpretation P = hS;R; li of L, it is not necessarily the
case that if  jsP ? then  j= ?. This is because it is possible for  to be P -unsatisable,
i.e. ModP () = ?, so that MinR() = ? even though  is not a contradiction, i.e.  is
not P0-unsatisable where P0 = hS;R; li for S = UT and l the identity function. How-
ever, if Consistency Preservation is formulated so that instead of taking the entailment
relation to be j=, that is j=P0, it is taken to be j=P , then every rational consequence
relation satises (this weakened form of) Consistency Preservation.
12Conditionalisation is referred to as rule S by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990).
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Proposition 5.16 Let P = hS;R; li be a ranked interpretation of L and let jsP be
the rational consequence relation on L induced by P . Then jsP satises the following
property:
 if  jsP ? then  j=P ? (Weak Consistency Preservation)
Proof. Let  jsP ?. But thenMinR() = ?. Suppose that  6j=P ?. SoModP () 6=
?. But R is ModP ()-smooth, and thus for every s 2 ModP () there is some s0 2
ModP () such that (s0; s) 2 R and s0 is minimal in ModP (). But then MinR() 6= ?.
Contradiction. So  j=P ?.
Although not explicitly stated, the entailment relation used in Left Logical Equiv-
alence and Right Weakening is the entailment relation j=P determined by the ranked
interpretation under consideration. Bochman (2001) refers to such an entailment rela-
tion as the internal logic determined by a defeasible consequence relation (or inference
relation in his terminology). The entailment relation j=P is a variation of the pivotal-
valuation (monotonic) consequence relations of Makinson (2003b, 2005) that give rise to
default valuation (nonmonotonic) consequence relations of which rational consequence
relations are one example. Makinson calls the logic associated with pivotal-valuation
consequence relations paraclassical and studies a number of such paraclassical logics
(Makinson, 2003b, 2005) that act as natural bridges between classical logic and di¤erent
kinds of nonmonotonic logics.
For rational consequence relations to satisfy Consistency Preservation, a special con-
straint has to be imposed on ranked interpretations. Following Gärdenfors and Makinson
(1994), who used a slightly di¤erent formulation, these constrained ranked interpretations
will be called nice.
Denition 5.24 A ranked interpretation P = hS;R; li of L is nice when the labelling
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function l is surjective13.
Denition 5.25 An expectation-based consequence relation is a rational consequence
relation js on L that satises Consistency Preservation.
The fundamental idea underlying the notion of expectation-based consequence rela-
tions, provided by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1994), is that the reasoning of an agent
is guided not only by its rm beliefs, but also by its expectations. These expectations
come in di¤erence forms, of which expectation sets and expectation relations are the most
pertinent. The focus will be on the latter, which is expressed as an ordering vE between
sentences with  vE  interpreted as saying that  is at least as expected as or  is
at least as surprising as .
Denition 5.26 A binary relation vE on L is an expectation relation i¤ it satises
the following postulates:
(E1) vE is transitive
(E2) If  j=  then  vE 
(E3) For all ;  2  ,  vE  ^  or  vE  ^ 
Expectation orderings can be used to determine defeasible consequence relations.
Intuitively,  js  i¤  follows logically from  together with the sentences that are
su¢ ciently well expected in the light of . Note that the postulates for expectation
orderings are included in the postulates for epistemic entrenchment orderings (see sec-
tion 4.5). In the context of belief revision, postulate (EE4) is required to relate the
entrenchment ordering v to the specic belief set undergoing revision (or contraction)
13The restriction of the labelling function to a surjective mapping from S to UT corresponds to a
constraint that Makinson and Gärdenfors (1994) call ample.
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while postulate (EE5) is required to generate an operation of contraction that satis-
es the postulate of recovery. In the context of nonmonotonic reasoning, both of these
postulates are superuous. It turns out that an expectation ordering and an epistemic
entrenchment ordering (with respect to some satisable belief set) generate the same
class of defeasible consequence relations.
Denition 5.27 A defeasible consequence relation js of L is a comparative expecta-
tion consequence relation i¤ there is an expectation ordering vE on L such that  js 
i¤ either  j=  or there is some  2 L such that  ^  j=  and : @E 
Theorem 5.16 (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994) Let js be any binary relation on
L. Then the following conditions are mutually equivalent:
1. js is the comparative expectation consequence relation determined by some expec-
tation ordering vE on L
2. js is the defeasible consequence relation induced by some ranked interpretation P =
hS;R; li that is nice
3. js is an expectation-based consequence relation
The theorem establishes a formal relationship between belief revision and nonmonotonic
reasoning based on the notion of expectation by viewing the relation of epistemic en-
trenchment as a kind of expectation ordering. It leads to the conclusion that belief revi-
sion and nonmonotonic reasoning are basically the same process, albeit used for di¤erent
purposes. The process in belief revision is essentially a movement from new information
(or evidence) to those models that are minimal with respect to the ordering representing
the agents beliefs (and expectations) and from there to a revised belief set that is true
at each of the minimal models. In nonmonotonic reasoning, the process is essentially a
214
5.7. Revision and nonmonotonic reasoning
movement from a hypothesis to those models that are minimal with respect to the or-
dering representing the agents beliefs (and expectations) and from there to a defeasible
consequence that is true at each of the minimal models, without changing the agents
beliefs or expectations. The di¤erence is that in belief revision, beliefs are modied as
necessary to maintain consistency with the new information, whereas in nonmonotonic
reasoning, the hypothesis entertained need not lead to any loss of background beliefs or
expectations. Belief revision can therefore be viewed as dynamicand nonmonotonic
reasoning as static.
In the context of t-orderings, this view is conrmed, albeit with some subtle di¤er-
ences. The postulates for templated revision, when restricted to belief assertions, corre-
spond precisely to the AGM postulates for revision (of belief sets) via the KM postulates
for revision (of knowledge bases) with the exception of postulate (TR  4). Before inves-
tigating a possible translation of postulate (TR  4) into a postulate for nonmonotonic
reasoning, and vice versa, the Makinson-Gärdenfors translation scheme will be adapted
for t-orderings as representations of epistemic states.
Denition 5.28 Let T = hS; tE; li be a templated interpretation of L such that l is injec-
tive and card(S) = n and let M = hS; li be the corresponding extensional interpretation
of L. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state. Then for every sentence  2 L that is consistent
with know(tE),  jsT  i¤ bel(tE  ) j=M .
Proposition 5.17 Let T = hS; tE; li be a templated interpretation of L such that l is
injective and card(S) = n and let M = hS; li be the corresponding extensional interpre-
tation of L. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state. Then Postulate (TR  4) implies Left
Logical Equivalence.
Proof. From postulate (TR  4) it follows that if  M  then bel(tE  ) M
bel(tE  ) given that  that is consistent with know(tE). Suppose that bel(tE ) j=M 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and  M . But then bel(tE  ) j=M . From the Makinson-Gärdenfors translation, it
follows that if  jsT  and  M  then  jsT , which is the Left Logical Equivalence
postulate.
The translation of Left Logical Equivalence into postulate (TR  4) does not hold
because the equivalence of two belief assertions bel(tE  ) and bel(tE  ), given that
 M , does not guarantee that the t-orderings tE  and tE  are equal as required by
postulate (TR  4). The breakdown of the translation can be attributed to the fact that
templated revision operates at the level of epistemic states rather than at the level of belief
sets. For iterated revision, which typically operates at the level of epistemic states, the
correspondence between iterated nonmonotonic reasoning and iterated revision appears
to be unclear even at the level of belief sets, as pointed out by Makinson (2003a).
Example 5.8 (Makinson, 2003a) An iterated revision (at the level of belief sets) is
typically something like (K  )   while an iterated defeasible consequence is typically
something like  js ( js ) or ( js ) js . The translation of  2 (K )   into the
language of nonmonotonic reasoning would be  jsJ  where J = Cn() = f j  jsK g.
On the other hand, the translation of  js ( js ) into the language of belief revision
would be ( js ) 2 K , and the translation of ( js ) js  would be  2 K ( js ).
It is not clear how these relate to each other - nor what they mean individually.
Despite the formal map between belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, Makin-
son (2003a) cautions against an over-emphasis on formal translations that may obscure
underlying di¤erences of gestalt and intuition, such as illustrated by the case of iterated
belief revision.
Another di¤erence between belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, perhaps not
of gestalt, is illustrated by proposition 5.10, which shows that in templated revision, the
new information (or evidence) becomes more plausible in the revised epistemic state than
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it was in the original epistemic state. On the other hand, in nonmonotonic reasoning, the
plausibility of the hypothesis does not change as the result of a defeasible consequence
thus conrming the view that belief revision is dynamicand nonmonotonic reasoning
static.
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On the Art of Combination
De Arte Combinatoria (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz)
6.1 Knowledge base merging
Di¤erent proposals for knowledge base merging have been presented, many of which are
based on di¤erent intuitions. The focus of this section will be on propositional knowledge
bases as dened by Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) and not on (rst-order) knowledge
bases described as logic programs (or deductive databases) with integrity constraints
(Baral, Kraus, andMinker, 1991; Baral, et al., 1992; Subrahmanian, 1994). The proposals
for knowledge base merging that will be reviewed are all based on nitely generated
propositional languages under a traditional truth-value semantics. As mentioned before,
the traditional truth-value semantics of propositional logic corresponds to the classical
interpretation M0 = hS; li, which will henceforth be assumed. The focus of the review is
on the logical properties of merging.
The notion of arbitration is due to Revesz (1993), who dened arbitration as an
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alternative form of belief change. In the epistemic change operations considered thus far,
the new information has been taken very seriously, to the extent that the agent is willing
to sacrice previously held beliefs or knowledge in order successfully to incorporate the
new information. The key idea we now consider is that when the new information is
considered neither better nor worse than (the information represented by) the existing
belief set, then a form of mergingis called for. Using the formulation of Katsuno and
Mendelzon for knowledge bases, arbitration is dened in terms of an auxiliary operation
called model-tting, which is a binary operation on L that tsthe knowledge base to
the new information.
Revesz (1997) proposes the following seven postulates for model-tting.
Denition 6.1 Let  be a knowledge base of L. A model-tting operation B is an
operation such that for every sentence  2 L, the knowledge base  B , which is the
result of model-tting  to , satises the following set of postulates:
(RB 1) B  j= 
(RB 2) If  ^  is satisable, then B    ^ 
(RB 3) If  is satisable, then B  is satisable
(RB 4) If   0 and   0 then B   0 B 0
(RB 5) (B ) ^  j= B ( ^ )
(RB 6) If (B ) ^  is satisable, then B ( ^ ) j= (B ) ^ 
(RB 7) (B ) ^ (0 B ) j= ( _ 0)B 
Postulates (RB 1) to (RB 6) correspond directly to postulates (KM  1) to (KM  6)
for revision. Postulate (RB 7) says that any model that is closest to both  in  and 0 in
 must be a closest model to _0. The converse of postulate (RB 7) appears, amongst
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other di¤erences, as an additional postulate in the original formulation of model-tting
operations (Revesz, 1993) and is stated here as postulate (RB 8).
(RB 8) if (B ) ^ (0 B ) is satisable, then ( _ 0)B  j= (B ) ^ (0 B )
Together, postulates (RB 7) and (RB 8) say that the closest models to  _ 0 are
the intersection of the closest model to  in  and to 0 in , provided the intersection
is nonempty. Arbitration is originally dened as a special case of model-tting, namely,
4  def= ( _ ) B >. However, in Revesz (1997) arbitration is described as a gener-
alisation of weighted model-tting. The intuition is that a knowledge base (comprising
individual sentences, say  and ) can be tested, or model-tted, against several pos-
sible hypotheses (represented by a single sentence, say ) without actually changing the
knowledge base. In this scenario, arbitration resembles hypothetical querying rather than
a form of belief change.
Liberatore and Schaerf (1998) give an alternative formulation for arbitration as a
form of belief change. Their approach rests on the intuition that if there are two dif-
ferent sources of information, each having a di¤erent view of the situation and neither
completely unreliable, then the best an agent can do is to mergethe two views into one
that is consistent, whilst trying to preserve as much information as possible. They call
this merging process arbitration. A knowledge base is dened as a nite set of sentences,
represented by a single sentence . Arbitration is essentially a binary operation on L
that merges two knowledge bases into a new knowledge base.
The following eight postulates for arbitration are proposed by Liberatore and Schaerf
(1998).
Denition 6.2 Let  and  be two knowledge bases of L. An arbitration operation
4 is an operation such that the knowledge base 4 , which is the result of arbitrating
between  and , satises the following set of postulates:
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(LS4 1) 4   4 
(LS4 2)  ^  j= 4 
(LS4 3) If  ^  is satisable, then 4  j=  ^ 
(LS4 4) 4  is unsatisable i¤ both  and  are unsatisable
(LS4 5) If   0 and   0 then 4   04 0




(4 ) _ (4 )
(LS4 7) 4  j=  _ 
(LS4 8) If  is satisable, then  ^ (4 ) is satisable
Postulate (LS4 1) ensures that arbitration is commutative. Postulate (LS4 2) en-
sures that the result of an arbitration contains only information present in either of the
knowledge bases while postulates (LS4 3) and (LS4 7) ensure that as much as possible
of the information is retained. Postulate (LS4 4) says that the result of an arbitration
should be unsatisable if and only if both the knowledge bases are unsatisable. Postu-
late (LS4 5) ensures that arbitration adheres to the Principle of Irrelevance of Syntax.
Postulate (LS4 6) guarantees that arbitration of composite knowledge bases can be
obtained by composition of the arbitration of sub-knowledge bases. Postulate (LS4 8)
ensures that both knowledge bases contribute to the result of an arbitration. The ba-
sic properties that all arbitration operations should satisfy are postulates (LS4 1) to
(LS4 5).
Arbitration is generally seen as one subclass of merging operations, the other impor-
tant subclass being that of majority merging. Lin and Mendelzon (1999) were the rst
to formalise the notion of merging knowledge bases by majority, based on earlier work
by Lin (1996). The intuition behind their approach is that the problem of merging the
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knowledge of multiple agents is the same as the problem of merging multiple knowledge
bases. A knowledge base is dened as a nite set of sentences, which will be represented
by a single sentence . Majority merging is an operation that takes a set of m knowledge
bases and merges it into a single knowledge base in such a way that the view of the ma-
jority is reected. Since the result of majority merging does not depend on any order of
the knowledge bases in the set, majority merging is commutative by denition. To ease
comparison with other approaches, majority merging will be restricted to two knowledge
bases and treated as a binary operation on L. However, to ensure that majority merging
as a binary operation is commutative, the following postulate is added to those proposed
by Lin and Mendelzon.
(LM4 0) 4   4 
The approach of Lin and Mendelzon relies on a notion of partial support. A knowl-
edge base  is said to support a sentence  if  j=  and to oppose  if  j= :. The
notion of partial support applies only to literals. A knowledge base  is said to partially
support a literal , denoted by  j , if there exists a sentence , which mentions no
atom appearing in , such that  j=  _  but  6j=  and  6j= . Model-theoretically,
 j  i¤Mod(^:) 6= ? and there exists a state s 2Mod(^) such that s =2Mod(),
where s denotes the state that agrees with s on every atom except the one appearing in
literal .
Proposition 6.1 (Lin and Mendelzon, 1999) For a knowledge base  and a literal
, if  j=  or  j= : or  ^  is unsatisable, then  j6 .




Denition 6.3 Let  and  be knowledge bases of L. A majority merging operation
4 is an operation such that the knowledge base 4 , which is the result of merging 
and  by majority, satises the following set of postulates:
(LM4 1) 4  is satisable
(LM4 2) If  ^  is satisable, then 4    ^ 
(LM4 3) If   0 then 4   04 
(LM4 4) For a literal  2 L and   = f; g, if card(f 2   j  j= g) > card(f 2   j
 j= :g) + card(f 2   j  j :g) then 4  j= 
Postulate (LM4 1) ensures that the result of merging is satisable (even if the
knowledge bases being merged are unsatisable). Postulate (LM4 2) says that if there
is no conict among the knowledge bases, then the result of merging is simply the con-
junction of the knowledge bases. Postulate (LM4 3) ensures that merging adheres to
the Principle of Irrelevance of Syntax. Whilst postulates (LM4 1) to (LM4 3) apply
to any merging operation, postulate (LM4 4) applies only to merging operations that
obey the majority principle. Postulate (LM4 4) says that if the (combined) support
for a literal is greater than the (combined) support and partial support for the negation
of the literal, then the result of merging by majority should support the literal.
With their focus on the problem of merging the knowledge of multiple agents, Lin and
Mendelzon review several protocols for resolving conicts in a group of agents, in partic-
ular, the protocols of Borgida and Imielinski (1984) of which the democracyprotocol
proved to be closest to the principle of majority merging.
Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (1998) make a clear distinction between majority merging
and arbitration by dening both as subclasses of (pure) merging operations. A knowl-
edge base is dened as a nite set of sentences, represented by a single sentence , and is
assumed to be satisable. Merging is an operation that maps a multiset of m knowledge
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bases to a new knowledge base. When using multisets, the result of merging does not
depend on any order of the knowledge bases in the multiset, so that merging is commu-
tative by denition. As before, to ease comparison, a merging operation is restricted to
two knowledge bases and treated as a binary operation on L. The following postulate
is added to those proposed by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez to ensure that merging as a
binary operation is commutative.
(KP4 0) 4   4 
The following six postulates are proposed for (pure) merging operations by Konieczny
and Pino-Pérez (1998).
Denition 6.4 Let  and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. A merging operation
4 is an operation such that the knowledge base 4 , which is the result of merging 
and , satises the following set of postulates:
(KP4 1) 4  is satisable
(KP4 2) If  ^  is satisable, then 4    ^ 
(KP4 3) If   0 then 4   04 
(KP4 4) If  ^  is unsatisable, then 4  6j= 
(KP4 5) (4 ) ^ (04 ) j= ( _ 0)4 
(KP4 6) If (4 ) ^ (04 ) is satisable, then ( _ 0)4  j= (4 ) ^ (04 )
Postulate (KP4 1) says that the result of merging is satisable (under the assump-
tion that the knowledge bases being merged are satisable). Postulates (KP4 2) and
(KP4 3) are identical to postulates (LM4 2) and (LM4 3) of Lin and Mendelzon
respectively. Postulate (KP4 4) is called the Fairness postulate and ensures that when
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two knowledge bases are merged, preference is given to neither. Postulates (KP4 5)
and (KP4 6) correspond directly to postulates (RB 7) and (RB 8) for model-tting.
Konieczny and Pino-Pérez propose two additional postulates to distinguish between
majority merging and arbitration. The postulate for majority merging says that if a
knowledge base is included enough times in a multiset, then the result of majority merging
will entail the knowledge base while the postulate for arbitration says that the result of
arbitration is, to a large extent, independent of the frequency with which a knowledge
base appears in a multiset. These postulates cannot be translated in terms of binary
operations but the formulation in terms of a multiset   of knowledge bases is included
here as postulate (KP4 7) for majority merging and postulate (KP4 8) for arbitration.
(KP4 7) 8 9m 4(  t m) j= 
(KP4 8) 80 9 0 6j=  8m 4(0 t m)  4(0 t )
The original formulation for arbitration, which is stated below as postulate (KP4 80),
has been shown to be inconsistent with postulates (KP4 0) to (KP4 6) by Paolo
Liberatore (Konieczny and Pino-Pérez, 1998).
(KP4 80) 8 8m 4(  t m)  4(  t )
The notion of merging is extended by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (1999) to merging
with integrity constraints, also referred to as IC merging. When the integrity constraint
is taken to be a tautology, IC merging is compatible with puremerging (Konieczny and
Pino-Pérez, 2002). The main di¤erences are that postulates (KP4 4) and (KP4 7)
are weaker than their counterparts for IC merging while the IC merging counterpart for
postulate (KP4 8) is described as a rule expressing non-majority, as opposed to a rule
characterising arbitration. However, the proposed postulate for IC arbitration is not
expressible without integrity constraints.
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The connection between IC merging operations and the operations of Revesz, Libera-
tore and Schaerf, and Lin and Mendelzon is studied to varying degree by Konieczny and
Pino-Pérez (2002). The arbitration operations of Liberatore and Schaerf are investigated
as a special case of IC merging operations where the integrity constraint is taken to be the
disjunction of the knowledge bases. Provided certain properties hold, it is shown that an
IC merging operation dened in this manner satises postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 8).
However, the proposed postulate for IC arbitration is not considered in the investigation.
The model-tting operations of Revesz, which are very close to IC merging operations,
and the majority merging operations of Lin and Mendelzon are only briey addressed.
In the next section, merging operations will be considered in more detail. However,
it is useful to compare the four proposals for merging operations within the context of
a uniform representation, accepting the assumption of Konieczny and Pino-Pérez that
merging only applies to knowledge bases that are satisable. In contrast to Konieczny
and Pino-Pérez (2002), our comparison focusses on puremerging (as opposed to IC
merging) and on those postulates which are regarded as basic.
Lin and Mendelzons proposal that postulates (LM4 1) to (LM4 3) should ap-
ply to any merging operation appears to be justied. Postulate (LM4 1) correspond
directly to postulates (KP4 1), (LS4 4), and (RB 3); while postulate (LM4 2) cor-
respond directly to postulates (KP4 2), (LS4 2) together with (LS4 3), and (RB 2);
with postulate (LM4 3) corresponding directly to postulates (KP4 3), (LS4 5), and
(RB 4).
Commutativity is also strongly supported. Postulate (LM4 0) corresponds directly
to postulates (KP4 0) and (LS4 1) and is satised by every model-tting operation
of Revesz if  ^  is satisable, a result which follows directly by postulate (RB 2)
and the commutativity of conjunction. However, if  ^  is unsatisable, then postulate




Example 6.1 Suppose L is generated by Atom = fP (a); P 0(a)g. Let B be any model-
tting operation of Revesz, i.e. B satises postulates (RB 1) to (RB 7). Let Mod() =
f11g and Mod() = f10g. By postulate (RB 1) it follows that Mod(B )  f10g and
Mod( B )  f11g. Since neither may be empty by postulate (RB 3), it follows that
Mod(B ) = f10g and Mod(B ) = f11g and hence Mod(B ) 6=Mod(B ).
The only other basicpostulates are postulates (KP4 4), (KP4 5), and (KP4 6)
of Konieczny and Pino-Pérez. They are compared with the model-tting operations of
Revesz, the arbitration operations of Liberatore and Schaerf, and the majority merging
operations of Lin and Mendelzon in the following results.
Proposition 6.2 Let  and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate (KP4 4)
is satised by every model-tting operation of Revesz, not satised by every majority
merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, and not satised by every arbitration operation
of Liberatore and Schaerf.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.1.
Proposition 6.3 Let , 0, and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate (KP4 5)
is satised by every arbitration operation of Liberatore and Schaerf but is not satised by
every majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.1.
Postulate (KP4 5) corresponds directly to postulate (RB 7). Although not satis-
ed by every majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, postulate (KP4 5) is
satised if  ^  or 0 ^  is satisable, as shown by the following result.
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Proposition 6.4 Let , 0, and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate (KP4 5)
is satised by every majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, provided ^  or
0 ^  is satisable.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.1.
Proposition 6.5 Let , 0, and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate (KP4 6)
is not satised by every model-tting operation of Revesz, not satised by every arbitra-
tion operation of Liberatore and Schaerf, and not satised by every majority merging
operation of Lin and Mendelzon.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.1.
The comparison shows that postulates (KP4 1) to (KP4 3) are uncontroversial
as logical properties of merging. There is strong support for postulates (KP4 0)
and (KP4 5) as basic properties of merging but less so for postulates (KP4 6) and
(KP4 4).
In all of these approaches a semantic characterisation of merging operations is pro-
vided in terms of preorders on the set of possible worlds S (or }(S) in the case of
Liberatore and Schaerf) satisfying di¤erent constraints. This leads to semantic methods
for constructing merging operations whereby the result of merging is a knowledge base
the models of which are minimal in some sense with respect to the particular preorder.
6.2 Some merging operations
Most of the semantic methods for constructing (knowledge base) merging operations rely
on a notion of distance between possible worlds. A popular choice is the distance function
of Dalal (1988), also known as the Hamming distance, which is a function d : SS ! N
such that d(s; s0) is the number of atoms that have di¤erent truth values under s and s0.
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More abstractly, Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (2002) dene the distance between possible
worlds as a function d : SS ! N such that d(s; s0) = d(s0; s), and d(s; s0) = 0 i¤ s = s0.
The distance between possible worlds is used to dene a distance between a possible
world s and a knowledge base  as the minimal distance between s and the models of
 as d(s; ) = minfd(s; s0) j s0 2 Mod()g. From the distance between a possible world
and an individual knowledge base, an overall distance between a possible world s and a
multiset   of knowledge bases to be merged can be dened using di¤erent functions 
as d(s; ) = fd(s; ) j  2  g.
Merging operations based on the notion of distance between possible worlds di¤er
primarily in their choice of the function . Irrespective of the choice of , the overall
distance between a possible world s and the multiset   of knowledge bases to be merged
can be used to induce a pre-order  ; on the set of possible worlds S (with respect to
 ) as s  ; s0 i¤ d(s; )  d(s0; ). This ensures that there is an assignment that
maps each multiset   of knowledge bases to a preorder  ; on S. The result of merging
a multiset   of knowledge bases can then be obtained by taking as the models of 4( )
the minimal models of > with respect to  ;, i.e. Mod(4( )) =Min ;(>).
Provided the assignment satises the conditions associated with a specic set of pos-
tulates for merging operations, the corresponding representation theorem can then be
used to prove that the merging operation 4 satises the set of postulates.
Three families of merging operations are considered. The rst family of merging
operations, called  operations, uses the sum of the distances between a possible world
and the individual knowledge bases as their function .
Denition 6.5 Let   be a multiset of satisable knowledge bases of L and let s; s0 2 S.
Then the merging operation 4 is dened by taking d(s; ) =
P
2  d(s; ) and
s  ; s0 i¤ d(s; )  d(s0; ) so that Mod(4( )) =Min ;(>).
The merging operation 4 is given by Lin and Mendelzon (1999) as an example of a
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majority merging operation and independently, in a slightly di¤erent format, by Revesz
(1993) as an example of a weighted model-tting operation. Both examples are based on
the Hamming distance between possible worlds. 4 is also a majority merging operation
in the sense of Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (1998).
Proposition 6.6 (Lin and Mendelzon, 1999) 4 satises postulates (LM4 1) to
(LM4 4).
Proposition 6.7 (Konieczny and Pino-Pérez, 1998) 4 satises postulates (KP
4 1) to (KP4 6) and (KP4 7).
The second family of merging operations, called Max operations, uses the maximum
of the distances between a possible world and the individual knowledge bases as their
function .
Denition 6.6 Let   be a multiset of satisable knowledge bases of L and let s; s0 2 S.
Then the merging operation 4Max is dened by taking dMax(s; ) = max2  d(s; ) and
s  ;Max s0 i¤ dMax(s; )  dMax(s0; ) so that Mod(4Max( )) =Min ;Max(>).
The merging operation 4Max is given by Revesz (1993) as an example of a model-
tting operation, again based on the Hamming distance between possible worlds. 4Max
is regarded as a quasi-merging operation by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (2002) because it
does not satisfy postulate (KP4 6). Although it satises postulate (KP4 8), Konieczny
and Pino-Pérezs postulate for arbitration, it is not an arbitration operation in the sense
of Liberatore and Schaerf.
Proposition 6.8 (Konieczny and Pino-Pérez, 1998) 4Max satises postulates (KP
4 1) to (KP4 5) and (KP4 8), but not postulate (KP4 6).
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Proposition 6.9 Let , , and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. 4Max satises
postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 6), but fails to satisfy postulates (LS4 7) and (LS4 8).
Proof. Postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 5) are satised through the correspondence
with postulates (KP4 0) to (KP4 3) and proposition 6.8.
(LS4 6) It must be shown thatMod(4Max(_)) =Mod(4Max) orMod(4Max
) or Mod(4Max )[ Mod(4Max ). Choose any s 2Mod(4Max (_)). So there
is no s0 2 Mod(>) such that s0 f;_g;Max s unless s f;_g;Max s0. In other words,
for every s0 2 Mod(>) it holds that dMax(s; f;  _ g)  dMax(s0; f;  _ g), i.e.
maxfd(s; ); d(s; _ )g  maxfd(s0; ); d(s0; _ )g. Suppose that s =2Mod(4Max )
and s =2 Mod( 4Max ) and therefore also s =2 (Mod( 4Max ) [ Mod( 4Max
). Since s =2 Mod( 4Max ) it follows that there is some s00 2 Mod(>) such that
maxfd(s00; ); d(s00; )g < maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g. Suppose that maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g =
d(s; ). So d(s00; ) < d(s; ) and d(s00; ) < d(s; ) and d(s; )  d(s; ). But d(s00;  _
)  d(s00; ) and d(s; _)  d(s; ). Somaxfd(s00; ); d(s00; _)g < maxfd(s; ); d(s; _
)g. Contradiction. Now suppose that maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g = d(s; ). So d(s00; ) 
d(s; ) and d(s00; )  d(s; ) and d(s; )  d(s; ). If d(s;  _ ) = d(s; ) then
maxfd(s00; ); d(s00;  _ )g  maxfd(s00; ); d(s00; )g < maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g =
maxfd(s; ); d(s;  _ )g, resulting in a contradiction. Otherwise d(s;  _ ) < d(s; )
and thus d(s;  _ ) = d(s; ). Since s =2 Mod( 4Max ) it follows that there is
some s000 2 Mod(>) such that maxfd(s000; ); d(s000; )g  maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g. Since
d(s000;  _ )  d(s000; ) and d(s;  _ ) = d(s; ) it follows that maxfd(s000; ); d(s000;  _
)g  maxfd(s; ); d(s;  _ )g. Contradiction. But then it must be the case that
s 2 Mod(4Max ) or s 2 Mod(4Max ) or s 2 (Mod(4Max ) [Mod(4Max ).
Since s was chosen arbitrarily, the result holds in one direction.
Conversely, choose any s 2Mod(4Max) or s 2Mod(4Max) or s 2 (Mod(4Max
) [Mod( 4Max ). So for every s0 2 Mod(>) it holds that maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g 
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maxfd(s0; ); d(s0; )g or maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g  maxfd(s0; ); d(s0; )g or both. Suppose
that s =2 Mod(4Max ( _ )). So there is some s00 2 Mod(>) such that maxfd(s00; );
d(s00;  _ )g  maxfd(s; ); d(s;  _ )g. If d(s00;  _ )g = d(s00; ) then maxfd(s00; );
d(s00; g  maxfd(s; ); d(s; _)g. But d(s; _)  d(s; ) and somaxfd(s00; ); d(s00; g
 maxfd(s; ); d(s; g. Otherwise d(s00; _) < d(s00; ) and thus d(s00; _) = d(s00; ).
But then maxfd(s00; ); d(s00; g  maxfd(s; ); d(s;  _ )g. But d(s;  _ )  d(s; )
and thus maxfd(s00; ); d(s00; g  maxfd(s; ); d(s; g. So it cannot be the case that
for every s0 2 Mod(>) it holds that maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g  maxfd(s0; ); d(s0; )g or
maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g  maxfd(s0; ); d(s0; )g or both. Contradiction. But then s 2
Mod( 4Max ( _ )). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, the result holds in the other
direction as well. But then 4Max satises postulate (LS4 6).
(LS4 7) It will be shown that it not always the case that Mod( 4Max ) 
Mod( _ ). The proof is by counterexample. Suppose L is generated by Atom =
fP (a); P 0(a)g. Let Mod() = f00g and Mod() = f11g. Abusing notation, d() =
f(11; 2); (10; 1); (01; 1); (00; 0)g and d() = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 1); (00; 2)g. But then
dMax(f; g) = f(11; 2); (10; 1); (01; 1); (00; 2)g and thusMod(4Max ) = f10; 01g. But
Mod(_ ) = f00; 11g. So Mod(4Max ) 6Mod(_ ). So postulate (LS4 7) is not
satised.
(LS4 8) It will be shown that it not always the case that Mod() \Mod(4Max
) 6= ?. Using the same example as for postulate (LS4 7), it follows that Mod() \
Mod(4Max ) = f00g \ f10; 01g = ?. So postulate (LS4 8) is not satised.
The third family of merging operations, called GMax operations, are a generalisation
of Max operations. A GMax operation orders the distances between a possible world
and the individual knowledge bases in descending order and uses the lexicographical order
lex on sequences of N to induce a pre-order on S.
Denition 6.7 Let   be a multiset of satisable knowledge bases of L and let s; s0 2 S.
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Then the merging operation 4GMax is dened by taking dGMax(s; ) = hd(s; ) j  2  i in
descending order and s  ;GMax s0 i¤ dGMax(s; ) lex dGMax(s0; ) so thatMod(4GMax( )) =
Min ;GMax(>).
The merging operation 4GMax is given by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez (1998) as an
example of an arbitration operation. As with the other two merging operations, it is
based on Dalals distance function. However, 4GMax is not an arbitration operation in
the sense of Liberatore and Schaerf.
Proposition 6.10 (Konieczny and Pino-Pérez, 1998) 4GMax satises postulates
(KP4 1) to (KP4 6) and satises postulate (KP4 8) i¤ card(Atom) > 1.
Proposition 6.11 Let , , and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. 4GMax satises
postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 6), but fails to satisfy postulates (LS4 7) and (LS4 8).
Proof. Postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 5) are satised through the correspondence
with postulates (KP4 0) to (KP4 3) and proposition 6.10.
(LS4 6) It must be shown that Mod( 4GMax ( _ )) = Mod( 4GMax ) or
Mod(4GMax) orMod(4GMax)[Mod(4GMax). Choose any s 2Mod(4GMax
( _ )). So there is no s0 2Mod(>) such that s0 f;_g;GMax s unless s f;_g;GMax
s0. In other words, for every s0 2 Mod(>) it holds that dGMax(s; f;  _ g) lex
dGMax(s
0; f;  _ g), i.e. hd(s; ) j  2 f;  _ gi lex hd(s0; ) j  2 f;  _ gi. Sup-
pose that s =2 Mod( 4GMax ) and s =2 Mod( 4GMax ) and therefore also s =2
(Mod(4GMax ) [Mod(4GMax ). Since s =2 Mod(4GMax ) it follows that there
is some s00 2 Mod(>) such that hd(s00; ) j  2 f; gi <lex hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi. Sup-
pose that maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g = d(s; ). So d(s00; ) < d(s; ) and d(s00; ) < d(s; )
and d(s; )  d(s; ). But d(s00;  _ )  d(s00; ) and d(s;  _ )  d(s; ). So
hd(s00; ) j  2 f;  _ gi
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<lex hd(s; ); d(s;  _ )i. Contradiction. Now suppose that maxfd(s; ); d(s; )g =
d(s; ). So d(s00; )  d(s; ) and d(s00; )  d(s; ) and d(s; )  d(s; ). If d(s;  _ ) =
d(s; ) then hd(s00; ) j  2 f;  _ gi lex hd(s;  _ ); d(s; )i resulting in a contra-
diction. Otherwise d(s;  _ ) < d(s; ) and thus d(s;  _ ) = d(s; ). Since s =2
Mod(4GMax) it follows that there is some s000 2Mod(>) such that hd(s000; ) j  2 f; gi
lex hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi. Since d(s000;  _ )  d(s000; ) and d(s;  _ ) = d(s; ) it
follows that hd(s000; ) j  2 f;  _ gi lex hd(s;  _ ); d(s; )i. Contradiction. But
then it must be the case that s 2 Mod( 4GMax ) or s 2 Mod( 4GMax ) or
s 2 (Mod( 4GMax ) [ Mod( 4GMax ). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, the result
holds in one direction.
Conversely, choose any s 2 Mod( 4GMax ) or s 2 Mod( 4GMax ) or s 2
(Mod( 4GMax ) [ Mod( 4GMax ). So for every s0 2 Mod(>) it holds that
hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi lex hd(s0; ) j  2 f; gi or hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi
lex hd(s0; ) j  2 f; gi or both. Suppose that s =2 Mod(4GMax ( _ )). So there
is some s00 2Mod(>) such that hd(s00; ) j  2 f;  _ gi lex hd(s; ) j  2 f;  _ gi.
If d(s00; _)g = d(s00; ) then hd(s00; ) j  2 f; gi lex hd(s; ) j  2 f;  _ gi. But
d(s; _)  d(s; ) and thus hd(s00; ) j  2 f; gi lex hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi. Otherwise
d(s00; _) < d(s00; ) and thus d(s00; _) = d(s00; ). But then hd(s00; ) j  2 f; gi lex
hd(s; ) j  2 f;  _ gi. But d(s;  _ )  d(s; ) and thus hd(s00; ) j  2 f; gi lex
hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi. So it cannot be the case that for every s0 2 Mod(>) it holds that
hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi lex hd(s0; ) j  2 f; gi or hd(s; ) j  2 f; gi lex
hd(s0; ) j  2 f; gi or both. Contradiction. But then s 2 Mod( 4GMax ( _ )).
Since s was chosen arbitrarily, the result holds in the other direction as well. But then
4GMax satises postulate (LS4 6).
(LS4 7) It will be shown that it not always the case that Mod( 4GMax ) 
Mod(_ ). The proof is by counterexample, using the same example as for proposition
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6.9. So Mod() = f00g and Mod() = f11g with d() = f(11; 2); (10; 1); (01; 1); (00; 0)g
and d() = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 1); (00; 2)g. But then
dGMax(f; g) = f(11; h2; 0i); (10; h1; 1i); (01; h1; 1i); (00; h2; 0i)g and thus Mod(4GMax
) = f10; 01g. But Mod(_ ) = f00; 11g. So Mod(4GMax ) 6Mod(_ ) and thus
postulate (LS4 7) is not satised.
(LS4 8) It will be shown that it not always the case that Mod() \Mod(4GMax
) 6= ?. Using the same example as for postulate (LS4 7), it follows that Mod() \
Mod(4GMax ) = f00g \ f10; 01g = ?. So postulate (LS4 8) is not satised.
The three families of merging operations di¤er primarily in their choice of the function
, which, as mentioned earlier, determines an overall distance between a possible world
and the set of knowledge bases to be merged. These functions are also referred to as
aggregation functions (Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis, 2002, 2004) and abstractly dened
as a function  : NN: : : N! N that satises a number of constraints. The abstract
distance function d and the abstract aggregation function  provide two parameters for
dening specic merging operations. By adding an additional aggregation function ,
DA2 merging operators are obtained (Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis, 2004). The D
is short for Distance-based and the A2 short for 2 Aggregation steps. The second
aggregation function  is only applicable when the set of knowledge bases to be merged
are belief bases and syntactic methods for constructing merging operations are called
for. The basic idea is that the arbitrary set of sentences that comprises a belief base
represents pieces of information that can be aggregated. In the context of diagrammable
systems, the aggregation function  is irrelevant.
The three families of merging operations that were considered all operate at the level
of belief sets (or knowledge bases). In the next section, the focus turns to merging at the
level of epistemic states.
236
6.3. Merging epistemic states
6.3 Merging epistemic states
In the approach of Meyer (2001a) epistemic states are described as structures in the style
of Spohn (1988) based on a nitely generated propositional language under a traditional
truth-value semantics. The epistemic state of an agent is taken to be a function e from the
set S of possible worlds to N while the knowledge base (e) 2 L associated with e is de-
ned byMod((e)) = fs 2 S j e(s) = 0g. From this denition it follows that a knowledge
base (e) may be unsatisable. For every epistemic state e, min(e) = minfe(s) j s 2 Sg
and max(e) = maxfe(s) j s 2 Sg. An epistemic list E = [e1; e2; : : : ; em] is a nite list of
epistemic states of length m. A merging operation 4 on epistemic states is a function
from the set of all non-empty epistemic lists to the set of all epistemic states.
Meyer (2001a) proposes the following properties for the merging of epistemic states:
(M4 0) 4([e])(s) = e(s) min(e)
(M4 1) 9s s.t. 4(E)(s) = 0
(M4 2) If ei(s) = ej(s) 8ei; ej 2 E, ei(s)  ei(s0) 8ei 2 E, and ej(s) < ej(s0) for some
ej 2 E then 4(E)(s) < 4(E)(s0)1
(M4 3) If ei(s)  ei(s0) 8ei 2 E then 4(E)(s)  4(E)(s0)
(M4 4) If 4(E)(s)  4(E)(s0) then ei(s)  ei(s0) for some ei 2 E
Property (M4 0) ensures that trivial merging (with a singleton epistemic list) results
in a satisable knowledge base while property (M4 1) ensures the same for non-trivial
merging. Property (M4 2) says that whenever all of the epistemic states in E have
the same level of plausibility for a specic state s then, in the epistemic state obtained
from merging, s would be strictly more plausible than any state s0 which is at most as
1This formulation is the simpliied version used in Chopra, Ghose, and Meyer (2006).
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plausible as s in every epistemic state in E, but less plausible than s in at least one
epistemic state in E. Property (M4 3) states that if s is at least as plausible as s0 in
every epistemic state in E, then it should remain so in the epistemic state obtained from
merging. Property (M4 4) states that if s is at least as plausible as s0 in the epistemic
state obtained from merging the epistemic states in E, then this should have been the
case for at least one epistemic state in E.
When the KP postulates are phrased in terms of a multiset of knowledge bases, then
property (M4 1) is the counterpart of postulate (KP4 1) while property (M4 2) can
be seen as a generalisation of postulate (KP4 2). To see this, recall that in the semantic
representation of a knowledge base  2 L the models of  are strictly below (and hence
more plausible than) the nonmodels of . The counterpart for postulate (KP4 3) is
called property (Comm) because it is a commitment to commutativity (as is postulate
(KP4 3) when phrased in terms of multisets). It relies on a notion of equivalence
between epistemic lists. Two epistemic lists E and E0 are said to be element-equivalent,
written as E  E0, i¤ for every element e of E there is a unique element e0 (position-wise)
of E0 such that e = e0 and vice versa.
(Comm) If E  E0 then 4(E) = 4(E0)
Postulate (KP4 7) for majority merging and the (original) postulate (KP4 80) for
arbitration of Konieczny and Pino-Pérez are also generalised for merging operations on
epistemic states.
(Maj) 9m s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, e(s)  e(s0) if 4(E t em)(s)  4(E t em)(s0)
(Arb) 8m 4(E t [e])(s)  4(E t [e])(s0) i¤4(E t em)(s)  4(E t em)(s0)
The e¤ect of property (Maj) for majority merging is to produce a rened version
of epistemic state e when the epistemic state e has been included enough times in an
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epistemic list. This is similar to postulate (KP4 7) for knowledge base majority merging
where the e¤ect is to produce a rened version of knowledge base  (a subset ofMod())
when  has been included enough times in the multiset. Property (Arb) for arbitration
says (similarly to postulate (KP4 80) for knowledge base arbitration) that the result of
arbitration is independent of the frequency with which an epistemic state (a knowledge
base) appears in an epistemic list (a multiset).
The feasibility of these properties is supported by the construction of several merging
operations on epistemic states, of which generalisations of the three families of merging
operations on knowledge bases are examples. As pointed out by Meyer (2001a), the
distance d(s; ) between a possible world s and a knowledge base  can be used to induce
an epistemic state e by taking e(s) = d(s; ) for every s 2 S. It then follows that e(s) = 0
i¤ s 2 Mod() so that (e)  , i.e. so that  is the knowledge base associated with
epistemic state e. However, an epistemic state need not be induced in this manner.
The rst collection of merging operations on epistemic states includes generalisations
of the4 and4Max operations for merging knowledge bases and introduces a new merg-
ing operation on epistemic states, denoted by 4Min, which is inspired by an arbitration
operation proposed by Liberatore and Schaerf (1998).
Denition 6.8 Let E = [e1; e2; : : : ; em] be an epistemic list and let s 2 S. Then the
merging operations 4, 4Max, and 4Min are dened as follows:
 4(E)(s) = SumE(s) minfSumE(s) j s 2 Sg
where SumE(s) =
P
ei(s) j ei 2 E
 4Max(E)(s) =MaxE(s) minfMaxE(s) j s 2 Sg
where MaxE(s) = maxfei(s) j ei 2 Eg





e1(s) if m = 1
2minfei(s) j ei 2 Eg if ei(s) = ej(s)8ei; ej 2 E
2minfei(s) j ei 2 Eg+ 1 otherwise
In all of these merging operations the uniform subtraction is a form of normalisation to
ensure that the knowledge base associated with the resulting epistemic state is satisable,
as required by property (M4 1).
The next collection of merging operations on epistemic states is a renement of the
rst collection and includes a generalisation of the 4GMax operation for merging knowl-
edge bases. As with the family of GMax operations, some of these merging operations
use a lexicographical order lex on (nite) sequences of N; others a total preorder. Given
any set Seq of nite sequences of N and any total preorder  on Seq, Meyer denes
a function 
Seq; : Seq ! f0; 1; : : : ; card(Seq)   1g which assigns consecutive natural
numbers to the elements of Seq in the order imposed by , starting by assigning 0 to the
elements lowest down in . Associated with every epistemic list E = [e1; e2; : : : ; em] is
the set SeqE of all sequences of length m of N, ranging from 0 to maxfmax(ei) j ei 2 Eg,
the subset SeqEA of all sequences of SeqE in ascending order, and the subset SeqED of
all sequences of SeqE in descending order.
For every s 2 S, qE(s) denotes the sequence he1(s); e2(s); : : : ; em(s)i while qEA(s)
and qED(s) respectively denotes qE(s) in ascending and descending order. For q 2 SeqE,
sumE(q) =
Pm




j=i+1 jqi   qjj where qi denotes the i-th element
of q. A total preorder E on SeqE is dened by taking q E q0 i¤ sumE(q) < sumE(q0)
or (sumE(q) = sumE(q0) and dE(q)  dE(q0)).
Meyer (2001a) denes as renements of4,4Max, and4Min respectively the merging
operations 4R, 4RMax, and 4RMin on epistemic states (with 4RMax the generalisation
of 4GMax.)
Denition 6.9 Let E = [e1; e2; : : : ; em] be an epistemic list and let s; s0 2 S. Then the
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merging operation 4R, 4RMax, and 4RMin are dened as follows:
 4R(E)(s) = RSumE(s) minfRSumE(s) j s 2 Sg
where RSumE(s) = 
SeqE;E(qE(s))
 4RMax(E)(s) = RMax(s) minfRMaxE(s) j s 2 Sg
where RMax(s) = 
SeqED;lex(qED(s))
 4RMin(E)(s) = RMin(s) minfRMinE(s) j s 2 Sg
where RMinE(s) = 
SeqEA;lex(qEA(s))
Both collections of merging operations satisfy properties (M4 0) to (M4 4) and
(Comm) supporting the view that these properties may be regarded as basic properties
of merging operations on epistemic states.
Proposition 6.12 (Meyer, 2001) 4, 4Max, 4Min,4R, 4RMax, and4RMin all sat-
isfy properties (M4 0) to (M4 4) and (Comm).
Proposition 6.13 (Meyer, 2001) 4 and4R both satisfy property (Maj) while4Min
and 4Max both satisfy property (Arb).
An interesting result is that none of the merging operations of Meyer satises postulate
(KP4 4) while all but 4R satisfy postulate (KP4 5) (when the KP postulates are
rephrased for multisets). Postulate (KP4 6) is only satised by4,4RMax, and4RMin.
Although some of the merging operations of Meyer are based on the constructions of
Konieczny and Pino-Pérez, the notion of distance between possible worlds di¤ers between
these approaches. Proposition 6.13 supports the use of property (Maj) as a suitable
postulate for the subclass of majority merging operations on epistemic states and is
compatible with results from knowledge base merging. For the subclass of arbitration
241
6. Merging
operations on epistemic states, the use of property (Arb) conicts, to some extent, with
the results from knowledge base merging (Meyer, 2001a).
The last collection of merging operations on epistemic states comprises non-commutative
merging operations, of which the operation4Lex is presented as an example. This opera-
tion is a lexicographic renement of the epistemic states in an epistemic list E under the
assumption that the epistemic states in E are (strictly) ranked according to reliability.
Denition 6.10 Let E = [e1; e2; : : : ; em] be a ranked epistemic list and let s 2 S. Then
the merging operation 4Lex is dened as 4Lex(E)(s) = LexE(s) minfLexE(s) j s 2 Sg
where LexE(s) = 
SeqE;lex(qE(s)).
Proposition 6.14 (Meyer, 2001) 4Lex satises properties (M4 0) to (M4 4) but
not property (Comm).
Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann (2003) make explicit the ranking on epistemic states
when they dene a total preorder w over a nite set of sources by taking a w a0 i¤
rank(a)  rank(a0) where rank is function from a nite set A of sources to any totally
ordered nite set Rank of ranks2. The intuition is that the epistemic state of an agent
can be constructed when the agent is informed by a set of sources (agents) of varying
degrees of reliability by aggregating (or merging) the epistemic states associated with
each source. The epistemic state of an agent, called a generalised belief state, is taken
to be a modular, transitive relation  on S. The relation  is one of strict likelihood
with s  s0 interpreted as saying that there is reason to consider s as strictly more likely
than s0. Associated with every relation  is an equal likelihood relation  representing
agnosticism, dened such that s  s0 i¤ s 6 s0 and s0 6 s, and a conict relation on,
dened such that s on s0 i¤ s  s0 and s0  s. The epistemic state associated with a
source a is denoted by a.
2The relations w and  should be interpreted as saying that greateris better.
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Aggregating (the epistemic states associated with) strictly ranked sources can be
achieved by a lexicographic renement operation where lower ranked sources rene the
epistemic states of higher ranked sources.
Denition 6.11 Let A be a nite set of sources and let w be a total partial order on A.
Then the aggregation operation ARGRf is dened as ARGRf (A) = f(s; s0) j (9a 2 A)
s a s0 ^ (8a0 2 A; a0 A a implies s a0 s0)g.
For the special case in which all of the sources are equally ranked, a di¤erent aggre-
gation operation is proposed.
Denition 6.12 Let A be a nite set of sources and let w be a total preorder on A that
is fully connected. Then the aggregation operation ARGUn is dened as ARGUn(A) =
Un(A)+ where Un(A) =
S
a2A a.
A more general form of aggregation, in which several ranks are possible and more
than one source may have the same rank, is dened by rst applying the lexicographic
renement operation and then applying closure.
Denition 6.13 Let A be a nite set of sources and let w be a total preorder on A.
Then the aggregation operation ARG is dened as ARG(A) = ARGRf (A)+.
From the generalised aggregation operation ARG, the aggregation operations ARGRf
and ARGUn can be obtained as special cases:
 if w is a total partial order, then ARG(A) = ARGRf (A) and
 if w is fully connected, then ARG(A) = ARGUn(A).
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The approach of Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann was inspired by earlier work of Maynard-
Reid II and Shoham (2001) in which the epistemic state of an agent is taken to be a total
preorder on S and the reliability of sources is assumed to be strictly ranked. The deci-
sion not to use total preorders was motivated by results from social choice theory. The
classical approach in social choice theory is to use total preorders to represent (collective)
preferences but Arrows (1951, 1963) celebrated Impossibility Theorem showed that no
aggregation operation based on total preorders exists that satises a particular small set
of conditions deemed desirable. Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann show that the aggregation
operation ARG, which is based on the lexicographic renement of modular transitive re-
lations representing the epistemic states of agents, satises suitably modied versions of
Arrows conditions. A similar result is obtained by Andréka, Ryan and Schobbens (2002)
who show that the lexicographic rule is the only way of combining binary relations, called
preference relations, which satises natural conditions that are similar to those of Arrow.
As stated by Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann (2003):
The social choice community has dealt extensively with the problem of
representing collective preferences (cf. Sen, 1986). However, the problem is
formally equivalent to that of representing collective beliefs, so the results are
applicable.
Stated di¤erently, the problem of merging epistemic states may be viewed as tech-
nically similar to the problem of aggregating preferences in social choice theory. The
connection between belief merging (in the broader sense) and social choice theory is gen-
erally seen as a fruitful area for future research (Delgrande et al., 2005; Chopra, Ghose,
and Meyer, 2006; Pigozzi, 2006). It seems reasonable then to take note of the results in
social choice theory before proposing the notion of templated merging.
244
6.4. Social choice theory
6.4 Social choice theory
Social choice theory is concerned about social (or collective) decision-making and the
logical foundations of welfare economics (Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura, 2002). The focus
of this section will be on social decision-making and, in particular, the conditions imposed
by Arrow. The origins of social choice theory can be traced back to the works of Borda
(1781) and Condorcet (1785) on voting in elections. Condorcet discovered that pairwise
majority voting may lead to indeterminacy in the social choice, a paradox generally
referred to as the Condorcet paradox. Borda proposed a method of rank-order voting,
which supported his view that the entire ordering of individual voters over alternative
candidates is needed for social decision. An extensive history of the theory of social
choice, starting with the works of Borda and Condorcet, is provided by Black (1958) who
also uncovered the work of Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) from unpublished manuscripts.
One of the most signicant contributions to the theory of social choice is due to
Arrow (1951, 1963). In contrast to earlier work, Arrow did not focus on specic voting
schemes but on the process or rule by which individual preferences determine social
choice. This process or rule for aggregating individual preferences into a social preference
is captured by the notion of a social welfare function. Arrows approach is axiomatic in
nature in the sense that a set of conditions is imposed for social welfare functions to be
deemed reasonable. The startling result from Arrows General Possibility Theorem (or
Impossibility Theorem) is that there exists no social welfare function satisfying this set
of conditions.
In Arrows framework, the society of individuals is assumed to be nite and xed.
The preference of an individual i over a nite set A of alternative social states is taken
to be a total preorder Ri3. If x and y are alternatives in A, then (x; y) 2 R states that
3Arrow used the term orderinginstead of total preorder.
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x is preferred or indi¤erent to y. Associated with every total preorder R is a (strict)
preference relation P dened such that (x; y) 2 P i¤ (x; y) 2 R but (y; x) =2 R and an
indi¤erence relation I dened such that (x; y) 2 I i¤ (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) 2 R. The
concept of choice is dened in terms of R as the choice set CR(A) = fx 2 A j (x; y) 2 R
for every y 2 Ag. For every non-empty subset A0  A the choice set CR(A0) is non-empty
(Sen, 1970). It is interesting to note that the preference relation P is nothing other than
the strict modular partial order Q corresponding to R (as shown in proposition 3.8) and
that the choice set CR(A) is the set of minimal elements in A with respect to R, i.e.
CR(A) =MinR(A).
Denition 6.14 A social welfare function is a function swf that maps a m-tuple of
total preorders R1; R2; : : : ; Rm on A (representing individual preference orderings) to a
corresponding total preorder RSC on A (representing the social preference ordering).
The denition of the social welfare function reects additional characteristics of Ar-
rows framework: rstly, social choice depends only on individual preferences; secondly,
the outcome of the process for determining social choice is a social preference ordering;
and thirdly, the social preference ordering is a total preorder.
As is to be expected, frameworks outside this classic framework abound (Campbell
and Kelly, 2002). One such framework, characterised by the assumption that society
does not require a social preference ordering in order to have a social choice, deserves
special mention by virtue of its link with nonmonotonic reasoning. It relies on the notion
of a choice function to determine the choice set, without assuming the pre-existence of
some order relation, and a set of rationality conditions to impose coherence constraints
on choices. Both Arrow (1959) and Sen (1969, 1970) contributed to the development of
this framework, sometimes referred to as the theory of rational choice, of which a survey
is provided by Moulin (1985). The link between this framework of social choice theory
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and nonmonotonic logic is investigated, amongst others, by Lehmann (2001) and Rott
(1998, 2001)4.
Arrow imposed four conditions5 on social welfare functions (Arrow, 1963 ch.VIII).
 Condition U (Unrestricted domain) All logically possible total preorders on the set
of alternative social states are admissible.
The rationale behind condition U is that each individual in society should be free
to form and express any preference of social states and that the social welfare function
should be robust enough to aggregate the individual preference orderings into a social
preference ordering.
 Condition P (Pareto principle) If every individual strictly prefers some social state
to another, then so should society.
The Pareto principle ensures that the social welfare function faithfully reects unani-
mous (strict) preference expressed by all individuals over a pair of social states. Formally,
it is dened as follows: If (x; y) 2 Pi for every individual i, then (x; y) 2 PSC .
 Condition IIA (Independence of irrelevant alternatives) The social choice between
two alternatives should be independent of other alternatives.
Condition IIA ensures that if the choice is between alternatives x and y, and some
change occurs that leaves the individual choices between x and y the same (for all in-
dividuals), then, irrespective of other changes amongst alternatives, the social choice
4An earlier study linking nonmonotonic and default reasoning with social choice theory in the classic
framework may be found in Doyle and Wellman (1991).
5We follow Sen (1970) in labelling the conditions except for condition IIA, which Sen labelled as
condition I. (Condition U corresponds to Arrows condition 10, condition IIA to his condition 3, and
condition D to his condition 5.)
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between between x and y will remain the same. Formally condition IIA can be dened
as follows: Let R1; R2; : : : ; Rm and R01; R
0
2; : : : ; R
0
m be two m-tuples of total preorders on
A. For every x; y 2 A, it holds that if for every individual i, (x; y) 2 Ri i¤ (x; y) 2 R0i,
then (x; y) 2 RSC i¤ (x; y) 2 R0SC .6
 Condition D (Nondictatorship) The social welfare function should not be dictato-
rial.
A social welfare function is said to be dictatorial if there exists an individual i such
that for every m-tuple of total preorders R1; R2; : : : ; Rm on A, (x; y) 2 Pi implies (x; y) 2
PSC for every x; y 2 A.7 Condition D ensures that social choice is not based on the
preference of only one individual in society.
From Arrows Impossibility Theorem it follows that there exists no social welfare
function that can simultaneously satises all four conditions U, P, IIA, and D.
Theorem 6.1 (Arrow, 1963 ch.VIII) Conditions U, P, IIA, and D are inconsis-
tent.
The method of majority voting (or decision-making) in which society prefers alterna-
tive x to y i¤ the number of individuals in society who prefer x to y is at least as great
as the number of individuals who prefer y to x has been shown to satisfy conditions P,
IIA, and D. However, it fails to satisfy condition U as shown by the Condorcet paradox,
which can be illustrated by considering three voters 1, 2, and 3 and three candidates x, y,
and z and assuming that voter 1 prefers x to y and y to z, voter 2 prefers y to z and z to
x, and voter 3 prefers z to x and x to y. By majority voting, each candidate defeats the
6In the original formulation (Arrows,1963), condition IIA is dened in terms of the choice set asso-
ciated with a social preference.
7This denition of condition D makes explicit the inclusion of every element in the domain of the
social welfare function as suggested by Sen(1970).
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others by two votes so that society prefers x to y and y to z and z to x yielding a social
preference ordering cycle. This leads to inconsistencies because transitivity requires that
society prefers x to z.
The rank-order method of voting assigns a specic score to each candidate for being
ranked rst in any voters preference, a smaller score for being ranked second in anyones
preference, and so on. The individual scores received by each candidate over all voters
are then added up, sometimes referred to as the Borda count, and the winner is the
candidate with the highest score. The rank-order method of voting satises conditions
U, P, and D but fails to satisfy condition IIA. To use an illustration from Sen (1970,
pp.39), consider three voters 1, 2, and 3 and three candidates x, y, z and assume that
the scores for rst, second, and third ranked choices are 3, 2, and 1 respectively. Suppose
that voter 1 ranks candidates in the order x, y, z while voters 2 and 3 rank them in the
order z, x, y. With a highest score of 7, candidates x and z are tied for rst place. Now
consider another scenario in which voter 1 changes his mind about (the now irrelevant)
candidate y so that his ranking becomes x, z, y. Applying the method to this scenario
yields a highest score of 8 for candidate z making him the winner. Everyones ordering of
x and z are still the same, but the social choice between x and z is not the same, hence
violating condition IIA. The central concepts and results underlying the Borda method
(and to a lesser extent the Condorcet method) are reviewed by Pattanaik (2002) in the
context of positional rules for collective decision-making.
Much of the work that has been done in the eld of social choice theory since the
publication of Arrows Impossibility Theorem either attempts to show the robustness of
the theorem or attempts to nd escape routes around the theorem by relaxing the condi-
tions or by modifying the framework (or both). A classic example of relaxing a condition
is the single-peaked preference approach of Black (1948) which relaxes condition U so
that the method of majority decision-making (voting) becomes a social welfare function.
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The basic idea is that if individuals classify or categorise alternatives in terms of some
dimension, so that there are patterns of preferences, and vote for the alternative closest
to their own position, then the individuals preference pattern is single-peaked. In the
context of political voting, one such classication or categorisation may be extreme left,
moderate left, moderate right, and extreme right. The assumption of single-peakedness
requires that every triple be arranged in a manner characteristic of partial agreement, in
other words, everyone agrees that a particular alternative in the triple is not worst (or
not best, or not medium). This restriction is called value restriction and if it holds for
every triple, then the method of majority voting is a social welfare function, provided the
number of voters is odd. Sen and Pattanaik (1969) generalised the assumption of single-
peakedness to an arbitrary number of voters by imposing a restriction called extremal
restriction, which requires that if someone prefers x to y and y to z, then z is uniquely
best in an individuals preference ordering i¤ x is uniquely worse in its preference order-
ing. Extremal restriction permits a wide variety of relations (for example, partly similar
or sharply opposite) and if it holds for every triple of alternatives, then the method of
majority voting is a social welfare function. For a discussion of other types of domain
restrictions, the reader is referred to Gaertner (2002).
The approach of Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann discussed earlier can be seen as an
example where both the conditions are relaxed and the framework is modied. By adopt-
ing modular transitive relations as the notion of preference instead of total preorders, the
Arrow framework is modied signicantly. Recall that each modular transitive relation
has an associated equal likelihood relation and an associated conict relation. In the
presence of conicts, condition IIA is weakened to say that the social preference between
two alternatives should be independent of other alternatives unless these alternatives put
them in conict. In the approach of Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann, information sources
(individuals) are ranked according to credibility (or reliability) with the most credible
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information sources viewed as dictatorsin the sense of Arrow. Condition D is therefore
restricted to information sources of equal rank only. The relaxation of conditions IIA
and D raise the question to what extent the Arrow conditions are applicable in a given
context.
In the context of diagrammable systems, there would be a large degree of compatibility
or similarity of preferences among agents. For example, consider two agents 1 and 2, each
with a two-level ordering such that the states in agents 1 upper level are in agents 2
lower level and vice versa. These agents do not share a single untautological belief and
therefore their beliefs cannot be expected to be sensibly reconcilable. The condition of
unrestricted domain is therefore inappropriate in the context of diagrammable systems.
The setting for decision-making by control room agents is a complex and dynamic
environment in which decisions are made, typically by a group of agents, on the basis of
experience. Decision-making is these environments is characterised by high uncertainty,
incomplete information, time pressures, organisational inuences, and high stakes because
of the potential consequences for the decision-makers8. In decision-making events such
as these, interaction and cooperation between agents are essential and often lead to
changes in the preferences of individual agents. The nature of decision-making by control
room agents rules out the condition of nondictatorship as simply inappropriate. The
Pareto principle, on the other hand, is a natural condition for decision-making by control
room agents. If every agent participating in a decision-making event agrees that some
alternative is preferred to another, then the Pareto principle will ensure that they adopt
the most preferred alternative.
Experiments conducted by Tversky, Kahneman, and others showing that human be-
haviour rarely adheres to the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives are
8The term NDM or Naturalistic Decision Making (Zsambok and Klein, 1997) refers to the study of
decision-making in environments such as these.
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applicable for decision-making by control room agents. These experiments demonstrate,
for example, that the way in which alternatives are framed may a¤ect decision makers
choices (Tverksy and Kahneman, 1981, 1986); that decision makers look for reasons to
prefer one alternative to another (Tversky and Shar, 1992); that in choice under uncer-
tainty, decision makers value losses more heavily than corresponding gains (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979); that systematic errors or biases occur when humans make decisions
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982); and that humans dont choose objects per se,
they tend to choose collections of features (or aspects) of which the objects are composed
(Tversky, 1972). More recent material is covered in Kahneman and Tversky (2000). The
condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives has also received some criticism on
technical grounds (Hansson, 1973).
To summarise, the large degree of homogeneity among control room agents and the
complex and dynamic setting for decision-making by control room agents mean that
the conditions of unrestricted domain, nondictatorship, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives are not considered to be applicable in the context of diagrammable systems.
The Pareto principle, however, is applicable and will play a key role in templated merging.
6.5 Templated merging
In a recent survey on logic-based approaches to information fusion (Grégoire and Konieczny,
2006) the notion of belief merging is broadened to include other types of information such
as knowledge, goals, regulations, and observations. The logic-based approaches in the
context of possibilistic logic (Dubois, Lang, and Prade, 1994) are gaining in popularity
from the earlier application to belief change (Dubois and Prade, 1991, 1992) to more
recent applications to information fusion (Dubois and Prade, 2004; Benferhat, Dubois,
Kaci, and Prade, 2002, 2006). Grounded in fuzzy methods (Zadeh, 1978), these possi-
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bilistic approaches may be seen as numerical and hence not applicable in the context of
our qualitative treatment of control room agents.
It is necessary to distinguish between information that is symbolic, which can be
communicated by agents in a linear fashion using sentences of the knowledge representa-
tion language, and information that is nonsymbolic, which can be communicatedby an
agents sensors as sub-agents. Symbolic information communicated from another agent
can be merged with an agents own information requiring only a binary operation. But
sensory input communicated by an agents sub-agents typically happens in parallel and
requires an m-ary operation to be merged. Note that both symbolic and nonsymbolic
information can be represented, to the extent that they bear upon the exclusion of states
of the system, by t-orderings in normal form, as discussed in section 3.4.
Templated merging refers to the merging of possibly conicting information repre-
sented by regular t-orderings. An information tuple T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) is an m-tuple of
regular t-orderings. An information tuple T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) is said to be contradictory
i¤
S
ti2T top(ti) = S and satisable i¤
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Two information tuples T
and T0 are element-equivalent, written as T  T0, i¤ for every t-ordering t of T there is
a unique t-ordering t0 (position-wise) of T0 such that t = t0 and vice versa.
Formally, a templated merging operation 4 is an m-ary operation on regular t-
orderings. Adopted as properties for templated merging are the uncontroversial pos-
tulates (KP4 1) to (KP4 3) of Konieczny and Pino-Pérez, the property of commuta-
tivity, and the Pareto principle from social choice theory. Suitably modied for regular
t-orderings, the properties proposed for templated merging are the following:
(TM4 1) bottom(4(T)) 6= ?
(TM4 2) If T is satisable, then bottom(4(T)) = Tti2T bottom(ti)
(TM4 3) If T  T0, then 4(T) = 4(T0)
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(TM4 4) If ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T, then 4(T)(s)  4(T)(s0)
(TM4 5) If 4(T)(s)  4(T)(s0), then ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T
Properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 3) are the respective counterparts to postulates
(KP4 1) to (KP4 3) when phrased in terms of multisets. A separate property for com-
mutativity is not required because property (TM4 3) implies commutativity. Property
(TM4 4) is a formal expression of the Pareto principle while property (TM4 5) can be
seen as guaranteeing that the merging operation doesnt introduce ctitious preferences
that no individual agent entertains. Properties (TM4 4) and (TM4 5) correspond
directly to Meyers properties (M4 3) and (M4 4) respectively.
The feasibility of these properties will be illustrated by the construction of several
templated merging operations on regular t-orderings. The proposed principle of Quali-
tativeness, which applies generally to control room agents, will be used to evaluate the
concrete templated merging operations. The method for constructing templated merging
operations relies on the notion of an indexing function and an associated (well-ordered)
index set . For the family of basic templated merging operations, an indexing function
f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kg (with respect to information tuple T) is dened abstractly as
f(s) = fti(s) j ti 2 Tg. Di¤erent indexing functions may have di¤erent codomains de-
pending on the value of k which represents the maximum index. Every indexing function
f induces an index set A, which is a subset of f0; 1; : : : ; kg, dened as A = ran(f).
Since A is nite and  is a linear order on A it follows that  is a well-ordering on A.
A basic templated merging operation 4, based on f, can now be dened abstractly.
Denition 6.15 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Let f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kg
be an indexing function (with respect to T) and A its associated index set, well-ordered




8<: card(seg(f(s))) if f(s) < k or card(A) = 1n otherwise
where seg(f(s)) is the initial segment of f(s) 2 A.
Proposition 6.15 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Every t-ordering
produced by a basic templated merging operation 4 is regular.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Basic templated merging operations di¤er only in their choice of indexing function.
It is not hard to see that for every s 2 S the construction of 4(T)(s) depends only on
the the linear order  on the index set A = ran(f). Provided the indexing function f
does not make use of arithmetic operations on template B, any basic merging operation
4 will satisfy the principle of Qualitativeness.
Three basic templated merging operations are proposed, namely, minimisation, max-
imisation, and sum, denoted respectively by 4Min, 4Max, and 4. They are based
respectively on the indexing functions fMin : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng, fMax : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng,
and f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;m ng.
Denition 6.16 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. The indexing func-
tions fMin : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng, fMax : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng, and f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;m ng
(with respect to T) are dened as follows:
 fMin(s) =
8<: t1(s) if ti(s) = tj(s) for every ti; tj 2 Tsucc(minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg) otherwise
where succ(x) is the successor of x in template B
 fMax(s) = maxfti(s) j ti 2 Tg
 f(s) =
Pfti(s) j ti 2 Tg
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The basic templated merging operations 4Min, 4Max, and 4 are dened using de-
nition 6.15. From the denitions of indexing functions fMin, fMax, and f, it follows that
templated merging operations 4Min and 4Max satisfy the principle of Qualitativeness
while templated merging operation f , which makes use of addition, fails to do so.
The minimisation operation 4Min is inspired by the (P,P)-capped merging operation
4Min2 of Chopra, Ghose, and Meyer (2006). Its e¤ect is to create a merged regular
t-ordering in which the states are as low as possible by considering the minimum level
assigned to a state by any of the t-orderings in the information tuple, but distinguishing
the special case in which all of the t-orderings assign the same level to a state. The
minimisation operation ensures that the level assigned to a state s 2 S in the merged
result when the t-orderings in the information tuple are not all in agreement in terms
of their assignment of s, is minimally higher than when all of the t-orderings in the
information template are in agreement in terms of their assignment of s. This require-
ment ensures that property (TM4 2) is satised but is not the most extreme form of
minimisation. The minimise operation 5, which was dened in section 5.5, is the most
extreme form of minimisation. It can be reformulated in terms of an indexing function
f5 by taking f5(s) = minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg, thus making implicit the process of nor-
malisation, which is explicit in the original formulation of operation 5. The minimise
operation 5 is however not a templated merging operation because it violates property
(TM4 2). To see this, take T = (t1; t2). By property 3 of proposition 5.11, it follows
that bottom(t15 t2) = bottom(t1)[ bottom(t2). Property (TM4 2), on the other hand,
requires that if T is satisable, then bottom(t15 t2) = bottom(t1) \ bottom(t2).
In contrast to minimisation, the maximisation operation 4Max creates a merged reg-
ular t-ordering in which the states are as high as possible by considering the maximum
level assigned to a state by any of the t-orderings in the information tuple. It is a gener-
alisation of the family of knowledge base merging operations called Max operations by
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Konieczny and Pino-Pérez and similar to Meyers 4Max operation on epistemic states.
The essential di¤erence between the templated maximisation operation 4Max and that
of Meyer lies in the notion of normalisation; Meyers notion of normalisation can be de-
scribed as an (explicit) downward shift of all states that leaves the distance between states
unchanged while the notion of templated normalisation can be described as an (implicit)
downward shift of non-denitely excluded states that leave the ordering between states
unchanged.
The sum operation 4 is a generalisation of the family of knowledge base merging
operations called  operations by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez. It is similar to Meyers 4
operation on epistemic states but, again, di¤ers in the way normalisation is performed.
The following example illustrates:
Example 6.2 Let T = (t1; t2; t3; t4) be an information tuple where
t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g, t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g,
t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t4 = f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. But then
fMin = f(11; 1); (10; 1); (01; 3); (00; 1)g with AMin = (1; 3),
fMax = f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 3)g with AMax = (1; 2; 3; 4), and
f = f(11; 1); (10; 5); (01; 12); (00; 5)g with A = (1; 5; 12).
The merged regular t-orderings 4Min(T), 4Max(T), and 4(T) are depicted in gure
6-1 below.
Lemma 6.1 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Let 4 be a basic tem-
plated merging operation based on an indexing function f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kg (with
respect to T). For every s; s0 2 S,
 if f(s) = f(s0) then 4(T)(s) = 4(T)(s0) and
 if f(s) < f(s0) then 4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0).
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Figure 6-1: Basic templated merging
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.16 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4Min satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.17 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4Max satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.18 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4 satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Using a similar method of construction, rened versions of the basic templated merg-
ing operations can be dened by using a rened indexing function. Following Meyer
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(2001a), the idea behind the rened versions is that a merged regular t-ordering can
be rened by creating a distinction between states at the same level without disturb-
ing the relative ordering of states at di¤erent levels. However, since states at the
top level of t-orderings are denitely excluded, no distinction will be created between
states at the top level of the merged regular t-ordering. A rened indexing function
fR : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kgl (with respect to information tuple T) assigns to each state
s 2 S an l-tuple over f0; 1; : : : ; kg, dened abstractly as fR(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xl) ordered
in accordance with . Di¤erent rened indexing functions may have di¤erent codomains
depending on the value of k, which represents the maximum index, and the value of
l, which represents the indexing range. Every rened indexing function fR induces a
rened index set AR dened exactly as before as AR = ran(fR). The di¤erence is
that AR is a set of l-tuples over f0; 1; : : : ; kg, i.e. a subset of the Cartesian product
f0; 1; : : : ; kgl. Since f0; 1; : : : ; kg is nite with  a linear order on f0; 1; : : : ; kg, it follows
from lemma 4.1 that the lexicographic ordering  on AR is a well-ordering on AR.
Denition 6.17 Let fR : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kgl be a rened indexing function and AR
its associated index set, well-ordered by the lexicographic ordering . Let fR(s) =
(x1; x2; : : : ; xl) and fR(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; yl). Then fR(s)  fR(s0) i¤ x1 < y1 or
[(9j > 1)(8i < j) xi = yi and xj < yj].
A rened templated merging operation 4R, based on fR, can now be dened
abstractly.
Denition 6.18 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Let fR : S !
f0; 1; : : : ; kgl be a rened indexing function (with respect to T) and AR its associated
index set, well-ordered by the lexicographic ordering . A rened templated merging




8<: card(seg(fR(s))) if first(fR(s)) < k or first(min(AR)) = kn otherwise
where seg(fR(s)) is the initial segment of fR(s) 2 AR
and first(x1; x2; : : : ; xl) returns the rst element x1 of the l-tuple.
Proposition 6.19 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Every t-ordering
produced by a rened templated merging operation 4R is regular.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2
As was the case with basic templated merging operations, rened templated merging
operations di¤er only in their choice of rened indexing function. To ensure that the
rened merging operations do not create a merged regular t-ordering in which the states
at the top level are rened, the rened indexing functions have to ensure that the rst
element of the l-tuple assigned to a state is the maximum index i¤ it is the maximum
index assigned to that state by the corresponding indexing function. It is not hard
to see that for every s 2 S the construction of 4R(T)(s) depends only on the the
lexicographic ordering  on the rened index set AR = ran(fR). Provided the rened
indexing function fR does not make use of arithmetic operations on template B, any
rened merging operation 4R will satisfy the principle of Qualitativeness.
Three rened templated merging operations are proposed, namely, rened minimi-
sation, rened maximisation, and rened sum, denoted respectively by 4RMin, 4RMax,
and 4R. They are based respectively on the rened indexing functions fRMin : S !
f0; 1; : : : ; ngm, fRMax : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ngm, and fR : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;m ngn.
Denition 6.19 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. The rened indexing
functions fRMin : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ngm, fRMax : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ngm, and fR : S !
f0; 1; : : : ;m ngn (with respect to T) are dened as follows:
 fRMin(s) = (ti(s) j ti 2 T) ordered increasingly
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 fRMax(s) = (ti(s) j ti 2 T) ordered decreasingly
 fR(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) such that xj =
Pfti(s) j ti 2 T and ti(s) > j   1g
The rened templated merging operations4RMin,4RMax, and4R are dened using
denition 6.18. The e¤ect of the renement operations are to rene the merged regular t-
ordering created by the corresponding basic templated merging operations by considering
all of the levels assigned to a state by the t-orderings in the information tuple. From the
denitions of rened indexing functions fRMin, fRMax, and fR, it follows that rened
templated merging operations 4RMin and 4RMax satisfy the principle of Qualitativeness
while, as would be expected, rened templated merging operation fR fails to satisfy the
principle of Qualitativeness.
The rened minimisation operation 4RMin and maximisation operation 4RMax are
similar to Meyers renement operations 4RMin and 4RMax on epistemic states. Apart
from di¤erent notions of normalisation, the templated rened minimisation and maximi-
sation operations di¤er from those of Meyer in their treatment of states at the top level of
the t-ordering obtained from the basic merging operations; these states, being denitely
excluded, are not rened. Note that the rened maximisation operation 4RMax is a gen-
eralisation of the family of knowledge base merging operations called GMax operations
by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez.
The rened sum operation 4R is similar in spirit to Meyers renement operation
4R on epistemic states but, apart from di¤erences in normalisation and in the treatment
of denitely excluded states, it di¤ers in the construction of the underlying ordering.
Our construction creates n-tuples over f0; 1; : : : ;m  ng through the rened indexing
function fR which is then well-ordering by the lexicographic ordering on AR. Meyers
construction creates a total preorder E on the set SeqE of all sequences of length m of
N, ranging from 0 to maxfmax(ei) j ei 2 Eg, where E =[e1; e2; : : : ; em] is an epistemic
list of epistemic states.
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The following example illustrates the e¤ect of each of the three rened templated
merging operations:
Example 6.3 Let T = (t1; t2; t3; t4) be the information tuple of example 6.2 (on page
257). But then,
fRMin = f(11; (0; 0; 0; 1)); (10; (0; 1; 2; 2)); (01; (2; 2; 4; 4)); (00; (0; 1; 1; 3))g
with ARMin = ((0; 0; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1; 3); (0; 1; 2; 2); (2; 2; 4; 4)),
fRMax = f(11; (1; 0; 0; 0)); (10; (2; 2; 1; 0)); (01; (4; 4; 2; 2)); (00; (3; 1; 1; 0))g
with ARMax = ((1; 0; 0; 0); (2; 2; 1; 0); (3; 1; 1; 0); (4; 4; 2; 2)), and
fR = f(11; (1; 0; 0; 0)); (10; (5; 4; 0; 0)); (01; (12; 12; 8; 8)); (00; (5; 3; 3; 0))g
with AR = ((1; 0; 0; 0); (5; 3; 3; 0); (5; 4; 0; 0); (12; 12; 8; 8)).
The merged regular t-orderings4RMin(T), 4RMax(T), and4R(T) are depicted in gure
6-2 below.
Figure 6-2: Rened templated merging
Lemma 6.2 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Let 4R be a rened
templated merging operation based on a rened indexing function fR : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kgl
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(with respect to T). For every s; s0 2 S,
 if fR(s) = fR(s0) then 4R(T)(s) = 4R(T)(s0)
 if fR(s)  fR(s0) and (first(f(s)) < k or first(f(s0)) < k or first(min(AR)) =
k) then 4R(T)(s) < 4R(T)(s0)
 if fR(s)  fR(s0) and (first(f(s)) = k and first(f(s0)) = k and
first(min(AR)) 6= k) then 4R(T)(s) = 4R(T)(s0)
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.20 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4RMin satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.21 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4RMax satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.22 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4R satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
These results, together with those for basic templated merging operations, support
the view that properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5) may be regarded as basic properties of
templated merging operations. However, properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5) cannot be
viewed as a canonical list of properties for templated merging operations.
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In addition to properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5) for templated merging operations,
properties for the subclass of templated majority merging operations and the subclass of
templated arbitration operations are also dened. Let Ttj ;k = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm; tj; tj; : : : ; tj)
be the information tuple obtained from the information tuple T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) by
adding the regular t-ordering tj 2 TE to T exactly k times. Property (TM4 6) captures
the idea behind majority merging while property (TM4 7) captures the idea behind
arbitration.
(TM4 6) 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4(Ttj ;k)(s)  4(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0)
(TM4 7) 8tj 2 TE 8k 4(Ttj ;k) = 4(Ttj ;1)
Property (TM4 6) is the counterpart of property (Maj) for epistemic states and
says that if a regular t-ordering tj 2 TE is added enough times to an information tuple,
then the result of templated majority merging will reect the ordering of t-ordering tj.
Property (TM4 7) is the counterpart for postulate (KP4 80) and says that the result
of templated arbitration is fully independent of the frequency with which a regular t-
ordering appears in an information tuple. It is somewhat stricter than property (Arb)
for epistemic states.
Proposition 6.23 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Property (TM4 6)
is satised by templated merging operation 4 and 4R but not satised by 4Min, 4Max,
4RMin, and 4RMax.
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
Proposition 6.24 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Property (TM4 7)
is satised by templated merging operations 4Min and 4Max, but not satised by 4,
4RMin, 4RMax, and 4R.
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Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.2.
From the results, it follows that templated merging operations 4Min and 4Max be-
long to the subclass of templated arbitration operations. This is consistent with the
results of Meyer (2001a) whose operations 4Min and 4Max on epistemic states, albeit
slightly di¤erent from ours, also belong to a subclass of arbitration operations. In con-
trast, Konieczny and Pino-Pérezs (1998) operation 4Max on knowledge bases does not
belong to a subclass of arbitration operations. The di¤erence is not unexpected given
that property (TM4 7) for templated arbitration and Meyers property (Arb) for arbi-
tration are both based on Konieczny and Pino-Pérezs original postulate (KP4 80) for
arbitration as opposed to postulate (KP4 8).
Templated merging operations 4 and 4R belong to the subclass of templated
majority merging operations, a result that is consistent with that of Meyer. It supports
the view that property (TM4 6) may be regarded as an appropriate property for the
subclass of templated majority merging operations.
Lastly, the results show that the rened templated merging operations 4RMin and
4RMax belong to neither of the subclasses of templated merging operations. Again, this
is consistent with Meyers results for the renement operations 4RMin and 4RMax on
epistemic states.
The templated merging operations that were dened do not rely on a notion of dis-
tance between possible worlds as is the case with most semantic methods for constructing
(knowledge base) merging operations. Rather, they rely on the notion of an indexing
function (rened indexing function) and an associated well-ordered index set (rened
index set) to construct a basic templated merging operation (rened templated merging
operation). Because these templated merging operations are dened abstractly, it is pos-
sible to construct di¤erent kinds of templated merging operations. However, the abstract
denitions of basic and rened templated merging operations do not guarantee that the
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principle of Qualitativeness will be satised. Indeed, both templated majority merging
operations that were dened fail to satisfy the principle of Qualitativeness. Because of
the importance we attach to the principle of Qualitativeness, two new purely qualitative
templated majority merging operations will be constructed in the next section, both of
which are inspired by the notion of an infobase.
6.6 Content-based merging
The notion of information communicated by independent sources is closely linked to the
concept of an infobase (Meyer, Labuschagne, and Heidema, 2000b; Meyer, 2001b). For-
mally, an infobase IB is a nite list of sentence [1; 2; : : : ; m] representing information
obtained from independent sources by a specic point in time. Each sentence in an
infobase is associated with one and only one source. This means that repeated commu-
nications from a single source would be represented cumulatively by a single sentence.
Every infobase denes a total preorder on the set of states, which is used in the
construction of infobase change operations (Meyer, 2001b). The total preorder is dened
according to the number of sentences in the infobase that the states satisfy; the more
sentences a state satises, the lower down in the ordering the state will be. For s 2 S,
the IB-number sIB of s is dened as the number of sentences i in the infobase IB such
that s 2 Mod(i). The total preorder R on S is then obtained by taking (s; s0) 2 R i¤
s0IB  sIB.
Since every sentence  2 L induces a denite t-ordering t such that bottom(t) =
ModM() and top(t) = NModM(), where M = hS; li is an extensional interpretation
of L, and since every denite t-ordering t 2 TD has a syntactic expression in the form
of a sentence  2 L that is a nite axiomatisation of bottom(t) under M , it follows
that every infobase IB = [1; 2; : : : ; m] can be represented as an information tuple
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T = (t1 ; t2 ; : : : ; tm) and vice versa, provided none of the sentences in the infobase is a
contradiction. (A contradiction ? induces a denite t-ordering t? that is not regular.)
To generate a t-ordering from an infobase, as opposed to a total preorder on the set of
states, provision must be made for the exclusion of states. This will be accomplished by
generating the t-ordering from the nonmodels (or semantic content) of the sentences in the
infobase, instead of from the models of the sentences. Recall from semantic information
theory that the (semantic) content of a sentence  is dened as ContM() = NModM(),
under an extensional interpretationM = hS; li. The fewer sentences a state is a nonmodel
of, the lower down in the t-ordering it will be. If a state is an element of the (semantic)
content of every sentence in the infobase, then the state will be denitely excluded in the
t-ordering generated from the infobase.
Denition 6.20 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and let IB = [1; 2; : : : ; m] be an infobase. For s 2 S , the IB-content of s is dened
as contIB : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg by contIB(s) = card(fi 2 IB j s 2 ContM(i)g).
An IB-content function can be seen as a form of indexing function (with respect
to IB) from which an index set AIB  f0; 1; : : : ;mg can be dened by taking AIB =
ran(contIB). (Since AIB is nite and  is a linear order on AIB it follows that  is a
well-ordering on AIB.) The t-ordering generated from an infobase IB will be denoted by
TIB.
Denition 6.21 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and let IB = [1; 2; : : : ; m] be an infobase. Then the t-ordering TIB generated from
infobase IB is dened as
 TIB(s) =
8<: card(seg(contIB(s))) if contIB(s) < mn otherwise
where seg(contIB(s)) is the initial segment of contIB(s) 2 AIB.
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The idea of generating a t-ordering from the (semantic) content of the sentences in
an infobase will serve as the inspiration for constructing a new type of basic templated
merging operation, called a content-based templated merging operation, by using the
same method as for basic templated merging operations. A content-based indexing func-
tion fCont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg (with respect to information tuple T) assigns to each state
the number of t-orderings in T in which the state is excluded. Note that exclusion here
means both denitely excluded and tentatively excluded. This is because content-based
templated merging operations should apply to every information tuple, and not only to
information tuples that correspond to infobases. If a state is excluded by every t-ordering
in the information tuple, denitely or tentatively, then the state will be denitely excluded
in the merged regular t-ordering.
Denition 6.22 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. The content-based
indexing function fCont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg (with respect to T) is dened as fCont(s) =
card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g).
The content-based templated merging operation 4Cont based on indexing function
fCont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg is dened by using denition 6.15. From the denition of
content-based indexing function fCont and the fact that for every s 2 S the construction
of 4(T)(s) depends only on the the linear order  on the index set A = ran(f),
it follows that content-based templated merging operation 4Cont satises the princi-
ple of Qualitativeness. The e¤ect of the content-based operation 4Cont is to create a
merged regular t-ordering in which the states reect the combined indenite content of
all t-orderings in the information tuple by considering the number of t-orderings in the
information tuple for which a state s 2 S is tentatively (or denitely) excluded by a
t-ordering ti 2 T, i.e. for which s 2 Cont0(ti). The following example illustrates:
Example 6.4 Let T = (t1; t2; t3; t4) be the information tuple of example 6.2 (on page
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257) where t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g, t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g,
t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t4 = f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. But then
fCont = f(11; 1); (10; 3); (01; 4); (00; 3)g with ACont = (1; 3; 4). The merged regular t-
ordering 4Cont(T) is depicted in gure 6-3.
Figure 6-3: Content-based merging
The main di¤erence between4Cont and the other basic templated merging operations
is that a state will be denitely excluded in the merged t-ordering if it is excluded,
denitely or tentatively, by every t-ordering in the information tuple. In the case of4Min
and4, a state will only be denitely excluded in the merged t-ordering if it is denitely
excluded by every t-ordering in the information tuple whereas in the case of 4Max, a
state will be denitely excluded in the merged t-ordering if it is denitely excluded by
some t-ordering in the information tuple. (Note, however, that the denition of basic
templated merging operations ensures that in the event of every state being targeted
for denite exclusion in the merged t-ordering, the resulting merged t-ordering would be
tautological rather than strongly contradictory and thus regular as shown by proposition
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6.15.) Despite these di¤erences, content-based templated merging operations also satisfy
properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proposition 6.25 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4Cont satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 6)
but fails to satisfy property (TM4 7).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.3.
This result strengthens the view that properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5) may be
regarded as basic properties of templated merging operations. From the proposition it
follows that basic content-based merging operation 4Cont is a new type of templated
majority merging operation.
In the case where the information tuple comprises only denite (regular) t-orderings,
the result of a content-based templated merging operation is precisely the t-ordering
generated from the infobase corresponding to the information tuple.
Proposition 6.26 LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) = n
and let IB = [1; 2; : : : ; m] be an infobase such that no i  ?. Let T = (t1 ; t2 ; : : : ; tm)
be the information tuple corresponding to IB. Then TIB = 4Cont(T).
Proof. Let  2 L. If s 2 ContM() then by denition 3.3, s 2 NModM(). But
then s 2 top(t), i.e. t(s) > 0. So card(fi 2 IB j s 2 ContM(i)g) = card(fti 2
T j ti(s) > 0g). But then card(seg(fCont(s))) = card(seg(contIB(s))), and hence by
denitions 6.21 and 6.15, it follows that TIB = 4Cont(T).
As was the case with the other basic templated merging operations, it is possible to
dene a rened version of content-based merging operations based on the denition of a
rened content-based indexing function.
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Denition 6.23 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. The rened content-
based indexing function fRCont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mgn (with respect to T) is dened as
fRCont(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) such that xj = card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > j   1g).
The rened content-based templated merging operation 4RCont based on indexing func-
tion fRCont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mgn is dened by using denition 6.18. From the denition
of rened content-based indexing function fRCont and the fact that for every s 2 S the
construction of 4R(T)(s) depends only on the the lexicographic ordering  on the
rened index set AR = ran(fR), it follows that rened content-based templated merg-
ing operation 4RCont satises the principle of Qualitativeness. The e¤ect of the rened
content-based operation 4RCont is to rene the merged regular t-ordering obtained from
the basic content-based merging operation4Cont by creating a distinction between states
at the same level without disturbing the relative ordering of states at di¤erent levels or
rening the set of denitely excluded states. The following example illustrates:
Example 6.5 Let T = (t1; t2; t3; t4) be the information tuple of example 6.2 (on page
257) where t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g, t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g,
t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t4 = f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. But then
fRCont = f(11; (1; 0; 0; 0)); (10; (3; 2; 0; 0)); (01; (4; 4; 2; 2)); (00; (3; 1; 1; 0))g
with ARCont = ((1; 0; 0; 0); (3; 1; 1; 0); (3; 2; 0; 0); (4; 4; 2; 2)).
The merged regular t-ordering 4RCont(T) is depicted in gure 6-4 below.
Proposition 6.27 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be information tu-
ples. Templated merging operation 4RCont satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 6)
but fails to satisfy property (TM4 7).
Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.3.
From the results it follows that the rened content-based merging operation4RCont is
another templated merging operation that belongs to the subclass of templated majority
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Figure 6-4: Rened content-based merging
merging operations. Both content-based merging operations depend on the principle
of Trustworthiness, which says that the information received by agents is trustworthy.
Therefore, a state may be denitely excluded in the merged result if it is excluded,
even tentatively, by every agent (or sub-agent) communicating information. However,
a state which is tentatively excluded in the merged result of a content-based merging
operation must have been excluded, at least tentatively, by at least one agent (or sub-
agent) communicating information.
Proposition 6.28 Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Then, the following
holds for each s 2 S:
1. s 2 ContD(4Cont(T)) i¤ s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T
2. if s 2 Cont0(4Cont(T)) then s 2 Cont0(ti) for some ti 2 T
3. s 2 ContD(4RCont(T)) i¤ s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T
4. if s 2 Cont0(4RCont(T)) then s 2 Cont0(ti) for some ti 2 T
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Proof. See proof in appendix D, section D.3.
It may be argued that content-based merging operations 4Cont and 4RCont are too
credulous. For agents operating in a competitive setting where information communi-
cated by other agents is not guaranteed to be trustworthy, such as in games, this may
be true. But for control room agents operating in a cooperative setting where infor-
mation communicated by other agents (or sub-agents) is trustworthy, it need not be
true. However, should a more sceptical content-based merging operation be required, the
content-based indexing function may be modied to increase the threshold of exclusion.
In other words, a content-based indexing function fCont;j : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg may be
dened by taking fCont;j(s) = card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > j for 0 < j < ng) where j indi-
cates the threshold of exclusion. The most credulous of content-based indexing functions
would be fCont;0 whereas the most sceptical of content-based indexing functions would
be fCont;n 1. Albeit interesting, the idea of sceptical content-based merging operations






Anyway Ill make an end, for I want to.... ... Is it really the end?
Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment (Fyodor Dostoyevsky)
7.1 Summary
One of the goals of the thesis has been to emphasise the benets of taking an agent-
oriented view in the broader area of knowledge representation and reasoning. The agent-
oriented view led to the demarcation of a specic class of systems, the class of diagram-
mable systems, and a compatible class of agents, the class of control room agents. These
determined the choice of knowledge representation languages, namely, nitely generated
transparent propositional languages under a possible worlds semantics (as opposed to
the classical truth-value semantics). By taking an agent-oriented view, subtleties were
discovered in the general area of belief change that may otherwise have been left undis-
covered.
Within the broader agent-oriented perspective, an information-theoretic approach
was adopted, which gave rise to the concept of a templated ordering (t-ordering), a
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novel semantic construct that allows for the combination of both denite and indenite
information in the same structure. One of the attractive features of this data structure
is that (di¤erent classes of) t-orderings are expressible (by di¤erent normal forms) in the
knowledge representation language and recoverable from such. This was accomplished
by extending the obvious state description normal form or SDNF (semantic content
normal form or SCNF) into state description cumulative form or SDCF (semantic content
cumulative form or SCCF) and state description templated form or SDTF (semantic
content templated form or SCTF).
Finding appropriate representations of the epistemic states of agents is an important
issue in the area of knowledge representation and reasoning. The information-theoretic
representation of an epistemic state as a regular t-ordering is di¤erent from most other
approaches, even the ordinal conditional functions of Spohn, in the sense that it allows
for the representation of both knowledge and (degrees of) belief. In accordance with
the agent-oriented view, knowledge is not viewed in the Platonic tradition as true justi-
ed belief, which would make sense only from the perspective of an omniscient godlike
superagent, but is instead related to a psychological notion of entrenchment of belief.
No attempt is made to specify a particular degree of entrenchment that constitutes the
threshold of conviction at which mere belief becomes knowledge. Not only is this likely to
be context-dependent, but a full account must take into account emotions (or emotion-
analogs), since it would seem that one of the mechanisms whereby belief is replaced by
knowledge is the recruitment of emotions. The process of converting a tentative prefer-
ence into a deeply entrenched conviction that the agent is unwilling to give up in the face
of argument has, in contexts such as vegetarianism and beliefs about the desirability of
cigarette smoking, been called moralizationand associated with the emotion of disgust
by Rozin (1997). Evidence that such convictions do not yield to mere argument is cited
in Haidt (2001). For present purposes, therefore, we are content to rely on the evidence
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that there is indeed a point at which tentative belief is su¢ ciently deeply entrenched to
acquire the status of a conviction.
Similarly to beliefs, convictions may be surrendered, although not lightly. For exam-
ple, an agent may somehow be brought to realise that circumstances have changed. In
everyday human social intercourse this realisation may come about in a variety of ways,
for example as a result of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). For control room agents
the relevant mechanism is paradox-resolution - the agent resolves the paradox created by
the reception of trustworthy new information that is inconsistent with what the agent
strongly believes to be fact, by realising that the state of the system has changed. This
mechanism is built into the proposed epistemic change algorithm. The algorithm pro-
vides a control room agent with a novel mechanism to choose between di¤erent epistemic
change operations, most notably, between revision and update.
An area of general neglect in the representation of epistemic states is the construction
of an initial epistemic state. This has been addressed by dening a renement operation
on t-orderings in normal form and using it to rene the agents xed information by its
default rules about the system.
The area of belief change has been an active research area for at least two decades
with the major focus on belief revision and, to a lesser extent, on belief (or knowledge
base) update. One of the features of templated revision, apart from extending the notion
of belief revision to include knowledge, is that a notion of informational gain (or loss)
is available through the denition of the (semantic) information content of t-orderings.
As has been shown, templated revision results in monotonic growth of the control room
agents knowledge and nonmonotonic growth of its beliefs. The epistemic change al-
gorithm proved instrumental in providing an alternative justication for rejecting the
controversial postulate (C2) for iterated revision and in casting some shadow over recent
claims that the DP-postulates are overly permissive.
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The main contribution of the thesis to the area of belief change lies, however, in
templated update. Recognising that the distinctive postulate for update, called the
Disjunction Rule, requires an operation to be dened on epistemic states so that the
rule holds on the associated knowledge bases, a modication of the KM postulates for
update was proposed which allows for the transition from update as a function of belief
sets to update as a function of epistemic states. The other main insight about update
stems from adopting an agent-oriented view in which diagrammable systems are dened
as discrete systems. This led to the subtle discovery that belief update has essentially
been cast in the realm of continuous systems. Recasting epistemic update into the realm
of discrete systems resulted in e¤ectively rejecting one of the KM postulates for update
and gave rise to the notion of an epistemic transition function. Templated revision and
templated update support iterated epistemic change in a unied framework and, for each,
a representation result has been proved and a concrete operation constructed.
In recent times, research in the area of belief change has tended to shift more towards
belief merging and the eld of information fusion. In accordance with our focus on con-
trol room agents, only the Pareto principle from Arrows set of conditions in social choice
theory was adopted as a rationality property for templated merging. Through the deni-
tion of an abstract basic templated merging operation and an associated abstract rened
templated merging operation, a exible foundation was provided for constructing merg-
ing operations that do not rely on any notion of distance. Several concrete instantiations
of these abstract templated merging operations were constructed, thereby illustrating
the exibility of the foundation. Based on ideas from infobase change, the proposal for
content-based merging gave rise to a new family of purely qualitative templated majority
merging operations. Using the foundation provided by the abstract templated merging
operations, two concrete content-based merging operations were constructed, which could




In this thesis, a control room agent is viewed as a rst-order intentional system having
both informational attitudes and motivational attitudes, but the focus has been exclu-
sively on the informational attitudes of knowledge and belief. Of particular interest would
be to (attempt to) model the role that emotion plays in the reasoning (Simon, 1967; Oat-
ley and Johnson-Laird, 1987; Picard, 1997; Moore and Oaksford, 2002) of control room
agents. One possible avenue of exploration is to augment the epistemic framework of
control room agents with an ordering on sentences that reects a preference ordering of
emotion, which may serve to direct and limit (by conserving resources) the reasoning
of the agent. The ordering may be induced from a t-ordering by a suitable power con-
struction, such as those used in verisimilitude (Brink and Heidema, 1987; Burger and
Heidema, 1995). Whether these ideas will prove useful remains to be seen. Another line of
research would be to extend the notion of a control room agent as a rst-order intentional
system by formalising some of the motivational attitudes of a control room agent.
Moving away from a single agent, an obvious next step would be to generalise tem-
plated interpretations under the information-theoretic semantics for epistemic logic so
as to represent the epistemic states of multiple agents. In this connection, the use of t-
orderings has an advantage to o¤er, specially in respect of the treatment of agentsxed
information. Given a single agent, the usual treatment of xed information is to per-
manently exclude from all consideration the states that are (known to be) unrealisable.
However, given multiple agents, each with limited information, it becomes necessary to
record the di¤erences in these agentsxed information when modelling their epistemic
states. Such di¤erences cannot be recorded if the usual treatment is used because it does
not provide a means for choosing which states to permanently exclude amongst those
known by di¤erent agents (or even an omniscient godlike superagent) to be unrealisable.
In the context of multiple agents, t-orderings make it possible to explicitly represent
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di¤erence in the agentsxed information.
The information-theoretic approach to belief change is purely qualitative and, as
such, avoids the problems associated with quantitative approaches relating to numbers,
fundamental among which is the problem Where do the numbers come from?. However,
as pointed out by Fermé and Rott (2004), quantitative approaches are more expressive
than qualitative approaches in allowing degrees of acceptance of the input sentence, for
example, Spohns conditionalisation k  (;m). Whilst in agreement with the arguments
against the use of numbers, Fermé and Rott also agree that there should be ways of
specifying the strength of new beliefs. Their proposal, called revision by comparison, is
to provide a qualitative analogue in the form of a reference sentence  which calls for an
input sentence  to be accepted with a degree of plausibility that is at least equal to that of
, by using an epistemic entrenchment ordering v. The revision by comparison operation
K ( v ) instructs the agent to ensure that the entrenchment of  is at least as rm as
the entrenchment of  in the revised epistemic state. From an agent-oriented view, a key
question is how the reference sentence (degree of acceptance) is determined and by whom,
given that agents obtain information in the form of observations and communications
from other agents. Incorporating qualitative analogues for such quantitative constructs
into templated revision and templated update seems a useful area for future research
provided, from an agent-oriented view, that it is meaningful for the class of agents under
consideration.
Belief merging and belief revision, whether at the level of belief sets or epistemic
states, are generally viewed as alternative forms of belief change. However, at the level
of epistemic states, iterated revision can also be viewed as a form of prioritised merging
(Maynard-Reid II and Shoham, 2001; Delgrande, Dubois, and Lang, 2006). In the context
of information fusion, where the notion of belief merging relates to the combination
of (possibly conicting) information received from multiple sources, yet another view
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emerges. In this view, which can be traced back to the Decision Ladder of Rasmussen
(1986), the result of belief merging (combining information) serves as the input for belief
revision (as well as for belief expansion and belief update). The intuitive meaning is that
the control room agent is presented with both certain and uncertain information. Since
the result of templated merging is a regular t-ordering, it means that the epistemic change
algorithm, and hence all the templated operations, will have to be redened to accept as
input not a denite t-ordering but a regular t-ordering. Technically, templated update
may be redened as a templated maximisation operation whereas templated revision
may be redened by a suitable modication of the partial renement operation. The
potential implications are not yet clear, especially for templated update. From an agent-
oriented perspective, the notion of scepticism (credulousness) should form part of any
proper account.
The last area for future research to be considered is the computational complexity
(Papadimitriou, 1994) of the proposed templated operations for epistemic change and
for combining (merging) information. The complexity of deciding whether a sentence is
a semantic consequence of a revised (updated) knowledge base are studied by Eiter and
Gottlob (1992) while Liberatore and Schaerf (2001) study whether a possible world is a
model of a revised (updated) knowledge base. The analysis of Cadoli, Donini, Liberatore,
and Schaerf (1999) focusses on a specic computational aspect, namely, the size of the
revised (updated) knowledge base. Liberatore (1997) considers the complexity of iterated
revision operations. Some complexity results for distance-based merging operations is
studied by Konieczny, Lang, and Marquis (2002) and it would be constructive to see
whether the complexity results for templated merging operations di¤er signicantly from





Proofs for Chapter 3
A.1 Proofs for Section 3.2
Proposition A.1 (3.7 ) Let X be a set and let R be a total preorder on X. Then R
produces a strict linearly ordered partition of X.
Proof. To construct the partition of X, start by constructing an equivalence relation
 on X from R. Let  be the relation on X given by x  y i¤ (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) 2 R.
Then  is reexive on X by reexivity of R, symmetric by denition of , and transitive
by transitivity of R, i.e.  is an equivalence relation on X. The equivalence classes
form the relevant partition PR of X. Let < be the relation on PR dened as [x] < [y]
i¤ (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) =2 R. (Note that < is independent of choice of representatives.
To see this suppose [x] < [y]. So (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) =2 R. Choose any x0 2 [x] and
y0 2 [y]. Since x  x0, (x; x0) 2 R and (x0; x) 2 R. Similarly, (y; y0) 2 R and (y0; y) 2 R.
By transitivity of R, (x0; y0) 2 R. Suppose (y0; x0) 2 R. By transitivity of R, (y; x) 2 R.
Contradiction. So (y0; x0) =2 R.) It is easy to see that the relation < is irreexive and
antisymmetric. To see that < is transitive, suppose that [x] < [y] and [y] < [z]. So
(x; y) 2 R and (y; x) =2 R and (y; z) 2 R and (z; y) =2 R. By transitivity of R, (x; z) 2 R.
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But (z; x) =2 R otherwise, by transitivity of R, (z; y) 2 R resulting in a contradiction.
Hence, [x] < [z]. To see that < is connected, pick any [x]; [y] 2 PR. Suppose [x]  [y].
But then, by denition of <, (x; y) =2 R or (y; x) 2 R or both. If both, then [y] < [x].
If (x; y) =2 R but (y; x) =2 R we have a contradiction since R is total. If (y; x) 2 R but
(x; y) 2 R, then x  y and hence [x] = [y]. Thus, for every [x]; [y] 2 PR, either [x] < [y]
or [y] < [x] or [x] = [y]. So < is a strict linear order on PR.
Proposition A.2 (3.9) Let X be a set and let Q be a strict modular partial order on
X. Then Q produces a strict linearly ordered partition of X.
Proof. To construct the partition of X, begin by constructing an equivalence relation
' on X from Q. Let ' be the relation on X given by x ' y i¤ (x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q.
By irreexivity of Q, for every x 2 X, (x; x) =2 Q. So for every x 2 X, x ' x, i.e. ' is
reexive on X. Suppose x ' y. So (x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q. But then y ' x, i.e. ' is
symmetric. Suppose x ' y and y ' z. So (x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q, and (y; z) =2 Q and
(z; y) =2 Q. Suppose (z; x) 2 Q. But (x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q. So, by the rst condition
of modularity of Q, (z; y) 2 RS. Contradiction. So (z; x) =2 Q. Similarly, (x; z) =2 Q. So
x ' z, i.e. ' is transitive. But then ' is an equivalence relation on X. The equivalence
classes form the relevant partition PQ of X. Let  be the relation on PQ dened as
[x]  [y] i¤ (x; y) 2 Q. (Note that  is independent of choice of representatives. To
see this suppose [x]  [y]. So (x; y) 2 Q. Choose any x0 2 [x] and y0 2 [y]. Since
x ' x0, (x; x0) =2 Q and (x0; x) =2 Q by denition. Similarly, since y ' y0, (y; y0) =2 Q
and (y0; y) =2 Q. By the rst condition of modularity of Q, (x; y0) 2 Q. By the second
condition of modularity of Q, either (x0; y0) 2 Q or (x; x0) 2 Q. But (x; x0) =2 Q. So
(x0; y0) 2 Q.) To show that  is linear and strict, it must be shown to be irreexive,
antisymmetric, transitive, and connected. But  is irreexive on PQ by irreexivity of
Q, antisymmetric by antisymmetry of Q, and transitive by transitivity of Q. To see that
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 is connected, pick any [x]; [y] 2 PQ. Suppose [x]  [x], [y]  [x], and [x] 6= [y]. So
(x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q and x 6= y. Then, by denition of ', x ' y. So [x] = [y].
Contradiction. So  is connected as well. But then ' is a strict linear order on PQ.
Proposition A.3 (3.10) Let X be a set, R a total preorder on X, and Q the corre-
sponding strict modular partial order on X. Then R and Q produce the same strict
linearly ordered partition of X.
Proof. By proposition 3.7, R produces a a strict linearly ordered partition < on PR
and by proposition 3.9, Q produces a strict linearly ordered partition  on PQ where
Q = R   f(x; y) j (y; x) 2 Rg. It must be shown that PR = PQ and that the relations
< on PR and  on PQ are equal. Suppose x  y. Thus, by denition, (x; y) 2 R and
(y; x) 2 R. But then (x; y) =2 Q and (y; x) =2 Q since Q = R   f(x; y) j (y; x) 2 Rg. So,
by denition of ', x ' y. Conversely, suppose x ' y. Thus, by denition, (x; y) =2 Q
and (y; x) =2 Q. But R is total and thus (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) 2 R. So, by denition of
, x  y. To show that the relations < on PR and  on PQ are equal it must be shown
that if [x] < [y], then [x]  [y] and, conversely, if [x]  [y], then [x] < [y]. Choose any
[x] < [y]. By denition of <, (x; y) 2 R and (y; x) =2 R. But Q = R f(x; y)j(y; x) 2 Rg.
So (x; y) 2 Q. Thus, by denition of , [x]  [y]. Conversely, choose any [x]  [y]. So
(x; y) 2 Q. But Q  R and so (x; y) 2 R. Suppose (y; x) 2 R. By denition of Q,
(x; y) =2 Q. Contradiction. So (y; x) =2 R. Thus [x] < [y]. It may therefore be concluded
that R and Q produce the same strict linearly ordered partition of X.
A.2 Proofs for Section 3.3
Proposition A.4 (3.13) Let t 2 TS, i; j 2 B, and s 2 S. Then the following con-
straints hold:
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1. bottom(t)  get"(t; j) and top(t)  get#(t; j)
2. get!(t; i)  get"(t; j) if i  j and get!(t; i)  get#(t; j) if i  j
3. get"(t; j) [ get#(t; j) = S and get"(t; j) \ get#(t; j) = get!(t; j)
4. pull(push(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t
5. push(pull(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t
Proof. The rst three results follow directly from the denitions.
4. Suppose j > t(s). Then push(t; s; j) = t > f(s; j)g. So push(t; s; j)(s) = j. Thus
push(t; s; j)(s) > t(s). But then pull(push(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = push(t; s; j) > f(s; t(s))g.
So pull(push(t; s; j); s; t(s))(s) = t(s). But only s was involved in the overriding and
thus pull(push(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t. Now suppose that j  t(s). So push(t; s; j) = t, i.e.
push(t; s; j)(s) = t(s). But then pull(push(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t.
5. Suppose j < t(s). Then pull(t; s; j) = t > f(s; j)g. So pull(t; s; j)(s) = j. Thus
pull(t; s; j)(s) < t(s). But then push(pull(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = pull(t; s; j) > f(s; t(s))g. So
push(pull(t; s; j); s; t(s))(s) = t(s). But only s was involved in the overriding and thus
push(pull(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t. Now suppose that j  t(s). So pull(t; s; j) = t, i.e.
pull(t; s; j)(s) = t(s). But then push(pull(t; s; j); s; t(s)) = t.
Lemma A.1 (3.1) Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B and let g be the
normalise function for A. Then g(x) < n for every x 2 A such that x 6= n.
Proof. Pick any element x 2 A such that x 6= n. So g(x) = card(seg(x)). But A is
well-ordered and so x = succ(seg(x)) and n = succ(seg(n)). Since x < n it follows that
seg(x)  seg(n) and thus card(seg(x)) < card(seg(n)). But seg(n) [ fng = B and so
card(seg(n)) = n. Hence card(seg(x)) < n, i.e. g(x) < n.
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Lemma A.2 (3.2) Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B and let g be the
normalise function for A. Then g is injective.
Proof. If A is a singleton then g is trivially injective. Suppose A is not a singleton.
Pick any elements x; x0 2 A. To prove that g is injective it must be shown that if x 6= x0
then g(x) 6= g(x0). Assume that x 6= x0. Suppose further that x 6= n and x0 6= n.
Since A is well-ordered it follows that x = succ(seg(x)) and x0 = succ(seg(x0)). But
then seg(x) 6= seg(x0) otherwise x = x0. So card(seg(x)) 6= card(seg(x0)) and thus
g(x) 6= g(x0). Now suppose that x = n. Then g(x) = n and g(x0) < n (by lemma 3.1)
and so g(x) 6= g(x0). Similarly when it is supposed that x0 = n. Hence g is injective.
Lemma A.3 (3.3) Let A be a non-empty proper subset of template B and let g be the
normalise function for A. If j < n and j 2 ran(g), then k 2 ran(g) for every 0  k < j.
Proof. Suppose j < n and j 2 ran(g). But g is injective (by lemma 3.2). So there
is exactly one x 2 A such that g(x) = card(seg(x)) = j. Let gjseg(x) be the restriction
of g to seg(x). We shall show that ran(gjseg(x)) = f0; 1; : : : ; j   1g. To see this pick
any k 2 ran(gjseg(x)). But g is injective (by lemma 3.2). So there is exactly one
x0 2 seg(x) such that g(x0) = card(seg(x0)) = k. But x0 < x and since A is well-ordered
it follows that ?  seg(x0)  seg(x). But then 0  card(seg(x0)) < card(seg(x)), i.e.
0  g(x0) < g(x), i.e. 0  k < j. So k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; j   1g. Conversely, pick any
k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; j   1g. Let x0 be the predecessor of x. Since A is well-ordered it follows
that x0 2 seg(x) and seg(x0) = seg(x) fx0g. So card(seg(x0)) = j  1. If j  1 6= k then
the process repeats until card(seg(x00)) = k for some x00 2 seg(x)). So k 2 ran(gjseg(x)).
Thus ran(gjseg(x)) = f0; 1; : : : ; j   1g. So if it is the case that j < n and g(x) = j
then ran(gjseg(x)) = f0; 1; : : : ; j   1g. In other words, if j < n and j 2 ran(g), then
k 2 ran(g) for every 0  k < j.
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A.3 Proofs for Section 3.4
Lemma A.4 (3.4) Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Then for every sentence  =
Vn
i=0 i of L in SDCF, ModM() =ModM(0).
Proof. Pick any sentence  =
Vn
i=0 i of L in SDCF. By denition of SDCF, each
i is a sentence in extensional SDNF. Pick any state description, say j, occurring in
i. Then, since  is in SDCF, j occurs in every k where k > i. But for every state
description j in i, there exists a corresponding state sj 2 S such thatModM(j) = fsjg
(because M is extensional). So ModM(i)  ModM(k) for every k > i. But thenTn
i=0ModM(i) = ModM(0): Since ModM( ^  ) = ModM() \ModM( ) for every
;  2 L, it follows that ModM() =
Tn
i=0ModM(i). But then ModM() =ModM(0).
Lemma A.5 (3.5) Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Then for every sentence  =
Vm
i=0 i of L in SCCF, ModM() =ModM(0).
Proof. Pick any sentence  =
Vm
i=0 i of L in SCCF. By denition of SCCF, each
i is a sentence in extensional SCNF. Pick any content element, say "j, occurring in i.
Then, since  is in SCCF, "j occurs in every k where k < i. But for every content
element "j in i, there exists a corresponding state sj 2 S such that NModM("j) = fsjg
(because M is extensional). So NModM(i)  NModM(k) for every k < i. Hence
ModM(k)  ModM(i) for every k < i. But then
Tm
i=0ModM(i) = ModM(0): Since
ModM( ^  ) = ModM() \ModM( ) for every ;  2 L, it follows that ModM() =Tn
i=0ModM(i). But then ModM() =ModM(0).
Lemma A.6 (3.6) Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =
n. Then for every sentence  = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn
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Proof. Pick any sentence  = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn
i=0 i) of L in SDTF. By denition of
SDTF, each i is a sentence in extensional SDNF. Pick any state description, say j,
occurring in i. Then, since  is in SDTF, j occurs in every k where k > i. But
for every state description j in i, there exists a corresponding state sj 2 S such that
ModM(j) = fsjg (because M is extensional). So ModM(i)  ModM(k) for every
k > i. Let  =
Wn 1
i=0 i. Since ModM(_ ) =ModM()[ModM( ) for every ;  2 L,
it follows thatModM() =
Sn 1
i=0 ModM(i). ButModM(i) ModM(k) for every k > i
and thus ModM() =ModM(n 1). Hence ModM(
Wn 1
i=0 i) =ModM(n 1).
Lemma A.7 (3.7) Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S) =








Proof. Pick any sentence  = (
Wn 1
i=0 i) ^ (
Vn 1
i=0 i) of L in SCTF. By denition
of SCTF, each i is a sentence in extensional SCNF. Pick any content element, say "j,
occurring in i. Then, since  is in SCCF, "j occurs in every k where k < i. But
for every content element "j in i, there exists a corresponding state sj 2 S such that
NModM("j) = fsjg (because M is extensional). So NModM(i)  NModM(k) for
every k < i. Hence ModM(k)  ModM(i) for every k < i. Let  =
Wn 1
i=0 i. Since
ModM( _  ) = ModM() [ModM( ) for every ;  2 L, it follows that ModM() =Sn 1




A.4 Proofs for Section 3.6
Lemma A.8 (3.8) Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let  2 L.
Then Mint() = fs 2ModT () j t(s) = dt(t; )g.
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Proof. If Mint() = ? then the result holds trivially. Suppose Mint() 6= ?.
Choose any s 2 Mint(). So s 2 ModT () and there is no s0 2 ModT () such that
t(s0)  t(s) unless t(s)  t(s0). But s 2 get"(t; t(s)). So s 2 get"(t; t(s))\ModT (). But
t(s) is the least j such that get"(t; j) \ModT () 6= ? otherwise s =2 Mint(). But then
t(s) = dt(t; ). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that Mint()  fs 2ModT () j
t(s) = dt(t; )g.
Conversely, if ModT () = ? then the result holds trivially. Suppose ModT () 6= ?.
Choose any s 2 ModT () such that t(s) = dt(t; ). Suppose dt(t; ) = j for j  n.
But then get"(t; j) \ModT () 6= ? and get"(t; i) \ModT () = ? for every i < j. It is
claimed there is no s0 2ModT () such that t(s0)  j unless j  t(s0) otherwise it cannot
be the case that get"(t; i) \ModT () = ? for every i < j. But then s 2Mint(). Since
s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that fs 2ModT () j t(s) = dt(t; )g Mint(). But
then Mint() = fs 2ModT () j t(s) = dt(t; )g.
Lemma A.9 (3.9) Let T = hS; t; li be a templated interpretation of L and let  2 L
and s 2 S. If s 2ModT ( ^ ) and s 2Mint(), then s 2Mint( ^ ).
Proof. Let s 2 ModT ( ^ ) and s 2 Mint(). By lemma 3.8, s 2 ModT () and
t(s) = dt(t; ). Suppose s =2 Mint( ^ ). So there must be some s0 2 ModT ( ^ )
such that t(s0) < t(s). So t(s0) < dt(t; ). But then s0 =2 ModT (). Contradiction. So
s 2Mint( ^ ).
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Proofs for Chapter 4
B.1 Proofs for Section 4.3
Proposition B.1 (4.6) Let hS; F i be a frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model of
the set Kn 1Tn 14n 15n 1 of sentences of L0 that are instances of one of the schemas
Kn 1, Tn 1, 4n 1, or 5n 1 i¤ for every s; s0 2 S,
1. s is accessible from itself and
2. if s0 is accessible from s, then ContD(F (s0)) = ContD(F (s)).
Proof. Suppose that hS; F i is a frame-model of Kn 1Tn 14n 15n 1. Then by propo-
sition 4.5 it follows that for every s 2 S, s is accessible from itself. To show that
condition 2 holds, suppose that there are s; s0 2 S such that s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1) but
ContD(F (s
0)) 6= ContD(F (s)), i.e. get"(F (s); n   1) 6= get"(F (s0); n   1). Then a tem-
plated interpretation based on hS; F i can be constructed that is not a model of all the in-
stances of schema 5n 1, in particular the sentence :[n 1]P (a)! [n 1]:[n 1]P (a). Take
T = hS; F; li such that vl(s0)(P (a)) = 0 for state s0 2 get"(F (s); n 1) and vl(s00)(P (a)) = 1
for every s00 2 get"(F (s0); n   1). So P (a) is not satised at state s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1)
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and hence [n  1]P (a) is not satised at state s from which it follows that :[n  1]P (a)
is satised at state s. However, P (a) is satised at every state s00 2 get"(F (s0); n   1)
and thus [n   1]P (a) is satised at state s0 from which it follows that :[n   1]P (a) is
not satised at state s0. But s0 2 get"(F (s); n   1) and thus [n   1]:[n   1]P (a) is not
satised at state s. But then s fails to satisfy :[n   1]P (a) ! [n   1]:[n   1]P (a) at
state s. So hS; F i cannot be a frame-model of :[n   1]P (a) ! [n   1]:[n   1]P (a).
Contradiction. Hence, if s0 is accessible from s, then ContD(F (s0)) = ContD(F (s)).
Conversely, suppose that for every s; s0 2 S, s is accessible from itself and if s0 is
accessible from s, then ContD(F (s0)) = ContD(F (s)). It must be shown that hS; F i is a
frame-model of Kn 1Tn 14n 15n 1. By propositions 4.4 and 4.5 hS; F i is a frame-model
of every sentence that is an instance of schemas Kn 1 and Tn 1 respectively.
To show that hS; F i is a a frame-model of every sentence that is an instance of schema 4n 1
choose any sentence  2 L0 of the form [n 1]! [n 1][n 1]. Suppose hS; F i is not a
frame-model of . So there must be some templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 and
some state s 2 S such that s fails to satisfy  in T . So it must be the case that [n 1] is
satised at s but [n 1][n 1] is not. If [n 1][n 1] is not satised at s then there must
be some state s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1) at which [n  1] is not satised. Hence there must
be some state s00 2 get"(F (s0); n 1) that fails to satisfy . Recall that [n 1] is satised
at s. So it must be the case that  is satised at every state s000 2 get"(F (s); n   1),
including s0. But get"(F (s0); n   1) = get"(F (s); n   1) and thus s00 2 get"(F (s); n   1)
from which it follows that  is satised at s00. Contradiction. Hence, hS; F i is a frame-
model of the arbitrarily chosen sentence  and therefore of every instance of schema 4n 1.
To show that hS; F i is a a frame-model of every sentence that is an instance of schema
5n 1 choose any sentence  2 L0 of the form :[n 1]! [n 1]:[n 1]. Suppose hS; F i
is not a frame-model of . So there must be some templated interpretation T = hS; F; li
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of L0 and some state s 2 S such that s fails to satisfy  in T . So it must be the case
that :[n   1] is satised at s but [n   1]:[n   1] is not. If [n   1]:[n   1] is not
satised at s then there must be some state s0 2 get"(F (s); n  1) at which :[n  1] is
not satised, i.e. at which [n  1] is satised. So it must be the case that  is satised
at every s00 2 get"(F (s0); n  1). Recall that :[n  1] is satised at s and thus [n  1]
is not. So there must be some s000 2 get"(F (s); n   1) that fails to satisfy . But since
s0 2 get"(F (s); n 1) it follows that get"(F (s); n 1) = get"(F (s0); n 1) and hence that
s000 2 get"(F (s0); n 1). But then  must be satised at s000. Contradiction. Hence, hS; F i
is a frame-model of the arbitrarily chosen sentence  and therefore of every instance of
schema 5n 1.
Proposition B.2 (4.7) Let hS; F i be a frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model of
the set K0D04050 of sentences of L0 that are instances of one of the schemas K0, D0, 40,
or 50 i¤
1. for every s 2 S there exists some s0 2 S such that s is accessible to degree 0 from
s0 and
2. for every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is accessible to degree 0 from s, then Cont0(F (s0)) =
Cont0(F (s)).
Proof. Suppose that hS; F i is a frame-model of K0D04050. To show that condition
1 holds, choose any s 2 S. It must be shown that there is some state s0 2 S such that
s0 2 get"(F (s); 0). Suppose it is not the case. So get"(F (s); 0) = ?. Then a templated
interpretation based on hS; F i can be constructed that is not a model of all the instances of
schema D0, in particular the sentence [0]P (a)! :[0]:P (a). Since get"(F (s); 0) = ?, it
hold vacuously that P (a) is satised at every s0 2 get"(F (s); 0) and that :P (a) is satised
293
B. Proofs for Chapter 4
at every s0 2 get"(F (s); 0). So [0]P (a) is satised at s and [0]:P (a) is satised at s. But
if [0]:P (a) is satised at s then :[0]:P (a) fails to be satised at s. But then hS; F i
cannot be a frame-model of [0]P (a)! :[0]:P (a). Contradiction. Hence, there must be
some state s0 2 S such that s0 2 get"(F (s); 0). To show that condition 2 holds, suppose
that there are s; s0 2 S such that s0 2 get"(F (s); 0) but Cont0(F (s0)) 6= Cont0(F (s)).
The proof can now be constructed in exactly the same way as the proof for proposition
4.6 by constructing a templated interpretation based on hS; F i that is not a model of
all the instances of schema 50, using sentence :[0]P (a)! [0]:[0]P (a) as an instances of
schema 50.
Conversely, suppose that conditions 1 and 2 hold. It must be shown that hS; F i
is a frame-model of K0D04050. By proposition 4.4, hS; F i is a frame-model of every
sentence that is an instance of schema K0. To show that hS; F i is a a frame-model
of every sentence that is an instance of schema D0 choose any sentence  2 L0 of the
form [0] ! :[0]:. Suppose hS; F i is not a frame-model of . So there must be some
templated interpretation T = hS; F; li of L0 and some state s 2 S such that s fails to
satisfy  in T . So it must be the case that [0] is satised at s but :[0]: is not.
If :[0]: is not satised at s, then [0]: must be satised at s and hence, : must
be satised at every state s0 2 get"(F (s); 0). Since get"(F (s); 0) 6= ? it follows that
 fails to be satised at every s0 2 get"(F (s); 0). But then [0] cannot be satised at
s. Contradiction. Hence, hS; F i is a frame-model of the arbitrarily chosen sentence 
and therefore of every instance of schema D0. In addition, hS; F i can be shown to be a
frame-model of every sentence that is an instance of schema 40 by choosing any sentence
 2 L0 of the form [0] ! [0][0] and following the same argument as for the proof
of schema 4n 1 in proposition 4.6. Similarly, by choosing any sentence  2 L0 of the
form :[0] ! [0]:[0] and using the same argument as for the proof of schema 5n 1 in
proposition 4.6, it can be shown that hS; F i is a frame-model of every sentence that is
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an instance of schema 50.
Proposition B.3 (4.10) Let hS; F i be a frame of L0. Then hS; F i is a frame-model of
the set KiTn 14Ki5Ki of sentences of L0 that are instances of one of the schemas Ki,
Tn 1, 4Ki, or 5Ki i¤ for every s; s0 2 S,
1. s is accessible from itself and
2. if s0 is accessible to degree i from s, then Conti(F (s)) = Conti(F (s0)) and F (s0)(x) =
F (s)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s0); i).
Proof. Suppose that hS; F i is a frame-model of KiTn 14Ki5Ki. Then by proposition
4.5 it follows that for every s 2 S, s is accessible from itself. So condition 1 holds. For
every s; s0 2 S, if s0 is accessible to degree i from s, then by proposition 4.8 it holds that
Conti(F (s))  Conti(F (s0)) and F (s0)(x)  F (s)(x) for every x 2 get"(F (s0); i) and by
proposition 4.9 it holds that Conti(F (s0))  Conti(F (s)) and F (s)(x)  F (s0)(x) for
every x 2 get"(F (s); i). But then condition 2 holds.
Conversely, suppose that for every s; s0 2 S, s is accessible from itself and if s0 is ac-
cessible to degree i from s, then Conti(F (s)) = Conti(F (s0)) and F (s0)(x) = F (s)(x) for
every x 2 get"(F (s0); i). It must be shown that hS; F i is a frame-model of KiTn 14Ki5Ki.
By propositions 4.4 and 4.5 hS; F i is a frame-model of every sentence that is an instance
of schemas Ki and Tn 1 respectively. Proposition 4.8 shows that hS; F i is a frame-model
of every sentence that is an instance of schema 4Ki while 4.9 shows that hS; F i is a
frame-model of every sentence that is an instance of schema 5Ki.
B.2 Proofs for Section 4.6
Lemma B.1 (4.1) Suppose X and Y are two nite sets on which there are linear orders
X and Y respectively. Then the lexicographic ordering  on any subset A of the
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Cartesian product X  Y is a well-ordering on A.
Proof. It will be shown that  is linear on A and use the niteness of A to conclude
that  is a well-ordering on A. To show that  is reexive on A pick any element
(x; y) 2 A. Then (by reexivity of X and Y ) x = x and y = y. So (x; y) = (x; y)
thus establishing the reexivity of  on R. To show that  is antisymmetric suppose
that (x; y)  (x0; y0) and (x; y) 6= (x0; y0). So x X x0 and if x = x0 then y <Y y0
for otherwise it would be the case that (x; y) = (x0; y0). But then ((x0; y0); (x; y)) =2.
Thus  is antisymmetric. To show that  is transitive suppose that (x; y)  (x0; y0) and
(x0; y0)  (x00; y00). So x X x0 and if x = x0 then y Y y0. Furthermore, x0 X x00 and if
x0 = x00 then y0 Y y00. But then (by transitivity of X), x X x00. Suppose x = x00. So
x = x0 and x0 = x00. But then, by transitivity of Y , y Y y00. So (x; y)  (x00; y00), i.e.
 is transitive. To show that  is linear pick any elements (x; y); (x0; y0) 2 R. But X
and Y are both linear and so either x X x0 or x0 X x and either y X y0 or y0 X y.
Suppose that x X x0. If x = x0 then either (x; y)  (x0; y0) or (x; y0)  (x0; y). Now
suppose that x0 X x. If x = x0 then either (x0; y)  (x; y0) or (x0; y0)  (x; y). Thus, 
is a linear order on A. But A is nite and so  is a well-ordering on A.
Proposition B.4 (4.15) Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. Let
t1; t2 2 TN and let A be the index set induced by ht1; t2i and well-ordered by the lexico-
graphic ordering . Then the following holds for every s; s0 2 S:
1. t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s)
2. if t1(s) < t1(s0) then (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0)
3. if t1(s) = t1(s0) 6= n and t2(s) < t2(s0) then (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0)
4. bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1)
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5. ContD(t1) = ContD(t1  t2)
6. Cont0(t1)  Cont0(t1  t2)
Proof. 1. Suppose that t1(s) = n. But then (t1  t2)(s) = n and thus t1(s) =
(t1  t2)(s). Suppose that t1(s) = j where j < n. But t1 is in normal form and so there
must be at least j elements (i; k) in A such that i = 0; 1; : : : ; j   1 and 0  k  n. But
then card(seg(t1(s); t2(s)))  j, i.e. (t1  t2)(s)  j. Hence t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s).
2. Let t1(s) < t1(s0). So t1(s) 6= n. Suppose that (t1  t2)(s)  (t1  t2)(s0). So
card(seg(t1(s); t2(s)))  card(seg(t1(s0); t2(s0))). But then (t1(s0); t2(s0))  (t1(s); t2(s)).
So t1(s0)  t1(s). Contradiction. Hence (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0).
3. Let t1(s) = t1(s0) 6= n and t2(s) < t2(s0). Suppose (t1  t2)(s)  (t1  t2)(s0). So
card(seg(t1(s); t2(s)))  card(seg(t1(s0); t2(s0))). But then (t1(s0); t2(s0))  (t1(s); t2(s)).
So since t1(s0) = t1(s), it follows that t2(s0)  t2(s). Contradiction. Hence (t1  t2)(s) <
(t1  t2)(s0).
4. It must be shown that bottom(t1t2)  bottom(t1). Choose any s 2 bottom(t1t2).
So (t1  t2)(s) = 0. But then card(seg(t1(s); t2(s))) = 0. Since t1 is in normal form it
follows that t1(s) = 0. So s 2 bottom(t1). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that
bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1).
5. It must be shown that top(t1) = top(t1 t2). Choose any s 2 top(t1). So t1(s) = n.
But then (t1t2)(s) = n, i.e. s 2 top(t1t2). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that
top(t1)  top(t1 t2). Conversely, choose any s 2 top(t1 t2). Then top(t1 t2)  top(t1)
follows similarly. Hence top(t1) = top(t1  t2).
6. It must be shown that get(t1; 1; n)  get(t1 t2; 1; n). Choose any s 2 get(t1; 1; n).
So t1(s)  1. But t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s) by the rst condition. So (t1  t2)(s)  1. But
then s 2 get(t1  t2; 1; n). So get(t1; 1; n)  get(t1  t2; 1; n).
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 5
C.1 Proofs for Section 5.4
Proposition C.1 (5.1) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE; tE0 2 TE and let ; 0 2 L be consistent with bel(tE) and bel(tE0) respectively.
Then it holds that if tE = tE0 and  M 0 then tE +  = tE0 + 0.
Proof. Let tE = tE0 and  M 0. Let X = ModM() and S   X = NModM().
So for every s; s0 2 X, tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE + )(s)  (tE + )(s0). Since tE(s) =
tE0(s) for every s 2 S, it follows that for every s; s0 2 X, (tE + )(s)  (tE + )(s0)
i¤ (tE0 + )(s)  (tE0 + )(s0). Hence tE +  and tE0 +  are order-equivalent on X.
But ModM(know(tE +)) =ModM(know(tE)^) =ModM(know(tE))\ ModT () and
thus S   X 6 ModM(know(tE + )), i.e. S   X 6 get"(tE + ; n   1). So for every
s; s0 2 S  X, (tE + )(s) = n. Since tE(s) = tE0(s) for every s 2 S, it follows that for
every s; s0 2 S  X, (tE0 + )(s) = n. Hence tE +  and tE0 +  are order-equivalent on
S   X. But  M 0 and thus X = ModM(0) and S   X = NModM(0). But then
tE +  and tE0 + 0 are order-equivalent. Since both tE +  and tE0 + 0 are regular, it
follows by proposition 3.17 that tE +  = tE0 + 0.
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Proposition C.2 (5.2) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be consistent with bel(tE). Then the following holds:
1. ContD(tE)  ContD(tE + )
2. Cont0(tE)  Cont0(tE + )
Proof. 1. If ContD(tE) = ? then the result holds vacuously. Assume thatContD(tE) 6=
?. Choose any s 2 ContD(tE). So s 2 top(tE), i.e. s =2 get"(tE; n   1), i.e. s =2
ModM(know(tE)), i.e. s =2ModM(know(tE))\ModM(), i.e. s =2ModM(know(tE+)),
i.e. s =2 get"(tE + ; n  1). So s 2 top(tE + ). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that ContD(tE)  ContD(tE + ).
2. If Cont0(tE) = ? then the result holds vacuously. Assume that Cont0(tE) 6=
?. Choose any s 2 Cont0(tE). So s 2 get(tE; 1; n), i.e. s =2 bottom(tE), i.e. s =2
ModM(bel(tE)), i.e. s =2 ModM(bel(tE)) \ModM(), i.e. s =2 ModM(bel(tE + )), i.e.
s =2 bottom(tE + ). So s 2 get(tE + ; 1; n). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that Cont0(tE)  Cont0(tE + ).
Proposition C.3 (5.3) Let T = hS; tE; li and T 0 = hS; tE + ; li be templated interpre-
tations of L such that l is injective and card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be
T -satisable and consistent with bel(tE). Then the following holds:
1. pl(tE; )  pl(tE + ; )
2. dt(tE; ) = dt(tE + ; )
Proof. 1. If  is T -valid, then pl(tE; ) = pl(tE+; ) = n. Assume that  is not T -
valid. Now ModT (know(tE +)) =ModT (know(tE))\ModT (), i.e. ModT (know(tE +
))  ModT (), i.e. get"(tE + ; n   1)  ModT (). So pl(tE + ; ) = n   1. But
pl(tE; )  n  1 and hence pl(tE; )  pl(tE + ; ).
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2. Since  is consistent with bel(tE) it follows that ModT (bel(tE)) \ModT () 6= ?,
i.e. bottom(bel(tE)) \ ModT () 6= ?. So dt(tE; ) = 0. But ModT (bel(tE + )) =
ModT (bel(tE))\ModT (). SoModT (bel(tE+)) ModT (), i.e. bottom(bel(tE+)) 
ModT (), i.e. bottom(bel(tE + )) \ ModT () 6= ?. So dt(tE + ; ) = 0. Hence
dt(tE; ) = dt(tE + ; ).
Theorem C.1 (5.14) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE. A templated revision operation  : TE  L! TE
satises postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8) i¤ for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that
is consistent with know(tE) the following holds:
1. ModM(bel(tE  )) =MintE(ModM())
2. ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM(know(tE) ^ )
3. For every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0)
Proof. (=)) Suppose that  satises postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8). It must be
shown that conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
1. It must be shown that ModM(bel(tE  )) = MintE(ModM()). Choose any s 2
ModM(bel(tE)). By postulate (TR  1), s 2ModM(). Suppose s =2MintE(ModM()).
So there must be some s0 2 ModM() such that tE(s0) < tE(s). Now either s0 2
ModM(bel(tE)) or s0 =2ModM(bel(tE)). Suppose s0 2ModM(bel(tE)). But then bel(tE)^
 isM -satisable, and thus by postulate (TR  2),ModM(bel(tE)) =ModM(bel(tE)^
). Since s 2ModM(bel(tE )), it follows that s 2ModM(bel(tE)), i.e. s 2 bottom(tE).
But then tE(s0) < tE(s). Contradiction. So s 2 MintE(ModM()). Suppose s0 =2
ModM(bel(tE)). Let  be a nite axiomatisation of fs; s0g, i.e. ModM() = fs; s0g. Now
by postulate (TR  1), ModM(bel(tE  ))  ModM(). So let s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  ))
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and s =2 ModM(bel(tE  )). Since ModM() \ModM() = ModM(), it follows that
^ M . Thus, by postulate (TR  4), ModM(bel(tE  (^))) =ModM(bel(tE ))
and hence, by postulate (TR  5), ModM(bel(tE ))\ModM() ModM(bel(tE  )).
Since s 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) and s 2 ModM() it follows that s 2 ModM(bel(tE  )).
Contradiction. So s 2 MintE(ModM()). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that
ModM(bel(tE  )) MintE(ModM()).
Conversely, choose any s 2 MintE(ModM()). So s 2 ModM(). Suppose that
s =2ModM(bel(tE)). By postulate (TR  3),ModM(bel(tE)) 6= ?. So there must be
some s0 2ModM(bel(tE )). But then, by postulate (TR  1), s0 2ModM(). Let  be
a nite axiomatisation of fs; s0g, i.e. ModM() = fs; s0g. Since ModM()\ModM() =
ModM(), it follows that  ^  M . Thus, by postulate (TR  4), ModM(bel(tE 
( ^ ))) = ModM(bel(tE  )) and hence, by postulate (TR  5), ModM(bel(tE  )) \
ModM()  ModM(bel(tE  )). Since s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) and s0 2 ModM() it
follows that bel(tE  ) ^  is M -satisable, and hence, from postulate (TR  6), that
ModM(bel(tE  ))  ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM(). But then ModM(bel(tE  )) =
ModM(bel(tE ))\ModM(). Since s0 2ModM(bel(tE )) and s =2ModM(bel(tE )),
it follows that ModM(bel(tE  )) = fs0g. So tE  (s0) < tE  (s). If tE  (s) = n then
s =2 ModM(know(tE  )), and hence from postulate (TR  7) it follows that either s =2
ModM(know(tE)) or s =2 ModM(). But s 2 ModM() and thus s =2 ModM(know(tE)),
i.e. tE(s) = n. So tE(s0)  tE(s). On the other hand, if s 2 ModM(know(tE  )),
then by postulate (TR  8), tE(s0)  tE(s). But s 2MintE(ModM()) and thus tE(s) 
tE(s
0). So tE(s) = tE(s0). But s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )), i.e. s0 2 bottom(tE  ), i.e.
(tE )(s0) = 0. But then (tE )(s) = 0, i.e. s 2 bottom(tE ), i.e. s 2ModM(bel(tE 
)). Contradiction. Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that MintE(ModM()) 
ModM(bel(tE  )). Hence ModM(bel(tE  )) =MintE(ModM()).
2. It must be shown that ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM(know(tE))\ ModM(),
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which follows directly by postulate (TR  7).
3. It must be shown that for every s; s0 2 ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s) 
(tE  )(s0). Suppose there is some s; s0 2 ModM() such that tE(s)  tE(s0) but
(tE )(s) 6 (tE )(s0). Suppose that tE(s0) = n, i.e. s0 =2ModM(know(tE)). But then,
by postulate (TR  7), s0 =2 ModM(know(tE  )), i.e. (tE  )(s0) = n. So (tE  )(s) 
(tE  )(s0). Contradiction. Suppose that tE(s0) < n. Let  be a nite axiomatisation of
fs; s0g, i.e. ModM() = fs; s0g. Since ModM()\ModM() =ModM(), it follows that
^ M . Thus, by postulate (TR  4), ModM(bel(tE  (^))) =ModM(bel(tE ))
and hence, by postulate (TR  5), ModM(bel(tE ))\ModM() ModM(bel(tE  )).
ButModM(bel(tE )) ModM() by postulate (TR  1). Suppose thatModM(bel(tE 
)) = fsg. So s 2ModM(bel(tE )) and s0 =2ModM(bel(tE )). But then (tE )(s) <
(tE  )(s0). Contradiction. So for every s; s0 2 ModM() such that tE(s)  tE(s0) it
holds that (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0).
Conversely, suppose there is some s; s0 2ModM() such that (tE )(s)  (tE )(s0)
but tE(s) 6 tE(s0). Suppose that (tE  )(s0) = n, i.e. s0 =2 ModM(know(tE  )).
But ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM(know(tE))\ ModM() by postulate (TR  7). So
either s0 =2 ModM(know(tE)) or s0 =2 ModM(). But s0 2 ModM() and thus it must
be the case that s0 =2 ModM(know(tE)), i.e. tE(s0) = n. But then tE(s)  tE(s0).
Contradiction. Suppose that (tE  )(s0) < n. But then, by postulate (TR  8), tE(s) 
tE(s
0). Contradiction. So for every s; s0 2 ModM() such that (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0)
it holds that tE(s)  tE(s0).
((=) Suppose that conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold. It must be shown that  satises
postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8).
(TR  1) It must be shown thatModM(bel(tE )) ModM(). ButModM(bel(tE 
)) = MintE(ModM()) and since MintE(ModM())  ModM() it follows that
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ModM(bel(tE  )) ModM().
(TR  2) Suppose that bel(tE) ^  is M -satisable, i.e. bottom(tE)\ ModM() 6= ?.
It must be shown that ModM(bel(tE  )) = ModM(bel(tE) ^ ). Choose any s 2
ModM(bel(tE  )), i.e. s 2 MintE(ModM()). So there can be no s0 2 ModM() such
that t(s0)  t(s), unless t(s)  t(s0). But then s 2 bottom(tE) otherwise bel(tE) ^  is
not M -satisable. So s 2ModM(bel(tE)). But then s 2ModM(bel(tE)^). Since s was
chosen arbitrarily, it follows that ModM(bel(tE  ))  ModM(bel(tE) ^ ). Conversely,
choose any s 2 ModM(bel(tE) ^ ). So s 2 bottom(tE) and s 2 ModM(). But then
there can be no s0 2 ModM() such that t(s0)  t(s), unless t(s)  t(s0). Hence s 2
MintE(ModM()). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that ModM(bel(tE) ^ ) 
MintE(ModM()). Hence ModM(bel(tE  )) =ModM(bel(tE) ^ ).
(TR  3) It must be shown that bel(tE  ) and know(tE  ) are M -satisable.
Since  is consistent with know(tE) it follows that ModM(know(tE) ^ ) 6= ?. But
ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM(know(tE) ^ ) and thus know(tE  ) is M -satisable.
But if ModM(know(tE) ^ ) 6= ? then ModM() 6= ? and thus MintE(ModM()) 6= ?.
Since ModM(bel(tE )) =MintE(ModM()) it follows that bel(tE ) is M -satisable.
(TR  4) Suppose that tE = tE0 and  M 0. It must be shown that tE  = tE0 0.
Let X = ModM() and S  X = NModM(). So for every s; s0 2 X, tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤
(tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0). Since tE(s) = tE0(s) for every s 2 S, it follows that for every
s; s0 2 X, (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0) i¤ (tE0  )(s)  (tE0  )(s0). Hence tE   and
tE0  are order-equivalent on X. Now ModM(know(tE )) =ModM(know(tE)^) =
ModM(know(tE))\ ModM() and thus S   X 6 ModM(know(tE  )), i.e. S   X 6
get"(tE ; n 1). So for every s; s0 2 S X, (tE )(s) = n. SinceModM(know(tE0)) =
ModM(know(tE)), it follows that for every s; s0 2 S  X, (tE0  )(s) = n. Hence tE  
and tE0   are order-equivalent on S  X. But  M 0 and thus X = ModM(0) and
S   X = NModM(0). But then tE   and tE0  0 are order-equivalent. Since both
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tE   and tE0  0 are regular, it follows by proposition 3.17 that tE   = tE0  0.
(TR  5) It must be shown that ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM()  ModM(bel(tE 
( ^ ))). Choose any s 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM(). So s 2 ModM(bel(tE  ))
and s 2 ModM(), i.e. s 2 MintE(ModM()) and s 2 ModM(), i.e. s 2 ModM()
and s 2ModM(), i.e. s 2 ModM() \ModM(), i.e. s 2ModM( ^ ). Suppose that
s =2 ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))), i.e. s =2 MintE(ModM( ^ )). But s 2 ModM( ^ )
and hence there must be some s0 2 MintE(ModM( ^ )) and tE(s0) < tE(s). But if
s0 2 MintE(ModM( ^ )) then s0 2 ModM( ^ ), i.e. s0 2 ModM(). But then
s =2 MintE(ModM()). Contradiction. So s 2 ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))). Since s was
chosen arbitrarily it follows thatModM(bel(tE))\ModM() ModM(bel(tE(^))).
(TR  6) Suppose that bel(tE  ) ^  is M -satisable, i.e. MintE(ModM()) \
ModM() 6= ?. It must be shown that ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))) ModM(bel(tE  )) \
ModM(). Choose any s 2ModM(bel(tE(^))). So s 2MintE(ModM(^)), i.e. s 2
ModM() and s 2ModM() and there is no s0 2ModM() and s0 2ModM() such that
t(s0)  t(s), unless t(s)  t(s0). Suppose that s =2ModM(bel(tE ))\ModM(), i.e. s =2
MintE(ModM()) \ ModM(), i.e. s =2 MintE(ModM()) or s =2 ModM(). Since s 2
ModM() it follows that s =2MintE(ModM()). However,MintE(ModM())\ModM()
6= ? and hence there must be some s00 2 MintE(ModM()) such that s00 2 ModM(),
i.e. s00 2 ModM() and s00 2 ModM(). Since s =2 MintE(ModM()) but s 2 ModM()
it follows that tE(s00) < tE(s). Contradiction. So s 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM().
Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))) ModM(bel(tE 
)) \ModM().
(TR  7) It must be shown thatModM(know(tE )) =ModM(know(tE)^), which
follows directly from condition 2.
(TR  8) Suppose that (tE )(s)  (tE )(s0) < n. It must be shown that tE(s) 
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tE(s
0). Since (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0) < n, it follows that s; s0 2 ModM(know(tE  )).
But ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM(know(tE) ^ ) and thus s; s0 2 ModM()). But for
every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE )(s)  (tE )(s0). Hence tE(s)  tE(s0).
Proposition C.4 (5.5) Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief as-
sertion and know(tE) the knowledge assertion associated with tE. Then the revision
operation  satises postulates (DP  1) to (DP  6) under the classical interpretation
M0 = hS; li of L.
Proof. It follows from proposition 4.12 that tE induces a total preorder E on the set
of states that is faithful with respect to Th(bottom(t)) (or Cn(bel(tE))) and from proposi-
tion 5.4 that if tE = tE0 thenE=E0. Hence the requirement by theorem 5.10 for a faith-
ful assignment is satised. If it can be shown that Mod(bel(t  tE)) =MinE() then,
by theorem 5.10, it follows that the revision operation  satises postulates (DP  1)
to (DP  6). For every sentence  2 L, Mod() = bottom(t) and NMod() = top(t)
for t 2 TD the denite t-ordering induced by . Choose any s 2 Mod(bel(t  tE)).
So s 2 bottom(t  tE) 6= ?, i.e. (t  tE)(s) = 0. But if (t  tE)(s) = 0 then
card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) = 0 and by proposition 4.15(1), t(s) = 0. So s 2 bottom(t), i.e.
s 2 Mod(). Suppose there is some s0 2 Mod() such that s0 E s but s 6E s0. But
then card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) 6= 0 . Contradiction. Hence, there can be no s0 2 Mod()
such that s0 E s, unless s E s0. So s 2 MinE(). Since s was chosen arbitrarily is
follows that Mod(bel(t  tE)) MinE().
Conversely, choose any s 2 MinE(). So s 2 Mod() and there is no s0 2 Mod()
such that s0 E s, unless s E s0. Hence t(s) = 0 and tE(s)  tE(s0). But then
card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) = 0 and since t(s) < n it follows that (t  tE)(s) = 0. So s 2
bottom(t  tE), i.e. s 2 Mod(bel(t  tE)). Since s was chosen arbitrarily is follows
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that MinE()  Mod(bel(t  tE)). But Mod(bel(t  tE))  MinE() and thus
Mod(bel(t  tE)) =MinE().
Proposition C.5 (5.6) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be consistent with know(tE). Then ContD(tE) 
ContD(tE  ).
Proof. If ContD(tE) = ? then the result holds vacuously. Assume that ContD(tE) 6=
?. Choose any s 2 ContD(tE). So s 2 top(tE), i.e. s =2 get"(tE; n   1), i.e. s =2
ModM(know(tE)), i.e. s =2ModM(know(tE))\ModM(), i.e. s =2ModM(know(tE )),
i.e. s =2 get"(tE  ; n  1). So s 2 top(tE  ). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that ContD(tE)  ContD(tE  ).
Proposition C.6 (5.7) Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n. Let
t1 2 TD and t2 2 TN and let A be the index set induced by ht1; t2i and well-ordered by the
lexicographic ordering . Then the following holds for every s; s0 2 S:
1. t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s)
2. if t1(s) < t1(s0) then (t1  t2)(s)  (t1  t2)(s0)
3. if t1(s) = t1(s0) 6= n and t2(s) < t2(s0) then (t1  t2)(s) < (t1  t2)(s0)
4. bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1)
5. ContD(t1)  ContD(t1  t2)
6. Cont0(t1)  Cont0(t1  t2)
7. ContD(t2)  ContD(t1  t2)
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Proof. 1. Suppose that t1(s) = n. But then (t1  t2)(s) = n and thus t1(s) =
(t1  t2)(s). Suppose that t1(s) 6= n. Since t1 is denite it follows that t1(s) = 0. But
then card(seg(t1(s); t2(s)))  0, i.e. (t1  t2)(s)  0. Hence t1(s)  (t1  t2)(s).
2. Let t1(s) < t1(s0). Since t1 is denite it follows that t1(s) = 0. Suppose that
(t1 t2)(s) > (t1 t2)(s0). So card(seg(t1(s); t2(s))) > card(seg(t1(s0); t2(s0))). But then
(t1(s
0); t2(s0))  (t1(s); t2(s)). So t1(s0) < t1(s). Contradiction. Hence (t1  t2)(s) 
(t1  t2)(s0).
3. Let t1(s) = t1(s0) 6= n and t2(s) < t2(s0). Since t1 is denite it follows that
t1(s) = t1(s
0) = 0. Suppose that (t1  t2)(s) > (t1  t2)(s0). So card(seg(t1(s); t2(s))) >
card(seg(t1(s
0); t2(s0))). But then (t1(s0); t2(s0))  (t1(s); t2(s)). Since t1(s0) = t1(s), it
follows that t2(s0) < t2(s). Contradiction. Suppose that (t1 t2)(s) = (t1 t2)(s0). Since
t1(s) = t1(s
0) = 0 it follows that t2(s) = t2(s0). Contradiction. Hence (t1  t2)(s) <
(t1  t2)(s0).
4. It must be shown that bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1). Choose any s 2 bottom(t1 
t2). So (t1  t2)(s) = 0. But then card(seg(t1(s); t2(s))) = 0. Since t1 is denite it
follows that t1(s) = 0. So s 2 bottom(t1). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows that
bottom(t1  t2)  bottom(t1).
5. It must be shown that top(t1)  top(t1 t2). Choose any s 2 top(t1). So t1(s) = n.
But then (t1  t2)(s) = n, i.e. s 2 top(t1  t2). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows
that top(t1)  top(t1  t2).
6. It must be shown that get(t1; 1; n)  get(t1 t2; 1; n). Since t1 is denite it follows
that get(t1; 1; n) = top(t1). By the previous condition it follows that top(t1)  top(t1t2).
But top(t1  t2)  get(t1  t2; 1; n). Hence get(t1; 1; n)  get(t1  t2; 1; n).
7. It must be shown that top(t2)  top(t1 t2). Choose any s 2 top(t2). So t2(s) = n.
But then (t1  t2)(s) = n, i.e. s 2 top(t1  t2). Since s was chosen arbitrarily it follows
that top(t2)  top(t1  t2).
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Proposition C.7 (5.8) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE)
the knowledge assertion associated with tE. Then the templated revision operation 
satises postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8).
Proof. Theorem 5.14 will be used to show that the templated revision operation
 satises postulates (TR  1) to (TR  8). For every sentence  2 L, ModM() =
bottom(t) and NModM() = top(t) for t 2 TD the denite t-ordering induced by 
(since M is extensional). It will be shown that for every M -satisable sentence  2 L
that is consistent with know(tE), the following holds:
1. ModM(bel(t  tE)) =MintE(ModM())
2. ModM(know(t  tE)) =ModM(know(tE) ^ )
3. For every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (t  tE)(s)  (t  tE)(s0)
1. Choose any s 2 ModM(bel(t tE)). So s 2 bottom(t tE), i.e. (t tE)(s) = 0.
But if (t  tE)(s) = 0 then card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) = 0 and by proposition 5.7(1),
t(s) = 0. So s 2 bottom(t), i.e. s 2 ModM(). Suppose there is some s0 2 ModM()
such that tE(s0)  tE(s) and tE(s) 6 tE(s0). But then card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) 6= 0 .
Contradiction. Hence, there can be no s0 2 ModM() such that tE(s0)  tE(s), unless
tE(s)  tE(s0). So s 2 MintE(ModM()). Since s was chosen arbitrarily is follows that
ModM(bel(t  tE)) MintE(ModM()).
Conversely, choose any s 2 MintE(ModM()). So t(s) = 0 and tE(s) < n oth-
erwise know(tE) ^  is not M -satisable. But s 2 MintE(ModM()) and hence there
can be no s0 2 ModM() such that tE(s0)  tE(s), unless tE(s)  tE(s0). But then
card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) = 0 and since both t(s) < n and tE(s) < n, it follows that
(t  tE)(s) = 0. So s 2 bottom(t  tE), i.e. s 2 ModM(bel(t  tE)). Since s
was chosen arbitrarily is follows that MintE(ModM())  ModM(bel(t  tE)). Hence
ModM(bel(t  tE)) =MintE(ModM()).
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2. Choose any s 2ModM(know(ttE)). So s 2 get"(ttE; n 1), i.e. (ttE)(s) <
n. But then card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) < n. Since t is denite, it follows that t(s) = 0
and tE(s) < n, i.e. s 2 bottom(t) and s 2 get"(tE; n   1), i.e. s 2 ModM() and
s 2 ModM(know(tE)), i.e. s 2 ModM(know(tE) ^ ). Since s was chosen arbitrarily is
follows that ModM(know(t  tE)) ModM(know(tE) ^ ).
Conversely, chooses any s 2ModM(know(tE)^), i.e. s 2ModM(know(tE)) and s 2
ModM(), i.e. s 2 get"(tE; n  1) and s 2 bottom(t), i.e. tE(s) < n and t(s) = 0. But
then card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) < n. So (t tE)(s) < n, i.e. s 2 get"(t tE; n 1), i.e. s 2
ModM(know(t tE)). Since s was chosen arbitrarily is follows that ModM(know(tE)^
) ModM(know(t  tE)). Hence ModM(know(t  tE)) =ModM(know(tE) ^ ).
3. Choose any s; s0 2ModM(). So t(s) = 0 and t(s0) = 0. Suppose tE(s)  tE(s0).
If tE(s0) = n then (t  tE)(s0) = n and hence (t  tE)(s)  (t  tE)(s0). Otherwise
card(seg(t(s); tE(s)))  card(seg(t(s0); tE(s0))) and thus (t  tE)(s)  (t  tE)(s0).
Conversely, suppose that (t  tE)(s)  (t  tE)(s0). If (t  tE)(s0) = n then either
tE(s) = n or tE(s0) = n and thus tE(s)  tE(s0). Otherwise card(seg(t(s); tE(s))) 
card(seg(t(s
0); tE(s0))). But t(s) = 0 and t(s0) = 0 and hence tE(s)  tE(s0).
Proposition C.8 (5.9) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Every templated revision operation  satises postulates (C1), (C3), and (C4),
provided  is dened for the input sentence.
Proof. Let  be any templated revision operation, i.e.  satises postulates (TR  1)
to (TR  8). Then, by theorem 5.14, it follows that for everyM -satisable sentence  2 L
that is consistent with know(tE), it holds that
1. ModM(bel(tE  )) =MintE(ModM()),
2. ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM(know(tE) ^ ), and
3. for every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0).
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(C1) Suppose that thatModM() ModM(). It must be shown thatModM(bel(tE
)) = ModM(bel(tE  )  )). Suppose that know(tE) ^  is M -satisable so that
tE   is dened. So ModM(bel(tE  )) = MintE(ModM()) and for every s; s0 2
ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0). But ModM()  ModM() and
thus, since tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s)  (tE  )(s0) for every s; s0 2 ModM(), it
follows that tE and tE   and order equivalent on ModM(). Hence ModM(bel(tE 
)) =MintE(ModM()). But ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM(know(tE)) \ModM().
Since ModM()  ModM() it follows that ModM(know(tE  )) \ModM() 6= ?. So
know(tE )^ isM -satisable. But thenModM(bel(tE )) =MintE(ModM()).
Hence ModM(bel(tE  )) =ModM(bel(tE  )  ).
(C3) Suppose that ModM(bel(tE  ))  ModM(). It must be shown that ModM
(bel(tE  )  )  ModM(). Suppose that know(tE  ) ^  is M -satisable so that
(tE) is dened. SoModM(bel(tE)) =MintE(ModM()) and for every s; s0 2
ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ ((tE))(s)  ((tE))(s0). Suppose that know(tE)^
is M -satisable so that tE  is dened. So ModM(bel(tE )) =MintE(ModM()) and
for every s; s0 2ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE )(s)  (tE )(s0). But then (tE )
and tE   are order equivalent on ModM(). Suppose that s 2 ModM(bel(tE  )  ),
i.e. s 2 bottom((tE  )  ), i.e. ((tE  )  )(s) = 0. So there can be no s0 2ModM()
such that ((tE  )  )(s) < ((tE  )  )(s0), i.e. there can be no s0 2 ModM() such
that (tE )(s) < (tE )(s0). So s 2MintE(ModM()). But sinceModM(bel(tE )) =
MintE(ModM()), it follows that s 2 bottom(tE  ), i.e. s 2 ModM(bel(tE  )). But
ModM(bel(tE  ))  ModM() and thus s 2 ModM(). Since s was chosen arbitrarily
it follows that ModM(bel(tE  )  ) ModM().
(C4) Suppose that that ModM(bel(tE  )) 6 NModM(). It must be shown that
ModM(bel(tE  )  ) 6 NModM(). Suppose that know(tE  ) ^  is M -satisable
so that (tE  )   is dened. So ModM(bel(tE  )  ) = MintE(ModM()) and for
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every s; s0 2 ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ ((tE  )  )(s)  ((tE  )  )(s0). Suppose
that know(tE) ^  is M -satisable so that tE   is dened. So ModM(bel(tE  )) =
MintE(ModM()) and for every s; s
0 2 ModM(), tE(s)  tE(s0) i¤ (tE  )(s)  (tE 
)(s0). But then (tE  )   and tE   are order equivalent on ModM(). Suppose that
s 2ModM(bel(tE ) ), i.e. s 2 bottom(tE ) ), i.e. ((tE ) )(s) = 0. So there
can be no s0 2 ModM() such that ((tE  )  )(s) < ((tE  )  )(s0), i.e. there can
be no s0 2ModM() such that (tE  )(s) < (tE  )(s0). So s 2MintE(ModM()). But
since ModM(bel(tE  )) =MintE(ModM()), it follows that s 2 bottom(tE  ), i.e. s 2
ModM(bel(tE  )). But ModM(bel(tE  )) 6 NModM(). So either s =2 NModM(),
or s 2 NModM() in which case there must be some s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) such
that s0 =2 NModM(). But then s0 2 MintE(ModM()). So tE(s0) = tE(s). But then
(tE  )(s0) = (tE  )(s) and hence, since (tE  )   and tE   are order equivalent on
ModM(), it follows that ((tE ) )(s0) = ((tE ) )(s). Since ((tE ) )(s) = 0,
it follows that ((tE  )  )(s0) = 0, i.e. s0 2ModM(bel(tE  )  ). Since s was chosen
arbitrarily it follows that ModM(bel(tE  )  ) 6 NModM().
Proposition C.9 (5.10) Let T = hS; tE; li and T 0 = hS; tE  ; li be templated inter-
pretations of L such that l is injective and card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be
T -satisable and consistent with know(tE). Then the following holds:
1. pl(tE; )  pl(tE  ; )
2. dt(tE  ; )  dt(tE; )
Proof. 1. If  is T -valid, then pl(tE; ) = pl(tE ; ) = n. Assume that  is not T -
valid. Now ModT (know(tE  )) = ModT (know(tE)) \ModT (), i.e. ModT (know(tE 
))  ModT (), i.e. get"(tE  ; n   1)  ModT (). So pl(tE  ; ) = n   1. But
pl(tE; )  n  1 and thus pl(tE; )  pl(tE  ; ).
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2. Since know(tE) ^  is T -satisable it follows that get"(tE; n  1) \ModT () 6= ?.
But then dt(tE; ) < n. But ModT (bel(tE )) =MintE(ModM()). Hence bottom(tE 
) \ModT () 6= ?. But then dt(tE  ; ) = 0 and thus dt(tE  ; )  dt(tE; ).
C.2 Proofs for Section 5.5
Proposition C.10 (5.11) Let S be a non-empty set of states with card(S) = n and let
t1; t2; t3 2 TN . Then the following holds:
1. t15 t2 = t25 t1
2. t15 (t25 t3) = (t15 t2)5 t3
3. bottom(t15 t2) = bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2)
4. ContD(t15 t2) = ContD(t1) \ ContD(t2)
5. ContI(t15 t2) = ContI(t1) \ ContI(t2)
Proof. 1. From the denition it follows that (t1 _ t2)(s) = minft1(s); t2(s)g =
minft2(s); t1(s)g = (t2_ t1)(s) for every s 2 S. So t1_ t2 = t2_ t1. But then g  (t1_ t2) =
g  (t2 _ t1), i.e. t15 t2 = t25 t1.
2. From the denition it follows that (t1_ (t2_ t3))(s) = minft1(s);minft2(s); t3(s)gg
and ((t1 _ t2) _ t3)(s) = minfminft1(s); t2(s)g; t3(s)g for every s 2 S. But minft1(s),
minft2(s); t3(s)gg = minfminft1(s); t2(s)g; t3(s)g for every s 2 S. Hence t1 _ (t2 _ t3) =
(t1 _ t2)_ t3. But the normalise function g  t is order equivalent to t for every t 2 TS by
proposition 3.16. Hence, t15 (t25 t3) = (t15 t2)5 t3.
3. If bottom(t15t2) = ? then t15t2 must be strongly contradictory, i.e. g(t1_t2) is
strongly contradictory. So g((t1_t2)(s)) = n for every s 2 S. But then (t1_t2)(s) = n for
every s 2 S, i.e. minft1(s); t2(s)g = n for every s 2 S. So it must be the case that both
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t1 and t2 are strongly contradictory. Hence bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2) = ?. Suppose that
bottom(t15t2) 6= ?. Choose any s 2 bottom(t15t2). So (t15t2)(s) = 0. If (t1_t2)(s) 6= 0,
then it must be the case that t1(s) 6= 0 and t2(s) 6= 0. But t1; t2 2 TN and thus, both
t1 and t2 must be strongly contradictory. But then, by a similar argument as before,
(t15t2)(s) 6= 0. Contradiction. So (t1_t2)(s) = 0. But then either t1(s) = 0 or t2(s) = 0,
i.e. s 2 bottom(t1) or s 2 bottom(t2), i.e. s 2 bottom(t1)[ bottom(t2). Since s was chosen
arbitrarily, it follows that bottom(t1 5 t2)  bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2). Conversely, if
bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2) = ?, then both t1 and t2 must be strongly contradictory since
t1; t2 2 TN . But then t1 _ t2, and hence t1 5 t2 would be strongly contradictory so
that bottom(t1 5 t2) = ?. Suppose that bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2) 6= ?. Choose any
s 2 bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2). So s 2 bottom(t1) or s 2 bottom(t2), i.e. t1(s) = 0 or
t2(s) = 0. But then (t1 _ t2)(s) = 0 and thus g((t1 _ t2)(s)) = 0, i.e. (t1 5 t2)(s) = 0.
So s 2 bottom(t1 5 t2). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that bottom(t1) [
bottom(t2)  bottom(t15 t2). Hence bottom(t15 t2) = bottom(t1) [ bottom(t2).
4. It must be shown that top(t1 5 t2) = top(t1) \ top(t2). If top(t1 5 t2) = ? then
g((t1 _ t2)(s)) < n for every s 2 S. But then (t1 _ t2)(s) < n for every s 2 S, i.e.
minft1(s); t2(s)g < n for every s 2 S. So it must be the case that top(t1) \ top(t2) = ?.
Suppose that top(t1 5 t2) 6= ?, i.e. top(t1 _ t2) 6= ?. But then t1(s) = n and t2(s) = n,
i.e. s 2 top(t1) and s 2 top(t2), i.e. s 2 top(t1) \ top(t2). Since s was chosen arbitrarily,
it follows that top(t1 5 t2)  top(t1) \ top(t2). Conversely, if top(t1) \ top(t2) = ?,
then it must be the case, using a similar argument as before, that top(t1 _ t2) = ?, i.e.
top(t15t2) = ?. Suppose that top(t1)\top(t2) 6= ?. Choose any s 2 top(t1)\top(t2). So
s 2 top(t1) and s 2 top(t2), i.e. t1(s) = n and t2(s) = n. But then minft1(s); t2(s)g = n,
i.e. (t1 _ t2)(s) = n, i.e. g((t1 _ t2)(s)) = n, i.e. (t1 5 t2)(s) = n. So s 2 top(t1 5 t2).
Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that top(t1) \ top(t2)  top(t1 5 t2). Hence
top(t15 t2) = top(t1) \ top(t2).
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5. It must be shown that get(t15 t2; 1; n) = get(t1; 1; n) \ get(t2; 1; n). But get(t15
t2; 1; n) = S  bottom(t15 t2). But bottom(t15 t2) = bottom(t1)[ bottom(t2) from result
3. So get(t15 t2; 1; n) = S  (bottom(t1)[ bottom(t2)). But bottom(t1) = S get(t1; 1; n)
and bottom(t2) = S get(t2; 1; n). But then get(t15 t2; 1; n) = get(t1; 1; n)\get(t2; 1; n).
Proposition C.11 (5.12) Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief
assertion and know(tE) the knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epis-
temic transition function. Then the templated update operation  satises postulates
(KM  10) to (KM  70) for every satisable sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with
know(tE), under the classical interpretation M0 = hS; li of L.
Proof. (KM  10) It must be shown that Mod(bel(tE  ))  Mod(), i.e. that
bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))  bottom(t). By proposition 5.11(3),
bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) = [s2Mod(bel(tE))bottom(t  ~F (s)). Since t 2 TD and
~F (s) 2 TE it follows by proposition 4.15(4), that bottom(t  ~F (s))  bottom(t) for
every s 2Mod(bel(tE)). But then bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))  bottom(t).
(KM  20) Since  is not entailed by bel(tE), the result holds vacuously.
(KM  30) Since both bel(tE) and  are satisable, it must be shown thatMod(bel(tE
)) 6= ?, i.e. that bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) 6= ?. By proposition 4.15(4),
bottom(t  ~F (s))  bottom(t) for every s 2 Mod(bel(tE)). Since  is satisable, it
follows that bottom(t ~F (s)) 6= ? for every s 2Mod(bel(tE)). But then, by proposition
5.11(3), bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) 6= ?.
(KM  40) It must be shown that if tE = tE0 and   0, then Mod(bel(tE 
)) = Mod(bel(tE0  0)). Suppose that tE = tE0 and   0. It must be shown
that bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t ~F (s))) = bottom(5s02Mod(bel(tE0 ))(t0  ~F (s0))). But tE =
tE0 and thus bottom(tE) = bottom(tE0), i.e. Mod(bel(tE)) = Mod(bel(tE0)). But then
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~F (s) = ~F (s0) for every s 2Mod(bel(tE)). Since   0 it follows that t = t0. But then
bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) = bottom(5s02Mod(bel(tE0 ))(t0  ~F (s0))).
(KM  50) It must be shown that Mod(bel(tE  ))\Mod() Mod(bel(tE  (^
))), i.e. that bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))\bottom(t)  bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t^
 ~F (s))). Choose any s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) \ bottom(t). By proposi-
tion 5.11(3), s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s)) for some s 2 Mod(bel(tE)), say s00, and by proposi-
tion 4.15(4), s0 2 bottom(t). But s0 2 bottom(t) and thus s0 2 bottom(t^). But since
bottom(t^)  bottom(t) and s0 2 bottom(t) it follows that s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s00)).
But then s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t^  ~F (s))). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that Mod(bel(tE  )) \Mod() Mod(bel(tE  ( ^ ))).
(KM  60) It must be shown that if bel(tE)^ is satisable and bel(tE) is complete,
then Mod(bel(tE  ( ^ ))) Mod(bel(tE  ))\Mod(). Suppose that bel(tE  )^ 
is satisable, i.e. Mod(bel(tE  )) \ Mod() 6= ?, and that bel(tE) is complete, i.e.
bel(tE) has exactly one model, say s. Choose any s0 2 Mod(bel(tE  ( ^ ))). So
s0 2 bottom(t^  ~F (s)). By proposition 4.15(4), s0 2 bottom(t^). So s0 2 bottom(t)
and s0 2 bottom(t). Suppose that s0 =2 Mod(bel(tE  )) \Mod(). Since s0 2 Mod()
it follows that s0 =2 Mod(bel(tE  )), i.e. s0 =2 bottom(t  ~F (s)). But Mod(bel(tE 
)) \ Mod() 6= ? and hence there must be some s00 2 bottom(t  ~F (s)) such that
s00 2 bottom(t). By proposition 4.15(4), s00 2 bottom(t). So (t  ~F (s))(s00) < (t 
~F (s))(s0). Since s00 2 bottom(t^) and bottom(t^)  bottom(t), it follows that (t^
~F (s))(s00) < (t^  ~F (s))(s0). But then s0 2 bottom(t^  ~F (s)). Contradiction.
So s0 2 Mod(bel(tE  )) \ Mod(). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
Mod(bel(tE  ( ^ ))) Mod(bel(tE  )) \Mod().
(KM  70) It must be shown that Mod(bel((tE 5 tE0)  ) = Mod(bel(tE  )) [
Mod(bel(tE0  )), i.e. it must be shown that bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE5tE0 ))(t  ~F (s))) is
equal to bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) [ bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE0 ))(t  ~F (s))). Choose
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any s0 2 Mod(bel((tE 5 tE0)  )). So s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE5tE0 ))(t  ~F (s))). By
proposition 5.11(3), s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s)) for some s 2Mod(bel(tE 5 tE0)), say s00. By
proposition 5.11(3) bottom(tE5 tE0) = bottom(tE)[ bottom(tE0) and thus Mod(bel(tE5
tE0)) = Mod(bel(tE)) [ Mod(bel(tE0)). So s00 2 Mod(bel(tE)) or s00 2 Mod(bel(tE)).
If s00 2 Mod(bel(tE)), then s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s00)) and thus, by proposition 5.11(3),
s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))). Similarly, if s00 2 Mod(bel(tE0)), then s0 2
bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE0 ))(t ~F (s))). So s0 2Mod(bel(tE )) or s0 2Mod(bel(tE0 )).
Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows thatMod(bel((tE5 tE0))) Mod(bel(tE 
)) [Mod(bel(tE0  )).
Conversely, choose any s0 2Mod(bel(tE  )) [Mod(bel(tE0  )). If s0 2 bottom
(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))) then by proposition 5.11(3), s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s)) for
some s 2 Mod(bel(tE)), say s00. Similarly, if s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE0 ))(t  ~F (s))),
then s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s)) for some s 2 Mod(bel(tE0)), say s000. But Mod(bel(tE)) [
Mod(bel(tE0)) =Mod(bel(tE5tE0)) by proposition 5.11(3). So s0 2 bottom(t ~F (s00)) for
s00 2Mod(bel(tE5tE0)) or s0 2 bottom(t ~F (s000)) for s000 2Mod(bel(tE5tE0)). But then,
by proposition 5.11(3), s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE5tE0 ))(t ~F (s))). Since s0 was chosen ar-
bitrarily, it follows thatMod(bel(tE))[Mod(bel(tE0)) Mod(bel((tE5tE0))).
But then Mod(bel((tE 5 tE0)  )) =Mod(bel(tE  )) [Mod(bel(tE0  )).
Theorem C.2 (5.15) LetM = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and know(tE) the
knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic transition function. A
templated update operation  : TE L! TE satises postulates (TU  1) to (TU  8) i¤
for every M-satisable sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with know(tE), the following
holds:
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2. ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM()
3. For every s1; s2 2ModM(), if (tE )(s1)  (tE )(s2), then ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2)
for some s 2ModM(bel(tE))
Proof. (=)) Suppose that  satises postulates (TU  1) to (TU  7). It must be
shown that conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
1. It must be shown that ModM(bel(tE  )) =
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()).
By postulate (TU  2), ModM(bel(tE  ) 6= ?. Choose any s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )).
Then by postulate (TU  1), s0 2 ModM(). Suppose that s0 =2 Min~F (s)(ModM())
for every s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). So for every s 2 ModM(bel(tE)) there must be some
s00 2 Min~F (s)(ModM()) such that ~F (s)(s00) < ~F (s)(s0). Let  be a nite axiomatisa-
tion of fs00; s0g, i.e. ModM() = fs00; s0g. Now by postulate (TU  1), ModM(bel(tE 
))  ModM(). So let s00 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) and s0 =2 ModM(bel(tE  )). Since
ModM() \ ModM() = ModM(), it follows that  ^  M . Thus, by postu-
late (TU  3), ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))) = ModM(bel(tE  )) and hence, by postulate
(TU  4),ModM(bel(tE))\ModM() ModM(bel(tE)). Since s0 2ModM(bel(tE
)) and s0 2 ModM() it follows that s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )). Contradiction. So
s0 2 Min~F (s)(ModM()) for some s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). But then s0 2
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))
Min~F (s)(ModM()). Since s
0 was chosen arbitrarily it follows that ModM(bel(tE  )) S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()).
Conversely, choose any s0 2 Ss2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()). So s0 2 Min~F (s)
(ModM()) for some s 2 ModM(bel(tE)), say s1. So there is can be no s00 2 ModM()
such that ~F (s1)(s00)  ~F (s1)(s0) unless ~F (s1)(s0)  ~F (s1)(s00). Suppose that s0 =2
ModM(bel(tE  )). Let ModM(bel(tE)) = fs1; s2; : : : ; skg and let ti be the denite
t-ordering such that ModM(bel((ti)) = fsig. Now ModM(bel(tE)) = ModM(bel(t1)) [
ModM(bel(t2))[: : :[ModM(bel(tk)). ButModM(bel(t)) = bottom(t) and thus, by propo-
sition 5.11(3), ModM(bel(tE)) =ModM(bel(t15 t25 : : :5 tk)). By postulate (TU  6),
318
C.2. Proofs for Section 5.5
ModM(bel(tE)) =ModM(bel(t1))[ModM(bel(t2))[: : :[ModM(bel(tk)). Since
s0 =2ModM(bel(tE )) it follows that s0 =2ModM(bel(ti )) for every ti. But, by postu-
late (TU  2), ModM(bel(tE  )) 6= ?. So there must be some s00 2ModM(bel(tE  )),
i.e. s00 2 ModM(bel(ti  )) for some ti, say t1. But then, by postulate (TU  1),
s00 2 ModM(). Let  be a nite axiomatisation of fs00; s0g, i.e. ModM() = fs00; s0g.
SinceModM()\ModM() =ModM(), it follows that ^ M . Thus, by postulate
(TU  3),ModM(bel(t1(^))) =ModM(bel(t1)) and hence, by postulate (TU  4),
ModM(bel(t1  )) \ModM()  ModM(bel(t1  )). Since s00 2 ModM(bel(t1  )) and
s00 2 ModM() it follows that bel(t1  ) ^  is M -satisable, and hence, since bel(t1) is
complete, it follows from postulate (TU  5), that ModM(bel(t1  ))  ModM(bel(t1 
))\ModM(). But thenModM(bel(t1)) =ModM(bel(t1))\ModM(). Since s00 2
ModM(bel(t1)) and s0 =2ModM(bel(t1)), it follows thatModM(bel(t1)) = fs0g. So
(t1)(s0) = 0 and (t1)(s00) > 0. If (t1)(s00) = n then s00 =2ModM(know(t1)), and
hence by postulate (TU  7) it follows that s00 =2 ModM(know(tI)), i.e. ~F (s1)(s00) = n.
So ~F (s1)(s0)  ~F (s1)(s00). On the other hand, if s 2 ModM(know(t1  )), then by
postulate (TU  8), ~F (s1)(s0)  ~F (s1)(s00). But s0 2 Min~F (s1)(ModM()) and thus
~F (s1)(s
00)  ~F (s1)(s0). So ~F (s1)(s0) = ~F (s1)(s00). But (t1  )(s0) = 0 and thus
(t1  )(s00) = 0. Contradiction. So s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )). Since s0 was chosen ar-
bitrarily, it follows that
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM())  ModM(bel(tE  )). But
then ModM(bel(tE  )) =
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()).
2. It must be shown that ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM(), which follows directly
by postulate (TU  7).
3. It must be shown that for every s1; s2 2ModM(), if (tE)(s1)  (tE)(s2), then
~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). Choose any s1; s2 2 ModM(). Sup-
pose that (tE)(s1)  (tE)(s2) but ~F (s)(s1) 6 ~F (s)(s2) for every s 2ModM(bel(tE)).
Suppose that (tE)(s2) = n, i.e. s2 =2ModM(know(tE)). ButModM(know(tE)) =
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ModM() by postulate (TU  1) and hence s2 =2 ModM(). Contradiction. Suppose
that (tE  )(s2) < n. But then, by postulate (TU  8), ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some
s 2ModM(bel(tE)). Contradiction. Since s1; s2 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that for
every s1; s2 2ModM(), if (tE )(s1)  (tE )(s2), then ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some
s 2ModM(bel(tE)).
((=) Suppose that conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold. It must be shown that  satises
postulates (TU  1) to (TU  8).
(TU  1) It must be shown thatModM(bel(tE)) ModM() andModM(know(tE
)  ModM(). Since Min~F (s)(ModM())  ModM() for every s 2 ModM(bel(tE)) it
follows that
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()) ModM(). But thenModM(bel(tE)
ModM().
(TU  2) It must be shown that bel(tE  ) and know(tE  ) are M -satisable.
Since  is M -satisable it follows that ModM() 6= ?. But then
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))
Min~F (s)(ModM()) 6= ? from which it follows that bel(tE  ) 6= ?, i.e. bel(tE  ) is
M -satisable. Furthermore, ModM(know(tE )) =ModM(). Since  isM -satisable,
it follows that know(tE  ) is M -satisable.
(TU  3) Suppose that tE = tE0 and  M 0. It must be shown that tE  = tE0 0.
Let X = ModM() and S   X = NModM(). Choose any s1; s2 2 X. Suppose that
(tE  )(s1)  (tE  )(s2). If (tE  )(s1)  (tE  )(s2), then ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for
some s 2ModM(bel(tE)). Since tE(s) = tE0(s) for every s 2 S, it follows that ~F (s)(s1) 
~F (s)(s2) for s 2 ModM(bel(tE0)). So it is not the case that ~F (s)(s1) 6 ~F (s)(s2) for
every s 2 ModM(bel(tE0)). But then it is not the case that (tE0  )(s1) 6 (tE0  )(s2).
So (tE0  )(s1)  (tE0  )(s2). Hence tE   and tE0   are order-equivalent on X.
Now ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM() and thus S   X 6= ModM(know(tE  )), i.e.
S   X 6= get"(tE  ; n   1). So for every s1; s2 2 S   X, (tE  )(s) = n. Since
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ModM(know(tE0)) = ModM(know(tE)), it follows that for every s1; s2 2 S   X, (tE0 
)(s) = n. Hence tE   and tE0   are order-equivalent on S   X. But  M 0
and thus X = ModM(0) and S   X = NModM(0). But then tE   and tE0  0 are
order-equivalent. Since both tE  and tE0 0 are regular, it follows by proposition 3.17
that tE   = tE0  0.
(TU  4) It must be shown thatModM(bel(tE ))\ModM() ModM(bel(tE (^
))). Choose any s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM(). So s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) and
s0 2ModM(), i.e. s0 2
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM(), i.e. s
0 2Min~F (s)(ModM())
for some s 2 ModM(bel(tE)), say s00. So s0 2 ModM() and s0 2 ModM(), i.e. s0 2
ModM() \ModM(), i.e. s0 2 ModM( ^ ). But since ModM( ^ )  ModM()
and s0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM()) it follows that s0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM( ^ )). But then
s0 2 Ss2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM(^), i.e. s0 2ModM(bel(tE(^))). Since s0 was
chosen arbitrarily it follows thatModM(bel(tE))\ModM() ModM(bel(tE(^))).
(TU  5) Suppose that bel(tE  ) ^  is M -satisable and bel(tE) complete. So
bel(tE) has exactly one model, say s00. It must be shown that ModM(bel(tE  ( ^
)))  ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM(). Choose any s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))). So
s0 2 Ss2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM( ^ )), i.e. s0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM( ^ )). So s0 2
ModM( ^ ), i.e. s0 2ModM() and s0 2ModM(). Suppose that s0 =2ModM(bel(tE 
)) \ModM(). Since s0 2 ModM() it follows that s0 =2 ModM(bel(tE  )), i.e. s0 =2
Min~F (s00)(ModM()). But bel(tE  )^  is M -satisable and hence there must be some
s000 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM()) such that s000 2 ModM(). So ~F (s00)(s000) < ~F (s00)(s0). But
then s000 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM( ^ )) and s0 =2 Min~F (s00)(ModM( ^ )). Contradiction.
So s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM(). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
ModM(bel(tE  ( ^ ))) ModM(bel(tE  )) \ModM().
(TU  6) It must be shown that ModM(bel((tE 5 tE0)  )) = ModM(bel(tE  )) [




C. Proofs for Chapter 5
Min~F (s)(ModM()), i.e. s
0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM()) for some s00 2 ModM(bel(tE 5 tE0)).
By proposition 5.11(3) bottom(tE5 tE0) = bottom(tE)[ bottom(tE0), i.e. ModM(bel(tE5
tE0)) = ModM(bel(tE)) [ ModM(bel(tE0)). But then s00 2 ModM(bel(tE)) or s00 2
ModM(bel(tE0)). If s00 2 ModM(bel(tE)) then s0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM()) and thus s0 2S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()), i.e. s
0 2ModM(bel(tE )). If s00 2ModM(bel(tE0))
then s0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM()) and thus s0 2
S
s2ModM (bel(tE0 ))Min~F (s)(ModM()), i.e.
s0 2 ModM(bel(tE0  )). So s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) [ ModM(bel(tE0  )). Since s0
was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that ModM(bel((tE 5 tE0)  )) ModM(bel(tE  )) [
ModM(bel(tE0  )).
Conversely, choose any s0 2 ModM(bel(tE  )) [ ModM(bel(tE0  )). If s0 2
ModM(bel(tE  )) then s0 2 Min~F (s00)(ModM()) for some s00 2 ModM(bel(tE)). On
the other hand, if s0 2 ModM(bel(tE0  )) then s0 2 Min~F (s000)(ModM()) for some
s000 2ModM(bel(tE0)). ButModM(bel(tE))[ModM(bel(tE0)) =ModM(bel(tE5 tE0)). So
s0 2 Min~F (s)(ModM()) for some s 2 ModM(bel(tE 5 tE0)), either s00 or s000. Hence s0 2
ModM(bel((tE 5 tE0)  ). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that ModM(bel(tE 
))[ModM(bel(tE0  )) ModM(bel((tE 5 tE0)  )). But then ModM(bel((tE 5 tE0) 
)) =ModM(bel(tE  )) [ModM(bel(tE0  )).
(TU  7) It must be shown that ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM(), which holds by
condition 2.
(TU  8) Suppose that (tE  )(s1)  (tE  )(s2) < n. It must be shown that
~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some s 2ModM(bel(tE)). Since (tE  )(s1)  (tE  )(s2) < n,
it follows that s1; s2 2 ModM(know(tE  )). But ModM(know(tE  )) = ModM()
and thus s1; s2 2 ModM(). But then, by condition 3, ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some
s 2ModM(bel(tE)).
Proposition C.12 (5.13) Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with
card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE be an epistemic state with bel(tE) the belief assertion and
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know(tE) the knowledge assertion associated with tE and let ~F be an epistemic transi-
tion function. Then the templated update operation  satises postulates (TU  1) to
(TU  8) for every satisable sentence  2 L that is inconsistent with know(tE).
Proof. Theorem 5.15 will be used to show that the templated update operation
 satises postulates (TU  1) to (TU  8). For every sentence  2 L, ModM() =
bottom(t) and NModM() = top(t) for t 2 TD the denite t-ordering induced by 
(since M is extensional). It will be shown that for every M -satisable sentence  2 L
that is inconsistent with know(tE), the following holds:
1. ModM(bel(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))) =
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM())
2. ModM(know(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))) =ModM()
3. For every s1; s2 2ModM(), if 5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t ~F (s))(s1)  5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t
~F (s))(s2), then ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some s 2ModM(bel(tE)).
1. Choose any s0 2ModM(bel(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t~F (s)))). So s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))
(t  ~F (s))). By proposition 5.11(3), s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s)) for some s 2Mod(bel(tE)).
So (t ~F (s))(s0) = 0. But if (t ~F (s))(s0) = 0 then card(seg(t(s0); ~F (s)(s0))) = 0 and
by proposition 4.15(1), t(s0) = 0. So s 2 bottom(t), i.e. s 2 ModM(). Suppose there
is some s00 2ModM() such that ~F (s)(s00)  ~F (s)(s0) and ~F (s)(s0) 6 ~F (s)(s00). But then
card(seg(t(s
0); ~F (s)(s0))) 6= 0. Contradiction. So there can be no s00 2 ModM() such
that ~F (s)(s00)  ~F (s)(s0) unless ~F (s)(s0)  ~F (s)(s00). So s0 2 Min~F (s)(ModM()). But
then s0 2 Ss2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that ModM(bel(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))) 
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()).
Conversely, choose any s0 2 Ss2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()). So s0 2 Min~F (s)
(ModM()) for some s 2ModM(bel(tE)). Since s0 2ModM(), it follows that t(s0) = 0.
But s0 2 Min~F (s)(ModM()) and hence there can be no s00 2 ModM() such that
~F (s)(s00)  ~F (s)(s0) unless ~F (s)(s0)  ~F (s)(s00). But then card(seg(t(s0); ~F (s)(s0))) = 0
and thus (t  ~F (s)))(s0) = 0. So s0 2 bottom(t  ~F (s))). But then, by proposition
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5.11(3), s0 2 bottom(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))), i.e. s0 2 ModM(bel(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t 
~F (s))). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()) 
ModM(bel(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))). Hence ModM(bel(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))) =S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()).
2. Choose any s0 2ModM(know(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t~F (s)))). So s0 2 get"(5s2Mod(bel(tE))
(t ~F (s)); n 1). By proposition 5.11(4), top(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t ~F (s))) =
T
s2Mod(bel(tE))
top(t  ~F (s)). But then s0 2 get"(t  ~F (s); n   1) for some s 2 Mod(bel(tE)). So
(t  ~F (s)))(s0) < n. But then card(seg(t(s0); ~F (s)(s0))) < n. So t(s0) < 0. But t is
denite and thus t(s0) = 0, i.e. s0 2ModM(). Since s0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that ModM(know(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))) ModM().
Conversely, choose any s0 2 ModM(). So s0 2 bottom(t), i.e. t(s0) = 0. But then
card(seg(t(s
0); ~F (s)(s0))) < n for every s 2 Mod(bel(tE)). So (t  ~F (s)))(s0) < n for
every s 2 Mod(bel(tE)), i.e. s0 2 get"(t  ~F (s); n  1) for every s 2 Mod(bel(tE)). But
then s0 2 get"(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t ~F (s)); n 1), i.e. s0 2ModM(know(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t
~F (s)))). But s0 was chosen arbitrarily and thusModM() ModM(know(5s2Mod(bel(tE))
(t  ~F (s)))). Hence ModM(know(5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s)))) =ModM().
3. Choose any s1; s2 2ModM(). So s1; s2 2 bottom(t). Suppose that5s2Mod(bel(tE))
(t  ~F (s))(s1)  5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))(s2). Suppose that ~F (s)(s1) 6 ~F (s)(s2) for
every s 2ModM(bel(tE)). But t(s1) = t(s2) = 0 and hence card(seg(t(s1); ~F (s)(s1))) 6
card(seg(t(s2); ~F (s)(s2)) for every s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). But then (t  ~F (s))(s1) 6
(t  ~F (s))(s2) for every s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). But then minf(t  ~F (s))(s1); (t 
~F (s))(s2)g = (t  ~F (s))(s2) for every s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). Hence 5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t 
~F (s))(s2)  5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))(s1). Contradiction. So ~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for
some s 2 ModM(bel(tE)). Since s1; s2 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that for every
s1; s2 2ModM(), if 5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))(s1)  5s2Mod(bel(tE))(t  ~F (s))(s2), then
~F (s)(s1)  ~F (s)(s2) for some s 2ModM(bel(tE)).
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Proposition C.13 (5.14) Let T = hS; tE; li and T 0 = hS; tE  ; li be templated inter-
pretations of L such that l is injective and card(S) = n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be
T -satisable and inconsistent with know(tE). Let ~F be an epistemic transition function.
Then the following holds:
1. pl(tE; )  pl(tE  ; )
2. dt(tE  ; )  dt(tE; )
Proof. 1. If  is T -valid, then pl(tE; ) = pl(tE  ; ) = n. Assume that  is
not T -valid. Since know(tE) ^  is T -unsatisable, it follows that pl(tE; ) =  1. Now
ModT (know(tE  )) =ModT (), i.e. get"(tE  ; n  1) =ModT (). So pl(tE  ; ) =
n  1. Hence pl(tE; )  pl(tE  ; ).
2. Since know(tE)^ is T -unsatisable, it follows that dt(tE; ) = n. ButModT (bel(tE
)) =
S
s2ModM (bel(tE))Min~F (s)(ModM()) and thus bottom(tE )\ModT () 6= ?. But
then dt(tE  ; ) = 0. Hence dt(tE  ; )  dt(tE; ).
Proposition C.14 Let M = hS; li be an extensional interpretation of L with card(S)
= n. Let tE 2 TE and let  2 L be M-satisable and inconsistent with know(tE). Then
ContD(tE) 6 ContD(tE  ).
Proof. Since  is M -satisable but inconsistent with know(tE) it follows that
get"(t; n   1) \ ModM(know(tE)) = ?, i.e. ContD(t)  ContD(tE). By postulate
(TU  7) it follows that ModM(know(tE  )) =ModM(), i.e. ModM(know(tE  )) =
get"(t; n  1). But then ContD(tE  )  ContD(tE), i.e. ContD(tE) 6 ContD(tE  ).
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Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 6
D.1 Proofs for Section 6.1
Proposition D.1 (6.2) Let  and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate
(KP4 4) is satised by every model-tting operation of Revesz, not satised by every
majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, and not satised by every arbitration
operation of Liberatore and Schaerf.
Proof. Suppose that  ^  is unsatisable.
Case 1: Let B be any model-tting operation of Revesz, i.e. B satises postulates
(R B 1) to (R B 7). Suppose that Mod( B )  Mod(). By postulate (R B 1),
Mod( B )  Mod(). So Mod( B )  Mod( ^ ). But  is satisable and thus,
by postulate (R B 3),  B  is satisable. Since Mod( B )  Mod( ^ ) it follows
that  ^  must be satisable. Contradiction. So Mod(B ) 6 Mod(), i.e. postulate
(KP 4 4) is satised.
Case 2: Let 4 be any majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, i.e. 4
satises postulates (LM4 0) to (LM4 4). The proof is by counterexample. Suppose L
is generated by Atom = fP (a); Q(a)g. Let Mod() = f11g and Mod() = f10g with 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the literal P (a). So Mod() = f11; 10g. But then both  and  entails  while neither
 nor  entails :. Since both  and  entails ::, it follows from proposition 6.1 that
 j6 : and  j6 :. So the support for  is greater than the opposition to  together
with the partial support for :. Hence, by postulate (LM4 4),Mod(4) Mod(),
i.e. Mod(4 )  f11; 10g. For literal :P (a), the support is 0, since neither  nor 
entails :P (a), while for literals Q(a) and :Q(a) both the support and opposition is 1,
since Q(a) is supported by  but opposed by  and vice versa for :Q(a). So the support
for these literals is not greater than the opposition to them. Hence there are no other
restrictions on Mod(4 ) except that Mod(4 ) 6= ?, by postulate (LM4 1). So
it is possible that Mod(4 ) = f11g. But then Mod(4 )  Mod(), i.e. postulate
(KP4 4) is not satised.
Case 3: Let 4 be any arbitration operation of Liberatore and Schaerf, i.e. 4 satises
postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 8). Choose any s 2 Mod( 4 ). So s 2 Mod( 4 )
by postulate (LS4 1). But, by postulate (LS4 7), s 2 Mod() [Mod(). So either
s 2 Mod() or s 2 Mod(), but not both since  ^  is unsatisable. Suppose that
s 2 Mod(). Since s was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Mod( 4 )  Mod(),
i.e. postulate (KP4 4) is not satised. Suppose that s 2 Mod(). Since s was chosen
arbitrarily, it follows thatMod(4) Mod(), i.e. postulate (KP4 4) is not satised.
Proposition D.2 (6.3) Let , 0, and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate
(KP4 5) is satised by every arbitration operation of Liberatore and Schaerf but is not
satised by every majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon.
Proof. It must be shown that Mod( 4 ) \Mod(0 4 )  Mod(( _ 0) 4 ).
If Mod( 4 ) \ Mod(0 4 ) = ? then the result holds vacuously. Suppose that
Mod( 4 ) \ Mod(0 4 ) 6= ?. Choose any s 2 Mod( 4 ) \ Mod(0 4 ). So
s 2Mod(4 ) and s 2Mod(04 ).
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Case 1: Let 4 be any arbitration operation of Liberatore and Schaerf, i.e. 4 satises
postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 8). Suppose that s =2Mod((_0)4). Then by postulate
(LS4 1), s =2 Mod(4 ( _ 0)). But then, by postulate (LS4 6), s =2 Mod(4 )
and s =2 Mod( 4 0) and s =2 Mod( 4 ) [Mod( 4 0). So s 62 Mod( 4 ) and
s 62Mod(04 ), by postulate (LS4 1). Contradiction. Since s was chosen arbitrarily,
it follows that Mod(4 ) \Mod(04 ) Mod(( _ 0)4 ).
Case 2: Let 4 be any majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, i.e. 4
satises postulates (LM4 0) to (LM4 4). The proof is by counterexample. Suppose
L is generated by Atom = fP (a); Q(a)g. Let Mod() = f11g, Mod(0) = f00g, and
Mod() = f10g with  the literal P (a) and 0 the literal :Q(a). So Mod() = f11; 10g
and Mod(0) = f00; 10g. As shown by proposition 6.2(Case 2), Mod(4 ) Mod(),
i.e. Mod( 4 )  f11; 10g, with no other restrictions on Mod( 4 ) except that
Mod(4) 6= ?, by postulate (LM4 1). Similarly, it can be shown thatMod(04) 
Mod(0), i.e. Mod(04 )  f00; 10g, with no other restrictions on Mod(04 ) except
thatMod(04) 6= ?, by postulate (LM4 1). Suppose thatMod(4) = f11; 10g and
Mod(04) = f00; 10g so that Mod(4)\Mod(04) = f10g. Now Mod(_ 0) =
f11; 00g. But neither  _ 0 nor  entails :P (a) or Q(a). However,  entails both
::P (a) and :Q(a). So the support for :P (a) and Q(a) are in both cases less than the
opposition to these literals. Turning to literals P (a) and :Q(a):  _ 0 entails neither
but  entails both. Moreover, neither  _ 0 nor  entails ::P (a) or :Q(a). However,
 _ 0 partially supports both ::P (a), since Mod(( _ 0) ^ :P (a)) = f00g and for
f11g 2 Mod(( _ 0) ^ P (a)) it holds that f01g =2 Mod(( _ 0), and :Q(a), since
Mod(( _ 0) ^ ::Q(a)) = f11g and for f00g 2 Mod(( _ 0) ^ :Q(a)) it holds that
f01g =2 Mod(( _ 0). So the support for P (a) and :Q(a) are in both cases not greater
that the partial support for the negation of these literals. So postulate (LM4 4) places
no restriction on Mod(( _ 0)4 ). Suppose Mod(( _ 0)4 ) = f11; 00g. But then
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Mod(4)\Mod(04) 6Mod((_0)4), i.e. postulate (KP4 5) is not satised.
Proposition D.3 (6.4) Let , 0, and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate
(KP4 5) is satised by every majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, provided
 ^  or 0 ^  is satisable.
Proof. Choose any s 2 Mod( 4 ) \ Mod(0 4 ). So s 2 Mod( 4 ) and
s 2 Mod(0 4 ). Suppose that  ^  is satisable. Then by postulate (LM4 2),
4   ^ . So s 2Mod()\Mod(), i.e. s 2Mod(_ 0)\Mod(). But if ^  is
satisable, then (_0)^ is satisable and thus, by postulate (LM4 2), (_0)4 
( _ 0) ^ . But then s 2 Mod(( _ 0)4 ). Similarly if 0 ^  is satisable. Since s
was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Mod(4 ) \Mod(04 ) Mod(( _ 0)4 ),
i.e. postulate (KP4 5) is satised.
Proposition D.4 (6.5) Let , 0, and  be satisable knowledge bases of L. Postulate
(KP4 6) is not satised by every model-tting operation of Revesz, not satised by
every arbitration operation of Liberatore and Schaerf, and not satised by every majority
merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon.
Proof. LetMod(4)\Mod(04) 6= ?. It must be shown thatMod((_0)4) 
Mod(4 ) \Mod(04 ).
Case 1: Let B be any model-tting operation of Revesz, i.e. B satises postulates
(RB 1) to (RB 7). The proof is by counterexample. Suppose L is generated by Atom =
fP (a); Q(a)g. Let Mod() = f11g, Mod(0) = f10g, and Mod() = f00; 01g. So
 ^ , 0 ^ , and ( _ 0) ^  are all unsatisable. By postulate (RB 1), Mod( B
)  f00; 01g, Mod(0 B )  f00; 01g, and Mod(( _ 0) B )  f00; 01g. Suppose
that Mod( B ) = f00g, Mod(0 B ) = f00g, and Mod(( _ 0) B ) = f00; 01g so
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that Mod( B ) \Mod(0 B ) = f00g and postulate (RB 7) is satised. But then
Mod((_0)B) 6Mod(B)\Mod(0B), i.e. postulate (KP4 6) is not satised.
Case 2: Let 4 be any arbitration operation of Liberatore and Schaerf, i.e. 4 sat-
ises postulates (LS4 1) to (LS4 8). The proof is by counterexample. Suppose L is
generated by Atom = fP (a); Q(a)g. Let Mod() = f11; 01g, Mod(0) = f10; 01g, and
Mod() = f00g. So  ^ , 0 ^ , and ( _ 0) ^  are all unsatisable. By postulate
(LS4 7), Mod( 4 )  f11; 01; 00g and Mod(0 4 )  f10; 01; 00g. Suppose that
Mod(4 ) = f01; 00g and Mod(04 ) = f10; 00g so that postulate (LS4 8) is satis-
ed. SoMod(4)\Mod(04) = f00g. Then by postulates (LS4 1) and (LS4 6),
Mod(( _ 0)4 ) = f01; 00g or Mod(( _ 0)4 ) = f10; 00g or Mod(( _ 0)4 ) =
f01; 00; 10g. In all three cases, Mod(( _ 0) 4 ) 6 Mod( 4 ) \Mod(0 4 ), i.e.
postulate (KP4 6) is not satised.
Case 3: Let 4 be any majority merging operation of Lin and Mendelzon, i.e. 4
satises postulates (LM4 0) to (LM4 4). The proof is by counterexample. Using the
example from proposition 6.3(Case 2), the result isMod(4)\Mod(04) = f10g and
Mod((_0)4) = f11; 00g. But thenMod((_0)4) 6Mod(4)\Mod(04),
i.e. postulate (KP4 6) is not satised.
D.2 Proofs for Section 6.5
Proposition D.5 (6.15) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Every t-
ordering produced by a basic templated merging operation 4 is regular.
Proof. It must be shown that 4(T) is in normal form and not strongly contradic-
tory.
Suppose there is some i 2 B such that i < n and get!(4(T); i) = ?, but
get(4(T); i; n   1) 6= ?. So there can be no s 2 S such that 4(T)(s) = i but
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there must be some s0; s00 2 S such that 4(T)(s0) < i and i < 4(T)(s00) < n   1.
Since both 4(T)(s0) < n  1 and 4(T)(s00) < n  1, it follows by denition 6.15 that
card(seg(f(s0))) < i and card(seg(f(s00))) > i. But A is well-ordered and hence there
must be some f(s) 2 A such that card(seg(f(s))) = i. From the linear order  on
A it follows that f(s) < f(s00) < k. But then 4(T)(s) = i. Contradiction. So for
each i 2 B, it holds that if i < n and get!(4(T); i) = ? then get(4(T); i; n 1) = ?.
But then 4(T) is in normal form.
Suppose that get"(4(T); n   1) = ?. So 4(T)(s) = n for every s 2 S. But
then, by denition 6.15, f(s) = k for every s 2 S and card(A) > 1. But if f(s) =
k for every s 2 S then ran(f) = fkg and thus card(A) = 1. Contradiction. So
get"(4(T); n  1) 6= ?, i.e. 4(T) is not strongly contradictory.
Lemma D.1 (6.1) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Let 4 be a basic
templated merging operation based on an indexing function f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; kg (with
respect to T). For every s; s0 2 S,
 if f(s) = f(s0) then 4(T)(s) = 4(T)(s0) and
 if f(s) < f(s0) then 4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0).
Proof. Choose any s; s0 2 S. Suppose that f(s) = f(s0). If f(s) < k or
card(A) = 1 then 4(T)(s) = card(seg(f(s))) and 4(T)(s0) = card(seg(f(s0))).
But card(seg(f(s))) = card(seg(f(s0))) and thus4(T)(s) = 4(T)(s0). If f(s) = k
and card(A) 6= 1 then 4(T)(s) = n and 4(T)(s0) = n, i.e. 4(T)(s) = 4(T)(s0).
Suppose that f(s) < f(s0). So card(A) 6= 1 and f(s) < k. But then 4(T)(s) =
card(seg(f(s))). If f(s0) = k then 4(T)(s0) = n and since card(seg(f(s))) < n it
follows that 4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0). If f(s0) < k then 4(T)(s0) = card(seg(f(s0)))
and since card(seg(f(s))) < card(seg(f(s0))) by virtue of f(s) < f(s0), it follows
that 4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0).
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Proposition D.6 (6.16) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be infor-
mation tuples. Templated merging operation 4Min satises properties (TM4 1) to
(TM4 5).
Proof. Templated merging operation4Min is based on indexing function fMin : S !
f0; 1; : : : ; ng.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4Min(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.15,
4Min(T) is regular. But then bottom(4Min(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4Min(T)) =
T
ti2T
bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any s 2T
ti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T, including t1. But then fMin(s) =
t1(s) = 0 and hence 4Min(T)(s) = card(seg(0)). Since card(seg(0)) = 0 it follows that
s 2 bottom(4Min(T)). Conversely, choose any s 2 bottom(4Min(T)), i.e. 4Min(T)(s) =
0. So card(seg(fMin(s))) = 0, i.e. fMin(s) is the least element in AMin. Suppose
that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So fMin(s) = succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg), i.e.
fMin(s) 6= 0. But T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s such that
ti(s
0) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fMin(s0) = 0, i.e. fMin(s0) is the least element in
AMin. So fMin(s0) = fMin(s) = 0. Contradiction. So s 2 bottom(ti) for every ti 2 T, i.e.
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fMin : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng be the indexing function with respect to T and
f 0Min : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng the indexing function with respect to T0. From denition 6.16
it is clear that fMin(s) = f 0Min(s) for every s 2 S. But then, 4Min(T) = 4Min(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then 4Min(T)(s) 
4Min(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. Consider
the case where ti(s) = tj(s) for every ti; tj 2 T. So fMin(s) = t1(s). There are two
subcases. i) If ti(s0) = tj(s0) for every ti; tj 2 T then fMin(s0) = t1(s0). But t1(s)  tk(s0)
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and thus fMin(s)  fMin(s0). ii) If ti(s0) 6= tj(s0) for some ti; tj 2 T, then fMin(s0) =
succ(minfti(s0) j ti 2 Tg). Let minfti(s0) j ti 2 Tg = tk(s0). But t1(s)  tk(s0) and thus
t1(s)  succ(tk(s0)), i.e. fMin(s)  fMin(s0).
Consider the case where ti(s) 6= tj(s) for some ti; tj 2 T, in which case fMin(s) =
succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg). Let minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg = tk(s). There are two subcases.
i) If ti(s0) = tj(s0) for every ti; tj 2 T then fMin(s0) = t1(s0). Since ti(s) 6= tj(s) for
some ti; tj 2 T, there must be some tl 2 T such that tk(s) < tl(s). But tl(s)  tl(s0) =
t1(s
0) and thus succ(tk(s))  t1(s0), i.e fMin(s)  fMin(s0). ii) If ti(s0) 6= tj(s0) for some
ti; tj 2 T, then fMin(s0) = succ(minfti(s0) j ti 2 Tg). Let minfti(s0) j ti 2 Tg = tl(s0).
But tl(s)  tl(s0) and since tk(s)  tl(s) it follows that tk(s)  tl(s0), i.e. succ(tk(s)) 
succ(tl(s
0)), i.e. fMin(s)  fMin(s0). So in all cases fMin(s)  fMin(s0) and thus, by
lemma 6.1, 4Min(T)(s)  4Min(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if4Min(T)(s)  4Min(T)(s0) then ti(s)  ti(s0) for
some ti 2 T. Assume that 4Min(T)(s)  4Min(T)(s0). Suppose that ti(s0) < ti(s) for
every ti 2 T. Consider the case where ti(s0) = tj(s0) for every ti; tj 2 T. So fMin(s0) =
t1(s
0). There are two subcases. i) If ti(s) = tj(s) for every ti; tj 2 T then fMin(s) = t1(s).
But t1(s0) < t1(s) and thus fMin(s0) < fMin(s). ii) If ti(s) 6= tj(s) for some ti; tj 2 T, then
fMin(s) = succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg). Let minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg = tk(s). But t1(s0) < tk(s)
and thus t1(s0) < succ(tk(s)), i.e. fMin(s0) < fMin(s).
Consider the case where ti(s0) 6= tj(s0) for some ti; tj 2 T. So fMin(s0) = succ(minfti(s0) j
ti 2 Tg). Let minfti(s0) j ti 2 Tg = tk(s0). There are two subcases. i) If ti(s) = tj(s)
for every ti; tj 2 T then fMin(s) = t1(s). Since ti(s0) 6= tj(s0) for some ti; tj 2 T, there
must be some tl 2 T such that tk(s0) < tl(s0). But tl(s0) < tl(s) = t1(s) and thus
succ(tk(s
0)) < t1(s), i.e fMin(s0) < fMin(s). ii) If ti(s) 6= tj(s) for some ti; tj 2 T, then
fMin(s) = succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg). Let minfti(s) j ti 2 Tg = tl(s). But tl(s0) < tl(s)
and since tk(s0)  tl(s0) it follows that tk(s0) < tl(s), i.e. succ(tk(s0)) < succ(tl(s0)),
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i.e. fMin(s0) < fMin(s). So in all cases fMin(s0) < fMin(s) and thus, by lemma 6.1,
4Min(T)(s0) < 4Min(T)(s). Contradiction. But then ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
Proposition D.7 (6.17) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be infor-
mation tuples. Templated merging operation 4Max satises properties (TM4 1) to
(TM4 5).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4Max is based on indexing function fMax :
S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4Max(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.15,
4Max(T) is regular. But then bottom(4Max(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4Max(T)) =
T
ti2T
bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any s 2T
ti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then maxfti(s) j ti 2 Tg = 0,
i.e. fMax(s) = 0 and hence 4Max(T)(s) = card(seg(0)). Since card(seg(0)) = 0 it
follows that s 2 bottom(4Max(T). Conversely, choose any s 2 bottom(4Max(T), i.e.
4Max(T)(s) = 0. So card(seg(fMax(s)) = 0, i.e. fMax(s) is the least element in AMax.
Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So maxfti(s) j ti 2 Tg > 0, i.e. fMax(s)
6= 0. But T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s such that ti(s0) = 0
for every ti 2 T. But then fMax(s0) = 0, i.e. fMax(s0) is the least element in AMax.
So fMax(s0) = fMax(s) = 0. Contradiction. So s 2 bottom(ti) for every ti 2 T, i.e.
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fMax : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng be the indexing function with respect to T and
f 0Max : S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ng the indexing function with respect to T0. From denition 6.16
it is clear that fMax(s) = f 0Max(s) for every s 2 S. But then, 4Max(T) = 4Max(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then4Max(T)(s) 
4Max(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. Let
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maxfti(s) j ti 2 Tg = tk(s). Since tk(s)  tk(s0) it follows that tk(s)  maxfti(s0) j
ti 2 Tg. But then fMax(s)  fMax(s0). By lemma 6.1, it follows that 4Max(T)(s) 
4Max(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4Max(T)(s)  4Max(T)(s0) then ti(s)  ti(s0)
for some ti 2 T. Assume that 4Max(T)(s)  4Max(T)(s0). Suppose that ti(s0) < ti(s)
for every ti 2 T. Let maxfti(s0) j ti 2 Tg = tk(s0). Since tk(s0) < tk(s) it follows that
tk(s
0) < maxfti(s) j ti 2 Tg. But then fMax(s0) < fMax(s). By lemma 6.1, it follows that
4Max(T)(s0) < 4Max(T)(s). Contradiction. So ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
Proposition D.8 (6.18) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be informa-
tion tuples. Templated merging operation4 satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4 is based on indexing function f : S !
f0; 1; : : : ;m ng.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.15, 4(T)
is regular. But then bottom(4(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4(T)) =
T
ti2T
bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any s 2T
ti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then
Pfti(s) j ti 2 Tg = 0, i.e.
f(s) = 0 and hence 4(T)(s) = card(seg(0)). Since card(seg(0)) = 0 it follows that
s 2 bottom(4(T). Conversely, choose any s 2 bottom(4(T), i.e. 4(T)(s) = 0. So
card(seg(f(s)) = 0, i.e. f(s) is the least element in A. Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti)
for some ti 2 T. So
Pfti(s) j ti 2 Tg > 0, i.e. f(s) 6= 0. But T is satisable and hence
there must be some s0 6= s such that ti(s0) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then f(s0) = 0, i.e.
f(s
0) is the least element in A. So f(s0) = f(s) = 0. Contradiction. So s 2 bottom(ti)
for every ti 2 T, i.e. s 2
T
ti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let f : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;m ng be the indexing function with respect to T and
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f 0 : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mng the indexing function with respect to T0. From denition 6.16
it is clear that f(s) = f 0(s) for every s 2 S. But then, 4(T) = 4(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then 4(T)(s) 
4(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. But thenPfti(s) j ti 2 Tg  P ti(s0) j ti 2 T, i.e. f(s)  f(s0). But then, by lemma 6.1, it
follows that 4(T)(s)  4(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4(T)(s)  4(T)(s0) then ti(s)  ti(s0) for
some ti 2 T. Assume that 4(T)(s)  4(T)(s0). Suppose that ti(s0) < ti(s) for every
ti 2 T. But then
P
ti(s
0) j ti 2 T <
Pfti(s) j ti 2 Tg, i.e. f(s0) < f(s). But then, by
lemma 6.1, it follows that 4(T)(s0) < 4(T)(s). Contradiction. So ti(s)  ti(s0) for
some ti 2 T.
Proposition D.9 (6.19) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Every t-
ordering produced by a rened templated merging operation 4R is regular.
Proof. It must be shown that 4R(T) is in normal form and not strongly contra-
dictory.
Suppose there is some i 2 B such that i < n and get!(4R(T); i) = ?, but
get(4R(T); i; n   1) 6= ?. So there can be no s 2 S such that 4R(T)(s) = i but
there must be some s0; s00 2 S such that 4R(T)(s0) < i and i < 4R(T)(s00) < n   1.
Since both 4R(T)(s0) < n   1 and 4R(T)(s00) < n   1, it follows by denition 6.18
that card(seg(fR(s0))) < i and card(seg(fR(s00))) > i. But AR is well-ordered and
hence there must be some fR(s) 2 A such that card(seg(fR(s))) = i. From the
lexicographic ordering  on AR it follows that first(fR(s)) < first(fR(s00)) < k.
But then 4R(T)(s) = i. Contradiction. So for each i 2 B, it holds that if i < n and
get!(4R(T); i) = ? then get(4R(T); i; n   1) = ?. But then 4R(T) is in normal
form.
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Suppose that get"(4R(T); n   1) = ?. So 4R(T)(s) = n for every s 2 S. But
then, by denition 6.18, first(fR(s)) = k for every s 2 S and first(min(AR)) 6= k.
But if first(fR(s)) = k for every s 2 S then first(min(AR)) = k. Contradiction. So
get"(4R(T); n  1) 6= ?, i.e. 4R(T) is not strongly contradictory.
Lemma D.2 (6.2) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Let 4R be a
rened templated merging operation based on a rened indexing function fR : S !
f0; 1; : : : ; kgl (with respect to T). For every s; s0 2 S,
 if fR(s) = fR(s0) then 4R(T)(s) = 4R(T)(s0)
 if fR(s)  fR(s0) and (first(f(s)) < k or first(f(s0)) < k or first(min(AR)) =
k) then 4R(T)(s) < 4R(T)(s0)
 if fR(s)  fR(s0) and (first(f(s)) = k and first(f(s0)) = k and
first(min(AR)) 6= k) then 4R(T)(s) = 4R(T)(s0)
Proof. Choose any s; s0 2 S. Suppose that f(s) = f(s0). If first(f(s)) < k or
first(min(AR)) = k then4(T)(s) = card(seg(f(s))) and4(T)(s0) = card(seg(f(s0))).
But card(seg(f(s))) = card(seg(f(s0))) and thus4(T)(s) = 4(T)(s0). If first(f(s)) =
k and first(min(AR)) 6= k then 4(T)(s) = n and 4(T)(s0) = n, i.e. 4(T)(s) =
4(T)(s0).
Suppose that f(s)  f(s0) and that first(f(s)) < k or first(f(s0)) < k or
first(min(AR)) = k. If first(min(AR)) = k then 4(T)(s) = card(seg(f(s))) and
4(T)(s0) = card(seg(f(s0))). But since f(s)  f(s0) it follows that card(seg(f(s))) <
card(seg(f(s0))). But then 4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0). Assume first(min(AR)) 6= k.
If first(f(s)) < k and first(f(s0)) < k then 4(T)(s) = card(seg(f(s))) and
4(T)(s0) = card(seg(f(s0))). But f(s)  f(s0) and thus card(seg(f(s))) <
card(seg(f(s0))). Hence4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0). If first(f(s)) < k and first(f(s0)) =
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k then4(T)(s) = card(seg(f(s))) and4(T)(s0) = n. But card(seg(f(s))) < n and
hence 4(T)(s) < 4(T)(s0).
Suppose that f(s)  f(s0) and that first(f(s)) = k and first(f(s0)) = k and
first(min(AR)) 6= k. But then 4(T)(s) = n and 4(T)(s0) = n, i.e. 4(T)(s) =
4(T)(s0).
Proposition D.10 (6.20) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be infor-
mation tuples. Templated merging operation 4RMin satises properties (TM4 1) to
(TM4 5).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4RMin is based on indexing function fRMin :
S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ngm.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4RMin(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.19,
4RMin(T) is regular. But then bottom(4RMin(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4RMin(T)) =T
ti2T bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fRMin(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0)
and hence 4RMin(T)(s) = card(seg(0; 0; : : : ; 0)). Since card(seg(0; 0; : : : ; 0)) = 0 it fol-
lows that s 2 bottom(4RMin(T). Conversely, choose any s 2 bottom(4RMin(T), i.e.
4RMin(T)(s) = 0. So card(seg(fRMin(s)) = 0, i.e. fRMin(s) is the least element in
ARMin. Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So fRMin(s) 6= (0; 0; : : : ; 0). But
T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s such that ti(s0) = 0 for every
ti 2 T. But then fRMin(s0) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0), i.e. fRMin(s0) is the least element in ARMin.
So fRMin(s0) = fRMin(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0). Contradiction. So s 2 bottom(ti) for every
ti 2 T, i.e. s 2
T
ti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fRMin be the rened indexing function with respect to T and f 0RMin
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the rened indexing function with respect to T0. From denition 6.19 it is clear that
fRMin(s) = f
0
RMin(s) for every s 2 S. But then, 4RMin(T) = 4RMin(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then4RMin(T)(s) 
4RMin(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. Let
fRMin(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xm) and fRMin(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; ym). Since both fRMin(s) and
fRMin(s
0) are ordered increasingly it follows that x1  x2  : : :  xm and y1  y2 
: : :  ym. But ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. So x1  yi for every i = 1; 2; : : : ;m. If
x1 = y1 then x2  yi for every i = 2; : : : ;m. And so on. But then fRMin(s)  fRMin(s0).
Hence, by lemma 6.2, it follows that 4RMin(T)(s)  4RMin(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4RMin(T)(s)  4RMin(T)(s0) then ti(s) 
ti(s
0) for some ti 2 T. Assume that 4RMin(T)(s)  4RMin(T)(s0). Let fRMin(s) =
(x1; x2; : : : ; xm) and fRMin(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; ym). Since both fRMin(s) and fRMin(s0) are
ordered increasingly it follows that x1  x2  : : :  xm and y1  y2  : : :  ym. Suppose
that ti(s0) < ti(s) for every ti 2 T. But then y1 < x1. So fRMin(s0)  fRMin(s). But
then, by lemma 6.2, it follows that 4RMin(T)(s0)  4RMin(T)(s). Contradiction. So
ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
Proposition D.11 (6.21) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be infor-
mation tuples. Templated merging operation 4RMax satises properties (TM4 1) to
(TM4 5).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4RMax is based on indexing function fRMax :
S ! f0; 1; : : : ; ngm.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4RMax(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.19,
4RMax(T) is regular. But then bottom(4RMax(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4RMax(T)) =T
ti2T bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any
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s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fRMax(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0).
So card(seg(fRMax(s))) = 0, i.e. s 2 bottom(4RMax(T). Conversely, choose any
s 2 bottom(4RMax(T), i.e. 4RMax(T)(s) = 0. So card(seg(fRMax(s)) = 0, i.e. fRMax(s)
is the least element in ARMax. Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So
fRMax(s) 6= (0; 0; : : : ; 0). But T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s
such that ti(s0) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fRMax(s0) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0), i.e. fRMax(s0) is
the least element in ARMax. So fRMax(s0) = fRMax(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0). Contradiction. So
s 2 bottom(ti) for every ti 2 T, i.e. s 2
T
ti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fRMax be the rened indexing function with respect to T and f 0RMax
the rened indexing function with respect to T0. From denition 6.19 it is clear that
fRMax(s) = f
0
RMax(s) for every s 2 S. But then, 4RMax(T) = 4RMax(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then4RMax(T)(s) 
4RMax(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. Let
fRMax(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xm) and fRMax(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; ym). Since both fRMax(s) and
fRMax(s
0) are ordered decreasingly it follows that x1  x2  : : :  xm and y1  y2 
: : :  ym. But ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. So x1  y1. If x1 = y1 then x2  y2.
And so on. But then fRMax(s)  fRMax(s0). Hence, by lemma 6.2, it follows that
4RMax(T)(s)  4RMax(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4RMax(T)(s)  4RMax(T)(s0) then ti(s) 
ti(s
0) for some ti 2 T. Assume that 4RMax(T)(s)  4RMax(T)(s0). Let fRMax(s) =
(x1; x2; : : : ; xm) and fRMax(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; ym). Since both fRMax(s) and fRMax(s0) are
ordered decreasingly it follows that x1  x2  : : :  xm and y1  y2  : : :  ym. Suppose
that ti(s0) < ti(s) for every ti 2 T. But then y1 < x1. So fRMax(s0)  fRMax(s). But
then, by lemma 6.2, it follows that 4RMax(T)(s0)  4RMax(T)(s). Contradiction. So
ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
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Proposition D.12 (6.22) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be informa-
tion tuples. Templated merging operation4R satises properties (TM4 1) to (TM4 5).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4R is based on indexing function fR : S !
f0; 1; : : : ;m ngn.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4R(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.19,
4R(T) is regular. But then bottom(4R(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4R(T)) =
T
ti2T
bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fR(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0).
So card(seg(fR(s))) = 0, i.e. s 2 bottom(4R(T). Conversely, choose any s 2
bottom(4R(T), i.e. 4R(T)(s) = 0. So card(seg(fR(s)) = 0, i.e. fR(s) is the least
element in AR. Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So fR(s) 6= (0; 0; : : : ; 0).
But T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s such that ti(s0) = 0 for every
ti 2 T. But then fR(s0) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0), i.e. fR(s0) is the least element in ARMaj. So
fR(s
0) = fR(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0). Contradiction. So s 2 bottom(ti) for every ti 2 T, i.e.
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fR be the rened indexing function with respect to T and f 0R the rened
indexing function with respect to T0. From denition 6.19 it is clear that fR(s) = f 0R(s)
for every s 2 S. But then, 4R(T) = 4R(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then 4R(T)(s) 
4R(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. Let fR(s) =
(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) and fR(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; yn). But xj =
Pfti(s) j ti 2 T and ti(s) >
j   1g and yj =
Pfti(s0) j ti 2 T and ti(s0) > j   1g. Hence x1  x2  : : :  xn and
y1  y2  : : :  yn. But ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. So x1  y1. If x1 = y1 then
x2  y2. And so on. But then fR(s)  fR(s0). Hence, by lemma 6.2, it follows that
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4R(T)(s)  4R(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4R(T)(s)  4R(T)(s0) then ti(s)  ti(s0)
for some ti 2 T. Assume that 4R(T)(s)  4R(T)(s0). Let fR(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn)
and fR(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; yn). But xj =
Pfti(s) j ti 2 T and ti(s) > j   1g and yj =Pfti(s0) j ti 2 T and ti(s0) > j   1g. Hence x1  x2  : : :  xn and y1  y2  : : :  yn.
Suppose that ti(s0) < ti(s) for every ti 2 T. But then y1 < x1. So fR(s0)  fR(s).
But then, by lemma 6.2, it follows that 4R(T)(s0)  4R(T)(s). Contradiction. So
ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
Proposition D.13 (6.23) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Property
(TM4 6) is satised by templated merging operation 4 and 4R but not satised by
4Min, 4Max, 4RMin, and 4RMax.
Proof. Case 1: It must be shown that 4 and 4R satisfy property (TM4 6).
4: It must be shown that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4(Ttj ;k)(s)  4(Ttj ;k)(s0) then
tj(s)  tj(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S. If it holds that if 4(Ttj ;1)(s)  4(Ttj ;1)(s0)
then tj(s)  tj(s0) then it will hold for every k. So let k(s; s0) = 1. Otherwise, it holds
that if 4(Ttj ;1)(s)  4(Ttj ;1)(s0) then tj(s) > tj(s0). Let k(s; s0) = (4(Ttj ;k)(s0)  
4(Ttj ;k)(s)) + 2. But then 4(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0). So there exists a
k(s; s0) such that, for s; s0 2 S, it holds that if 4(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0) then
tj(s) > tj(s
0). By taking k to be the maximum of k(s; s0) for all 8s; s0 2 S, the result is
obtained.
4R: It must be shown that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if4R(Ttj ;k)(s)  4R(Ttj ;k)(s0) then
tj(s)  tj(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S. If it holds that if 4R(Ttj ;1)(s)  4R(Ttj ;1)(s0)
then tj(s)  tj(s0) then it will hold for every k. So let k(s; s0) = 1. Otherwise, it holds that
if 4R(Ttj ;1)(s)  4R(Ttj ;1)(s0) then tj(s) > tj(s0). Let k(s; s0) = (4R(Ttj ;k)(s0)  
4R(Ttj ;k)(s)) + 2. But then 4R(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4R(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0). So there exists a
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k(s; s0) such that, for s; s0 2 S, it holds that if 4R(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4R(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0)
then tj(s) > tj(s0). By taking k to be the maximum of k(s; s0) for all 8s; s0 2 S, the
result is obtained.
Case 2: It must be shown that 4Min, 4Max, 4RMin and 4RMax do not satisfy
property (TM4 6).
4Min: Let T = (t1; t2) be an info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g
and t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj = f(11; 4); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 4)g. So
fMin(11) = succ(minfti(11) j ti 2 Ttj ;kg) = 1 with respect to Ttj ;k for every k and
fMin(10) = succ(minfti(10) j ti 2 Ttj ;kg) = 1 with respect to Ttj ;k for every k.
Hence fMin(11) = fMin(10) with respect to Ttj ;k for every k. But then, by lemma
6.1, 4Min(Ttj ;k)(11) = 4Min(Ttj ;k)(10) for every k. But tj(11) = 4 and tj(10) = 0,
i.e. tj(11) > tj(10). So it does not hold that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4Min(Ttj ;k)(s) 
4Min(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0).
4Max: Let T = (t1; t2) be an info with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g and t2 =
f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj = f(11; 1); (10; 1); (01; 0); (00; 2)g. So fMax(00) =
maxfti(00) j ti 2 Ttj ;kg = 3 with respect to Ttj ;k for every k and fMax(01) = maxfti(01) j
ti 2 Ttj ;kg = 4 with respect to Ttj ;k for every k. Hence fMax(00) < fMax(01) with respect
to Ttj ;k for every k. But then, by lemma 6.1, 4Max(Ttj ;k)(00) < 4Max(Ttj ;k)(01) for
every k. But tj(00) = 2 and tj(01) = 0, i.e. tj(00) > tj(01). So it does not hold that 9k
s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4Max(Ttj ;k)(s)  4Max(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0).
4RMin: Let T = (t1; t2) be an info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g
and t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj = f(11; 4); (10; 2); (01; 0); (00; 1)g. So
fRMin(11) = (0; 0; 4) with respect to Ttj ;1 and fRMin(10) = (0; 1; 2) with respect to Ttj ;1.
Since tj(11) = max(fRMin(11)) and tj(10) = max(fRMin(10)) it follows that fRMin(11) 
fRMin(10) with respect toTtj ;k for every k. But first(fRMin(11)) < 4 and thus, by lemma
6.2, 4RMin(Ttj ;k)(11) < 4RMin(Ttj ;k)(10) for every k. But tj(11) = 4 and tj(10) = 0,
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i.e. tj(11) > tj(10). So it does not hold that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4RMin(Ttj ;k)(s) 
4RMin(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0).
4RMax: Let T = (t1; t2) be an info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g
and t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj = f(11; 4); (10; 2); (01; 0); (00; 1)g. So
fRMax(00) = (3; 1; 1) with respect to Ttj ;1 and fRMax(01) = (4; 2; 0) with respect to
Ttj ;1. Since tj(00) = min(fRMax(00)) and tj(01) = min(fRMax(01)) it follows that
fRMax(00)  fRMax(01) with respect to Ttj ;k for every k. But first(fRMax(00)) < 4 and
thus, by lemma 6.2, 4RMax(Ttj ;k)(00) < 4RMax(Ttj ;k)(01) for every k. But tj(00) = 1
and tj(01) = 0, i.e. tj(11) > tj(10). So it does not hold that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if
4RMax(Ttj ;k)(s)  4RMax(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0).
Proposition D.14 (6.24) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Property
(TM4 7) is satised by templated merging operations 4Min and 4Max, but not satised
by 4, 4RMin, 4RMax, and 4.
Proof. Case 1: It must be shown that 4Min and 4Max satisfy property (TM4 7).
4Min: t must be shown that 8tj 2 TE 8k 4Min(Ttj ;k) = 4Min(Ttj ;1). Let fMin;1(s)
and fMin;k(s) be the indexing functions with respect to information tuples Ttj ;1 and Ttj ;k
respectively. Choose any tj 2 TE. If tj(s) = ti(s) for every ti 2 T then fMin;1(s) =
t1(s) = tj(s). But then fMin;k(s) = t1(s) = tj(s) for every k, i.e. fMin;1(s) = fMin;k(s)
for every k. Otherwise fMin;1(s) = succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Ttj ;1g). But minfti(s) j ti 2
Ttj ;1g = minfti(s) j ti 2 Ttj ;kg for every k and thus succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Ttj ;1g) =
succ(minfti(s) j ti 2 Ttj ;kg) for every k, i.e. fMin;1(s) = fMin;k(s) for every k. So for
every s 2 S, fMin;1(s) = fMin;k(s) for every k. But then Min(Ttj ;k) = 4Min(Ttj ;1) for
every k. Since tj was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that4Min satises property (TM4 7).
4Max: It must be shown that 8tj 2 TE 8k 4Max(Ttj ;k) = 4Max(Ttj ;1) for 1  k 
n+1. Let fMax;1(s) and fMax;k(s) be the indexing functions with respect to information
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tuples Ttj ;1 and Ttj ;k respectively. Choose any tj 2 TE. Now fMax;1(s) = maxfti(s) j
ti 2 Ttj ;1g. But maxfti(s) j ti 2 Ttj ;1g = maxfti(s) j ti 2 Ttj ;kg for every k and thus
fMax;1(s) = fMax;k(s) for every k. So for every s 2 S, fMax;1(s) = fMax;k(s) for every
k. But then 4Max(Ttj ;k) = 4Max(Ttj ;1) for every k. Since tj was chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that 4Max satises property (TM4 7).
Case 2: It must be shown that4,4RMin,4RMax, and4RMaj do not satisfy property
(TM4 7).
4: Let T = (t1; t2) be an info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g
and t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj = f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. So
f(11) =
P
ti(11) j ti 2 Ttj ;1 = 1 with respect to Ttj ;1 and f(00) =
P
ti(00) j ti 2
Ttj ;1 = 4 with respect to Ttj ;1. Hence f(11) < f(00) with respect to Ttj ;1. But
then, by lemma 6.1, 4(Ttj ;1)(11) < 4(Ttj ;1)(00). For k = 5 it holds that f(11) =P
ti(11) j ti 2 Ttj ;5 = 5 with respect to Ttj ;5 and f(00) =
P
ti(00) j ti 2 Ttj ;5 = 4 with
respect to Ttj ;5. Hence f(00) < f(11) with respect to Ttj ;5. But then, by lemma 6.1,
4(Ttj ;5)(00) < 4(Ttj ;5)(11). So for k = 5 it holds that 4(Ttj ;5) 6= 4(Ttj ;1).
4RMin: Let T = (t1; t2; t3) be the info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g,
t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj =
f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. Since fRMin(00) = (0; 1; 1; 3) and fRMin(11) = (0; 0; 0; 1)
with respect to Ttj ;1 it follows that fRMin(11)  fRMin(00). But first(fRMin(11)) < 4
and thus, by lemma 6.2, 4RMin(Ttj ;1)(11) < 4RMin(Ttj ;1)(00). For k = 4 it is the
case that fRMin(00) = (0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 3) and fRMin(11) = (0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1) with respect to
Ttj ;4. But then fRMin(00)  fRMin(11) and hence, since first(fRMin(00)) < 4, it follows
by lemma 6.2 that 4RMin(Ttj ;4)(00) < 4RMin(Ttj ;4)(11). So for k = 4 it holds that
4RMin(Ttj ;4) 6= 4RMin(Ttj ;1).
4RMax: Let T = (t1; t2; t3) be the info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g,
t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj =
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f(11; 3); (10; 2); (01; 1); (00; 0)g. Since fRMax(00) = (3; 1; 1; 0) and fRMax(11) = (3; 0; 0; 0)
with respect to Ttj ;1 it follows that fRMax(11)  fRMax(00). But first(fRMin(11)) < 4
and thus, by lemma 6.2, 4RMax(Ttj ;1)(11) < 4RMax(Ttj ;1)(00). For k = 2 it is the
case that fRMax(00) = (3; 1; 1; 0; 0) and fRMax(11) = (3; 3; 0; 0; 0) with respect to Ttj ;2.
But then fRMax(00)  fRMax(11) and hence, since first(fRMax(00)) < 4, it follows
by lemma 6.2 that 4RMax(Ttj ;2)(00) < 4RMax(Ttj ;2)(11). So for k = 2 it holds that
4RMax(Ttj ;2) 6= 4RMax(Ttj ;1).
4R: Let T = (t1; t2; t3) be the info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g,
t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj =
f(11; 4); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. Since fR(11) = (4; 4; 4; 4) and fR(00) = (5; 3; 3; 0)
with respect to Ttj ;1 it follows that fR(11)  fR(00). But first(fR(11)) < 16 with
respect to Ttj ;1 and thus, by lemma 6.2, 4R(Ttj ;1)(11) < 4R(Ttj ;1)(00). For k = 2
it is the case that fR(11) = (8; 8; 8; 8) and fR(00) = (5; 3; 3; 0) with respect to Ttj ;2.
So fR(00)  fR(11). But first(fR(00)) < 20 with respect to Ttj ;2 and thus, by
lemma 6.2, 4R(Ttj ;2)(00) < 4R(Ttj ;2)(11). So for k = 2 it holds that 4R(Ttj ;2) 6=
4R(Ttj ;1).
D.3 Proofs for Section 6.6
Proposition D.15 (6.25) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be infor-
mation tuples. Templated merging operation 4Cont satises properties (TM4 1) to
(TM4 6) but fails to satisfy property (TM4 7).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4Cont is based on indexing function fCont :
S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4Cont(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.15,
4Cont(T) is regular. But then bottom(4Cont(T)) 6= ?.
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(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4Cont(T)) =T
ti2T bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then card(fti 2 T j ti(s) >
0g) = 0, i.e. fCont(s) = 0 and hence 4Cont(T)(s) = card(seg(0)). Since card(seg(0)) = 0
it follows that s 2 bottom(4Cont(T)). Conversely, choose any s 2 bottom(4Cont(T),
i.e. 4Cont(T)(s) = 0. So card(seg(fCont(s)) = 0, i.e. fCont(s) is the least element in
ACont. Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g) > 0,
i.e. fCont(s) > 0. But T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s such that
ti(s
0) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fCont(s0) = 0, i.e. fCont(s0) is the least element in
AMin. So fCont(s0) = fCont(s) = 0. Contradiction. So s 2 bottom(ti) for every ti 2 T, i.e.
s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fCont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg be the content-based indexing function with
respect to T and f 0Cont : S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mg the content-based indexing function with
respect to T0. From denition 6.22 it is clear that fCont(s) = f 0Cont(s) for every s 2 S.
But then, 4Cont(T) = 4Cont(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then4Cont(T)(s) 
4Cont(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. But then
card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g)  card(fti 2 T j ti(s0) > 0g), i.e. fCont(s)  fCont(s0). But
then, by lemma 6.1, it follows that 4Cont(T)(s)  4Cont(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4Cont(T)(s)  4Cont(T)(s0) then ti(s)  ti(s0)
for some ti 2 T. Assume that 4Cont(T)(s)  4Cont(T)(s0). Suppose that ti(s0) < ti(s)
for every ti 2 T. But then card(fti 2 T j ti(s0) > 0g)g < card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g), i.e.
fCont(s
0) < fCont(s). But then, by lemma 6.1, it follows that4Cont(T)(s0) < 4Cont(T)(s).
Contradiction. So ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
(TM4 6) It must be shown that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4Cont(Ttj ;k)(s)
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 4Cont(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S. If it holds that if
4Cont(Ttj ;1)(s)  4Cont(Ttj ;1)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0) then it will hold for every k. So
let k(s; s0) = 1. Otherwise, it holds that if4Cont(Ttj ;1)(s)  4Cont(Ttj ;1)(s0) then tj(s) >
tj(s
0). Let k(s; s0) = (4Cont(Ttj ;k)(s0) 4Cont(Ttj ;k)(s))+2. But then4Cont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) >
4Cont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0). So there exists a k(s; s0) such that, for s; s0 2 S, it holds that if
4Cont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4Cont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0) then tj(s) > tj(s0). By taking k to be maxi-
mum of k(s; s0) for all 8s; s0 2 S, the result is obtained.
(TM4 7) It must be shown that it is not the case that that 8tj 2 TE 8k4Cont(Ttj ;k) =
4Cont(Ttj ;1). Let T = (t1; t2) be an info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g
and t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj = f(11; 1); (10; 2); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. So
fCont(11) = card(fti 2 Ttj ;1 j ti(11) > 0g = 1 with respect to Ttj ;1 and fCont(00) =
card(fti 2 Ttj ;1 j ti(00) > 0g = 2 with respect to Ttj ;1. Hence fCont(11) < fCont(00)
with respect to Ttj ;1. But then, by lemma 6.1, 4Cont(Ttj ;1)(11) < 4Cont(Ttj ;1)(00). For
k = 5 it holds that fCont(11) = card(fti 2 Ttj ;5 j ti(11) > 0g = 5 with respect to
Ttj ;5 and fCont(00) = card(fti 2 Ttj ;5 j ti(00) > 0g = 2 with respect to Ttj ;5. Hence
fCont(11) > fCont(00) with respect to Ttj ;5. But then, by lemma 6.1, 4Cont(Ttj ;5)(11) >
4Cont(Ttj ;5)(00). So for k = 5 it holds that 4Cont(Ttj ;5) 6= 4Cont(Ttj ;1).
Proposition D.16 (6.27) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) and T0 = (t01; t
0
2; : : : ; t
0
m) be infor-
mation tuples. Templated merging operation 4RCont satises properties (TM4 1) to
(TM4 6) but fails to satisfy property (TM4 7).
Proof. Templated merging operation 4RCont is based on indexing function fRCont :
S ! f0; 1; : : : ;mgn.
(TM4 1) It must be shown that bottom(4RCont(T)) 6= ?. By proposition 6.19,
4RCont(T) is regular. But then bottom(4RCont(T)) 6= ?.
(TM4 2) It must be shown that if T is satisable, then bottom(4RCont(T)) =T
ti2T bottom(ti). Assume that T is satisable, i.e.
T
ti2T bottom(ti) 6= ?. Choose any
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s 2 Tti2T bottom(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fRCont(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0).
So card(seg(fRCont(s))) = 0, i.e. s 2 bottom(4RCont(T). Conversely, choose any s 2
bottom(4RCont(T), i.e. 4RCont(T)(s) = 0. So card(seg(fRCont(s)) = 0, i.e. fRCont(s)
is the least element in ARCont. Suppose that s =2 bottom(ti) for some ti 2 T. So
fRCont(s) 6= (0; 0; : : : ; 0). But T is satisable and hence there must be some s0 6= s such
that ti(s0) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then fRCont(s0) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0), i.e. fRCont(s0) is
the least element in ARCont. So fRCont(s0) = fRCont(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0). Contradiction. So
s 2 bottom(ti) for every ti 2 T, i.e. s 2
T
ti2T bottom(ti).
(TM4 3) It must be shown that if T  T0 then 4(T) = 4(T0). Assume that
T  T0. Let fRCont be the rened content-based indexing function with respect to T and
fRCont the rened content-based indexing function with respect to T0. From denition
6.19 it is clear that fRCont(s) = fRCont(s) for every s 2 S. But then, 4RCont(T) =
4RCont(T0).
(TM4 4) It must be shown that if ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T then4RCont(T)(s) 
4RCont(T)(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S such that ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. Let
fRCont(s) = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) and fRCont(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; yn). But xj = card(fti 2 T j
ti(s) > j   1g) and yj = card(fti 2 T j ti(s0) > j   1g). Hence x1  x2  : : :  xn and
y1  y2  : : :  yn. But ti(s)  ti(s0) for every ti 2 T. So x1  y1. If x1 = y1 then
x2  y2. And so on. But then fRCont(s)  fRCont(s0). Hence, by lemma 6.2, it follows
that 4RCont(T)(s)  4RCont(T)(s0).
(TM4 5) It must be shown that if 4RCont(T)(s)  4RCont(T)(s0) then ti(s) 
ti(s
0) for some ti 2 T. Assume that 4RCont(T)(s)  4RCont(T)(s0). Let fRCont(s) =
(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) and fRCont(s0) = (y1; y2; : : : ; yn). But xj = card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > j   1g)
and yj = card(fti 2 T j ti(s0) > j   1g). Hence x1  x2  : : :  xn and y1 
y2  : : :  yn. Suppose that ti(s0) < ti(s) for every ti 2 T. But then y1 < x1.
So fRCont(s0)  fRCont(s). But then, by lemma 6.2, it follows that 4RCont(T)(s0) 
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4RCont(T)(s). Contradiction. So ti(s)  ti(s0) for some ti 2 T.
(TM4 6) It must be shown that 9k s.t. 8s; s0 2 S, if 4RCont(Ttj ;k)(s)
 4RCont(Ttj ;k)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0). Choose any s; s0 2 S. If it holds that if
4RCont(Ttj ;1)(s)  4RCont(Ttj ;1)(s0) then tj(s)  tj(s0) then it will hold for every k.
So let k(s; s0) = 1. Otherwise, it holds that if 4RCont(Ttj ;1)(s)  4RCont(Ttj ;1)(s0)
then tj(s) > tj(s0). Let k(s; s0) = (4RCont(Ttj ;k)(s0)   4RCont(Ttj ;k)(s)) + 2. But then
4RCont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4RCont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0). So there exists a k(s; s0) such that, for
s; s0 2 S, it holds that if 4RCont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s) > 4RCont(Ttj ;k(s;s0))(s0) then tj(s) > tj(s0).
By taking k to be the maximum of k(s; s0) for all 8s; s0 2 S, the result is obtained.
(TM4 7) LetT = (t1; t2; t3) be the info tuple with t1 = f(11; 0); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 3)g,
t2 = f(11; 0); (10; 0); (01; 4); (00; 1)g, and t3 = f(11; 0); (10; 2); (01; 4); (00; 1)g. Let tj =
f(11; 4); (10; 1); (01; 2); (00; 0)g. Since fRCont(11) = (1; 1; 1; 1) and fRCont(00) = (3; 1; 1; 0)
with respect to Ttj ;1 it follows that fRCont(11)  fRCont(00). But first(fRCont(11)) < 4
with respect to Ttj ;1 and thus, by lemma 6.2, 4RCont(Ttj ;1)(11) < 4RCont(Ttj ;1)(00). For
k = 4 it is the case that fRCont(11) = (4; 4; 4; 4) and fRCont(11) = (3; 1; 1; 0) with respect
to Ttj ;4. So fRCont(00)  fRCont(11). But first(fRCont(00)) < 4 with respect to Ttj ;4
and thus, by lemma 6.2, 4RCont(Ttj ;4)(00) < 4RCont(Ttj ;4)(11). So for k = 4 it holds
that 4RCont(Ttj ;4) 6= 4RCont(Ttj ;1).
Proposition D.17 (6.28) Let T = (t1; t2; : : : ; tm) be an information tuple. Then the
following holds for each s 2 S:
1. s 2 ContD(4Cont(T)) i¤ s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T
2. if s 2 Cont0(4Cont(T)) then s 2 Cont0(ti) for some ti 2 T
3. s 2 ContD(4RCont(T)) i¤ s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T
4. if s 2 Cont0(4RCont(T)) then s 2 Cont0(ti) for some ti 2 T
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Proof. 1. Choose any s 2 ContD(4Cont(T)). Suppose there is some ti 2 T, say
tk, such that s =2 Cont0(tk). Since ContD(4Cont(T)) = top(4Cont(T)) it follows that
4Cont(T)(s) = n. So fCont(s) = m and card(ACont) 6= 1. But fCont(s) = card(fti 2
T j ti(s) > 0g) and thus tk(s) > 0. But Cont0(tk) = get(tk; 1; n), i.e. s 2 Cont0(tk).
Contradiction. So s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T. Conversely choose any s 2 S such
that s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T. But then ti(s) > 0 for every ti 2 T, i.e. card(fti 2
T j ti(s) > 0g) = m, i.e. fCont(s) = m. Now card(ACont) 6= 1 because otherwise
fCont(s
0) = m for every s0 2 S, i.e. no ti 2 T would be regular. So 4Cont(T)(s) = n, i.e.
s 2 top(4Cont(T)), i.e. s 2 ContD(4Cont(T)).
2. Choose any s 2 Cont0(4Cont(T)). Suppose for every ti 2 T, it holds that
s =2 Cont0(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g) = 0,
i.e. fCont(s) = 0. Since card(seg(fCont(s))) = 0 it follows that 4Cont(T)(s) = 0. But
then s =2 Cont0(4Cont(T)). Contradiction. So there must be some ti 2 T such that
s 2 Cont0(ti).
3. Choose any s 2 ContD(4RCont(T)). Suppose there is some ti 2 T, say tk,
such that s =2 Cont0(tk). Since ContD(4RCont(T)) = top(4RCont(T)) it follows that
4RCont(T)(s) = n. So first(fRCont(s)) = m and first(min(ARCont)) 6= m. But
first(fRCont(s)) = card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g). So tk(s) > 0. But Cont0(tk) =
get(tk; 1; n), i.e. s 2 Cont0(tk). Contradiction. So s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T.
Conversely choose any s 2 S such that s 2 Cont0(ti) for every ti 2 T. But then ti(s) > 0
for every ti 2 T, i.e. card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g) = m, i.e. first(fRCont(s)) = m.
Now first(min(ARCont)) 6= m because otherwise first(fRCont(s0)) = m for every s0 2 S,
i.e. no ti 2 T would be regular. So 4RCont(T)(s) = n, i.e. s 2 top(4RCont(T)), i.e.
s 2 ContD(4RCont(T)).
4. Choose any s 2 Cont0(4RCont(T)). Suppose for every ti 2 T, it holds that
s =2 Cont0(ti). So ti(s) = 0 for every ti 2 T. But then card(fti 2 T j ti(s) > 0g) = 0,
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i.e. fRCont(s) = (0; 0; : : : ; 0). So first(fRCont(s)) = 0. Since card(seg(fRCont(s))) = 0
it follows that 4RCont(T)(s) = 0. But then s =2 Cont0(4RCont(T)). Contradiction. So
there must be some ti 2 T such that s 2 Cont0(ti).
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